History and Hope

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd i

2/13/13 8:38 PM

I HA BOOK SERI ES

The International Humanitarian Affairs book series, edited by Kevin M. Cahill,
M.D., is devoted to improving the effectiveness of humanitarian relief programs.
With contributions by leading professionals, the books are practical guides to
responding to the many different effects of civil strife, natural disasters, epidemics,
and other crises. All books are available online at www.fordhampress.com. Books
marked with an asterisk are available in French translation from Robert Laffont
of Paris; books marked with a double asterisk are available in Spanish, German,
Arabic, and French.
Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, 2000*
Basics of International Humanitarian Missions, 2003*
Emergency Relief Operations, 2003*
Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action, 2003*
Human Security for All: A Tribute to Sergio Vieira de Mello, 2004
Technology for Humanitarian Action, 2004
To Bear Witness: A Journey of Healing and Solidarity, 2005*
Tropical Medicine: A Clinical Text, 7th edition, 2006
The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance, 2007
Even in Chaos: Education in Times of Emergency, 2010
Sudan at the Brink: Self-Determination and National Unity, F. D. Deng, 2010**
Tropical Medicine: A Clinical Text, 8th edition (Jubilee Edition), 2011*
More with Less: Disasters in an Era of Diminishing Resources, 2012
I I HA OCCASI ONAL PAP ERS

Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Abdirazak Haji Hussen, and
David Shinn, The Future of Somalia: Stateless and Tragic, 2004
Mark Malloch Brown, International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance, 2006
Francis Deng, Sudan: From Genocidal Wars to Frontiers of Peace and Unity, 2006
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., The University and Humanitarian Action, 2008
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., Romance and Reality in Humanitarian Action, 2008
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., Gaza: Destruction and Hope, 2009
Daithi O’Ceallaigh, The Tale Towards a Treaty—A Ban on Cluster Munition, 2010

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd ii

2/13/13 8:38 PM

History and Hope
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN READER

Edited by KEVIN M. CAHILL, M.D.

A J O I N T P UBL I C ATI O N O F F O RD H A M U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S A ND
TH E CE N TE R F O R I N TE R N A T IO N A L H U M A N IT A R IA N C O O P E R A T IO N
N E W YO R K 2 0 13

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd iii

2/13/13 8:38 PM

Copyright © 2013 The Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopy,
recording, or any other—except for brief quotations in printed reviews, without the prior
permission of the publisher.
Fordham University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs
for external or third-party Internet websites referred to in this publication and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Fordham University Press also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some
content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
History and hope : the international humanitarian reader / edited by Kevin M. Cahill, M.D.
— First edition.
pages cm. — (International humanitarian affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8232-5196-4 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-8232-5197-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Humanitarian assistance. 2. International relief. 3. Humanitarianism. I. Cahill, Kevin M.
HV544.5.H57 2013
361.2—dc23
2012046488
Printed in the United States of America
15 14 13 5 4 3 2 1
First edition
All royalties from this book go to the training of humanitarian workers.

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd iv

2/13/13 8:38 PM

For Herbert Allen, whose steady, generous support
of my clinical programs, research, and academic initiatives
has changed dreams and visions into realities

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd v

2/14/13 1:09 AM

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd vi

2/13/13 8:38 PM

Contents

Foreword
xi

LORD DAVID OWEN

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

xiii

Acknowledgments

xix

Introduction
1

KEVIN M. CAHILL, M.D.
PART I. HISTORY

Humanitarian Action in the Twenty-First Century:
The Danger of a Setback
14

PAUL GROSSRIEDER

Humanitarian Ethical and Legal Standards
26

MICHEL VEUTHEY

Humanitarian Vignettes
NICOLA SMITH AND LARRY HOLLINGWORTH

40

Humanitarian Response in the Era of Global Mobile
Information Technology
43

VALERIE AMOS

PART II. PRINCIPLES/VALUES

Neutrality or Impartiality
54

ALAIN DESTEXHE, M.D.

Torture
69

TIMOTHY W. HARDING, M.D.

vii

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd vii

2/13/13 8:38 PM

CONTENTS

Issues of Power and Gender in Complex Emergencies
84

JUDY A. BENJAMIN

Terrorism: Theory and Reality
97

LARRY HOLLINGWORTH

A Human Rights Agenda for Global Security
112

IRENE KHAN

PART III. EVOLVING NORMS

The Limits of Sovereignty
124

FRANCIS DENG

The Child Protection Viewpoint
140

ALEC WARGO

Preserving Humanitarian Space in Long-Term Conflict
155

PETER HANSEN

Humanitarian Action in a New Barbarian Age
169

DAVID RIEFF

PART IV. ACTORS

The Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the
United Nations and Its Secretary-General
178

BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

Initial Response to Complex Emergencies and Natural
Disasters
192

ED TSUI

The Peacekeeping Prescription
208

KOFI A. ANNAN

Reviving Global Civil Society After September 11
222

RICHARD FALK

The Academy and Humanitarian Action
235

JOSEPH A. O’HARE, S.J.

viii

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd viii

2/13/13 8:38 PM

CONTENTS

Government Responses to Foreign Policy Challenges
243

PETER TARNOFF

Disasters and the Media
255

JEREMY TOYE

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: Looking
Beyond the “Latest and Greatest”
270

CHRISTOPHER HOLSHEK

PART V. OPERATIONAL

Evidence-Based Health Assessment Process in Complex
Emergencies
288

FREDERICK M. BURKLE JR., M.D.

Teamwork in Emergency Humanitarian Relief Situations
303

PAMELA LUPTON-BOWERS

Education as a Survival Strategy: Sixty Years of Schooling
for Palestinian Refugees
320

SAM ROSE

What Can Modern Society Learn from Indigenous
Resiliency?
335

MARGARETA WAHLSTROM

PART VI. EXIT STRATEGIES

To Bind Our Wounds: A One-Year Post-9/11 Address
340

KEVIN M. CAHILL, M.D.

The Transition from Conflict to Peace
346

RICHARD RYSCAVAGE, S.J.

Humanitarianism’s Age of Reason
356

GHASSAN SALAMÉ

Healing with a Single History
370

RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE

ix

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd ix

2/13/13 8:38 PM

CONTENTS

PART VII. EPILOGUE

The Evolution of a Tropicalist
382

KEVIN M. CAHILL, M.D.

Disturb Us, O Lord
389

SIR FRANCIS DRAKE

Appendix: the IIHA Resource Library

391

Notes

393

List of Contributors

429

The Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation
and the Institute of International Humanitarian
Affairs

433

Index

435

x

CH00_FM_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p00i-xii.indd x

2/13/13 8:38 PM

Foreword
Lord David Owen

The pursuit of the goals of humanitarianism, whether through assistance or intervention, has no single way, follows no preconceived pattern. Almost by definition,
each experience is different. This means, more perhaps than in any other human
activity, that practitioners have to be ready to learn from experience and adapt to
circumstance.
As the editor of, contributor to, and inspiration of this much-needed book,
Kevin Cahill brings the insights of a clinician in tropical medicine and public health,
as well as those of an academic in humanitarian studies. Standing behind the book
are twelve volumes still with much relevance to present issues into which readers can
delve. The Introduction warns that humanitarian professionals have to “tread softly,
to offer change with great care. Attempts to introduce new methods and replace
timeworn approaches can be devastating, especially in times of crises, when a society
is extremely vulnerable and utterly dependent on strangers for the essentials of life.”
In the summer of 2012, the world watched as a horrendous civil war developed
in Syria with appalling humanitarian consequences, and international diplomacy,
hopefully only for a short time, died with it. Yet even amidst these troubled times,
this book is a testament to the humanitarian instinct which demands that we develop
better policies and improve our techniques, our delivery, and above all our understanding. What it also demonstrates is that the structures of humanitarian activity are
adjusting, evolving, and triumphing in many diverse and challenging surroundings.
The era of unbridled humanitarian intervention in support of human rights,
which began with saving the Kurds in Iraq in 1991, looks as if it has had its day and
that what happened over Libya could not be repeated over Syria. The circumstances
were very different, but the months-long deadlock in the Security Council carries a
warning, particularly for the five veto-carrying permanent members, that diplomacy
must never die.
An adjustment to the sweeping delegation of “all necessary powers,” in the language of Chapter 7 of the UN charter, was anyhow coming in the light of the mixed
success rates associated with the many interventions over the past twenty years.
xi
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Just as professional standards have been developed in the field and in academia
for humanitarian workers, so the Security Council is imposing through its voting structures limits on UN-authorized humanitarian interventions. Frustration,
locally and internationally, at these constraints abounds. But they are a natural and
inevitable tension that is certain to develop within the new humanitarian interpretation of the Charter.
Kevin Cahill and his distinguished fellow authors have distilled in this book
much wisdom of lasting value.
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Introduction
Kevin M. Cahill, M.D.

History and Hope: The International Humanitarian Reader is a compendium drawn
from some of the best chapters on various aspects of humanitarian assistance in a
series that I have written or edited for Fordham University Press since 2001, numbering twelve volumes to date. Books in the series are used in universities and training courses around the world.
Many fine essays by outstanding contributors could not be included in this
Reader because of the very real publishing restrictions of size and cost; nonetheless, this volume offers an unusually comprehensive overview of a complex and
multifaceted discipline. Most of the original chapters chosen have been shortened,
either by the authors or the editor, and much dated material was deleted. However,
many examples from the past were retained so that the opinions and observations
of the authors—all authorities who have worked in many of the great humanitarian
crises of the past half-century—have that ring of truth that can be conveyed only
by those with firsthand experience. Lessons learned from errors, and even failure,
often provide the foundation for better approaches in the future. Some chapters
have a brief addendum of two or three paragraphs to update the text, while several
authors chose to provide internal edits to accomplish the same goal.
History and Hope also represents the completion of a phase in an academic
program that was carefully conceived several decades ago. Didactic modules for
classroom and field were developed and implemented by colleagues who believed
we could distill our experiences from the harsh settings of humanitarian crises into
solid, practical, field-oriented courses that would be of university level quality.
Utilizing the book series, we have now trained more than two thousand candidates from 133 nations in the ever-evolving discipline of international humanitarian assistance.
The series began with Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, a
text that argued for recognition of the centrality of humanitarian action in foreign

1

CH00_Intro_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p001-012.indd 1

2/13/13 8:44 PM

KEVIN M. CAHILL, M.D.

policy, too often peripheral afterthoughts overshadowed by other national interests. The contributors utilized the methodology of public health in addressing the
softer discipline of diplomacy. The second volume in the series, Traditions, Values
and Humanitarian Action, was also a philosophic book assessing what influences
determine how both individuals and societies develop healthy—or destructive—
policies and practices in international humanitarian assistance. Both those volumes
provided solid foundations for the technical texts that followed.
The next two titles, Emergency Relief Operations and Basics of Humanitarian
Action, are self-explanatory. These books were primers that were needed as our
academic programs developed. The chapters reflect my strong conviction that the
practical challenges of disaster zones and refugee camps were proper subjects for
university study, and that our texts (and teachers) should be deeply grounded in
the harsh realities that are standard in complex emergencies.
The next volume in the series is the most personal. To Bear Witness: A Journey
of Healing and Solidarity is a compilation of some of my editorial pieces, unpublished lectures, short essays, and introductions to earlier books. I collected them,
searching for meaning and continuity, as a tribute to my wife, who was my partner
in a full life of humanitarian service. After she died, I reviewed our travels; at that
time I had worked in sixty-five countries, mostly in troubled areas, and she had
been with me on forty-five of those trips. We had a remarkably shared marriage for
forty-four years. This book has been widely reviewed, reprinted and translated; it is
an essential part of the series.
The following three books in the series provide more detailed information on
specific problems in humanitarian assistance. Human Security for All: A Tribute to
Sergio Vieira de Mello was conceived as a practical contribution to honor the memory of a good friend and colleague who had paid the ultimate price for attempting
to help those in humanitarian distress. Having attended numerous memorial services for Sergio, I felt that something more lasting was needed. Sergio had taught on
our courses and delivered an eloquent commencement address for our graduates.
He was the ultimate activist, and he deserved more than repetitive platitudes. I
organized an academic symposium that drew together many of his UN co-workers,
in which the President of Fordham University conferred on Sergio the first posthumous honorary doctorate in its 175-year history. The book is a practical, lasting
testament to a remarkable life.
Technology and Humanitarian Action evolved from my experience as Chief
Medical Advisor for Counterterrorism in the New York City Police Department.
Scientists associated with the Defense Advanced Research Policy Agency (DARPA)
impressed me greatly with their imaginative technologic proposals as we faced seri-
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ous biological, chemical, and radiation threats to our safety. As my contact with
these men and women deepened, I quickly realized how the intellectual and financial resources devoted to defense concerns dwarfed the attention given to the overwhelming, often intractable, problems that faced humanitarian workers. The book
is built on vignettes detailing practical challenges in complex emergencies, followed
by full chapters by DARPA scientists, most of whom had never considered applying their talents and techniques to the humanitarian field. Unfortunately, a decade
in technology is analogous to a century—or more—in the liberal arts, and most of
the chapters are now quite dated. I am sad to report that the vignettes, on the other
hand, have remained only too valid.
The seventh and eighth editions of Tropical Medicine: A Clinical Text reflect my
own professional background, as well as the cruel fact that in war zones and after
disasters more people usually die of the treatable—and usually preventable—diseases that are the subject of these textbooks. Although Tropical Medicine is primarily intended for doctors, nurses, and public health personnel, it has also been used
by nonmedical humanitarian workers whose duties require an understanding of
the basic life cycles and transmission patterns of epidemic diseases. The eighth edition of Tropical Medicine is a “Jubilee Edition,” reflecting its use in medical education for fifty years.
The next title in the series, The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance, derives from
my medical training. Taking the pulse—a basic diagnostic tool in medicine—is an
ancient and trusted clinical exercise. At the bedside the physician uses a gentle, tactile measurement to see if the patient has a strong and steady circulation or one that
is weak, irregular, thready, or even terminal. Taking the pulse is often the initial test
performed by a medical doctor trying to establish an objective record rather than
depending merely on a patient’s subjective complaints. The nature of the pulse may
lead to more refined studies, gradually building a foundation for rational therapy.
Trying to detect a pulse is often the final act for a physician in determining if life
has passed into death.
So, too, one can measure the pulse of humanitarian action today. In attempts to
diagnose some of the major current problems that afflict the humanitarian profession, it also offers prognoses—predicting a way forward. If one is to address human
suffering in the confusion that characterizes early complex humanitarian crises,
especially those in the developing world, then the etiologic significance of poverty
and ignorance, corruption and incompetence, and the all too often evil effects of religion and politics are areas of study as valid as the life cycles of microbes. Professionals
in humanitarian assistance must try to measure these factors constantly, just as one
carefully records the pulse on the bedside chart of a sick patient.

3
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Even in Chaos: Education in Times of Emergency and More with Less: Disasters
in an Era of Diminishing Resources were books developed during my capacity as
Chief Advisor for Humanitarian and Public Health Issues for three Presidents of
the United Nations General Assembly (PGA). The PGA is the most senior position
of the United Nations, and they reflect the interests of all 193 Member States. These
books became important parts of the legacies of the PGAs, and, as with the others
in the series, are used by policymakers, practitioners, and students in universities
around the world.
Books in the series are listed at the beginning of this volume. The full table of
contents of each book is available at www.fordham.edu/iiha. Seven of the texts are
available in French translations. Bernard Kouchner, the co-founder of Médecins
Sans Frontières and of Médecins du Monde and, later, Foreign Minister of France,
wrote Forewords for several of the books.
History and Hope is also a personal and professional culmination. I began
working among populations traumatized by conflict, natural or manmade disasters, more than fifty years ago. My dreams of and plans for how to do difficult
tasks better and how to create solutions to seemingly insoluble problems began in
refugee camps and slowly coalesced in the stimulating atmosphere of halls of higher
education. Preparing this anthology has allowed me to take stock of this particular
body of work and to assess the continuity of a struggle that will never be complete.
It is clear, at least to me, that there has been much progress in our efforts to
rationalize responses to the extreme challenges of delivering aid in complex humanitarian crises. An essential step was to create flexible structures through which both
field operations and teaching programs could be linked. Many decades ago, with
the practical help of former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s law firm, and with
the unequivocal support of Father Joseph O’Hare, S.J., then President of Fordham
University, we established both a charitable entity and an academic Institute. The
Center for International Humanitarian Cooperation (CIHC) is a public charity
founded by a small group of international diplomats and physicians who realized
that health and other humanitarian endeavors sometimes provide the only common ground for initiating dialogue, understanding, and cooperation among people and nations shattered by war, civil conflicts, and ethnic violence. The Founders
of the Center, some now deceased, included Secretary Vance, former UK Foreign
Minister Lord David Owen, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Lord
Paul Hamlyn, and John Cardinal O’Connor. We owe a great debt for their wise
guidance and generous support. The CIHC has been afforded full Consultative
Status by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at the United Nations. In
the United States, it is a fully approved charity by the Internal Revenue Service.

4
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The CIHC and its Directors have been deeply involved in trying to alleviate
the wounds of war in many areas. A CIHC amputee center for landmine victims in
Northern Somalia was developed to provide a simple, rapid, and inexpensive prosthetic program that could be replicated in other areas where there were almost no
health services. The center is still functioning in Northern Somalia, and the model
has been used in Mozambique and Afghanistan. In the former Yugoslavia, the
CIHC was active in prisoner and hostage release, as well as in providing legal assistance for human and political rights violations. It facilitated discussions between
combatants. The CIHC has provided staff support on the ground in crisis management in conflict zones in Iraq, East Timor, Indonesia, the Balkans, Palestine,
Albania, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia, Kenya, and other trouble spots.
The need to establish educational programs, as well as universally recognized
academic standards for humanitarian assistance workers, was early recognized
as urgent, and it soon became our top priority. To address this challenge, the
CIHC joined with Fordham University in New York City, creating an Institute
for International Humanitarian Affairs (IIHA). The essential, indeed indispensable, links between academia and humanitarian field operations are obvious in this
Reader and in the IIHA’s regular symposia and Occasional Papers.
The links are possibly most evident in our flagship course, the International
Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA), which is offered three times a year
in different locations around the world. This diploma program is offered under the
joint auspices of the CIHC, Fordham University, The Royal College of Surgeons in
Ireland, and the United Nations System Staff College. Other academic partners for
the IDHA have included the City University of New York, University of Geneva,
University of Liverpool, and the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine. It is a
highly intense, month-long residential course with twelve-hour days of lectures,
scenario exercises, and debates. The course was devised to simulate a humanitarian
emergency situation. Candidates are judged by strict academic criteria with weekly
oral and written exams. The average age of our candidates is thirty-eight, and most
of them have had significant field experience. They represent virtually every discipline working in humanitarian crises.
Today, our thousands of alumni work in almost every agency of the United
Nations and in most major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) around the
world. In addition, the IIHA at Fordham University offers a master’s degree in
International Humanitarian Action (MIHA) and an undergraduate International
Humanitarian Affairs minor program. The IIHA also offers many specialized training courses including, inter alia, humanitarian negotiations, international human
rights, humanitarian law, ethics accountability, and mental health in war zones.
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The IIHA is the sole academic center in the United States recognized as a full partner by NOHA, the consortium of universities coordinating teaching and research
in humanitarian assistance in Europe.
Total emergency relief aid spending has increased significantly in the last forty
odd years. In 1970 global emergency aid spending was less than $1 billion per year.
This figure began to rise sharply in the 1990s, and by 2010 annual spending was
more than $20 billion per year. The end of the Cold War, the subsequent proliferations of civil wars, and their consequent displacement crises in the 1990s certainly
suggest that this increase in spending was driven in part by a concomitant increase
in need. A decade into the twenty-first century, we are able to observe the “humanitarian international”—a vast complex of international organizations endeavoring
to deliver humanitarian assistance—as a globally powerful entity, with capabilities
and ambitions far beyond what existed in the early 1970s.
The rapid expansion of humanitarian aid has been accompanied by extensive
commentary on the successes and failures of relief and aid operations; on the delivery of goods and services; on the need for minimum standards; and on the need for
training and qualifications for aid workers. Professionalization and accountability
have been suggested time and again as panaceas for the persistent, significant flaws
in humanitarian responses to disasters and emergencies. Concerned individuals,
departments, and institutions dedicated to promoting professionalization and
accountability are clearly emerging. History and Hope provides them with a single
volume that details the major topics faced during this evolution.
It is difficult to describe the moment at which a new profession is recognized.
Historically, professions have emerged through a mixture of public and private
interests, associations between practitioners and academics, state institutions
and private ones. These processes are messy, time-consuming, and essential. At
Fordham University’s IIHA, our faculty has been engaged in this development for
decades, attempting to shape humanitarian practice while avoiding the pitfalls of
creating a system that benefits the professionals more than those it claims to serve.
Humanitarian assistance is a discipline that attracts men and women who, in
often-terrible situations, continue to strive for a better world. They have dreams
and visions, values and traditions, which have not been suppressed by many earlier
challenges. In fact, improvements in disaster prevention and response have often
come because of adversity. The improvements—the establishment of accepted
standards for shelter, food, protection, human rights, education, a code of ethics for
workers, and an emerging body of human rights and humanitarian law—have been
accomplished without abandoning the noble principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality that are the foundation for our work. One of the main dangers
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ahead, in my opinion, is that this very foundation may be destroyed because fiscal
concerns are subordinating humanitarian work to the political and military activities that accompany complex humanitarian crises.
When the United Nations Charter was drafted in 1945, there was but a single
mention of humanitarian affairs. Maybe understandably, in the horrifying afterglow
of World War II, the UN Charter focused mainly on human rights and the prevention of conflict. The full history of the United Nations, however, is far more nuanced
than the words of the Charter. While the Charter is almost silent on humanitarian
assistance, the deeds of the Organization speak for themselves. United Nations–led
relief operations actually predate the final signing of the Charter.
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) was its first
major international operation, offering critical help across the destroyed landscape
of Europe, addressing hunger and other needs of refugees as World War II was
winding down. Shortly, other agencies, such as UNICEF, UNRWA, and UNHCR,
became essential tools in the UN arsenal for disaster relief, and their mandates
grew—and changed—in response to the realities of the Cold War, superpower
politics, instant communications, and, later, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only
then was there a greater willingness on the part of the world community to identify
disaster zones and demand access to suffering populations.
The Charter has, as its foundation, the sovereignty of Member States. But
today, almost everyone recognizes that international humanitarian action often
requires moving across national borders in order to offer relief to victims. For that
very reason, humanitarians also contend that their work warrants respect for a
neutral—as opposed to political—space in which they can provide impartial assistance to all in need. There seems to be an inherent conflict in these views on sovereignty and intervention, at least as understood at the birth of the United Nations.
Since then there have been emerging concepts of the fundamental obligations of
States toward individual citizens, especially when it becomes clear to the international community that a State is not providing necessary basic assistance to those
in desperate need. This period of evolution in our understanding of the nature
of sovereignty, and the tensions that exist between those who favor intervention
over the absolute rights of the State, are ongoing. The Right to Protect (R2P) thesis
has been used to justify various humanitarian interventions (as, for example, in
Libya), but not without a growing concern about the limits and justifications for
such actions.
A further development at the United Nations, namely that the Organization
should deliver assistance “as one,” has inevitably increased the involvement
of political and military actors in what had previously been solely a traditional
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humanitarian domain. I believe there are serious dangers in such an approach,
since the humanitarian actor is almost always a minor partner, especially in financial terms, when compared with the budgets of military and peacekeeping operations. The goal of complete coordination of U.N. activity under one head in a complex humanitarian crisis sounds desirable from a fiscal and administrative point of
view. But it could well destroy the very freedom that made humanitarian assistance
unique and effective. There is almost certain to be significant resistance to this
approach in the international humanitarian community.
Humanitarian assistance is a noble undertaking. At an individual level it is as
old as mankind, with tales of generosity and compassion being part of the myths,
legends, and foundations of every society. As a formal discipline, however, the
organized response to the chaos and suffering that is an inevitable part of armed
conflicts, or extraordinary natural disasters, has very slowly evolved. In modern
times there has been a growing realization that both innocent victims and injured
combatants deserve protection. Henry Dunant’s attempt to establish neutral, “universal” space for humanitarian aid in 1859 in the midst of the Battle of Solferino is
often cited as the beginning of what we now accept as international humanitarian
law. The Geneva Conventions were later established to codify humankind’s rules
for the treatment of civilians and the injured, as well as for the behavior of combatants. The implementation of the Conventions has, sadly, been a tale of constant
exceptions and shameful interpretations.
At the close of the Cold War humanitarian assistance entered an era of enormous complexity, and it was ill prepared for the challenges that aid agencies faced.
There were no universally accepted standards for providing care in such dire situations. There were few comprehensive training programs; in fact, there was not even
a common vocabulary for guiding humanitarian workers. Academia was not part
of the solution, and its absence added to the problems.
More than three decades ago I insisted on a last-minute change in the title of
one of my books. I did not want the planned Threads in a Tapestry, but rather,
Threads for a Tapestry. I had to convince the publisher that the original title implied
that the tapestry was already completed, while I still see the tapestry of my life as
an ever-evolving one. Now, as I collect these written strands from the past, they are
offered not as a final compilation but as part of an ongoing effort to use the platform provided to an international physician, teacher, and humanitarian worker to
bear witness, especially in our privileged nation, to the sufferings and inequities
experienced by the downtrodden masses of the world. The plight of the poor, the
rights of the oppressed, the anguish and chaos of epidemics, and complex humanitarian crises have been my chosen fields.
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Emergency relief operations are the starting point for most international
humanitarian assistance programs. Wanton killing and brutality within supposedly
sovereign borders; ethnic and religious strife; millions of near-starving refugees;
other millions of migrants fleeing their homes out of fear for their lives; human
rights trampled down; appalling poverty in the shadows of extraordinary wealth;
inhumanity on an incredible scale in what was supposed to be a peaceful dawn
following the Cold War—these are the awesome challenges that face the world
community, and are quite different from the nation-state rivalries and alliances
that preoccupied statesmen during most of the last century. More and more, these
humanitarian crises are immediately known to us in an era of instant communications. They demand a response, and that response, to be effective, cannot be mere
compassion or sympathy but must reflect an emerging science and the strengths of
multiple partners.
It is often a dangerous and deceptive exercise to indulge in a “humanitarian
intervention,” implying that supplying food, water, shelter, or medical relief satisfies obligations when, in reality, such activities are often only a convenient way
for governments to avoid dealing with difficult underlying political problems. The
awareness that humanitarian aid can be a “band-aid” approach—satisfying but
ultimately futile—is a humbling but essential realization for those who accept leadership positions in the field.
Everything evolves and grows, or it stagnates and dies. This is clearly true in
nature, where plants and animals need to adapt constantly in order for their species
to survive. Our most profound thoughts also evolve, often very slowly, and sometimes coalesce into workable concepts only after prolonged gestation. It is also obvious that the philosophic, economic, and even religious bases of civilization change
in response to unforeseen challenges, sometimes influenced by new technology and
knowledge, often in reaction to failures. The semantic specificity that is expected in
medicine is equally necessary in disaster management. “Humanitarian crises” are
rarely the result of just a failure of the humanitarian system. Solutions, therefore,
will not be found by merely addressing unmet humanitarian needs.
Slowly but steadily, such philosophic observations led me more and more
deeply over time into the uncharted seas that influence complex humanitarian
crises. Some factors—medical, demographic, epidemiologic, logistical—are easily
measured, and an effective response can usually be formulated. Yet it is those less
definable, more subjective forces that so often determine the course of events. As in
human relations, it is usually the subtle, but utterly essential, influences of natural
empathy and understanding; a respect for the diversity of humanity; an appreciation of others’ values and customs; a willingness to cooperate, and share; and the
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courage to give and to love that most often provide the critical defining balance
between success and failure.
Professionals in humanitarian assistance must approach those in pain in a nonjudgmental manner. They learn to leave behind their pride and preconceptions and
to sublimate their own interests and agendas in an act of solidarity with refugees
and displaced persons who need their help. One learns to tread softly, to offer
change with great care. One quickly finds that existing customs and practices in
any community, even in the chaos of a refugee camp, must not be altered without
consultation and deliberation. The ways of a people, sometimes quite incomprehensible to one trained in a Western scientific system, are ultimately that group’s
own precious heritage and protection. Attempts to introduce new methods and
replace timeworn approaches can be devastating, especially in times of crises, when
a society is extremely vulnerable and utterly dependent on strangers for the essentials of life.
These personal observations were the primary genesis of the International
Humanitarian Book Series. For many decades I have been privileged to work in
remote areas among people far removed from the effects, good and bad, of modernity. The more I traveled, read, and participated in the daily lives of isolated clans
and communities, the more convinced I was that the richness of humanity lay in
its incredible diversity. I do not share the belief that there is only one right way—
whether that is how to rule, or how to worship, or court a mate, or establish a
family, or express love, or even how to die. Any diminution in that diversity diminishes all of us. Attempts to homogenize the world, to impose uniform standards of
behavior, to stifle differences of opinion and style, to impose restrictions on customs and practices because they are different from our own are regressive, usually
destructive, acts. The biologic world thrives in its complexity, and artistic creativity
flourishes best when there are multiple stimuli.
Humanitarian workers, if they are to be effective, must be realists. They deal
every day with the cruel facts of human suffering, and no amount of rhetoric can
alleviate pain or provide sustenance in times of widespread natural or manmade
crises. The most indispensible resource in disaster preparedness and response is
trained personnel. Education is a manifestation of society’s belief that somehow,
someday, somewhere there will be a life after the near death that is reality for so
many innocent victims in conflict and postconflict situations.
Only the university can provide the legitimacy and credibility needed in a
new world where globalization and international regulations guide all our actions,
including the provision of disaster relief. Only a university, empowered by government departments of education, can confer degrees and diplomas. This is abso-
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lutely critical for a discipline such as humanitarian assistance, where multiple skills,
mandates, and qualifications must be brought under the same umbrella. By its very
nature, experts in humanitarian work must be recognized as such by many nations,
since those afflicted by war and disaster flee across borders seeking safe havens in
neighboring lands.
The university has become an essential partner in international humanitarian assistance. Untrained workers are now rarely accepted, even as volunteers, by
major NGOs and reputable international organizations. An academic diploma in
humanitarian assistance has become a sine qua non as relief workers increasingly
move from the UN and national relief agencies to the private sector and back. The
imprimatur offered by a highly respected, university diploma, based on practical
experience, is now appreciated around the world. History and Hope is a result of the
long struggle to link academia and humanitarian action.
Ultimately, preserving “humanitarian space” will be imperative. Only the education of a committed cadre of trained professionals will be able to secure the traditions of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. In this Reader the history and
hope of that endeavor seem, to me, to blend and rhyme into a poetic and noble
assertion, one of undoubted reality but softened by the romance of universal love.
The seeds of experience will, we hope, be allowed to blossom into wisdom. Future
generations will have to continue the endless effort to relieve unnecessary suffering
and promote universal justice and peace. History and Hope should help guide the
way forward. That surely is my intent.
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PART I

History

History and Hope opens, appropriately, with an essay on the modern history of
humanitarian action, and a chapter detailing the ethical and legal foundations of
the discipline. Both cite the dangers that recent trends, particularly the “war on
terror,” pose to hard won, almost universally accepted, positions assuring the independence of international humanitarian assistance.
One of the books in the series, Technology for Humanitarian Action, was considered innovative and advanced when published in 2005. But, as already noted,
nothing changes faster than the science of modern technology. Each chapter in that
book was introduced by a vignette describing the reality faced by a humanitarian
fieldworker. Two vignettes introduce a more current contribution by the head of
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs emphasizing the importance of technology as we struggle to provide assistance in complex
emergencies.
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Humanitarian Action in the Twenty-First Century:
The Danger of a Setback
Paul Grossrieder

Humanitarian action as envisaged by Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross
Movement, is both simple—it is based on the natural human tendency to respect
a fellow human—and original—Dunant wished to apply that common sense principle in systematic fashion, even in war.
A fleeting glance at the past will help us appreciate what was original about
humanitarian action as conceived by Dunant, why it goes beyond good intentions
or mere charity. Until September 11, 2001, there was no reason to believe that the
international community would be tempted by a simplistic view of the world to
roll back the concept of humanitarian action that was born with the Red Cross. I
do not wish to indulge in facile anachronisms, but will retrace the development of
humanitarian idea and action and highlight the challenges as well as the risks of the
twenty-first century for humanitarian action.

Ancient Greece (Fifth Century BCE)
War had limits for only some members of humanity. The extent to which the
Greeks humanized war can only be understood in the light of their society’s division into city-states, competition between which was natural and gave rise to regular conflicts in an attempt to establish which was the best. Fighting between cities of
the same culture and the same religion was governed by unwritten rules (agraphoi
nomoi). The city that lost was always at a disadvantage, but the victor had to respect
limits to its conduct with regard to captives. Those rules were not a form of international law, however, as they applied only between Greek city-states, whereas there
was no limit to the acts of violence that could be carried out against the enemy in
wars between Greeks and barbarians (non-Greeks).
Ancient Greece therefore witnessed the first, very partial endeavor to use rules
of law to regulate certain conflicts between Greek city-states. Whether or not those
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unwritten rules applied depended not on one’s condition as a human being, but on
one’s membership in Greek civilization.

Religion and Respect for Human Beings
On the one hand, all the world’s great religions (primitive religions, Judaism,
Christianity,1 Islam, the religions of the Far East) recommend that their followers
treat other human beings with respect; on the other hand, each religion is linked
to a people, to a culture (or is imposed on others as a culture), and the notion of
universality is therefore absent. In addition, violence is often a part of religious
behavior, carried out to defend a god or a truth. In any event, it makes sense for
every religion to consider itself the best, otherwise why believe? In most past and
present conflicts, religious communities have identified with one of the parties to
the conflict. The conflicts in the Balkans have provided ample proof of this, but the
same thing has happened in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sri
Lanka, and in many other countries in conflict. It was therefore not religions that
originated and promoted the founding ideas of humanitarian law, neither in the
distant past nor in modern times.

Christianity since the Middle Ages: Love, Compassion, Charity
Since the Middle Ages and until the twenty-first century, the notions of love, compassion, and charity, and the activities based on them, evolved principally along
two lines:
1. One tradition used love, compassion and charity to fight the established powers.
In the face of the self-assigned privileges of the rich and powerful, men such as
Francis of Assisi (twelfth century), Joachim de Flore (fourteenth century), and,
later, Giordano Bruno (sixteenth century) branded those notions as weapons
in defense of the poor and the underprivileged. In some cases, their struggles
ended in social and political revolt.
2. In another tradition, represented chiefly by the institutional church, those
notions were applied only in respect of the faithful who followed the right
path. In that case, nothing took precedence over the established order; charity toward the poor was a means of maintaining that order and a requirement
for salvation, but had no intrinsic value. It can even be said that this tradition
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substituted charity for justice. Charity was the pretext for not dispensing the
justice that could undermine the power of the rich and mighty. This tradition’s purpose was to maintain and uphold a political and social order that was
unconcerned by equal rights and used charity to contain any hint of rebellion
on the part of the lower classes. In that context, the idea of universal humanitarianism had no scope to develop.
The dichotomy between the two traditions prevailed throughout Western
Christian culture until the nineteenth century and constituted the political leitmotif of that period.

The Premises of the Modern Humanitarian Idea
A Christian Exception: St. Vincent de Paul
In the seventeenth century, St. Vincent de Paul adopted a systematic approach
to poverty in France, with a view to its eradication. To that end, he established
two structures, or religious orders: the Daughters of Charity and the Lazarists. St.
Vincent de Paul’s approach was original in that it tackled poverty as a social phenomenon and established structures to remedy it.
Unfortunately, the system was appropriated by Louis XIV, or more specifically
his wife, Maria Teresa of Austria. St. Vincent de Paul’s humanitarian endeavor was
turned into “internment houses” run by the police, spelling a sad end to a pioneering humanitarian effort and protecting the hierarchical order of the time.

The Concept of “Humanity”
During that period—between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries—Europe
awakened to the revolutionary idea of a human being as an individual (Descartes,
Spinoza, Kant, Marx, etc.). Whereas Christian charity as it had evolved in Western
societies was compatible with social inequality, the modern concept of “humanity” considered every man and woman as equally “human.” Without a doubt, the
philosophical development of the concept of humans as individuals fostered the
sociological advent of the demand that all men and women be treated equal, and
hence the idea that any person, no matter what his social status, was entitled to
respect without discrimination.
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The First “Humanitarian” Operations (Late Eighteenth to Early Nineteenth Centuries)
1793: relief operation for French aristocrats forced to flee Santo Domingo during a slave uprising;
1812: earthquake in Caracas: the United States organized assistance by boat;
1821: aid for the Greeks (only) during their war against the Turks

Humanitarian action in time of war initially took the form of medical services
provided by the armed forces for their troops. Those who pioneered such services
were Ambroise Pare (sixteenth century) and Baron Larrey (1766–1842).
The eighteenth century saw the conclusion of the first agreements between
combatants for the reciprocal use of hospitals.
1743: Battle of Bethingen—agreement between the Marshall of Noailles (France) and
Lord Sain (England)

1759: Seven Years War—agreement between General de Barail and Henry Seymour Conway
Henry Dunant and Solferino
The Battle of Solferino in the Italian War of Unification (1859) marked a decisive
moment in the modern concept of humanitarianism, thanks first to Henry Dunant
and, subsequently, to the Red Cross in general and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) in particular. Dunant and the Committee of Five “invented”
the principles that underpin humanitarian action to this day. They are based on
three fundamental ideas:
The basic idea: A universal space, that of the victim, that respects the neutrality
of the victims of war. Henceforth, aid would not be limited to one’s own wounded
but would be extended to all the victims. As Henry Dunant wrote in A Memory of
Solferino: “The women of Castiglione, seeing that I made no distinction between
nationalities, followed my example, showing the same kindness to all these men
whose origins were so different, and all of whom were foreigners to them. ‘Tutti
fratelli,’ they repeated feelingly” (ICRC, 1986).
The second original idea: Those helping the victims must be part of the same
space, the space of humanity. Humanitarian agents help all the victims as members of one humanity. To give effect to this idea, an independent organization,
untainted by any military or political commitment, was founded; it was the
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voice of humanity in the midst of armed conflict. It soon came to be called the
Red Cross.
The third original idea: At a time when all man’s laws apparently ceased to exist
when fighting broke out, Henry Dunant created a space for a contract. Certain laws
could be applied universally even in the heat of battle. International humanitarian
law was born. In 1865, the States signed the Geneva Convention for the protection
of the war wounded, an international treaty that defined a legal space for humanitarian aid.
Thus, Henry Dunant and the Red Cross laid the foundations of contemporary
humanitarian action, which seeks to treat enemies hors de combat as equals in
humanity.

Contemporary Periods of Humanitarian Action
World War I
Previously a legal and moral authority, the ICRC—and the entire Red Cross—had
now to start taking action. The First World War was different from wars of the
nineteenth century in that it was total. It involved countries, economies, and populations on an unprecedented scale. The Red Cross was obliged to demonstrate that
the principles and rules laid down in the law of war were applicable.
The ICRC went from being a moral and legal authority to an operational organization. Its main fields of action were prisoners of war, repatriations, and tracing
activities. Forty-one delegates visited fifty-four prisoner-of-war camps. They repatriated a total of 700,000 prisoners; 1,200 volunteers worked at the International
Prisoners-of-War Agency in Basel, restoring ties between prisoners and their families. Two million parcels were sent to prisoners.
In 1917, the ICRC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
The Period between the Two World Wars
The first problem was practical in nature: What was to be done with the enormous
infrastructure set up during the First World War? The fight against tuberculosis
was one of the operations undertaken during this period. A Red Cross poster proclaimed: “Beat the Germans, beat tuberculosis.”
There then arose a political problem, for after the First World War, pacifism
became a force to be reckoned with (President Wilson, Treaty of Versailles, the
League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact). War was to be outlawed.
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In order to deal with these two problems, the Red Cross organized itself into
two international institutions. At the instigation of the President of the American
Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies was established; it would be responsible for peacetime activities. The ICRC would specialize in wartime operations,
and in humanitarian law and its dissemination.
During the same period, the Save the Children Fund (1919) and the precursor
of a High Commission for Refugees (1921) were also established. Both organizations would deal with peacetime issues arising from war.

World War II
For the Red Cross, and in particular the ICRC, this war was marked by the questions and issues posed by totalitarian regimes (Bolshevism, Nazism).
Those regimes manipulated humanitarian aid for their own purposes. In 1921,
for example, the USSR had demanded total control of the humanitarian assistance
provided to the famine-stricken population of the Ukraine. Under the pressure of
public opinion, the Western countries had caved in to its demands.
The Second World War also brought to light shortcomings in international
humanitarian law. Specifically, it became apparent during the war in Spain (1936)
that humanitarian law did not cover non-international conflicts. Nor did it afford
protection to civilians in time of war.
Moreover, the totalitarian regimes, which rejected the international system of
the League of Nations, also ignored humanitarian law.
The ICRC, for its part, strengthened by its success during the First World War,
approached the humanitarian issues of World War II as though they were a repetition of the first. It focused almost exclusively on prisoners of war. Blinded by its
operational approach, concerned to safeguard its activities, the ICRC made the
tragic decision not to deal with civilians or the Holocaust. There were several heroic
exceptions, the result of initiatives taken by certain delegates in the field. The most
spectacular example was Friedrich Born, who saved an estimated 15,000 Jews in
Hungary from the death camps.
The Postwar Period
After the Second World War and the horrors committed by the Nazis, the world
felt the need to do all in its power to make sure such crimes were never again committed. In that atmosphere of widespread remorse, numerous associations were
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founded to help the populations of Europe, especially in the United States and
among the religions communities (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish): the International
Rescue Committee (IRC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Services
(CWS), the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), CARE, Oxfam, to name but a few.
It was also during this period that most of the United Nations specialized agencies were founded; that the Geneva Conventions were renegotiated to include common Articles 1 and 3, and that the Fourth Convention, on the protection of civilians, was adopted. These new international instruments explicitly recognized that
the ICRC was an “impartial humanitarian organization.”
Finally, the Refugee Convention was adopted in 1951.
This was a heady period for humanitarianism, for society and public opinion
were eager to correct the serious mistakes of the Second World War.

The Cold War and Humanitarian Action: The Limits Set by Ideology
The universal, independent, neutral, and impartial approach was severely tested by
the growing ideological tension and deepening cold war between the East and West
blocs. On the one hand, the Soviet Union did not agree to apply humanitarian law
and its principles in the countries and regions within its sphere of influence;2 on the
other, the West included the law in its arsenal of weapons against the East bloc. All
this took place against a backdrop of public will to do good.
During the same period, the widespread struggle for decolonization brought
humanitarian organizations face-to-face with liberation movements and the peoples under their control. Generally speaking, the organizations belonged to one of
two schools:
Those influenced by the analyses on inequality and anti-imperialism (F. Fanon,
S. Amin),3
Those guided by the position of American economist W. Rostow: that poverty fostered
the spread of communism.

In the face of these global developments, of the rise and proliferation of liberation movements (the PLO, UNITA, the Sandinistas, RENAMO, etc.), how was the
ICRC, the guardian of humanitarian law, to react? How should the law and practice
be adapted to encompass these “new conflicts?” How could the basic principles and
rules be recognized as applying to the victims of those conflicts? How could the
ICRC contact all the parties? Obtain access to all the victims? These questions were
the subject of protracted debate, and, in the end, the ICRC decided to adapt the law
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to the changed situation. That adaptation in no way signified that Henry Dunant’s
humanitarian principles were to be abandoned, but rather that their field of application was to be enlarged. The ICRC’s decision resulted, in 1977, in the adoption of
the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions.
At the same time, the “borderless” movement was launched as a different
approach to the same issues. Doctors seconded to the ICRC by France during the
Biafra war, deemed the organization’s methods poorly adapted, too rigid and legalistic, to bound up with the authorities, and founded Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF,
Doctors Without Borders) in 1968.
This new kind of humanitarian organization was set up to counter the ICRC,
to circumvent the constraints of humanitarian law, which were seen as an obstacle
to humanitarian action. Unfettered by diplomatic and legal considerations, MSF
found it easy to be ironical about the timid approach of the Red Cross and the
cowardice of the Untied Nations. It has covered interesting ground since then, for
today MSF is one of the most fervent defenders of humanitarian law and has published a highly accessible handbook, the most complete manual for humanitarian
practitioners in existence.
MSF and the organizations founded on the same model have a number of
strengths and limitations. One of MSF’s strengths is that it is a private association
conducting private operations, which are therefore very independent and free. Its
staff tends to go on brief but intense missions, and its operational policy is characterized by enormous flexibility.
In terms of limitations, MSF’s political choices, especially during the early years
of its existence, prevented it from being impartial (for example, in Afghanistan during the Soviet period, when MSF doctors sided with the mujaheddin). The covert
nature of certain activities precluded the development of systematic, large-scale
operations.
Things have changed now. MSF’s methods are much closer to those of the
ICRC, and the ICRC has followed in MSF’s footsteps and adopted a more informal
style. What remains particularly different is the duty to bear witness, by which MSF
staff members are bound, whereas ICRC delegates must follow a policy of discretion,
chiefly in order to obtain access to places of detention and prisoner-of-war camps.
The 1980s: The Proliferation of Conflicts on the Periphery: “Le Tout-urgence”
The wars of liberation were followed by what Jean-Christophe Rufin called conflicts on the periphery. These were waged within the context of a return to the
Roman limes policy, in which “imperial” interests did not extend beyond the limits
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of a concentric circle outside which war and chaos were allowed to rage. This new
form of conflict was contemporaneous with the “dissolution of the bipolar order.”4
The proliferation of bloody and spectacular periphery conflicts, involving little
activity on the part of the superpowers (Sri Lanka, Ethiopia, Cambodia) signaled
a return to urgency. Humanitarian agents played on the emotions and troubled
conscience of people in the West. This period of absolute urgency had its downside, as well. Were we feeding the victims or feeding war? Certain leaders, such
as Mengistu in Ethiopia in 1995, considered it judicious, for reasons of internal
politics, to foment disaster.

After the Cold War: Humanitarian Action in Spite of Everything
The fall of the Berlin Wall sparked somewhat rash predictions that conflicts on the
periphery would end and humanitarians would be out of a job. In fact, the number
of regional and local conflicts rose (Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the
Balkans). The anarchic and chaotic nature of those conflicts made them extremely
dangerous and rendered humanitarian work hugely complex, as it became more
and more difficult to have access to the victims for security reasons. This period was
marked by the almost total withdrawal of external political support for local wars.
As a result, armed movements replaced their political partners with economic partners and embarked on business activities, at times forming alliances with private
commercial firms. They also started to exploit territory or to plunder the population. They became incredibly diverse in nature.
In those circumstances, the plight of the civilian population became increasingly perilous (witness the famines in southern Sudan and Somalia). The ICRC,
UNHCR, and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) all mobilized to provide emergency aid on an unprecedented scale.

Enter the States: The Politicization of Humanitarian Action
That situation—the proliferation of local conflicts and the growing number of
victims who suffered as a result—was compounded in 1990 when the states burst
on the humanitarian scene. During the Cold War, direct state intervention had
been justified by the fight against “the other side.” That justification wore thin
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and when the international community decided,
at the behest of the Americans, to intervene in Kuwait, it invoked defense of the
law. Those grounds soon proved insufficient. The concept of “peacekeeping,” with
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its humanitarian veneer, was then advanced. Most “peacekeeping” operations had
no clear political or military objective and in fact, troops were deployed for no
purpose other than to facilitate the arrival of relief supplies for civilians or to bring
in those supplies themselves. That is what happened in 1991 in Kurdistan (United
Nations General Assembly resolution 688, 1991), and subsequently in Somalia, the
former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.
Those interventions were the tangible expression of the right to intervene. They
were generally not well received by those concerned, who saw in them the risk
of a new form of legal domination by the north over the south, by the rich over
the poor. In practice, those so-called humanitarian interventions were not without
political ulterior motives, and were thus selective.
Those interventions also served to heighten the confusion between humanitarian endeavor and military operations. In Somalia, the ambiguous mandate of
the allied forces led them to become just another belligerent and resulted in their
precipitate withdrawal. In Yugoslavia, international troops undertook humanitarian action while the population was decimated by a siege. In Rwanda, United
Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNA-MIR) was not allowed to bring in
more troops and the genocide could not be stopped. Confining the blue helmets
to a humanitarian role gave rise to confusion. “How long will our governments
persist in their hypocrisy?” Claude Malhuret wrote in Le Monde on August 20,
1992. “Incapable of deciding on a course of action, which they know public opinion demands, they instead get involved, to show that they are ‘doing something,’
in humanitarian assistance that does nothing to remedy the basic problem. How
much longer will they try to make us believe that humanitarian action can take the
place of political action?”
In reality, there is a wide gap between military humanitarian action and the
principles promoted by Henry Dunant. In particular, confusion between what
is military and what is humanitarian voids the principle that the victim and the
humanitarian agent are neutral, which remains the sine qua non condition for the
existence of a humanitarian space. The principle of neutrality cannot be implemented by soldiers, only by independent humanitarian organizations.

Post-9/11: The Risk of a Further Drift
The attacks of September 11, 2001, against the twin towers of New York’s World
Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., naturally represent a paradigm shift in international relations. They open a new phase in humanitarian
action and present a major challenge to international humanitarian law.
23
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Following the attacks, the United States decided to launch a “war against terrorism” that, to date, has taken the form of a war against Afghanistan and a pitiless
international fight against terrorism and terrorists.
We are therefore faced with two different phenomena, even though they occasionally overlap. On one hand, we have an international war in Afghanistan in
which the Geneva Conventions, in particular the Third Convention, apply. On the
other hand, another struggle of another kind is being carried out against an international network (Al Qaeda); the American administration calls this a “war against
terrorism.” It in no way resembles traditional warfare and raises entirely new issues
for humanitarian law.
It goes without saying that we must first affirm that humanitarian law is applicable in the international, American-Afghan conflict, and that it must be implemented as closely as possible to the terms of the Geneva Conventions. Strictly
speaking, however, humanitarian law is not applicable in the “war against terrorism.” We are nevertheless entirely justified in wondering how to classify the situation. In principle, it is a kind of police operation, but President Bush did call it a
“war,” and the means employed to wage it are indeed reminiscent of war. In addition, the parties represent a break with tradition in that one of them is transnational
and transstate. But it is that sufficient reason to remove this new kind of war from
the purview of humanitarian law, whose specific aim is to help and protect the
victims of war?
In any event, the first step is to demand compliance with the existing provisions of humanitarian law where they are applicable and to do everything possible
to ensure that the law does not crumble under political pressure. At the same time,
the possibility to act must be ensured. Last, humanitarians must ponder the new
challenges and deal with them.
Today, as during the bleakest period of the Cold War, there is a real and present danger that humanitarian law will suffer a setback, its principles subordinated
to political interests. We must not allow that to happen, we must hark back to the
origins of the law and ensure that the interests of the victims reign supreme.

Conclusion
The definition of humanitarianism and its history reveal an original notion dating
from the Enlightenment and Henry Dunant: that humanity takes precedence over
war, over politics, race, and religion. The concept of humanitarianism, moreover,
has been incorporated into an international corpus of law. The principles must at
all costs be preserved so that the victims can continue to be protected and assisted.
24
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The twenty-first century has started with doubts about the law and the Geneva
Conventions. Giving in to those doubts would be an unforgivable setback for
humanity. Yes, we can become more professional; certainly, the different stages of
humanitarian endeavor, from prevention to development, can be more fully integrated with one another. But the first requirement of humanitarianism is and will
remain independence and freedom. All else is a matter of method, logistics, and the
management of security constraints.
It would be disgraceful indeed if the twenty-first century laid open to question the principles laid down in the nineteenth, notably that humanitarian action
aims first and foremost to restore man’s lost dignity, with no economic or strategic
ulterior motives.
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Humanitarian Ethical and Legal Standards
Michel Veuthey

There is a need for the implementation of existing ethical and legal standards,1 especially regarding the fundamental guarantees of human life and dignity.
International instruments of human rights and of international humanitarian
law are not the only sources providing these fundamental guarantees.2 International
law is only one of the many sources of humanitarian standards. Legal mechanisms
alone are insufficient to provide for an effective protection of fundamental human
values. Many different approaches can contribute to the promotion of respect for
fundamental human values in today’s conflicts. Historical considerations, including spiritual and ethnic research,3 could also be among the remedies for today’s
impasses.
Origins and Development
Spiritual Origin of Humanitarian Standards
Limiting Violence in Order to Ensure the Survival of the Group

Each civilization has formed islands of humanity inside which certain rules limit
violence by imposing restraints on the use of force and exist an obligation of solidarity toward victims.
These religion-based rules were of two types, imposing negative and positive
obligations:
1. A taboo by which it was forbidden to attack women and children, to destroy
temples or sacred places, to kill priests or people in religious orders, as well as
women, children, and elderly people belonging to the group. In the West, the
Peace of God (Pax Dei)4 and the Truce of God (Treuga Dei)5 were such rules.
Other similar rules can be found in every religion. Some of these rules were more
generous in so-called primitive civilizations than in today’s international law.
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2. The Golden Rule, which is found in several civilizations, not only in JudeoChristian ones, and which can be resumed thus: So, whatever you wish that men
would do to you, do so to them.6
These rules were set to ensure the survival of a group, and forbade behaviors
that would have permanently endangered the group.7 Indigenous people of all continents have aimed to avoid excesses that would turn conflicts into collective suicides.
Customs of Melanesians,8 Inuit,9 and Nilotic people,10 as well as of African tribes; religious precepts in Buddhism,11 Hinduism,12 Taoism,13 Confucianism,14 and Bushido15
in Asia; Judaism,16 Christianity,17 and Islam18 in the Middle East; and mutual restrictions imposed by chivalry and military honor19 in Europe, contain examples of rules
of “Life-Affirmative Societies,” in which the main emphasis of ideals, customs, and
institutions is the preservation and growth of life in all its forms.20
All these rules were aimed at precluding excesses that would turn clashes into
anarchy and hence make peace more difficult to achieve. Thus, in article 6 of his
Project for Perpetual Peace, Kant wrote: “No State shall, during war, permit such
acts of hostility which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace
impossible.”21
Recognizing the Human Dignity of Every Human Being Francisco de Vitoria
(1480–1596), a member of the Dominican Order, is often considered the founder
of Western international law. He believed in jus gentium, a universally valid “law of
nations” established on the basis of natural law. Living at the time of the conquest
of the Americas, Vitoria developed his teaching partly in the context of his discussions on the appropriate treatment of the native peoples of the New World.
Supported by Vitoria, Bartholomew de Las Casas (1474–1566) devoted himself
to the defense of the Amerindians against the ruthless exploitation and ferocious
cruelty that they suffered under the Spanish conquerors.22
Building Bridges Among Civilizations St. Francis of Assisi tried to open a dialogue between Christians and Muslims in 1219.23 All of the world’s great religious
traditions today emphasize the intrinsic value of each individual human life, and in
recent decades, religious communities have recognized their vital role in expressing moral outrage and taking actions to curb the types of inhumanity that people
have, time and again, inflicted upon one another over the last century. Religious
communities are, without a doubt, the largest and best-organized civil institutions
in the world today, claiming the allegiance of billions of believers and bridging the
divides of race, class and nationality.24
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Proliferation and Universality of Standards
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) International humanitarian law is usually defined as the set of principles and rules restricting the use of violence in armed
conflicts, both to spare the persons not (or no longer) directly engaged in hostilities
(wounded, sick, shipwrecked members of the armed forces, prisoners of war, and
civilians), and to limit the use of methods and means of warfare that causes superfluous injury (or excessive suffering, as in the case of dumdum bullets or with gas
warfare25), or severe damage to the natural environment, or betrayal of an adversary’s confidence in agreed-upon obligations (“perfidity”).
The principle of the limitation of armed violence is reflected in contemporary
written law, in the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868,26 as well as in Article 22 of
the Hague Regulations of 190727: “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”
The terminology used to refer to international treaties may vary (“humanitarian law,”28 “international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts,”29 “Laws
of war,”30 “Law of Geneva,”31 “Red Cross Conventions,” “Law of The Hague,”32
“human rights in armed conflicts,”33) but all seek the same objective—namely, to
limit the use of violence in war.
Contemporary international humanitarian law is the moving balance between
two dynamic forces: the requirements of humanity and military necessity.34 It is also
the sum of tragic real-life experiences that need not to be repeated: military wounded
and shipwrecked—and the humanitarian personnel taking care of them—must be
rescued and respected; prisoners of war must be humanely treated and released at
the end of active hostilities; and civilians not be killed nor harmed.
Each stage of the codification of international humanitarian law was the result
of a postwar shock wave in public opinion and governments, a collective painful
process of learning. These codifications occurred as follows:
The Battle of Solferino (1859)35 between Austrian and French armies was the
impetus for the First Convention, in 1864, protecting military wounded on
land
The Battle of Tsushima (1905) between the Japanese and Russian fleets prompted
adjustments of the Convention on War at Sea, in 1907, extending protection
to military shipwrecked
World War II led to the four 1949 Conventions,36 an extensive regulation of the
treatment of civilians in occupied territories and internment
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Decolonization and the Vietnam War preceded the two 1977 Additional Protocols,37 which brought written rules for the protection of civilian persons and
objects against hostilities
A worldwide campaign by like-minded governments, United Nations agencies,
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs in a full partnership
that stressed the human suffering and socioeconomic costs caused by antipersonnel mines resulted in the total ban on landmines signed in Ottawa on
December 4, 1997
Universality of International Humanitarian Law The four 1949 Geneva
Conventions are universally ratified. The two Additional Protocols are widely ratified, but still lack ratification by the United States and some other countries.
The 1907 Hague Regulations, which establish laws for conducting war on
land, are universally considered part of international customary law since the
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg declared on October 1, 1946, binding both signatories and nonsignatories.38
Humanitarian law has evolved from a law protecting only certain categories of
individuals (from medieval knights to today’s prisoners of war) to a set of provisions ensuring fundamental human rights guaranteeing the survival of entire civilian populations in wartime.
The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia39 and for
Rwanda40 broke down the distinction between international and non-international
armed conflicts regarding the prosecution of war crimes.41
Fundamental humanitarian rules and principles are to be respected in
all circumstances. This is especially important today, in the case of “collapsed
states,”42 “postmodern wars,”43 and anarchic conflicts.44 According to the ICRC’s
Commentary to the 1949 Conventions: “The words ‘in all circumstances’ in
Common Article 1 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions refer to all situations
in which the Convention has to be applied, and these are defined in Article 2. It
is clear, therefore, that the application of the Convention does not depend on
whether the conflict is just or unjust. Whether or not it is a war of aggression,
prisoners of war belonging to either party are entitled to the protection afforded
by the Convention.”45
The First Geneva Convention of 1864 had only twelve articles. The four 1949
Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 count more than
four hundred and fifty provisions. One article summarizes international humanitarian law: Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions.
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The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Nicaragua Case (1986), considered Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as “elementary considerations of humanity” binding all:
The Court considers that the rules stated in Article 3, which is common to the
four Geneva Conventions, applying to armed conflicts of a non-international
character, should be applied.
The United States is under an obligation to “respect” the Conventions and
even to “ensure respect” for them, and thus not to encourage persons or groups
engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of
Article 3. This obligation derives from the general principles of humanitarian
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression.46
Human Rights The Preamble of the United Nations Charter states the determination of Member States “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women,
and of nations large and small.” Article 1, paragraph 3 defines one of the purposes
of the UN as: “To achieve international co-operation in solving internal problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” World War II and regional
conflicts prompted the drafting of the United Nations instruments on human
rights, disarmament, prohibition of terrorism and mercenaries, protection of the
environment,47 and of the rights of children.48
While instruments of international humanitarian law are normally applicable
during armed conflicts, human rights treaties are based on a peacetime approach,
yet their scope often overlaps, especially in regard to the fundamental guarantees
they embody.
The universality of humanitarian standards can also be seen with human rights
instruments:49
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see the appendixes for the
full text of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide
Both 1966 Covenants (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)
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The 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
The universality50 and indivisibility51 of human rights was reaffirmed by the
UN International Conference in Tehran in 196852 and by the World Conference of
Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.53
The Advisory Opinion on the ICJ on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of May 28, 1951, confirmed
that the prohibition of genocide is part of customary international law.54
The following regional instruments complement the UN instruments:
The 1950 Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, signed in Rome;
The 1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, San Jose de Costa
Rica;
The 1981 African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights;
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council, and
the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice on December 7,
2000.55
Two regional instruments prohibit torture:
The 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture;
The 1987 European Commission for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
In addition to the first two “human rights generations” (civil and political/economic and social), new human rights—a third generation of “Solidarity Human
Rights”56 are under consideration at the United Nations and at regional fora, among
which are:
the right to development,
the right to a healthy environment,57
the human right to peace,
the human right to health, and
the right to food.
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The “Declaration on the Right to Development” was adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1986.58 The item has been regularly debated at the
General Assembly since then.59
The “Human Right to Peace” was hailed by Federico Mayor, Director-General
of UNESCO, as “a prerequisite for the exercise of all human rights and duties.”60
The “Human Right to Health” is proclaimed in the World Health Organization’s
Constitution, as well as in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and in the 1988 Protocol of San Salvador.61
As for the Right to Food, the Preamble to the FAO Constitution sets “ensuring
humanity’s freedom from hunger” as one of its basic purposes. The World Food
Summit in November 1996 reaffirmed the right of everyone to have access to safe
and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and gave a specific
mandate to the High Commissioner for Human Rights to better define the rights
related to food and propose ways to implement and realize them.62
“Soft Law” Standards Treaty law is not the only source of humanitarian standards. “Soft Law” is also a source of humanitarian standards. One example is the
adoption, by the International Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna in 1965, of
the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross/Crescent—humanity, impartiality,
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, universality.
Solidarity and compassion have always been widely expressed in both words
and deeds in the most diverse cultures.63 The Fundamental Principles are the result
of a century of experience. Proclaimed in 1965, they bind together the National Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.64 They
were imitated in many ways. The principle of neutrality has even become one of the
core principles of organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières.
The “MSF Charter”65 also mentions the principles of impartiality, nondiscrimination, independence, and voluntary service.
It stresses the right to humanitarian assistance.
Neutrality should be understood as the capacity of being available to everyone
for service, the ability to assist and protect victims without discrimination, enhancing the security of humanitarian workers and the sustainability of their action,
more important in its perception by all actors than in actual practice, closely linked
also to funding access to victims.
Professional ethics (military,66 police,67 medical,68 and media69) also strives for
universality.
In 1999, the Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed the “Global
Compact” to create a dialogue between business and civil society along nine fun32
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damental principles, drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Fundamental Principles on Rights at
Work, and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development.70
Multiplication of Legal Mechanisms
The proliferation of standards is matched by the multiplication of implementation
mechanisms for international humanitarian law or for human rights instruments
or for both.
International Humanitarian Law Mechanisms The mechanisms provided for
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of war victims are:
1. The States Party, which undertake to “respect and ensure respect” for the
Conventions “in all circumstances.”71 “Respect” clearly refers to the individual
obligation to apply it in good faith from the moment it enters into force.72 “To
ensure respect,” according to the ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Conventions,
“demands in fact that the States which are Parties to it should not be content
merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their
power to ensure that it is respected universally.”73 This collective responsibility
to implement international humanitarian rules74 often takes the form of bilateral or multilateral measures by States Party. Leaving aside the exceptional
meeting provided for in Article 7 of Protocol 1 of 1977,75 States Party to international humanitarian law treaties have used bilateral or multilateral meetings
at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), regional organizations (OAS, AU, OSCE, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe),
as well as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), to manifest their concern that
humanitarian law should be respected.76 “In all circumstances” means in time
of armed conflict as in time of peace, taking preventive steps, in the form of
training77 or evaluation,78 and prosecution.79
2. The Protecting Power,80 which was widely used in Europe during WW II81 and
much less thereafter.82 Additional Protocol 1 defines the Protecting Power in
international humanitarian law as “a neutral or other State not a Party to the
conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by
the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a Protecting Power under the Conventions and this Protocol.”83 The role of the Protecting Power is to maintain the liaison between two States at war, to bring
relief assistance to the victims, and protection to prisoners of war and civilian
internees.
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3. The ICRC, which received mandates from the international community in the
1949 Geneva Conventions to:
Visit and interview prisoners of war84 and civilian internees;85
Provide relief to the population of occupied territories;86
Search for missing persons and to forward family messages to prisoners of war87
and civilians;88
Offer its good offices to facilitate the institution of hospital zones89 and safety
zones;90
Receive applications from protected persons;91
Offer its services in other situations92 and especially in time of non-international armed conflicts.93
The First 1977 Additional Protocol adds two mechanisms of implementation:
The United Nations, “in situations of serious violations of the Conventions or
of this Protocol” (Article 89 of Protocol 1); and
The optional “International Fact-Finding Commission” (Article 90 of Protocol 1).94
The implementation mechanisms of international criminal law95 was significantly developed as the United Nations Security Council established the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,96 and
with the sixtieth ratification of 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court97 on April 11, and its entry into force on July 1, 2002.
This is a milestone in the international community’s fight to end impunity for
war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
The International Criminal Court will be able to punish war criminals and perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity in cases where national criminal
justice systems are unable or unwilling to do so. It is vital for the Court’s effective
functioning that the State Parties rapidly adopt comprehensive implementing legislation in order to be able to cooperate with the Court.98
Human Rights Mechanisms Increasingly, human rights mechanisms, at the
international, regional, and national level, deal with human rights as well as with
international humanitarian law issues.
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The United Nations General Assembly (Third Committee), the Human Rights
Council, the Human Rights Committee
For the Americas: the Organization of American States Commission on Human
Rights and the Human Rights Court
For Africa: the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, under the
aegis of the OAU.
In Europe: the European Commission, the European Court, the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, all under the aegis of the Council of Europe,99 as well
as the relevant organs of OSCE100 and the European Union.101
Informal Mechanisms In addition to the formal mechanisms of implementation
of international humanitarian law and human rights, there is an increasing role for
informal mechanisms at the international as on the national level:
good offices,102
media (local, regional, and international),103
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch104 or Amnesty International,
engaging nonstate actors105 to abide by humanitarian rules and principles,106
civil society,107
ad hoc independent monitors, agreed upon by all parties,108
private diplomacy, including private economy (multinational as well as local),
spiritual leaders,109 including mediators such as the Sant’Egidio Community.110

Toward a Renaissance of Fundamental Humanitarian Values
Research Roots
“Renaissance” literally means rebirth, renewal, and return to the source. We need
to research the roots of fundamental values in all civilizations in order to move
beyond the superficial universality of legal instruments, too often perceived as
imposed by Western powers and, in too many cases, poorly implemented.
As the ICRC survey conducted in 1999 for the fiftieth anniversary of the 1949
Geneva Conventions demonstrated, the local spiritual values are often the only

35

CH02_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p026-039.indd 35

2/13/13 8:52 PM

MICHEL VEUTHEY

efficient, convincing factor, with which motivate the compliance with humanitarian rules in warfare.111
Reanchor Awareness in All Civilizations
The whole idea of compassion is based on a keen awareness of the interdependence of all these living beings, which are all part of one another and all
involved in one another.
—Thomas Merton
Without losing the universality attained by the 1949 Geneva Conventions—
and in especially Common Article 3—we need to reanchor them in all civilizations
in a new awareness of belonging, empowerment and interdependence, a renewed
commitment to common humanity (humanité commune), and for the respect of
common values (patrimoine commun de l’humanité) and objects indispensable to
the survival of humankind, such as water, food supplies, public health structures,
cultural, and spiritual treasures.
Reaffirm Universality of Fundamental Values
We need to underline the common values, to move beyond the twentieth century celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the UN Charter, of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of the 1951
Convention on Refugees, etc., to reaffirm the universality of fundamental values.
There are divergences of opinion between American and European allies (on
the death penalty, for example). There are differences of emphasis between civil
and political rights on one hand and social and economic rights on the other. There
are also differences of importance of individual and group rights.112
We therefore need to reaffirm a common core of human values, in discovering
what makes them universal beyond cultural differences:
The right to life
The right to personal security and religious freedom
The right to family life
The right to health care, adequate nutrition and shelter
The principle of nondiscrimination
The prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.113
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Reinforce Existing Mechanisms
The international community of States Party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions should
reaffirm their collective responsibility according to Article 1, common to all four
Conventions and to Additional Protocol 1. According to this provision, “The High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for this Convention
an all circumstances.” Should measures114 be limited to diplomacy, adoption of
resolutions, or rather the use of sanctions115 and peace-enforcement operations in
order to stop genocide and arrest war criminals? A number of Security Council
resolutions, including those on anarchic conflicts, call upon all parties to respect
international humanitarian law and reaffirm that those responsible for breaches
thereof should be held individually accountable.
According to Article 89 of Protocol 1, “In situations of serious violations of
the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act
jointly or individually, in cooperation with the United Nations and in conformity
with the United Nations Charter.” This is a quite important provision, allowing for
creativity and flexibility, as needed.
The involvement of the UN in the implementation of IHL took many forms
including denunciations of violations of IHL in resolutions by the Security Council
or the General Assembly.
Ending the impunity of perpetrators of atrocities is a major challenge.116
The most important step taken by the UN in this context is the establishment of international criminal tribunals such as “The International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia;” The
Security Council established it in May 1993117 for serious violations committed there
since 1991. The tribunal has competence on the following offenses: grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions,118 violations of the laws and customs of war,119 genocide,120 and crimes against humanity.121
The International Tribunal for Rwanda was established by the Security Council
in 1994. This is the first time that an international criminal tribunal has been established with respect to an essentially non-international conflict.
Those ad-hoc Tribunals will need adequate resources and political support.122 Their existence does not do away with the requirement in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions for all States Party to see to the punishment of grave breaches wherever they occur, be it by government officials or warlords.123
The International Criminal Court needs to be supported. It is only one part of
a system that would end impunity to the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and torture. Such a system could certainly contribute to
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deter people contemplating such crimes, to allow victims to obtain justice, and to
support reconciliation efforts. States Party to the Geneva Conventions have been
increasingly aware of their responsibility to respect international humanitarian law
not only as individual States but also collectively. The awareness of their collective
responsibility is a more recent phenomenon, resulting from the combined pressure of public opinion, the ICRC, and various human rights NGOs,124 bilaterally
or before United Nations bodies. This collective responsibility not only pertains to
the enforcement of humanitarian rules, it is contributing to national stability and
international security, preventing disorderly movements of populations, uprooting of displaced persons and refugees, and the spreading of uncontrolled violence
around the world.125
Reinvent Remedies
We need to be more creative in applying remedies126 to promote the respect of fundamental values in all situations.
Some remedies might include:
1. The reaffirmation of fundamental humanitarian rules, customs, and principles
in a simple, easy to understand form, and translation into local languages;
2. Training of arms bearers (military, police, private security groups) in fundamental restraints of violence and essential humanitarian principles;127
3. Conducting international, regional, and local public opinion campaigns to
promote fundamental humanitarian values128 and counter-hate campaigns;
4. Mobilization of public role models (such as artists or athletes) in close contact
with local traditions who can influence leaders and public opinion at large;129
5. Including spiritual leaders in those campaigns, especially when religious and
spiritual values have been used to fuel conflicts;130
6. Preparing the youth to recognize and defend the distinction between humanity and inhumanity through educational programs.131 Reintegrate child soldiers
into society;132
7. Learning from human rights133 and environmental134 activists to promote fundamental humanitarian values to allow, in the long run, humanitarian norms
to become a part of humanitarian consciousness;
8. Monitoring arms transfers, beginning with light weapons,135 and promoting
innovative disarmament approaches, such as “weapons for food” or “weapons
for development”;
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9. Exerting better targeted bilateral and multilateral diplomatic, economic, and
adequate military pressures against violators, in accordance with the UN Charter and international humanitarian law;136
10. Fully including the respect of fundamental human values in the framework of
the maintenance and reestablishment of international security.137
Rebuild Public Conscience
“Public conscience” was introduced in positive international law by the Martens
Clause at the Hague Peace Conference in 1899.
It was the result of a compromise reached at the Hague Conference to break
a deadlock between great and small powers in Europe over the definition of combatants. In case of doubt, international humanitarian rules should be interpreted
in a manner consistent with standards of humanity and the demands of public
conscience.138
Humanitarian law is, at the same time, rooted in the history of all traditions of
humankind, in all parts of the world, and is also very much part of our future, as
one essential safeguard for our survival as a species. In the words of Jean Pictet, one
of the founding fathers of contemporary humanitarian law, respect for humanitarian law is “necessary to humankind’s survival.”
In the words of Martin Luther King Jr.: “The chain reaction of evil—hate begetting hate, wars producing more wars—must be broken, or we shall be plunged into
the dark abyss of annihilation” and “Either we live together as brothers, or we perish as fools.”
As the spiritual dimension was at the origin of universal fundamental human
values, we now need to bring back the spirit of humanity into the letter of international humanitarian law.
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Humanitarian Vignettes
Nicola Smith and Larry Hollingworth

I
Radio communication is vital in a relief and humanitarian setting; it is relatively
cheap to establish—after the initial purchase of hardware—and costs nothing to
run. Radio frequencies are normally allocated to various humanitarian actors by
the national government; sometimes channels are shared, but more often than not
humanitarian actors operate on different frequencies.
Interventions in camp settings become more complicated due to the vast array
of humanitarian actors who are involved. Services provided include camp management; health, water, and sanitation; child protection; food distribution; education;
shelter, and the list continues. There are many different agencies, both national and
international with different capacities and abilities, operating in the same camp.
Consistent coordination and communication is essential. Sometimes agencies have
shared radio frequencies, but that is not common. In fact, it is extremely rare to
have all the agencies in the same camp able to communicate with one another. The
importance of communication becomes very apparent during periods of insecurity.
In 2003, I was working in Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. MSF was the
health-care provider in a camp for approximately forty thousand internally displaced Afghans. The camp was literally in the middle of the desert and was called
Zhare Dasht (“yellow desert” in Pashtun). Space was not a problem, and the camp
was well laid out, but there was a problem with a consistent supply of water and
security.
The Zhare Dasht camp was the perfect infiltration environment for Taliban and
Al Qaeda who were operating against the Coalition in the war on terror. Tragically,
in 2003 Osama bin Laden openly declared war against the humanitarian actors in
Afghanistan and accused them of working with an illegal government. The assassination of an ICRC delegate was the first in an increasing number of murders of
humanitarian aid workers.
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By October 2003, security was becoming very difficult. Al Qaeda murdered two
humanitarian aid workers who were traveling up the main highway from Kandahar
to Herat. Security worsened after an incident occurred in the Zhare Dasht camp.
Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives had infiltrated the camp and attacked the demining agents who were working on the periphery removing the mines and unexploded ordinance that litter the country. Thankfully, the execution of the aid workers was thwarted, and the operatives fled the scene. That day a security incident
was averted, but more ominously only two humanitarian agencies out of seven
operating in the camp could communicate with one another to share information.
If technology could help provide a fast, user-friendly way of allowing improved
communication among different agencies, it could literally mean the difference
between life and death.
—Nicola “Nicky” Smith

II
Every message needs a messenger. The speed at which the message is delivered, the
number of people it reaches, and the effect it has can change lives.
In natural disasters the earliest hours are the most critical. Few die after the
opening hours. The knowledge of where to go, what and where to avoid, and what
to send and where to send it saves lives.
In manmade crises sometimes it is better to stay than to move. If you move, you
need to know to where and how and what dangers you will encounter. When you
return you need to know what awaits you—mines or booby traps, friends or foe.
In interethnic violence the media has proved to be both a force of evil and of
power. Radio stations have spewed forth venom and bias, TV images have fueled
insurrection, and the written word has published false gospels. Governments and
factions have manipulated the news to their own ends. Even the most independent
media stations have struggled to remain impartial in their output.
In the Balkans and in Central Africa, TV and radio stations are attempting
to reunite communities by using soap operas that emphasize the common bonds
and older values that existed before the violence. The difficulties of return and
reintegration, forgiveness and reconciliation are played out in tightly scripted daily
episodes.
The obscene aftermath of indiscriminate mine-laying, the loss of limbs, the loss
of livelihoods, and the loss of self-respect can be mitigated by an awareness of the
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danger. Mine-awareness programs can save more lives than mine-clearance activities. Posters and banners in schools and community buildings, advertisements in
newspapers, warnings on radio and television can prevent children from playing
and farmers from planting and tilling in suspect areas.
In crises, people need to know more than ever what is happening and who is
winning, who is causing the pain and who is curing it. Rumor spreads faster than
fact. It is more difficult to correct misinformation and disinformation than it is to
disseminate truth. If desperate people believe that transport is waiting to take them
away to safety, if starving people believe that food is to be distributed and both of
these are untrue, the blame will be placed upon the shoulders of the agency, not on
the authors of the untruth. The reaction and response may range from distrust to
destruction and rioting.
The major media companies are eager to cover “breaking news” crises, their
pictures and their comments are accepted as the facts, and when general public
interest wanes or the news becomes routine, they move on, leaving an information
vacuum in the very place where news coverage is needed most. Switching off the
camera lights falsely implies that the crisis is over, whereas for the local population
the long journey to recovery has hardly begun.
—Larry Hollingworth
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Humanitarian Response in the Era of Global Mobile
Information Technology
Valerie Amos

Technology is among the most difficult topics to tackle in a chapter designed to
be relevant for more than a few months. The digital revolution has brought, and
is still bringing, many positive changes to the world. In the humanitarian sector,
technology has revitalized worldwide volunteerism through crowdsourcing, driving closer cooperation between the humanitarian and the for-profit sectors. It has
empowered people who receive humanitarian aid and improved the way we manage information.
These changes have challenged old assumptions and reshaped existing systems
in deep and unexpected ways. In this chapter, I will set out what new technology
offers us across the humanitarian sector; highlight the mutual benefits of the sector’s newly formed relationship with the technology sector; and suggest how we can
improve the partnerships we are building to tap the full potential of information
technology in our work.

Building Resilience
The first step in crisis response starts well before disaster hits. Developing resilient
early warning systems helps communities withstand even major hazards. Mobile
technologies offer improved ways of doing this.
Social and economic data, including maps, are essential to building resilient
communities. Most conversations about public safety and assistance take place
around a map. Mobile technology enables us to compile, share, and update maps
more quickly and accurately than ever before, so that we can put our resources
where they will be most effective, at both local and national levels.
The Grassroots Mapping Project (www.grassrootsmapping.org) uses inexpensive techniques, like balloons and kites, to compile maps that are aimed at changing
how people see the world in environmental, social, and political terms. The organization worked in the New Orleans area in 2010 to map the BP oil spill, and is now
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broadening its scope to explore inexpensive and community-led means to measure
and explore environmental and social issues.
Interactive mobile technology can also enhance the ways maps are used, making them a valuable tool for advocacy and development—crucial elements of building resilience. In Somalia, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is running an online
map of its development projects in rural areas. The map shows every village with a
project funded by the DRC. Clicking on a village reveals details about the project,
its aims, and its progress. Somalis in the diaspora have started to use the map to
decide on the best villages for their donations. These diaspora communities are
even topping up the original funding offered by the DRC—an unexpected side
effect of the project.
Interactive mapping has been taken up at the international level by the World
Bank, which launched the Mapping for Results platform in October 2010. This
initiative visualizes the location of World Bank projects and enables citizens and
other stakeholders to provide direct feedback, enhancing the transparency and
social accountability of these projects.
For select countries, the platform provides not only geographic information
about World Bank–financed programs, but also allows users to overlay disaggregated poverty, population density, and human development data (i.e., infant mortality rates, malnutrition, etc.). Population density is available for 107 countries;
data on mortality, maternal health, and malnutrition data are available for fortythree countries; and poverty data for thirty-one countries. Such moves toward
transparency will undoubtedly have implications for funding and development in
the future.
Mobile cash transfer programs, which deliver vouchers or cash directly to
recipients, can also play a crucial part in building resilient communities, help people to withstand slow-onset crises, and build sustainable livelihoods. Programs can
be integrated with national social security systems to maximize impact. As in so
many areas, humanitarians are only beginning to investigate the possibilities that
this technology offers.

Local Action
In all disasters, local communities form the front line of the crisis response. If local
people have access to cutting-edge technology during an emergency, they can be
extremely effective in communicating the needs of affected communities to each
other and to local, regional, and international aid organizations.
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The formation of local social networks to spread news, including tips and warnings about impending weather events or volcanic activity, is another important way
in which mobile technology has contributed to disaster prevention and recovery.
These tools are increasingly being used in disaster-prone areas. For example, civil
authorities in Mexico City have recently rolled out a free mobile application that will
warn people when an earthquake is imminent. The application triggers an alarm
on the phone once an earthquake of magnitude 6.5 or higher has been detected.
During the 2010 eruption of Mount Merapi outside Jogjakarta in Indonesia, a local
communications group called Jalin Merapi used Twitter, Facebook, SMS, and local
radio to keep the community informed in real time and to understand and communicate emerging needs.
Local filmmakers in Thailand also used digital technology to spread the word
during a flood emergency in 2011. They posted a series of ten videos on YouTube
aimed at bringing home to people the seriousness of the situation. In one, they
represented the billions of cubic meters of water bearing down on Bangkok as an
equivalent volume of blue whales. The main video in the series has been viewed
more than a million times.
Looking to the future, it is clear that local mobile networks also have much
to offer in disseminating information during a crisis. The response to a tornado
that hit the town of Joplin, Missouri, in May 2011 was partly coordinated through
a Facebook page. The page, Joplin Tornado Information, was set up within two
hours of the tornado striking and began connecting needs, resources, transportation, and storage requirements. It soon had nearly 50,000 fans. Relief organizations,
churches, and news sources started to post information on the page, including the
news that water trucks had arrived in the town.
Similarly, social media was a primary source of communication after an earthquake and tsunami struck northern Japan in March 2011. Within an hour of the
earthquake, an estimated 1,200 tweets per minute including references to the disaster were being posted on Twitter. Many Japanese people used Facebook, Twitter,
and the Japan-specific site Mixi to share information and keep in touch. These
examples from highly connected countries with robust infrastructure show what
will be possible in an increasing number of countries in future.
Many of the most useful new mobile platforms are also accessible to locally
based groups and even those affected by crises. For example, Crowdmap (www
.crowdmap.com) allows anyone to set up a mapping project on the Ushahidi platform (www.ushahidi.com), a tool to crowd-source information using multiple
channels. This technology has recently been used by people in Syria to track unrest
there in real time.
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Early Warning
Information saves lives, and the UN is heavily investing in global systems to alert
early responders in the event of a major sudden-onset crisis like an earthquake or
typhoon. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
runs a web-based real-time information channel for affected countries and bilateral responders used immediately after major disasters. This channel, known as
the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) is used by most
Member States and regional organizations. Since 2004, the Virtual OSOCC has
been part of the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), which
is an international network of disaster information systems aimed at facilitating
information exchange and coordination in the first hours after a natural disaster.
GDACS includes an automatic disaster alert and notification system, as well as
automatic feeds of related disaster maps and satellite images. GDACS alerts are
submitted to subscribers by e-mail and SMS text message minutes after disaster
events to inform about the possible humanitarian impact of disasters.
A major initiative in this area is the UN Global Pulse, which was created by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2009 to explore opportunities to use real-time
data to gain a more accurate understanding of well-being, and assess levels of stress,
particularly on vulnerable people. Global Pulse tracks the human impacts of crises
as they happen, and enables the UN to access feedback in real time on how well its
responses are working.
The strategy has three interdependent areas of activity: “Data Research” to assess
community well-being; a “Technology Toolkit” of free and open source software
tools so development experts can mine data, share ideas, and make evidence-based
decisions; and the “Pulse Lab Network,” an integrated network of country-level
innovation centers, bringing together government experts, UN agencies, academia,
and the private sector to apply new applications of data to development challenges.
Global mobile communications technology plays a crucial role in all these areas.
Global Pulse stresses the importance of creating actionable information, that
is, policy recommendations, from raw data. The project detects what it calls “digital smoke signals” that indicate changing conditions and behavior. For example,
if people start to reduce unnecessary expenses and sell off property and livestock,
this is an early predictor of food insecurity and malnutrition. The initiative’s main
technology tool is a social network called Hunchworks, which helps experts share
hypotheses, collect evidence, and make decisions.
In addition to this major international push, national and regional disaster
management agencies also recognize the importance of using mobile technology in
early warning systems. Social media was used widely during the January 2012 floods
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in the Philippines, which has the fifth-largest number of Facebook users in the
world. Some 130,000 people made use of the government’s Weather Watch website
to receive updates on conditions for travel by road and sea. The site issued warnings
on collapsed roads and dangerous sea conditions for fishermen. Many Filipinos
who lack access to computers used their smart phones to receive this information.

Saving Lives in Crisis: An Evolving Picture
The scope for technology to help emergency responders was first explored after
the magnitude 7.0 earthquake that hit Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in January 2010. With
hundreds of thousands of people dead and more than a million homeless, governments pledged hundreds of millions of dollars, but ordinary citizens also contributed enormous amounts of money. Much of this was raised through mobile phone
text messages, marking the dawn of a new era of instant electronic donation.
Amid the chaos, one utility was up and running within days: the mobile phone
network. Over the previous five years, Haiti had undergone a transformation. Two
mobile phone networks run by Digicel and Voila covered almost the entire country. These networks had become the country’s leading industry. Haiti in 2010 was
the poorest country in the Americas, but its people could communicate with each
other, and with the world, even after the earthquake. This meant that they could
share information via local and international radio and online networks and participate in online mapping projects.
Volunteers gathered online to look for ways to communicate with Haitians and
map the crisis, using a raft of innovative tools from SMS messages to collaborative
mapping platforms and systems to mine data from social media sites like Twitter.
Within hours of the earthquake, the collaborative mapping platform Ushahidi set
up a site to collate and map data from text messages, social media, official situation
reports, and other sources of information.
An SMS short code, 4636, was established with Digicel for local people to send
and receive emergency-related messages. (Short codes work like the emergency numbers 911 or 999 as easily memorized shorthand for longer “traditional” numbers.)
OpenStreetMap,1 a collaborative system to mark names and key points on a
publicly available online map, started charting the transformed city of Port-auPrince; this became a vital resource for aid responders. A Haitian OpenStreetMap
team formed a close relationship with the International Organization for Migration
and their work informed the entire aid effort.
All these steps produced an incremental change in attitudes toward the use
of mobile technology in a disaster zone and this had a significant impact during
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the Libya crisis of early 2011. Part of the challenge in Libya was that the UN did
not have physical access to much of the country and was struggling to get a clear
picture of what was happening. Although there was data available online, there was
no way to verify and process this information. The Standby Task Force (SBTF)—a
self-organized group of volunteers born from the Haiti experience—responded by
creating the Libya Crisis Map.2 The map worked by collating data from dedicated
collaborators and the general public to plot incidents or trends, such as refugee
flows, on a map in real time. A UN specialist reviewed the data, looked for patterns,
and found ways to use this information.
Another significant step forward came during the largest humanitarian crisis
of 2011: a massive regional drought in eastern Africa. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) approached the SBTF, which activated a
network of volunteers to analyze thousands of images and chart settlements, tagging over a quarter of a million features.3 This helped to identify newly built urban
areas and to get a better picture of the numbers there who needed help.
Mobile Phones Change the Game: Two-Way Communication and Electronic Cash
The spread of cheap communications technology also promises to change the
entire aid model fundamentally by changing the relationship between humanitarian workers and those affected by emergencies and disasters. A 2011 study by the
U.S. government-funded Internews Media Support NGO examined the experience
of Somalis in the world’s largest refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya, and found that
establishing two-way communication with affected communities was not a high
priority for aid workers:
Serious communications gaps between the humanitarian sector and refugees
. . . are increasing refugee suffering and putting lives at risk . . .
Large numbers of refugees don’t have the information they need to access
basic aid; more than 70 percent of newly-arrived refugees say they lack
information on how to register for aid, and similar numbers say they need
information on how to locate missing family members.4
Some aid organizations have begun to contact affected communities using
communications technology. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC) is aiming to set up formal agreements with mobile phone
providers in fifty disaster-prone countries. They will be able to see how many
people are connected to each telephone aerial, and send out mass text messages.
These could be carefully targeted in the case of localized flooding, or used for early
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warning of hurricanes or other adverse weather events. The connection could also
be used to seek feedback on crisis conditions in an area, or even to locate people
trapped under rubble.
Another development that will have a significant impact on the relationship
between donors, humanitarians, and affected communities is the rise of mobile
electronic cash. This has the potential to transform the humanitarian sector through
direct transfers to large numbers of people affected by emergencies and through
targeted transfers to individuals to conduct specific tasks, including monitoring,
assessments, purchasing medicines for a clinic, and so on.
In crisis after crisis, markets have been shown to provide supplies extremely
quickly. The problem is that the most vulnerable people cannot afford to buy anything. Instead of meeting this shortfall with huge, expensive international logistics
chains that undercut the market, the advocates of mobile cash transfers argue that it
is cheaper and more effective to provide vulnerable people with money or vouchers
to buy what they need.
This proposition is fraught with controversy. Transferring cash creates many
logistical challenges, and will not always provide what is most badly needed. The
World Food Programme (WFP) says it chooses which kind of aid will be most
appropriate depending on various factors, including cost-effectiveness and availability of food. “When appropriate,” it states, “cash and vouchers can meet more
closely the needs of targeted vulnerable people.”5
Several programs are already using electronic money and vouchers. In 2009, the
WFP launched a mobile delivery and tracking system based on electronic vouchers
in Zambia, redeemable through mobile phones thanks to a technology platform
provided by Mobile Transactions Zambia. Recipients registered by uploading a
national registration card into the system. They then received a scratch card that
they could redeem at specific vendors.
A program in Niger in West Africa shows that this technology has potential even
where mobile phone ownership is low. In 2010, the international NGO Concern
joined forces with the mobile network operator Airtel to facilitate mobile money
transfer to four thousand households affected by drought-related food insecurity,
in an attempt to reduce operating costs and increase benefits to recipients. Other
households received cash in envelopes. Concern partnered with Tufts University
to investigate the impact of the mobile money transfer. They found that receiving
mobile money saved time for recipients, who did not have to walk to a distribution
point or wait for a delivery. The mobile money recipients also bought a greater
variety of food types and nonfood items and grew a wider variety of crops; the reasons for this were not clear. Even illiterate households had no problem accessing
the money; they sought help from relatives and neighbors.
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Private Sector Involvement
Another element of this changing landscape is the growing interaction between
the aid sector and the private sector. This interaction has brought the energy and
financial power of the private sector to benefit humanitarian causes. It has also
benefited the private sector, with a growing acknowledgment from companies that
encouraging healthy societies provides many tangible and intangible benefits.
After the Haiti earthquake, one of the country’s mobile phone providers,
Digicel, provided its 2 million customers with $5 of free credit, which enabled them
to get in touch with each other and the outside world, and build a better picture of
the situation at the height of the crisis. Digicel also donated generators, phones, and
credit to fifteen radio stations in Port-au-Prince to help them reach their listeners.
This provided an essential conduit for humanitarian aid responders to get their
message out to the general public.
Partnership with mobile phone providers also provided information on a
grander scale in Haiti. A study by researchers from Sweden’s Karolinska Institute
and Columbia University6 showed that it was possible to track the movement of
displaced people by following their mobile phones. The study indicated that some
600,000 people had left the Haitian capital in the nineteen days after the earthquake, with clear implications for the provision of humanitarian aid. This tracking
technology was also used after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011, and
offers great possibilities for future emergencies, displacements, and epidemics, provided due attention is paid to privacy issues.
Partnerships between the UN and the private sector were initially philanthropic;
the UN and partners would raise money from the private sector to fund projects
that were often not related to the core business of the company in question. Today,
these are genuine collaborations. An innovative partnership between the Vodafone
Foundation and the UN Foundation known as the Technology Partnership has
brokered relationships between UN agencies and some of the biggest companies
in the world. WFP is working with partners including PepsiCo, Caterpillar, and
Unilever. The IFRC has a long-running partnership agreement with Nestlé.
These partnerships reached a turning point when the technology sector began
to make products cheap and robust enough to be relevant to the developing
world. In December 2011, OCHA and Ericsson celebrated the eleventh anniversary
of their global partnership for the provision of GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications) and related services and expertise in support of humanitarian relief operations. Ericsson Response is the company’s volunteer program that
works to help OCHA in emergency situations by setting up mobile networks for
voice and data communication. The team has been deployed fifteen times since
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2001, most recently in Haiti in 2010, when its mobile network provided an average
of five thousand free calls per day to humanitarians for six months.
UNHCR, in partnership with Microsoft, is using communications technology
to improve UNHCR operations and develop programs to help refugees rebuild
their lives, store their data, and access new opportunities through education and
connectivity. Microsoft supports UNHCR by providing technological expertise,
while UNHCR contributes its fifty years of know-how in addressing challenging
refugee issues. Google is working on several projects, including the improvement
of financial tracking of donor contributions and is providing Google Earth services
to some aid operations.
Private organizations contribute resources such as employee mobilization or
secondment, funds, in-kind donations and expert services, cause-related marketing, and expertise to support humanitarian actors in relief and rehabilitation
efforts. The private sector also brings leadership, assets, access to global networks,
and a unique perspective that can greatly benefit our work.
For their part, companies are eager to partner when they add value. Working
in the humanitarian sector provides a narrative that shows that they are making a
sustained difference and builds a business case for their work, creating value for
the company.
Ericsson says that their volunteer program empowers employees to make a
difference in society and adds another dimension to employees’ jobs, making them
feel more motivated. In addition, the experience and knowledge gained through
working in emergency situations enables them to develop resilient and sustainable
technical solutions that will be relevant to their business in the longer term.
Both the humanitarian community and the private sector still have a lot to
learn from each other. Companies have far more to offer than the aid sector is currently equipped to ask for. We know there are potential private sector partners who
are struggling to understand the humanitarian system and how to play a part in it.

Overcoming Challenges: The Future
I see three main challenges to maximizing the value of new technology for aid work:
defining and working with the physical limitations of the technology; transforming our institutional frameworks to take account of the changing environment;
and dealing with cultural and even psychological barriers to the adoption of new
working practices.
First, we need more experience and research to clarify concrete areas in which
mobile technology offers significant benefits. One simple example is that in some
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cultures, mobile devices and computing power may be under the control of male
heads of household, which could present problems in delivering messaging, information, or cash transfers to women or the elderly. Building trust in new financial
instruments like cash transfers will be crucial to ensuring that they are taken up
and used effectively.
There are also valid concerns about the “consumerization” of disaster communications, ranging from fears over what happens to user data in politically insecure
environments to the proliferation of “white noise”—the paradox of being utterly
overwhelmed with information but still unable to find the information needed for
decision making.
These efforts must take into account the need to mitigate the risks associated
with ad hoc messaging in a disaster or a war zone, including managing expectations
and avoiding any perception of political bias or putting in danger those that are
highly vulnerable or at risk of political persecution. The technology must be used
wisely if it is to be as effective as possible.
At an institutional level, the international community has built large and complex systems over the years to collate, analyze, distribute, and act upon information. These tend to be driven by experts, and organized hierarchically. Some of
these structures are necessary and important to deal with issues of privacy, quality
control, economies of scale, security, and political sensitivity. But working with
new technology and new partners—including the new volunteer and technical
communities, and those from the commercial sector—has demonstrated that these
may be a barrier to full collaboration.
At a cultural and behavioral level, research has shown7 that aid agencies typically perceive new technology as being expensive or difficult to use, requiring specialist knowledge and support. Senior managers can often be the most reluctant
to embrace change as they may hold on to a traditional view of how programming should work. It will require vision and leadership to overcome this reluctance
and move from the “pilot” phase to the wide-scale adoption of new technologies.
Financial controllers must also be supportive in order for change to happen, and
must be made aware that initial investments will yield efficiencies or cost savings
over time.
A short chapter on such a rapidly evolving subject will inevitably leave out
more than it contains and many of the specifics may quickly become out of date.
However, it is possible to draw one conclusion that will stand the test of time. The
uptake of new technologies is more than a technical phenomenon: It is essential to
ensuring that aid work is as effective and relevant as it needs to be.
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PART II

Principles/Values

In this section, some of the humanitarian communities most distinguished practitioners reflect on fundamental principles and values. The former Directors of
Doctors Without Borders and Amnesty International provide cautionary advice—
how one can sacrifice gains to the cause of expediency. There are three chapters
describing serious fault lines in so-called civilized societies that must be recognized
and exposed, or we risk becoming partners in gender exploitation, terrorism (or
unbridled counterterrorism) and torture.
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Alain Destexhe, M.D.

The construction of a new world order and the evolution of the United Nations after
World War II have been guided by the principle: Never again! The Nazis’ unprecedented crimes became a benchmark for an international community founded on
certain basic values: opposition to genocide, the search for world peace, and respect
for human rights. However, over the years, that determination has been replaced
by pragmatism. The United Nations, rendered powerless as a result of superpower
hostility, found its role restricted to the provision of development aid. The end of
the Cold War raised again the idea of an international community based on shared
values, administered by international institutions, and defended by democratic
countries. In the face of an increasing number of crises, the UN is now called upon
regularly to encourage negotiation, to interpose itself, and to assist people at risk.
However, the window of opportunity that seemed to be opening with the end of
the Cold War is rapidly closing, and the idea that the UN could be the guarantor
of world peace is far from being realized. The honeymoon period and the dreams
of a “new world order” seem to be over. The major powers have made it clear that
they will neither sanction the UN to be the world’s police force nor take on the role
themselves, not even the United States.
Fifty years after the creation of the UN and five years after the end of the Cold
War, the international community showed its true colors: in Rwanda, it failed to
react to the first indisputable genocide since that perpetrated against the Jews; in
former Yugoslavia, it failed to react to the return of war and “ethnic cleansing” at
the heart of Europe. Under the pretense of neutrality, its only response was humanitarian aid.

The Shortcomings of the “New Humanitarianism”
There has been an unprecedented enthusiasm for humanitarian work throughout
the world during recent years, yet it is far from certain that this is always in the vic54
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tims’ best interests. The end of the Cold War ushered in a “new humanitarianism,”
or “emergency ethic,” that has become increasingly prevalent. There was an end to
the practice of judging individual victims from an ideological perspective, seen as
“good” or “bad,” depending on which sphere of influence they were from (communist or noncommunist). Now, they became simply fellow human beings deserving of compassion. However, we were too quick to forget that Cold War values
were also combined with realpolitik and that it was moral outrage converted into
action that, above all, helped to counter totalitarian thinking. From Afghanistan to
Angola, from Nicaragua to Cambodia, no one major Western power used humanitarian aid as its sole weapon against the Soviets, the Cubans, or the Vietnamese:
political or military interventions were key components in a strategy of containment in which humanitarian aid played only a minor role.
However, the examples of Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrated that this “new
humanitarianism” can rebound on those it is intended to help. These fellow human
beings, fighting to defend values we share, have become “victims” to be assessed
in terms of their immediate suffering; hungry mouths to feed, if they survive.
Protesting that it was essential to remain neutral, Europe, and later the UN, provided humanitarian aid as their only real response to Serb aggression in Bosnia; the
same response, based on the same claim to neutrality, was proffered in Rwanda—
when the genocide was over and it was too late to influence the situation. Here the
massive deployment of aid to the huge number of refugees became the focus of the
world’s attention, disguising the culpable failure of the international community
to come to the assistance of the Tutsi people. In Bosnia humanitarian aid, elevated
to the status of official policy, encouraged and fostered aggression while convincing public opinion to accept both the fait accompli by the stronger party and an
“ethnic” reading of the conflict.
A Brief History of Neutrality
From a humanitarian point of view, the principle of neutrality cannot be separated form the history of the Red Cross. The movement was founded by Henry
Dunant in 1863, in reaction to his horror at the slaughter he witnessed at the Battle
of Solferino.1 This led him to define the principle enshrined in the first Geneva
Convention for the protection of wounded soldiers and to set up the neutral Red
Cross agency to care for them. Subsequent Conventions extended this neutrality
to other noncombatants: civilians and prisoners of war. The almost universally
acknowledged Geneva Conventions remain the cornerstone of the Red Cross, a
movement that has seen an enormous expansion in membership over the years. The
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Geneva Conventions represent a fundamental stage in the history of humanitarian
action, first, because they enshrine the principle of neutrality applied to noncombatants, and second, because of the importance of the International Committee
of the Red Cross, universally recognized for its total respect for the principles of
neutrality and impartiality.
Dunant did not invent the concept of neutrality. Indeed, since the earliest times
there have been many examples of neutral behavior during conflicts and of bilateral
agreements aimed at respecting the wounded, civilians, and prisoners. But it was
Dunant who had the genius to see that the principle enshrined in a convention
would be universally respected. His wish has been realized; the four Conventions
now in force, signed in 1949, have now been ratified by almost every country in
existence today. Thanks to Dunant, the Red Cross is an agency backed by international law, to which it can refer when calling on warring parties to respect a certain
number of basic rules in regard to the treatment of the wounded, both prisoners
and civil populations.
However, despite this undeniable progress, the Red Cross principle of neutrality was soon brought into question and the difficulties that it presents have
not been resolved. First, the principle of neutrality certainly could be applied to
pitched battles between the armies of European countries that shared much of the
same ideology. But it was rendered null and void when, in the name of civilization, the white man attacked “barbarians.” Then humanitarian law ceased to apply.
The British, for example, after the battle of Omdurman, in the Sudan, did nothing
to assist fifteen thousand wounded enemy soldiers. Yet this was 1898, thirty years
after Britain had signed the first Geneva Convention.2 The principle of neutrality was conceived with a civil war in mind, or a war of two opposing comparable
forces. What relevance did it have in a war of aggression or in a case of systematic genocide such as that perpetrated by the Young Turks against the Armenians?
Chateaubriand, the French writer, gives the answer: “Such a neutrality is derisory
for it works against the weaker party and plays into the hands of the stronger party.
It would be better to join forces with the oppressors against the oppressed for at
least that would avoid adding hypocrisy to injustice.”
Second, although the Red Cross is a private institution, it has always depended
on national governments to enforce respect for humanitarian law. In order to
avoid embarrassing Convention signatories, it has constrained itself to the discrete silence that is an essential part of the Red Cross image. In fact, over several
decades the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has limited itself
to transmitting protests from one party to another during a conflict without ever
commenting on their validity. Meanwhile, many national Red Cross organiza-
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tions, far from being apolitical or neutral, seem to have taken on the role of faithful
government helpers.
The Red Cross grew up at the end of the nineteenth century, in a period of
liberal ideas. Lenin and, to a greater extent, Hitler confronted it with regimes that
were fundamentally opposed to the values on which it is founded. Forced to decide
between respect for humanitarian principles and the universality of the movement,
the Red Cross has always chosen the second alternative, persuaded—and not without reason—that only thus could it continue to play the role of a neutral intermediary in conflicts. The Red Cross has never broken off relations with a country’s
government—not with Mussolini, not with Lenin, and not with Nazi Germany,
not even when Jews were expelled from the German Red Cross.
Although this was not clearly understood at the time, it was when faced with
the “Final Solution” that the limits of humanitarian action really showed themselves. The Red Cross, as well as the Allies and the Vatican, knew about the terrible
reality of the Nazi extermination camps. And today it is still reproached for never
denouncing them and keeping silent about the largest-scale genocide in the twentieth century. Worse still, despite everything, the Red Cross tried to assist those held
in the death camps by handing over aid packages for them, without any control
whatsoever, to the German authorities. No matter the reasons the Red Cross presents as justification for its silence, the stance it took represents a black page in the
history of the movement.3 One result has been that the role played by the ICRC in
other domains (prisoners of war, tracking down and reuniting family members,
and so on) has received less attention than it deserves. Neutrality might have been
an issue in regard to the German and Allied armies, but how could it be evoked in
the face of the Nazi extermination camps? Organizations that aim to be “sans frontières” (“without borders”) were founded on lessons learned from that experience.
The inhuman must not be humanized; it must be denounced and it must be fought
against. Such organizations consider that they have a dual role to play: they provide
aid to victims in the field, but they also speak out as witnesses to intolerable events.
The Biafra crisis was another important stage in the evolution of the humanitarian movement. On one hand, it again underlined the limits of the Red Cross’s
“neutral” approach. It was unable to achieve an agreement between the two parties in order to allow food to get through to the Biafran enclave. It was a group of
churches that finally decided to disregard the objections of the Nigerian government and the Red Cross and launched an air bridge to the encircled Biafran secessionists.4 The churches thus invented the modern concept of humanitarian intervention, while making a significant breach in the principle of sovereignty that has
so often been used as an excuse for nonintervention, and that is still invoked today.
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The stance taken by the Western powers during the Biafran crisis foreshadowed the treatment of the Bosnian crisis, when all the major powers played the
humanitarian card without ever looking for a political solution. France, for example, openly encouraged Biafra to secede, but it neither recognized the secessionist
government nor provided arms to allow it to stand against Lagos. Unfortunately,
Biafra’s leaders soon learned that pictures of their starving children were the best
weapons for ensuring an international response and famine became inseparable
from the conflict itself.5 When the time came to sum up, it was clear that the
amount of humanitarian aid provided was always ridiculously small in comparison with the scale of the tragedy, although sufficient to allow the great powers to
maintain the illusion of an international commitment. The world was convinced
that it had flown to the rescue of Biafra: television images were proving more
convincing than reality.
The guerilla-style conflicts of the 1980s are an even clearer illustration of the
limits to neutrality. The Red Cross and UN agencies, refused access to guerilla
zones, had to chose between maintaining a presence that provided support exclusively to the government side or withdrawing completely. “Sans frontières” organizations were much better suited to provide assistance in that period of guerilla
wars. They could intervene clandestinely in most of these conflicts via neighboring
countries, in defiance of international law and the niceties of national sovereignty.
Unlike the Red Cross, this type of organization does not rely on humanitarian law
but on the backing of public opinion aroused by witness accounts of massacres
and aggression. Most of the larger-scale conflicts of the 1980s were indirect consequences of the growing influence of the USSR and her allies in developing countries, which became the battlefields where the Cold War was fought by proxy. As a
result, consciously or unconsciously, humanitarian aid became a powerful instrument in the anti-Soviet struggle throughout the world as more than 90 percent of
refugees during this period were fleeing from “progressive” regimes allied to the
USSR. Humanitarian assistance was provided both to populations that could only
be reached by the clandestine intervention of “sans frontières” organizations, and
to those in refugee camps set up on the borders of neighboring countries, which
also served as sanctuaries for the guerillas. It was at this time that the UN High
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), working in such refugee camps, developed
into one of the most important agencies in the aid system.
If it was during the 1980s that the serious flaws in the concept of humanitarian
neutrality became very apparent, it was in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda that
they came to be seen at their most perverse.
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Bosnia: The Placebo Effect
The war that was fought in Bosnia for over three years claimed two hundred thousand victims, most of them civilian, and turned four million people into refugees
and displaced persons. This conflict, the first on European soil since 1945, began
in April 1992, the day the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the
European Community (EC) and the United States. When Bosnian Serb forces,
with the support of the Yugoslav federal army, quickly seized almost 70 percent
of the new republic’s territory, the Western powers appeared to acquiesce in this
fait accompli, confining their response to reopening Sarajevo airport and deploying
Blue Helmets in an attempt to help those most in need.
Although newspaper editorials had forecast war in Bosnia month before it
finally broke out, there were no attempts to try to prevent it. The populations of
Bosnia’s towns and villages forced to leave their homes were not only the principle
victims of the combat, but also the target of the whole pitiless conflict. Europe,
reduced to the role of a charitable though powerless witness, raised no obstacle to
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, which was at times carried out under “humanitarian
protection.”
In fact, in a war being waged with the ultimate aim of excluding and expelling
a large part of the population, humanitarian workers faced an impossible dilemma.
There were two choices. Either they assisted people to evacuate so that they could
be protected, which inevitably helped to achieve the objectives of ethnic cleansing, or they refused to ally themselves with such inhumane acts and left people to
endure even more terrible suffering. The major preoccupation was no longer to
provide material assistance but to protect the people, which has never been in the
mandate of humanitarian organizations, but should have been included in that of
the Blue Helmets. Thus, humanitarian action was reduced to feeding the mass of
refugees. UNHCR representatives, delegated by the UN and EC to coordinate aid
in the former Yugoslavia, had to decide countless times during the conflict which
as the lesser of two such evils. Trying to protect refugees without having the power
to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place not only undermines
humanitarian principles but actually aggravates the problem.
Paradoxically, humanitarianism, while siding with the victims, also became
an arm of the aggressors. The Serbian army quickly realized the advantages to
be gained from opening up “corridors of ethnic cleansing” for those they were
expelling and bringing them to the “humanitarian front line.” Indeed, on several
occasions, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) directly contributed to the
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enforcement of ethnic cleansing by “helping” in the exchange of population. In
some ways, the humanitarian effort unintentionally served to help achieve Serbian
military objectives because the ethnic cleansers were only too happy to hand over
responsibility for the victims of their crimes to the international community.
The distribution of aid was subject to the acquiescence of the Serbs who opened
and closed the tap to the aid pipeline as and when it suited them, but never without
deducting a substantial levy. For more than a year, the encircled towns and villages
of eastern Bosnia received no aid at all as UNPROFOR convoys never used force
to get through.
Humanitarian arguments are used to explain the failure of governments to
make clear strategic decisions. But the real question is whether humanitarian work
should have been entrusted to UN troops in the first place. When peacekeepers
are sent into the middle of a way, they may be expected to use their weapons. If
relief work is impeded by violence, then the obvious role of armed UN troops is
to protect relief convoys and oppose the people who are obstructing them. Unlike
Somalia, in Bosnia the humanitarian problems were not the result of a general
breakdown of order but of Serbian aggression. If force had any role to play in relieving human suffering in Bosnia, it should have been used to protect the population
against the armed thugs who were massacring, raping, looting, and driving away
people from their homes. But that was never the intention.
Many NGOs wish governments would leave humanitarian work alone and
concentrate on the roles proper to them, which are political and military. In Bosnia
humanitarian problems had political causes that governments failed to acknowledge and deal with. UNPROFOR was used in a humanitarian role as the alibi for the
international community’s disastrous cop-out, making it appear something was
being done while failing miserably to react in the politico-military sphere, the only
arena for resolving the root causes.

From Total War to Total Humanitarianism
World War II taught Western democracies that no spoon is long enough for supping with the devil. “Never again!” cried Europe in unison, and a whole generation
grew up under the influence of this, rejecting all ideas of racial purity and territorial ambition. But this belief system was shattered the first time that Europe was
again confronted from within by a racist policy based on religion and ethnic group.
From that moment, history was forgotten and all the certainties and idealism flew
out of the window; the countries of Europe started to behave as if they had learned
nothing. Admittedly, there seemed only a small risk of the conflict spreading and
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becoming more generalized. Admittedly, Milosevic, or Karadzic, is not Hitler.
Nevertheless, the Bosnian disaster flouted all the ideals on which the European
democracies were founded in the aftermath of World War II, and no real attempt
was made to defend them.
It was Winston Churchill who developed the concept of a “total warfare against
Nazism, enforcing land, sea, and air blockades that even prevented food getting
through to Occupied Europe. The deterioration in health that inevitable resulted
was seen as a weapon in this form of total war where politics forced humanitarianism off the stage. Although this concept posed a dilemma from a humanitarian
point of view, the Allies were convinced that it was justifiable. In Bosnia, we passed
from one extreme to the other, from the concept of “total war” to that of “total
humanitarianism”; people were provided with food but not protection, and no
real political pressure was put on the aggressor. The logic of humanitarianism prevailed over the logic of a politics that did not dare exercise its prerogatives for fear
of endangering humanitarian efforts in the field. The question of what would have
been the best course of action from the victims’ point of view was made totally subordinate to that of how the international community could avoid involving itself
in military intervention. Certainly food got through to Sarajevo most of the time
and the impressive humanitarian effort saved the life of tens of thousands of people
throughout the area. Certainly the presence of the Blue Helmets on the group had
a moderating effect. But what about Vukovar, Gorazde, and Srebrenica? Should we
really be congratulating ourselves that fifty years after the creation of the UN we
were unable to stop that kind of slaughter?
Despite the sop it offered to European public opinion, in the short term,
humanitarianism achieved little. In the longer term, it served as an alibi for political impotence. Finally, in September 1995, under strong pressure from an American
government that finally decided to involve itself more actively, air strikes were
directed at Serb military targets and the Dayton Agreement led to the establishment
of a NATO-led international task. But it was all too late to avoid the inevitable: the
separation of Bosnia into separate, ethnically based ministates that may yet divide
even further. When they were confronted once again with Milosevic’s intransigence, this time in Kosovo, Europe and the United States utilized the hard lessons
learned from Bosnia.

Rwanda: From Indifference to Compassion
What took place in Rwanda between April and July 1994 was a genocide: and exceptional event in twentieth-century history. The term was first coined in 1944 by
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Raphael Lemkin6 and is the basis of the UN General Assembly’s convention committing member countries to punish and prevent genocide.7 This convention, passed
in 1949, defines genocide very specifically as those “acts committed with intent to
destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.” By applying it too generally,
this specific meaning has been so watered down, taken out of context, and misused
by those seeking to draw attention to other horrors that the real intention behind
this particular crime has been lost and the word genocide has become synonymous
with any act of mass murder. In fact, only three instances of mass slaughter the twentieth century can correctly be called genocide: the massacres of Armenians under
the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and 1916, the extermination of the Jews and Gypsies
under the Nazis, and the 1994 slaughter of almost 1 million Tutsis by Hutu militias
in Rwanda.8
When the massacres first began in Kigali, the world turned its back and the UN
decided to pull out its main body of Blue Helmets. Yet the death toll was increasing daily, and within four weeks it was estimated that almost a million people had
been killed. But the genocide could have been stopped early on if two moves had
been made. The UN could have used its troops to protect the churches, hospitals,
schools, and other places where Tutsis were desperately seeking refuge, and the UN
could have clearly recognized the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as the legitimate
government of Rwanda and broken off relations with the government that initiated
the genocide. Such measures would have changes the course of Rwanda’s history,
but they were not implemented. Again, the Security Council of the United Nations
decided to remain neutral and not to take sides with the RPF.
By the end of June 1994 the crises in Rwanda was seen exclusively as a humanitarian catastrophe affecting hundreds of thousands of (Hutu) refugees, arousing
international compassion, and completely distracting attentions from the genocide
that had more or less run its course because there were no more (Tutsi) victims
available for slaughter. As the RPF troops advances, the architects and instigators of
the genocide organized a mass exodus of the Hutu population into rapidly erected
refugee camps in Goma (Zaire) and Tanzania, or into the French-controlled security zone within Rwanda. The former government planned this deliberately so they
could claim that the RPF might have won the land, but not its people.
Humanitarian aid poured into the camps, fueled by the generosity of a public moved by television pictures of cholera victims in Goma. However, although
such aid may well be intended and based on sound principles, as had already been
pointed out, it can never be totally neutral. In this case, as so often elsewhere, it
represented almost the only source of food, equipment, and jobs in the camps
and thus became a major stake in the power struggle for control over the refugees.
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Humanitarian workers were continually confronted with the same problem: how
to aid the victims without getting caught up in the power game being played by
their oppressors, or in this case militias who were acting as the strong arm of the
politicians in the camps.
The problem was (is) that the refugees settled commune by commune in the
camps under the direction of the local leaders who had accompanied them. But this
situation posed a major ethical problem inasmuch as these leaders, who were also
implicated in the genocide, retained their authority over the refugees and passed on
instructions to them from the former government-in-exile. It is with such people
that the aid agency had to collaborate.
It is useful to draw a parallel here with the way in which the Khmer Rouge were
able to gain power over Cambodian refugees by manipulating humanitarian aid. At
the beginning of 1979 the Khmer Rouge, who were responsible for the massacre of
a million of their fellow Cambodians, fled before the advancing Vietnamese army.
Using force and propaganda, they took with them hundreds of thousands of civilians into refugee camps in the frontier area with Thailand, where they experienced
dreadful famine. The international community mobilized, although more slowly
than would happen today, and thousands of lives were saved. But the humanitarian
effort also fed the Khmer Rouge and inadvertently helped them to establish their
control over the refugee population, enabling them to continue the conflict for a
further decade.
It is clear that the international relief effort in Rwanda created a similar vicious
circle, fed by aid that could at worst grow into a future conflict and at best ensures
that the Hutu refugees remain in the camps. This is the result of treating the
Rwandan crisis as a purely humanitarian matter when it was first and foremost a
political issue. Other measures could have been taken, for example, early deployment of human rights observers in Rwanda, increasing the amount of aid distributed
directly though Kigali, reestablishing the justice system as quickly as possible, and
organizing a Nuremberg-style trial for the main instigators of the genocide. If the
right conditions had been provided, many humanitarian organizations were convinced that most of the refugees would have returned home. Instead, it is very likely
that the world will have to assist two million refugees for a period that could stretch
into years, war may well break out again, and further aid will be required for future
victims. Political inaction thus risks a much stronger negative effect on the situation
than the positive effects of the outpouring of solidarity that swept the world in 1994.
Humanitarian action provided a way of responding to the crisis while continuing conveniently to overlook the fact that a genocide had taken place, until
the situation had evolved to the point where it could be ignored completely. In a
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world where humanitarian aid seems almost the only international response to a
crisis, aid that neither can nor will make a distinction between different categories
of victim, all catastrophes are treated alike and reduced to their lowest common
denominator—compassion on the part of the onlooker. Certainly all victims merit
our care and consideration, whether they be Tutsis suffering as a result of genocide
or their murderers forced to become refugees and struck by cholera. Humanitarian
action is at the service of all victims: it seeks to care for and feed them and does not
take sides. But goodwill on its own is not enough and humanitarian aid is useless if
it is not accompanied by political action and efforts to achieve justice.
Humanitarian action transforms any dramatic event—crime, epidemics, natural disasters—into catastrophes for which it seems that nobody is every given the
blame. Humanitarianism also masks the obligation and the necessity to intervene
in other ways and acts as a defense against any possible future accusation of nonassistance to persons in danger. There are only a handful of individuals who might
risk speaking out in the middle of a catastrophe, when donations are rolling in, to
point out that giving food and drink to people who have lost everything in the wake
of horrendous massacres is only the least that can be done. Unfortunately, any kind
of debate along these lines is usually pursued when it is too late to be anything other
than theoretical. It only can be usefully carried on while a crisis is occurring and
some practical resolutions can be reached. Leave it too long and those who should
be accused of mass murder have succeeded in rehabilitating themselves politically
and become parties to the debate.
In short, confronted with the first unquestionable genocide since the Nazi
Holocaust, the world reacted with indifference. It was the sight of hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring out of Rwanda and the subsequent cholera epidemic that
aroused compassion and led to a purely humanitarian intervention. This was a convenient cover-up for nonintervention at the political or military level and allowed
Western governments to look good because they appeared to be doing something.
The refusal of the UN and the principle countries that should have been involved
to take a firm stand against the former criminal regime in Rwanda allowed them
to remain neutral in the face of the planned extermination of a population. But the
concept of neutrality has no sense when genocide is being carried out.

The Limits of Humanitarian Action
Humanitarian action has acquired a monopoly on morality and international action
in ongoing wars of a local nature. But if it is not coupled with political action and
justice, it is doomed to failure: it can work as a palliative, not as a panacea. Even
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worse, when held up to the limelight by the media for its work during a major crisis,
it becomes little more than a plaything of international politics, a conscience-saving
gimmick. There is an enormous disparity today between the principles and values
proclaimed by our democratic societies on the one hand, and the measures taken to
defend them on the other. In summary, although we may take great satisfaction in
commemorating past victories over tyranny, the historical lesson was not sufficiently
well absorbed to move us into action against the first indisputable genocide since
World War II in Rwanda or the return of ethnic cleansing to the heart of Europe.
For the international community to claim neutrality is a shaky defense of inaction. To be neutral is defined in the dictionary as “not assisting either party in the
case of war between other states.”9 The Red Cross is more specific: “In order to
maintain the confidence of all parties, the Red Cross withholds from taking sides
in hostilities and never takes sides in political, racial, religious or philosophical
controversies.” This is a radical interpretation of neutrality that suits the very specific mandate of the Red Cross (especially in regard to prisoners of war). However,
if applied generally by the international community, NGOs, the UN, and individual states, there may be disastrous consequences for populations in danger.
A claim of neutrality makes no sense at all in the case of genocide, where neutrality is reduced to the weakest possible definition of “indifference” and succeeds
only in removing every distinction between the victims and those who victimize
them. A number of humanitarian organizations have founded a very comfortable
refuge in neutrality on the intellectual level, which provides them with an excuse
not to question the sense or the consequences of humanitarian action. Indeed,
neutrality can become a refuge large enough to accept inhuman policies.
Whether working at the heart of conflicts, the course of which they influence, or whether faced with governments and totalitarian parties that are void of
any scruple, humanitarian organizations are always faced with two recurring and
related questions in the long term: first, to use the expression of William Shawcross,
“how to feed the victims without also providing aid to their tormentors,”10 and second, how to avoid humanitarian aid involuntarily having a negative effect on the
victims instead of improving their situation. These questions often take on sharper
meaning in extreme crisis situations. It is self-evident that humanitarian action
saves human lives. But it also risks a series of induced and secondary consequences
that are extremely important. In Somalia, food and other resources provided by
the humanitarian organizations help keep the conflict alive because gangs of armed
bandits also benefit from it. Such aid often helps to prolong and modify the course
of a conflict in other ways, because humanitarian organizations require authorization from the warring parties in order to have access to victims and this renders
them vulnerable to blackmail, manipulation, and all sorts of other pressures.
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Alternative Reactions
Diagnosis
A doctor’s duty toward a sick patient is first to establish a diagnosis before undertaking a treatment, and this principle should be applied just as systematically by the
international community when faced with a crisis situation. We have too often seen
a cure attempted before any serious analysis of the situation has been carried out.
This results in a rash and unreflective prescribing of the type that largely explains
the failures in international responses to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
Intervention should be a question of timely reaction motivated by political rather
than humanitarian intentions. When the UN has to deal with a deadly conflict,
it should analyze what is at stake for the parties involved, particularly the civilian
population, and then base its response on a clear distinction between two kinds of
conflict.
On the one hand, there may be a clear-cut, unilateral aggression by a very much
stronger party against another. In such cases, the UN cannot remain neutral. It
must stand with the victims and the “weaker side” against the aggressor, and military intervention should at least be seriously considered. However, given that this
might entail a risk of involvement over a long period, urgent consideration should
also be given to other possible actions, including the use of diplomatic or economic
sanctions. What is important is that the international community show a clear
signal that it will no longer stand by helplessly in the face of massacres and the
slaughter of civilians.
In Bosnia, during the spring and summer of 1992, a choice had to be made
between allowing Serbia’s Milosevic and Karadzic to seize territory and practice
ethnic cleansing and supporting the multinational government led by Bosnia’s
President Izetbegovic. The second alternative was the only one worthy of honest
consideration. In Rwanda, as soon as it became obvious that Habyarimana’s regime
and his armed forces were conducting a genocide, the only morally responsible
choice was to support the forces of the RPF, who could have halted the genocide.
In cases such as these, it should be clear which is the right choice to make.
On the other hand, the conflict may take the form of a general breakdown
in civil order with no clear-cut issues, no central authority in command, and an
increasing number of warring factions and militias out of control. This would
describe the situations in Somalia. The UN must recognize that very little can be
done to prevent or stop this kind of conflict without force, and that its role is to
avoid the ultimate collapse of the state and the prolonged suffering of civilians.
Every diplomatic measure must be considered, and the earlier the better; the art of
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preventive diplomacy should be practiced far more often. Humanitarian assistance
must, of course, be maintained impartially throughout the course of this type of
conflict.
Most crises are a complex mixture of both models and there are some conflicts that do not fit neatly into either description; therefore, diagnosis is even more
essential. Other political considerations complicate the situation even more. It is
clear that it is not possible to react in the same way to Russia’s intervention in
Chechnya as to, for example, an attack on Belize by Guatemala. The principal point
that must be recognized is that the international community and the UN failed in
Rwanda and Bosnia because of a refusal to define and categorize the crises before
responding to them.
Impartiality
“Neutrality” is a highly problematic concept. By the official Red Cross definition, “it
means not taking sides—military or ideological—in hostilities or engaging at any
time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.” This is a
radical definition. This definition presumes that no distinction is made between, for
example, a racist authoritarian regime and democratic forces, between victims and
their executioners. It also presumes that the crimes committed cannot be qualified
because the parties to a conflict will never agree on the meaning of terms such as
genocide or crimes against humanity. This definition of neutrality seems dangerous
as it takes no account of the necessary distinction between criminal and other politically motivated actions, or the level of gravity of the acts committed.
There is an alternative to neutrality that does not pose these kinds of problems
and that is impartiality. Whereas neutrality focuses on the warring parties, impartiality focuses on the victims as individuals. In this sense, impartiality means making no distinction between the victims with regard to race, ethnic origin, political,
philosophical, religious, or other beliefs. In humanitarian terms, it primarily means
to stress equality of all those who are in distress, with only priority given based on
the acuteness of the need for help. It does not mean reserving judgment of a political nature, but rather recognizing the validity and rights of an individual in distress.
Were this concept to be emphasized by the international community and its official
bodies (the UN and so on) in situations of deadly conflict, the rights of the victims
would pass before that of any such ambiguous concept or excuse of neutrality of
sovereignty. There would then be greater freedom to react in a variety of ways, and
countries could no longer refuse to do more than provide an exclusively humanitarian response.
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Justice
It is essential that those responsible for formulating, instigating, and carrying out
genocide, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleaning be brought to trial. Justice
is not only a moral imperative but also a political necessity: Ensuring that justice
is seen to be done will discourage others from carrying out further mass crimes.
Justice is necessary not only for the victims, but also for international order. There
is an enormous potential in the world today for crises with an ethnic dimension.
The greatest threat to society internationally is the rebirth of racist ideologies, with
their racial hierarchies that reject and exclude all others. Only the threat of punishment for mass murder will make leaders think twice before playing the ethnic card
to tighten their slacking grip on power. Justice must play a more important role
in international relations and could become a powerful instrument of preventive
diplomacy.

Conclusion
Humanitarian action sometimes shows humanity at its most noble, providing
assistance to victims, fellow human beings trying to regain control over their own
destiny. When the international community, supposedly still acting in the name
of humanity, reduces human beings to the status of mere biological organisms by
providing food in the place of the military and political support they so desperately
need and ask for,11 then it must stand accused of complicity in a massive crime
against humanity: nonassistance to people in danger. It must be states one more
time that passing food through the window when nothing is being done to get the
assassin out of the house is not a humanitarian act. When hostages are taken, the
first priority is to overcome the hostage takers, not to feed the hostages while they
are eliminated one by one.
To sum up, humanitarian problems are always the result of some more profound problem and cannot be solved by humanitarian means alone. In cases of
aggression, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the international community
can no longer invoke neutrality and be satisfied with an exclusively humanitarian
approach, rendering it an accomplice to the most criminal regimes. If humanitarian
assistance is to be worthy of its name, it must work in parallel with efforts to meet
the demands of justice and respect for human rights.
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Torture
Timothy W. Harding, M.D.

Torture has been and remains a constant in human society; its history is closely
linked to the evolution of state powers and the exercise of authority.1 In all circumstances, the notion of torture has two essential elements: the purposeful infliction
of pain, usually described as excruciating, and an ulterior motive in the interests
of the authority responsible for the torture.2 The pain can be either physical or
psychological in nature, and most authorities would accept that provoking intense
fear through mock executions or threats to family members can be considered a
form of acute psychological pain. Furthermore, the notion of humiliation is considered by many authorities as central to the process of torture, being antinomic to
the principle of human dignity at the origin of modern concepts of human rights.
The most frequently cited motive for torture is the extraction of a confession
or the obtainment of information during interrogation. The Japanese word for
torture, gomon,
is made up of two kanji, the first, rather rarely used in Japanese
language, meaning “to flog” or “to beat,” and the second a commonly used kanji
meaning “to question.” However, torture is also used as a form of punishment,
intimidation, and coercion outside the interrogation process. The use of torture on
a large segment of the population, including rape and mutilations, is recognized as
a means of intimidation against populations or minorities.3
The word for torture in most European languages is derived from the Latin “to
twist” or “to distort,” reflecting techniques of torture involving forcible extension
of the body or twisting of limbs, provoking intense musculoskeletal pain. The word
can also be taken to reflect the fundamental distortion in the human relationship
between the torturer and the tortured person. It should be recognized that, as well
as the tortured person’s losing his or her fundamental human dignity and suffering long-term consequences, both psychological and physical, the torturer is
also debased and humiliated by his activity. A key question, therefore, is why individuals are prepared to torture. At one time, it was thought that only particularly
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sadistic individuals were capable of committing torture. However, psychological
experiments show clearly that most normal individuals are capable of inflicting
even apparently intense pain under experimental conditions.4 It is the perception
of the victim and his or her difference and inferiority, as well as dangerousness,
that allows individuals with a normal psychological makeup to commit acts of torture. A striking example is the systematic rape of civilian women by soldiers during
armed conflict, for example when the Japanese Imperial Army entered Nanking in
1937,5 or, by Serb forces during the war in Bosnia. In both instances, there was an
open permissiveness and even encouragement by senior military officers, as well as
a perception of Chinese or Muslim women as racially inferior.

Brief Historical Review
Paradoxically, it is easiest to provide a well-documented account of torture in early
civilizations in ancient Greece and Rome, as well as in the Middle Ages in Europe up
until the eighteenth century, than in the modern world.6 This is because torture was
openly practiced and was part of judicial procedure, both during investigation and
as part of punishment. In both ancient Greece and Rome, slaves were systematically
tortured if they were involved in a judicial procedure, whether as accused or simple
witnesses, in order that their testimony could be heard in court. The earliest debates
about torture come from Roman times, when both Seneca and Cicero criticized the
torture of free men as being likely to lead to false confessions: “Even the innocent
may lie when tortured.” This is a utilitarian and legalistic argument against torture,
rather than a moralistic or humanitarian opposition. Saint Augustine is often cited
as the first to oppose torture on the grounds of its moral perversity. However, even
his opposition is centered on the risk of punishing a person for a crime falsely confessed under torture. He did not take a clear position against the humiliation and
infliction of pain during criminal procedures or as part of punishment.
The late Middle Ages and the period of the Reformation and CounterReformation saw an institutionalization and reutilization of torture; many woodcuts of this period give explicit details of torture instruments and methods. The
use of torture was common during the times of religious divide. The use of torture
during the period of the Inquisition in Spain has probably been exaggerated and its
main victims were not religious dissenters but the Jewish and Moorish minorities.
In the eighteenth century, during the period of the Enlightenment, the first
clearly enunciated oppositions to torture on moral and humanitarian grounds
were published by Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hobbes. Their philosophical position
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was linked to the new concept of the relationship between the individual and the
state enshrined in the American Constitution and the Declaration of Rights of the
Citizen following the French Revolution.
Torture was first abolished in Sweden in 1734, and almost all European countries had abolished torture from the provisions of criminal procedure by the early
nineteenth century.
There is surprisingly little written about the effects of this prohibition on interrogation procedures, and only fragmentary accounts of torture exist after its abolition in nineteenth-century Europe. Many political activists claimed to have been
beaten or subject to prolonged solitary confinement, particularly in czarist Russia.
In North America and Europe, the term “third degree” method came into use for
police questioning of difficult suspects, and certainly involved methods that today
would be considered as torture. It was the unprecedented and systematic abuses
committed by the Third Reich and the Japanese Imperial Forces in the form of
genocide, other forms of mass murder, human experimentation, and abuse of prisoners that led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the outright prohibition of torture in any form.
It is only a little over sixty years ago that torture was prohibited in a series of
interlocking provisions of international law; nevertheless, all objective assessments
about the prevalence of torture in the world today lead to the conclusion that systematic torture occurs in one form or another in the majority of states despite
the fact that they have confirmed their adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and have ratified the United Nations’ International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Article 7 of this covenant reads: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”7
Torture is also prohibited in times of armed conflicts by the Common Article 3 to
the Geneva Conventions. It is outlawed by the 1994 United Nations’ Convention
Against Torture. In the statute of the International Criminal Court, torture is recognized as a crime against humanity when it is committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.
Torture is, therefore, one of the few issues in which international human rights
and humanitarian law is unambiguous and for which no exceptions are provided. For example, under the European Convention of Human Rights, any high
contracting party may take measures derogating from its obligation under the
Convention in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation. However, no derogation is permitted for Article 3, prohibiting torture.8
The provisions of international law prohibiting torture did not give clear definitions of what would constitute torture. In most texts, the concept is linked to that
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of inhuman and degrading treatment, while the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966) indicated that being subjected to medical or scientific
experimentation without free consent is a particular form of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
The definitions were to come from several sources; first, through the work of
the European Court of Human Rights (and later the complementary European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment of 1989). In the decision concerning the case of Ireland versus
the United Kingdom over techniques of “interrogation in depth” carried out
by the British Army in Northern Ireland, the court ruling included a detailed
account of wall standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and
deprivation of food and drink, which were considered as a violation of Article 3
of the European Convention. The reports emanating by the Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CPT), set up by the 1989 Convention also give some detailed consideration as to
what constitutes torture.
Second, the reports of the special reporter of the UN Commission of Human
Rights investigating torture on a global scale also provide descriptions of the wide
variety of abuse and treatment that should be considered as torture.
In 1975, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a declaration on
Protection from Torture, in which torture is defined as “an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.” The essential
elements in the definition are the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, at the instigation of a public official. Torture is thus
defined as an intentional act under the authority of the state with the purpose of
obtaining information or a confession, but also as a punishment or to intimidate.
The 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture has a closely similar definition, although the role of a “public official or other person acting in an official
capacity” is widened to include not only direct infliction but also instigation, consent, or acquiescence. Both definitions from the United Nations exclude “pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to lawful sanctions.”
Torture is most commonly associated with attempts by security forces to deal
with dissent, insurrection, terrorism or other perceived threats to the authority
of the state. One example is the widespread and indiscriminate torture by security forces in Syria9. Those in Britain, France and the United States who condemn
the abuses in Syria should not forget the systematic use of torture by the British
during the Mau Mau uprising, 1952–1960, and by the French during the Algerian
War, 1952–1960.10 In both cases the use of torture by the colonial power provoked
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“retaliatory” torture by the other side. Military occupation is a potent trigger of
torture, as in the territories occupied by Israel or in the aftermath of the Iraq war
of 2003. Although public attention was seized by photographic records of the abuse
of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison, the violations were part of a much wider pattern
of ill treatment of persons detained by Coalition Forces revealed in a report of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the United States government
in 2004.11 The ICRC refers to “prisoners of war and other protected persons under
the Geneva Conventions.” This was in fact a contentious issue, since the US attorney general at the time, Alberto Gonzales, considered that such detainees should be
considered as unlawful combatants and therefore not under the protection of the
Geneva Conventions. He also considered detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay
detention center as “unlawful combatants,” thus authorizing an array of techniques
used during interrogation which amount clearly to torture.12 Some of the methods
were reminiscent of those used by the British security forces in Northern Ireland
during the 1970s and condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in
1978 but in addition “waterboarding,” a refinement of simulated drowning (“submarine”) used by security forces in Latin America with the knowledge and tacit
approval of US security services in the 1970s. However spurious Alberto Gonzales’
argument may be in international law, it clearly illustrates the tendency of executive
authorities to legitimize torture as a response to terrorism. The Turkish authorities had the same reflex in their handling of detainees during the uprising by the
Kurdish minority and also of members of left wing revolutionary movements.
However, torture can readily become a pervasive practice by the police in dealing with “ordinary criminals” as was the case in Turkey until recently and is still
frequent in many post–Soviet bloc countries. For this reason, a case study, “the
Angelova affair,” is recounted to underline that torture occurs in apparently banal
circumstances.
Case Study: The Angelova Affair
A seventeen-year-old boy was seen by the police hanging around parked cars in
a small town in Bulgaria.13 He was chased and apprehended by a policeman and
was then seen by members of the public handcuffed to a tree while the police carried out a search of the area. He was taken to the local police station. No written
detention order was issued and the register did not have an entry for him. The following morning, the boy was taken by the police to a local hospital, where he was
pronounced dead shortly afterward. An autopsy established that the cause of death
was internal bleeding in the brain as a result of a fractured skill around the left eye-
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brow. The autopsy report established that the trauma had occurred between four
and six hours prior to his death. There were also marks of recent trauma on several
other parts of the body. The medical legal conclusions were therefore clear: the boy
had died as a result of a blow received while in police custody, furthermore, there
had been a delay of several hours before the boy was brought to hospital; when he
arrived, it was too late to provide any care.
Since the police were involved, the criminal investigation into the boy’s death
was taken over by a military investigator, who appointed five medical experts from
the police and military to reexamine the conclusions. Without providing any fresh
evidence or arguments, the experts concluded that the trauma could have been
received more than ten hours before the death, and, therefore, prior to his arrest.
On this basis, the investigation was terminated. No administrative or discipline
reaction of any kind was taken.
So ends a typical case of death in custody, giving rise to serious suspicions of ill
treatment and possible torture by the police, investigated by another state authority, which concluded clearly that no abuse had occurred. If we add that the victim
belonged to the Roma ethnic group, a minority subject to discrimination and
social exclusion in many Eastern European countries, we can understand easily
why such a boy could be subject to abuse by the police and why the government’s
investigation was so half-hearted and inconclusive.
The story would normally end there, had Bulgaria not ratified the European
Convention of Human Rights in 1992. With the support of an NGO and a human
rights activist lawyer, the boy’s mother made an application to the European Court
of Human Rights on the basis of Article 2 of the European Convention, which guarantees the right to life. The mother complained simply of an unexplained death in
police custody, the failure to provide adequate medical care, and the ineffectiveness of the subsequent investigation. The proceedings before the court established
that the police had manipulated the detention records and that the government’s
explanation of the death was implausible. The police had delayed provision of
medical assistance and this contributed in a decisive manner to the fatal outcome.
Therefore, there had been a violation of the state’s obligation to protect the life of
persons in custody. Furthermore, the court considered that the investigation carried out by the military authority lacked the “requisite objectivity and thoroughness.” In particular, the police officers were never asked to explain why detention
records had been forged and why they had given false information on the boy’s
arrival at the hospital.
The court went further in its condemnation of the Bulgarian government by
concluding that the injuries shown at the autopsy were clear signs of inhuman
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treatment. It was therefore concluded that a violation of Article 3, which prohibits
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, had also occurred.
Finally, the court considered the mother’s complaint that the police’s abusive treatment was based on their discriminatory perception of him as a gypsy was
grounded on “serious arguments,” but proof beyond the reason brought out had
not been provided.
The mother received €19,000 in nonpecuniary damages.
This case is recounted in some detail in order to demonstrate how easy it is
for inhuman treatment amounting to torture and death to occur while in custody,
particularly when the victim is from a minority group; and how difficult it is to
investigate and bring to account the perpetrators.
Allegations, Denial, and Impunity
The clarity of the legal prohibition of torture is limited by the difficulties of investigation, which in turn leads to the widespread problem of impunity and denial.
On each occasion, when reputable human rights organizations such as Amnesty
International or Human Rights Watch provide well-documented reports of torture
in a particular country, there is a ritual exchange of documented allegations followed by official denials.
One example of such an exchange: on Monday, February 12, 2001, the BBC
World Service reports as a main news item:
The human rights group Amnesty International says torture and ill treatment of
prisoners and detainees in China has become “widespread and systematic;” the
victims are members of the banned Falun Gong spiritual movement, Muslim
separatists in Xinjiang, prisoners in Tibet, many of whom who were reported to
have died in custody. Amnesty suggested that the Chinese government’s commitment to curb torture was often undermined by its directives to use “every
means” in anticorruption campaigns and political crackdowns. Furthermore,
the torture and inhuman treatment were often carried out almost publicly in
order to “instill fear and discipline.”
The message is therefore clear: commitments to end torture do not survive
government drives against political opponents or what are perceived as dangers to
the fabric of society, such as corruption or separatist or religious movements.
The following day, Tuesday, February 13, 2001, the BBC World Service News
carried the rejection by China’s Foreign Ministry of the report by Amnesty
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International. “The allegations are totally groundless,” the Foreign Ministry’s
spokesman was quoted as saying. Later in the same week, the BBC News carried
a further item in which a senior Chinese government official denied the allegations of torture and inhuman treatment of members of the Falun Gong spiritual
movement. This spokesman accused the Falun Gong of being politically motivated
and “maiming and killing people.” He gave the example of the recent immolation
of five Falun Gong members in Tiananmen Square as a testimony to the group’s
inhumanity and deadliness. Furthermore, the official protested about the interference from the outside in China’s internal affairs, in particular the protests by the
European Parliament at that time concerning violation of human rights in Tibet,
the destruction of mosques, and the arrests of teachers of the Koran.
We can see therefore that the problem of torture is not limited to individual
occurrences of ill treatment in police custody, prisons, or other state detention
centers, however common they may be. Torture is intimately linked to the powers
of the state, the belief by those in authority of the need to defend, at all costs, the
state’s authority and policies, and the perception of individuals and groups as dangerous to the state. The denial of torture by governments is always accompanied by
reminders of threats against the state and the dangerousness of certain minorities.
The unspoken message is, of course: if torture does occur, it is because it is necessary to defend the state.
The ritual waltz between human rights organizations and governments, with
its well-defined, prearranged steps of allegation and denial, occurs dozens of times
every year. China, Egypt, Burma, Israel, Russia, Guantanamo, Turkey—the list
goes on and on, and the dance always remains the same. And, to be honest, our own
perception of these allegations is invariably related to our feelings about the regime
concerned. The ritual exchange quoted here took place early in 2001. Since then, of
course, the ritual has evolved further: every government response to allegations of
torture mentions the threat of terrorism.

Is the Prohibition of Torture in International Law Credible?
The issue of torture today therefore exposes not only the deep-seated fault line
about the relationship between the state and vulnerable individuals or groups, but
also the very credibility of International Human Rights Law. We have to ask the
question whether we are not living an illusion. The unequivocal outlawing of torture in human rights instruments has become a cruel farce in relation to what actually happens in police commissariats, interrogation centers, and prisons in most
countries of the world. By participating as lawyers, medical experts, international
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civil servants, or academics in the ongoing debates and processes at the international level, while ignoring what really happens in the shadows of states’ power and
structures, we are actively participating in this farce. Would it not be more honest
to face up to the ineffectiveness, the impotence, of International Human Rights
Law in the face of the power and prerogatives of individual states?
Such a position might seem heretical to most observers of the human rights
scene and participants in international organizations and NGO militants. It would
be seen as an acknowledgement of defeat, a surrender, or, in more subtle terms, an
appeasement. However, such a position would be more in line with historical reality. Torture has existed under all civilizations. (We should perhaps pause a moment
to note the paradoxical nature of this simple statement: Can torture really be part
of a civilization? Or does civilization necessarily imply some form of state authority
that, in turn, opens the way to torture and inhuman treatment?) Well, according
to historical perceptions of civilization, torture has almost always been an integral
part of it; the question is whether it always will be. As indicated above, for most of
recorded history, torture has been a formal part of juridical procedure, used for
obtaining information, forcing confessions, and also for punishment and execution. In China and Japan, torture practices are reflected in specific language and
terminology, which was found also in the detailed, almost obsessional, inventory
of torture techniques and instruments developed in Europe in the late Middle Ages
and during the Inquisition.
The persistence of torture in the so-called modern era of human rights since
1948 leads us to two kinds of analysis. First, whether torture is the inevitable
response of the state under threat, for example in time of war, when faced with acts
of terrorism or deep-seated social ills, and second, how it is that the complex and
wide-ranging provisions of international law are so consensual in public discourse
and so ineffectual in reality. Law can only be understood in a historical context, and
International Human Rights Law is no exception. The preamble of the Universal
Declaration describes the context clearly: “Whereas disregard and contempt for
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience
of mankind . . .” It is therefore a reaction to the horrors of the Third Reich and the
Japanese Imperial occupying armies in the middle of the last century. The preamble
also places the inherent dignity of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.
This was a period when the concept of the state was undergoing a fundamental
change. Keynesian economics and the foundation of the welfare state were changing the relationship between the individual citizen and the authorities. It was clearly
seen that genocide, torture, mass rape, and abusive human experimentation undermined the dignity not only of victims, but also of perpetrators and the state itself.
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Eleanor Roosevelt described the “basic character” of the Universal Declaration in
these terms: “It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement; it is not . . .
a statement of law or of legal obligation; it is a declaration of human rights and
freedoms . . . to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all
nations.” It was time, therefore, that the people and the nation could be placed
on the same footing with an appeal to the dignity of both. The powers of the state
should be limited and could not be used to undermine or threaten human dignity.
The aim was clearly to eradicate the kind of relationship that had existed between
the Nazi regime and Jews, gypsies, and the mentally ill, or the Japanese military
forces and the civilian population in Nanking or Manchuria.
The failure of International Human Rights Law to reduce substantially the
practice of torture is part of wider failure of international public law. The proliferation of conventions covering women, children, minority groups, indigenous
peoples, the disabled, the mentally ill, and many others, are all flawed by the
absence or the inadequacy of enforcement procedures. The special reporters of
the United Nations Commission of Human Rights are often hampered in their
work by governments, and there is more and more resistance to the idea of international investigative powers and jurisdiction. The idea that International Human
Rights Law would progressively influence national law has had some success, and
many countries have enacted laws criminalizing torture. However, there has been
little success in fields such as the investigation, exposure, and sanctions against
torture. Many government leaders express satisfaction about the growing body of
Human Rights Law but are resistant to its direct application for vulnerable people.
A substantial part of International Human Rights Law law is therefore essentially
cosmetic.
The European Exception
The most fertile ground for the realization of the human rights approach has provided, without any doubt, to be Europe. The political and economic context, the
recent traumatizing experiences of the Second World War, lent themselves to a
proactive approach to human rights, going further than the hortatory tone of the
United Nations’ texts. Thus, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome in 1950 opens with the statement that
the “Western European” governments were resolved “to take the first steps for the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.”
However presumptuous this might seem to the rest of the world, it is undoubtedly
true that investigation and enforcement are excessively weak, if not entirely absent,
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from almost all International Human Rights Law. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the investigation and punishment of torture is so ineffective and weak at
the national level. However, the European Convention did put into place procedures that allowed for the first time an independent supranational body to investigate allegations of human rights violations committed by state parties themselves.
Furthermore, the complaints could be launched not only by other state parties, but
also by individuals. Thus, in 1978, the court condemned the United Kingdom for
systematic violations of Article 3 during the interrogation of Irish Republican Army
(IRA) suspects arrested and interrogated by military investigators in Northern
Ireland. The court has rendered a number of other decisions on the Article 3 of the
Convention in recent years, for example the interrogation of detainees in Chechnya
(also the subject of two public statements made by the CPT).
It was rapidly recognized that the impact of the court was limited by its lack
of investigative power, especially in situations of detention and interrogation. The
revelations at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s of abusive interrogation
techniques and falsification of evidence in cases against suspected terrorists in
Britain, which had led to prolonged imprisonment of many innocent individuals,
shocked many people.
It was at this time that the Council of Europe introduced a new convention with
extraordinary powers of access to places of detention and with the explicit objective
of preventing torture and inhuman or degrading treatment: the CPT. In the early
years of the CPT’s work, visits and investigations were carried out, which allowed,
for the first time, a rather detailed picture of the anatomy, physiology, and pathology
of systematic torture to be described. It is not surprising that the early reports of the
CPT on visits to Turkey remained unpublished for many years (the reports from
the early 1990s detailing widespread and systematic torture were only made public
in 1998). Although the sinister interrogation rooms that were a constant feature
of Turkish police commissariats have been replaced over the last few years by less
intimidating premises and allegations of torture are less frequent, elsewhere allegations of police violence are on the increase. Clearly, both the European Court and
the CPT have much work to do, especially as their remit now extends from Lisbon to
Vladivostok. The commitment of the forty-odd members of the Council of Europe
to collectively prevent and banish torture has therefore achieved some impressive
results. Furthermore, the CPT has widened the scope of its work progressively to
cover not only police stations and prisons but also psychiatric hospitals, detention
centers for immigrants, and juvenile detention centers. However, the existence of
the European Court and the CPT did not prevent the extrajudicial detention of terrorist suspects subject to rendition in at least two European states.
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From the earliest years of the Council’s existence, there was, however, a deeply
hypocritical vein to this commitment. France and Great Britain, the self-declared
defenders of human rights and democratic values, were becoming embroiled in
long and drawn out colonial wars. We now have convincing evidence of the systematic and extensive use of torture and illegal killings as the violent struggle for
independence evolved in Africa and Southeast Asia. It is now clear that the most
senior military commanders and government ministers were fully aware of these
abuses over the period of 1952–1960 and, indeed, provided additional resources
and expertise. Thus, in both Malaya and Kenya, the British set up so-called reeducation camps for terrorists, involving prolonged sensory deprivation, humiliation, mock executions, and unrelenting physical abuse. France is trying to come to
terms with the admissions by most senior military officers of widespread torture
and illegal killings during the Algerian war, 1954–1962. The revelations and apologies or, in a least one case, unrepenting justification are at the same time moving
and disturbing.
All these instances of documented and confessed torture help us to understand
better the nature of torture and the fundamental distortion of human relationships
that are implied. The Bulgarian policeman’s perception of a Roma adolescent is of
the same order as the Japanese soldier’s perception of a young woman in Nanking
when the Imperial Army entered in 1937, the same as British interrogation officers’ toward Catholic terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland, or of the British and
French army faced with military uprisings by people who, until then, had been
colonial subjects.
The Medical Profession and Torture
It is widely believed that doctors can and should play an important role in the
fight against torture.14 First, they have the competence and expertise to detect and
document torture. When they examine prisoners or ex-prisoners, they may observe
physical lesions or the psychological consequences of abuse. Doctors who work
regularly in prisons or visit police stations can use epidemiological models to follow
the incidence of certain kinds of injuries and draw conclusions about the overall
prevalence of physical abuse. They are also able to observe certain patterns of injury
and correlate them with type of torture. The forensic pathologist has a special role
for cases of death in custody, providing objective and irrefutable evidence of traumatic lesions, their pattern, and timing.
However, this role is limited by the fact that some doctors working for the
state are not free to speak out and may be fearful of authoritarian regimes. Indeed,
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there are many well-documented cases of doctors who have spoken out about
cases of torture who have been arrested, mistreated, and even tortured themselves. Doctors, who occupy a privileged position in all societies, should be able
to criticize the authorities more freely than ordinary citizens, especially if they
have the support of professional organizations. However, this is not always the
case, despite the fact that most national medical associations are affiliated with
the World Medical Association, which has codified the responsibilities of doctors
in relation to torture in the 1975 Declaration of Tokyo. Another limitation is the
fact that many doctors are not trained to carry out forensic examinations; few
doctors can accurately detect the signs of asphyxia and interpret different kinds
of bruising or abrasions. The British Medical Association has been particularly
active in leading the campaign of “doctors against torture.” The association published a substantial report on torture in 1986,15 followed by a remarkable publication, Medicine Betrayed: The Participation of Doctors in Human Rights Abuses,
published in 1992,16 in which the active role of doctors in a process of torture and
human rights abuses is extensively documented. The conclusions about doctors’
motives for participating in torture are probably applicable to other professional
groups working for the state, particularly police officers, army interrogation
experts, and prison guards. The seminal study in this field is Lifton’s account of
the Nazi doctors, which puts emphasis on the way in which societal pressures
progressively distorted medical ethical values.17 This view has been elaborated
by Staub, who also emphasizes the role of military training and obedience, the
tendency to “blame the victim,” and, above all, the discrimination against and
labeling or devaluing of a victim group.18 Nazi doctors were thus living in a society where fundamental human values had been denied; they, therefore, yielded to
the psychological process of fear and threat of loss of their professional identity
by adopting the credo of assigning a subhuman status to Jews, gypsies, and the
mentally ill.
An important stimulus to medical involvement in the fight against torture has
been the role of medical journals. Until 1985, there were very few articles or editorials in the field of prison medicine, human rights, or torture published in medical
journals. Since then, the lead has been taken by certain editors, in particular in the
Lancet, British Medical Journal, and New England Journal of Medicine, to open their
columns to accounts of torture by doctors working for humanitarian organizations, as well as to more scholarly accounts of torture victims. Overall, the number
of papers on the subject of torture (to be found in citation lists) has grown from
between ten and twenty in 1985 to well over a hundred articles published each year
since 2000.
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Ambivalence
Torture and inhuman treatment are a fault line that runs deep and long in almost
every human society. Its history is as long as the history of state power and its geographical distribution is planetary. Since the prohibition of torture in international
human rights law, we can best describe the attitude of the state authorities toward
torture as ambivalent. The risk factors, to employ a public health model, are clear:
detention for interrogation, deep-seated perception of inferiority of the victim, and
the conviction that the state is under threat (the so-called war on terrorism syndrome) certainly increase the risk of torture of those arrested as terrorist suspects.
Methods of Torture

1. Beating: Kicks, fists, truncheons, canes (lathi), whips (sjambok), electric cables,
plastic bags, falanga (beating of soles of feet), telefono (beating of both ears
with palms)
2. Postural: Prolonged standing, suspension (Palestinian hanging), extension,
binding/fixed position, confined space
3. Burning: Cigarettes, acid, hot metallic objects, hot water
4. Electric Shocks: Electrodes (with hand-driven generation), shock baton (battery driven), metallic bed (attached to main electricity)
5. Piercing: Genitals, tongue, hands, fingernails
6. Asphyxia: Plastic bag, gas mask (elephant) submersion (submarine, la banera),
waterboarding, strangulation
7. Psychological: Pressure, threats, mock execution, anticipation (in earshot of
torture), humiliation, ridicule
8. Extrajudicial killings: Faked suicide, “attempted escape”
Principles of Treatment of Torture Victims

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Listening
Documentation
Avoid encounters reviving torture experience
Psychomotor approaches: relaxation/massage/exercises
Psychotherapy—cognitive, supportive
Psychopharmacology
Psychosocial rehabilitation

Today, just as there are international networks of crime, money laundering,
corruption, and terrorism, there is also an international network of repression and
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torture. There is no doubt that security forces, antiterrorist agencies, and secret
police maintain contact and share information, not only about investigations and
suspects, but also about techniques of interrogation and torture. There is no doubt
that the police officers and military investigators concerned believe sincerely that
their corporation and the resort to interrogation amounting to torture is justified,
whether in Chechnya, Israel, China, or Turkey. In every case, this belief, this justification, is underpinned by a distortion in the perception of the human relationship
concerned.
The pessimistic but realistic conclusion of this analysis is that existing human
rights law and procedures are powerful enough to counteract this network. Despite
this, it is fundamentally important to face up to the historical realities of torture,
whatever political, religious, or national affinities may be. Thus, the case brought
against General Pinochet and the details of torture carried out under his regime
informed public opinion both about the reality of torture and also its underlying
purpose as an instrument of state terror. Another case, which has had the same
effect of forcing a reluctant public’s attention, is that of Teniet El-Hdd, who was
born to a sixteen-year-old Algerian girl who had been tortured and repeatedly and
brutally raped by more than thirty French officers in an Algerian internment camp.
In 2001, a French court awarded damages to the son, thus breaking the preexisting
taboo about official recognition of torture and rape by the French army in Algeria.
The final example, of belated recognition of torture and illegal killing is drawn
from Geneva, Switzerland, home of many international and human rights organizations. Many visitors include in their itinerary the impressive and monumental
Wall of the Reformers, at the foot of the old town of Geneva, commemorating
Jean Calvin and his fellow Protestants. The visitor can have little doubt of the pride
that underlies such a memorial. Few visit another memorial, just next to Geneva’s
medical school, which is in memory of Michel Servet de Villeneuve d’Aragon, who
was tortured and burned at the stake in 1553, one of the many Catholic victims
of the theocratic regime of Jean Calvin. The inscription reveals the deep-seated
ambivalence that exists when condemning torture: “Respectful and grateful sons of
Calvin our great reformer but condemning an error which was that of his century
and strongly attached to liberty of conscience according to the true principles of
the Reformation and the Evangile we have erected this expiatory monument.” It is
a clear illustration of the ambivalence toward the perpetrators of torture and the
failure to recognize the fundamental flaw in the relationship between the state and
the individual, which underlies such abuses.
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Issues of Power and Gender in Complex Emergencies
Judy A. Benjamin

Two key issues dramatically affect the lives of women and children caught in the
chaos of complex humanitarian emergencies: protection and equal access to relief
goods and services. Equal access means that women and girls have the same access
and rights to relief items, shelter, health services, access to clean water, sanitation
facilities, training, employment, and education opportunities. Protection’s role
includes safeguarding displaced people—women and girls, in particular—from
rape, abduction, forced sexual slavery, genital mutilation, forced marriages, exploitation, torture, and murder.
The Fundamental Right to Basic Human Needs
Conflict is the main reason people become refugees or internally displaced. Women
and children comprise an estimated 80 percent of displaced populations. In situations of complex humanitarian emergencies, women assume primary responsibility for the survival of their families. Women keep the social fabric intact by maintaining cultural practices and traditions even during conflict and displacement.
The basic human needs embody the fundamental rights of all people. Basic
needs include food, water, shelter, nonfood items (blankets, clothes, cooking pots,
etc.), health care sanitation, education, and opportunities for self-support, as well
as freedom from persecution.
Power, Gender-Based Violence, and Access to Food
The entry point for preventing abuse and violence against women is the food distribution line. It is there that gender-power relationships are manifested in harmful
ways. Food ranks as the most valuable commodity in a refugee camp. Food can be
readily sold, traded, or bartered for cash and other items. Power rests with those
who control access to food. Women do not enjoy equal access to food in nearly all
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of the hundreds of refugee and IDP camps I have visited during the past ten years.
Sex exploitation scandals1 in the camps in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia point
to food as the main resource exchanged for sex. Food and other humanitarian
relief items provided by the international community fall under the control of men.
Poor monitoring by relief agencies permits the sexual exploitation of women and
girls. Other men, including international peacekeepers, military forces, and UN
and relief agency employees exploit the severe poverty conditions suffered by the
refugees by offering to women and young girls small sums of money or “gifts” in
exchange for sex. The majority of the victims of exploitation are females under the
age of eighteen—the most vulnerable recipients of humanitarian assistance.
Equal participation in relief programs and services will not guarantee that
women will not be pressured into providing sexual services or that they will not be
cheated on their rations as they pass through the distribution lines, but the chances
of blatant abuse will be lessened with women in decision-making roles and actively
engaged.
Refugees versus Internally Displaced Persons
Most conflicts today occur inside the boundaries of the affected country; therefore, the global number of IDPs exceeds that of refugees. In the writer’s experience,
refugee and IDP camps are much the same. In general, IDPs receive less international assistance than refugees do for several reasons. IDPs fall under the jurisdiction and responsibility of their own government, although in many situations the
government may be the cause of the displacement, or may not have the means to
offer support to its displaced citizens. The UNHCR’s mandate does not normally
include responsibility for IDPs, although in some cases they take on the task when
requested to do so by the UN Secretary-General. International relief agencies may
not be operational in IDP camps unless the conflict has high visibility or has gained
international attention.

Applying a Gender Analysis in Humanitarian Assistance
What are the major issues of concern to refugee and displaced women and girls?
What steps can the assistance community take to address and ensure the rights of
women in emergency situations? How can the gap between policy and practices be
closed? What can individual humanitarian workers do to ensure the protection of
the rights of vulnerable refugees and displaced persons?
85

CH07_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p084-096.indd 85

2/13/13 9:10 PM

JUDY A. BENJAMIN

Gender analysis requires a basic understanding of the premise upon which gender theory rests. Gender refers to the female and male roles within a given culture.
These roles and the expected behaviors of men and women are based on cultural
practices formed over time. We cannot study gender by focusing on females or
males to the exclusion of the other sex because gender involves dynamic interactions between women and men; to understand gender-power relationships, we
must examine those interactions.
As a concept gender often raises more questions that answers. In many cultures the word gender does not translate into local languages and dialects. Although
an understanding of gender and the idea of gender equality has evolved in recent
decades, and has become part of the global development and relief vocabulary, in
situations of forced mobility, whether caused by conflict or natural disaster, people
tend to behave according to the gender norms in their society. Extraordinary events,
however, may result in behavior that deviates substantially from social norms or
personal standards.
Gender as a Social Construct
How gender is constructed explains the position of women in society. Women in
developing countries negotiate their lives within a gender framework set by their
particular cultural groups. As Caroline Moser has rightly noted, when lives drastically change, as in the case of forced migration and conflict, women often lose
their negotiated positions of strength and revert to less equitable social statuses.2 If
gender is about a socially constructed concept that describes how men and women
interact within a particular society and how they define their roles in that culture,
then gender constructs are brought with refugees in exile along with other remnants of their culture.
The Gender Dimensions of Refugee Life
A review of refugee literature points to a gap in classifying refugees in gendered
roles. Development anthropologist Elizabeth Colson called the gap “biased toward
undifferentiated people without gender, age, or other defining characteristics.”
References to refugees in international agency and media reports often omit reference to gender, age, or other defining characteristics except ethnicity. Media
accounts merge refugees into one mass of starving, malnourished people wearing
the same bitter, hungry expressions. Such ethnocentric attitudes add to the problems women and children face in the camps. The representation of women refugees3
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has been that of passive, dependent homogeneous victims treated as nameless faces
in masses of humanity—individuality and personal identity missing. Harrell-Bond
(1996) rejected the idea that women refugees are helpless and dependent. Rather
she saw their vulnerability stemming from their lack of participation in humanitarian aid upon which their lives so much depended. The categorization of women as
helpless victims marginalized them in the sense that they are not afforded respect
and, therefore, not afforded the opportunity to become leaders and decision makers in the camps.
The term “victim” evokes images of helplessness and weakness. Images of
resourcefulness, stamina, and fortitude must replace the negative depictions of
women to support their becoming important members of their societies.
Tools for Gender Analysis
UNHCR uses a planning tool that they promote in field locations for staff training
called the People-Oriented Planning (POP) method. POP examines, among other
things, who does what, who owns what, and who controls what within a community. In other words, to better understand how the division of labor, economics,
and control over resources are broken down by gender.
The POP method uses a simple framework to analyze gender. The three components are (1) Refugee Population Profile and Context Analysis, (2) Activities
Analysis, and (3) Use and Control of Resources Analysis. These analytical components can be charted to facilitate useful checklists for field use.

Gender Violence Associated with Conflict and Forced Displacement
Conflict-imperiled women have been subjected to gender-specific abuses, including rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriages to members of various fighting
forces. Systematic and widespread rape and other sexual violence have been a hallmark of many internal and external conflicts around the globe. Sexual violence has
been directed against women of all ages, including very young girls. Thousands of
reported cases include individual and gang rape, sexual assault with objects, and
sexual slavery among other violent acts. All parties to armed conflict have committed human rights abuses, however, the international community has paid little
attention to gender-specific violations to date.
Gender violence in conflict situations violates the fundamental human right
to mental and physical integrity as protected under the Universal Declaration of
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Human Rights,4 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW),5 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.6 Sexual violence is the chief
source of fear for displaced women and girls.
Conflict situations greatly increase the violence inflicted upon women and
girls—at no other time are they more vulnerable. Frequently during conflicts
women not only lack the protection of their families and spouses, but also are
under threat by armed soldiers, who may regard them as spoils of war. Even when
abuses are not aimed at them personally, women suffer violations of their human
rights disproportionately when the normal codes of social conduct are ignored
because of conflict. Teenage rebels have ignored custom and social mores by raping women old enough to be their grandmothers.
When Short-Term Coping Equals Long-Term Risks
Both unequal access to food and gender-based violence lead to coping strategies
that may endanger women including increasing their exposure to harmful diseases
such as HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections. These two concerns
are among the most critical problems women and girls face when uprooted by circumstances that force them from the relative safety of their homes and villages into
temporary living situations fraught with danger and high risk.

What Is Gender-Based Violence?
Gender-based violence refers to violence targeted to people because of their gender,
or because of their special roles or responsibilities in their society. In many cases
women have sole responsibility for their households. Certain responsibilities of
women’s gender roles put them at greater risk of injury. Crossing landmine fields
or walking near military encampments in the course of their gender-defined task
of searching for water and firewood subjects women to maiming, crossfire injuries, and sexual attacks. Gender-based violence may be manifested in several ways:
domestic violence, rape, and forced prostitution and marriages. Although rape and
other sexual abuses are recognized as serious crimes in humanitarian laws, only
recently has the international community addressed these forms of violence as serious infringements of fundamental women’s rights.
Rape is a deliberate tactic used in war to dehumanize and dishonor not only
women but also husbands, families, communities, or ethnic groups. The humili-
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ation and degradation of rape are only compounded by the impunity of the perpetrators. The incidence of rape against refugee and internally displaced women is
higher than what is actually reported. Women IDPs are often reluctant to report
rape for fear of retribution from the perpetrators. Other forms of sexual coercion
are rife in refugee and IDP settings where young girls may be abducted and forced
into marriage or prostitution. Awareness of the problem and special programs are
needed to reduce the likelihood of such occurrences.

What Constitutes Vulnerability?
In general, the greater the mobility of displaced women and girls, the greater their
vulnerability. Program interventions in emergency situations need to pay special
attention when women become highly mobile. War-affected women often find
themselves without male household members who under normal circumstances
would provide protection to them and their children. When people are forced to
flee their homes and seek refuge they often escape with only the clothes they are
wearing. Women are usually the ones who must secure the household’s necessities,
including food, water, and cooking fuel.
In situations of forced migration women without husbands or fathers in their
households are more vulnerable to abuse than women with make adults present
in the home. Since most emergency situations today are the results of conflict, in
many refugee settings women outnumber men. In war zones many men die in
conflict, become prisoners, or actively engage in ongoing fighting. Vulnerability
also increases during periods of food shortages and scarcity.

Who Is Responsible for Protection?
In the case of refugees, the host state is responsible for the protection of refugees
(under the 1951 Refugee Convention obligation). However, the responsibility for
protection is also an international one that calls on assistance from UN agencies
and NGOs as well as host communities. UNHCR is the primary UN agency with
a mandate to provide for the protecting of refugees. Other UN agencies who have
taken on protection issues for both refugees and internally displaced people are
UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, and OCHA.
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Why Is Response to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence So Inadequate?
Implementing agencies often lack clear and coherent policies regarding gender
issues. Even when international organizations’ headquarters endorse strong gender policies, the field offices often do not implement programs. This can be due in
part to the high rate of staff turnover that makes it difficult to provide sufficient
training on critical issues. The tendency to compartmentalize sector activities in the
field leads to vertical programming that does not integrate well into other sectors.
Gender issues crosscut through all sectors.
Inexperienced Western fieldworkers are sometimes intimidated by unfamiliar cultural practices. Their ignorance creates fear to the extent that they may not
respond to events they would not tolerate in their Western environments. Domestic
violence is a huge problem in camps. Women are seriously injured and even murdered, but relief workers are reluctant to interfere in household conflict. They may
not recognize cases of child abuse or exploitation of child labor. Large poor families
sometimes send their older children out to fend for themselves in order to reduce
the number of mouths to feed. Some of those children become virtual slaves for
their employers.

Cultural Relativism
“It’s cultural, there is nothing we can do,” is a response often heard from aid
workers to excuse themselves from responding to cases of human rights abuse.
Humanitarian organizations that work with refugees or IDPs in various cultural
settings must be prepared to address misconceptions regarding cultural practices.
Assistance agencies must take action to educate their local and international staff
about human rights, refugee laws, UN conventions and resolutions, agency policies, and operating practices in order to combat harmful practices that violate
international standards. Agencies must clearly state their policies, and staff must
be held accountable for carrying out their agencies’ policies and intended practices.
One of the founding principles of human rights law is that it is not culturally relative—basic human rights are universally applicable as a matter of law.
Most NGOs working in refugee or IDP camps to not consider protection to
be their responsibility. Women and girls are insecure and at risk of sexual abuse
and exploitation from the time they leave their homes, during the exodus, and
ongoing during their refuge in camps. Border guards, police, and military factions
demand sexual favors of women in transit. Once inside refugee camps women may
fear venturing out of their shelters because of harassment or sexual assaults. In a
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large IDP camp outside of Herat, Afghanistan, women were afraid to visit feeding
centers or health posts because of the number of sexual assaults that took place in
those locations.

What Steps Can Be Taken to Increase Protection?
Structural
Changes in camp layout and structures will increase protection and reduce the risk
of violence against women and girls living in camps. Such measures include providing lighting, especially around water collection points and latrines; locating latrines
safe distances from shelters or setting up smaller latrines to be shared by four to
five families; changes in camp layout of latrines and water pumps to less secluded
locations; employing women as guards; establishing women’s “safe haven houses;”
and setting up community night watches.
Protection overlaps into all sectors within camp settings—health, education,
income generation, shelter, water, and sanitation. Because of severe water shortages in camps, women often must stand in line for hours both before dawn and
after dark for water. Many are attacked or forced to provide sex in exchange for
water.

Awareness-Raising
Humanitarian agencies can support women and help build their capacity to survive
with dignity. Agencies can help prevent gender violence by raising awareness about
gender-based violence within the affected community by providing rights-based
programming and by working to prevent physical and psychological abuses associated with forced displacement. The UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women and Sexual Violence against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response
are excellent resources. These guidelines should be more widely implemented by
international and local agencies.
Basic everyday chores become risky when women have to venture outside
camps in search of firewood or water. Some refugee and IDP sites provide truckloads of firewood within the camps. Another approach engages the labor of refugee
men to cut wood to supply roadside wood depots. These solutions can be expensive
and require donor funding but they provide some protection.
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Loss of Social and Cultural Ties
Displaced women generally lack community support. The disintegration of community unity increases the vulnerability of women and children and weakens their
coping mechanisms. Women and adolescent girls become easy targets for abuse
when they are separated from normal support systems, husbands, and other male
family members.

Skills Training and Income-Generation Activities
After basic needs are met and protection ensured, people need assistance to get
them on the road to self-sufficiency. Women especially need opportunities to learn
how to support themselves so they do not have to resort to harmful and degrading practices. The desperate need of refugee women heads of households to secure
food for their children can push women into prostitution. Humanitarian agencies
should be aware of the coping strategies of women without male household contributors and help women make healthy choices. The most important help organizations can provide to women is to ensure equal access to all resources offered in
the camp. Skills training and income generation are vitally important to improving
conditions and in helping to empower women and decease vulnerability.

Protection Under the Law
International and local organizations cannot protect the rights of people under
their care without understanding the basics of international human rights and refugee laws. The Geneva Conventions, put into effect in 1950, are the core of international humanitarian law. Humanitarian law is also referred to as the law of armed
conflict and covers the wounded and sick in the armed forces, treatment of prisoners of war, and the protection of civilians in time of war—Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1979 and took
effect in 1981.
Discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of rights and
respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation of women on
equal terms with men in the political, social, economic, and cultural life of their
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countries . . . and makes more difficult the full development of the potentialities
of women in the service of their countries and humanity.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) went into effect in 1990. The
CRC definition of a child is “Every human being under the age of eighteen.”
Both CEDAW and CRC merge civil and political rights with economic, social,
and cultural rights, including the rights to life, nationality, expression, association,
assembly and thought, conscience, and religion.

International Response to Gender Violence
The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women’s post was created in 1994
in the wake of crimes committed against women in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
post involves fact-finding missions around the world and reporting findings to the
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, but the post has no enforcement power.
The UN can only expose and use diplomatic measures against such practices.

Repatriation and Reintegration
Women from the affected communities should be involved in determining the
postconflict needs of women and girls, and they must be fully taken into account
in the formulation of repatriation and resettlement plans, as well as during the
demobilization and disarmament process.
Rehabilitation and reintegration programs must take into account the wide
extent of sexual assault and rape and formulate programs to address the specific
needs of survivors. Special initiatives must be developed to ensure that the security
and subsistence concerns of war widows and other female heads of household are
addressed.
NGOs and UN agencies can provide valuable assistance by sharing their program
reports, lessons learned, and experiences of working with refugee and IDP populations with agencies dealing with repatriation and reintegration of the same population. To date such collaboration and cooperation have not occurred effectively.
Governments in IDP countries and all parties should abide by and ensure
enforcement of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement introduced by
the United Nations in 1998. Governments must adopt effective measures to guarantee that the particular security concerns of women and children displaced by the
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conflict are met, including measures against rape and other gender-based violence.
Governments and the international community should take immediate action to
ensure that IDPs have access to basic services, particularly in regard to food, shelter,
health, education, and protection.

Gender-Based Violence Management in Refugee and IDP Camps
The physical structure and design of camps should be done in consultation with the
displaced with the input and guidance from women. Full participation of refugee
women in planning and providing services is essential. Female community leaders
should play significant roles in camp management, especially regarding protection,
the allocation and layout of shelter, and in setting up safe havens for at-risk women
and girls. Women beneficiaries should be involved in setting up mechanisms to
meet the needs of unaccompanied adolescents, the elderly, and the disabled.
Women should be properly registered and should carry their own documentation. Female-headed households should be regularly spot-checked to assess food
security and shelter. Latrines, water sources, clothes washing, and bathing facilities should be central, secured with locks, and well lighted. Female security guards
should be stationed at locations frequented by women and children.

Ensuring Compliance by Local NGOs and Refugee Camp Officials
International NGOs and UN agencies should not assume that local NGO partners
understand gender equity or international human rights and humanitarian laws.
Therefore, their services should be monitored and their activities spot-checked to
ensure that women have equal access to entitlements and that gender-based violence or exploitation of vulnerable people does not occur. Monitoring, supervision,
and training must be done at the point nearest to service delivery because that is
where violations occur. Visual, unannounced, spot-checking by experience staff
is the best deterrent to abuses during distributions of food and nonfood items, at
wood and fuel distribution points, and at water collection sites. Large illustrative
posters strategically placed at distributions points are also very helpful in reminding women and other beneficiaries of their rights but also in reminding male staff
to respect the rights of women and the rules and policies of the organization they
work for.
International NGOs and UN agencies can promote gender equality by requiring local NGO implementing partners to hire gender-balanced staff. International
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organizations should insist that women are represented on refugee management
teams in appropriate percentages based on the population of the camps. Unless
women participate in camp management their voices and concerns will not be
heard. Neither literacy nor the ability to speak English should be requirements for
active participation in camp management. Those skills would not be required for
women to participate in civil society in their home villages and towns.

Suggestions for Field-Based Relief Workers
All fieldworkers need training in gender awareness, human rights laws, and the
convention on the rights of the child. Field staff—international and national—
must be able to recognize exploitation and abuse of women and children and know
what correct actions to take.
Fieldworkers are well positioned to make tremendous differences in the lives
of women and children in emergency situations. Once fieldworkers understand
the issues and know how to recognize the signs of gender-based violence and child
abuse, they can be the best advocates for change.

Conclusion
The source of much of the suffering of women and children in emergency situations stems from their lack of access to food and other entitled resources and services provided for refugees and IDPs. When refugee women heads-of-households
receive the basic items to which they are entitled—food rations, plastics sheeting,
pots and pans, blankets, equal job and training opportunities—they are much less
likely to enter into sexual bartering or to accept exploitative and abusive living
arrangements with inappropriate partners. Not only are such coping measures
harmful to women but also they represent violations to the rights of women. The
denial of equal access to food and other entitlements goes against the policies of
the United Nations, international NGOs, and donors who provide with assistance
to refugees and IDPs.
Women refugees’ voices are too rarely heard. They have little say in camp management, design, or operations, and yet women and children make up approximately
80 percent of the population in most camps. Women in refugee and IDP camps are
less likely to be selected as camp managers, leaders, or community educators and
trainers than men because fewer women speak English, and hiring English speakers
is a convenience to international workers—not a requirement for efficiency.
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A gender perspective must pervade all activities in humanitarian assistance.
International and local organizations’ staff need to be trained in gender principles
so they may be sensitive to and understand the different roles, rights, and obligations men, women, and children hold in the cultural groups with which they work.
The “gender-blindness” of refugee aid must end.

96

CH07_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p084-096.indd 96

2/13/13 9:10 PM

Terrorism: Theory and Reality
Larry Hollingworth

The semantics of studies on terrorism seem to strive more for political correctness
than for presenting an accurate picture of the soil in which these terrible acts are
usually born, gestate, and explode. Definitions divorced from reality offer, at best, a
two dimensional view of a multifaceted problem. To focus solely on acts of desperate individuals and to not equally consider official or state terrorism is not only a
simplistic approach but also one that fails to make the obvious linkage of violence
to violence.
I have served as a humanitarian worker for refugees and displaced persons, and
as a negotiator, in areas of armed conflict in many parts of the world. I have personally witnessed the perverse impact of occupying governmental forces on innocent
civilians in Srebrenica, Chechnya, Aceh, East Timor, Rwanda, and Palestine.
Where there is an overt government policy to terrorize civilian populations
into a dependent, even supplicant, state, the silence of the oppressed can be very
deceptive. Hatred breeds when homes, fields, schools, hospitals, water and electricity supplies, and vital records are wantonly destroyed; when well-equipped armies
use overwhelming force against entire townships, killing and maiming women and
children; when targeted assassinations and torture instead of the rule of law are
used by sovereign states.
In this chapter, I shall offer the reflections of a fieldworker on some commonly
used definitions in the “war on terrorism,” and then provide a view of terrorism
as perceived and experienced on the ground by civilians under army occupation.

Definition
Look up “terrorism” on the web search engine “Google”; there are more than fifty
pages of entries, many clamoring to define what it is. In the excellent book Political
Terrorism, the authors Alex Schmid and Albert Longman offer twenty-six choices.1
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Noam Chomsky, in one of his numerous papers on the subject, offers two
approaches to the study of terrorism: the literal and the propagandistic.
Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon—concentrating on the major
examples . . . and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic
approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is
the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as “terrorist” just in the cases where they can be attributed (plausibly
or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed, or
termed “retaliation” or “self defense.” It comes as no surprise that the propagandistic approach is adopted by governments generally, and by their instruments
in totalitarian states.2
The U.S. Department of State definition is, “Terrorism is premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant groups by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.
International terrorism is terrorism involving citizens of the territories of more
than one country.”3
The U.S. Army Operational Concept for Terrorism Counteraction pamphlet 52537 of 1984 defines terrorism with a commendable economy of words as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious,
or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling
fear.”
Igor Primoratz, a philosopher at Melbourne University, defines terrorism, “for
the purpose of philosophical discussion . . . as the deliberate use of violence, or
threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other
people into a course of action they otherwise would not take.” Thus, he states,
“terrorism has two targets. One person or group is attacked directly, in order to get
at another person or group to intimidate them into doing something they would
not do. In terms of importance, the indirect target is primary and the direct target
secondary. The secondary, but directly attacked target is innocent people.”4
Rakesh Gupta presents a simpler “philosophical” offering. “In any discussion
on terrorism—whether it is criminal or political—denial of the right of life would
be the basic philosophical category of analysis.” This statement seems to suggest
that political terrorist acts may be legal. But Gupta continues and clears up the
doubt: “Since a terrorist action today is a small group action against innocents and
is against either national or international law, it is criminal.”5
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Back to Igor Primoratz to define who the victims of terrorism are:
The innocents . . . persons not guilty of any action or (omission) the terrorist
could plausibly bring up as a justification of what he does to them. They are not
attacking him; therefore he cannot justify his action in terms of self-defence.
They are not waging war on him, nor on those on whose behalf he presumes to
act; therefore he cannot say that he is merely waging war. They are not responsible, on any plausible understanding of responsibility, for the (real or alleged)
injustice, suffering, or deprivation that is being inflicted on him or on those
whose case he has adopted, and which is so grave that a violent response to it
can be properly considered.6
Primoratz importantly further defines the “innocents”: “In the context of war,
according to the mainstream version of just war theory, this includes all except
members of the armed forces and security services, those who supply them with
arms and ammunition, and political officials directly involved in the conflict. In the
context of a political conflict that falls short of war, the category of the innocent has
similarly wide scope: it includes all except government officials, police and members of security services.”
This seems to imply that, at least “philosophically,” soldiers, politicians, and
police are “legitimate” victims of acts of terrorism.

Violence
The key word in most definitions of terrorism is “violence,” an action that has been
around since Cain slew Abel. Is there good and bad violence, a violence that liberates and a violence that enslaves? St. Thomas Aquinas maintained that, “violence
is good or bad depending on the use or purpose to which it is put.” In his book
Violence, Jacques Ellul stresses the importance of who is responsible for an act of
violence and introduces the concept of “force” by quoting the well-known example
used by the theologian Suarez: “a man cannot lawfully kill his neighbor, nor can
two men together, nor ten thousand, but a judge can lawfully pronounce a sentence
of death. His indisputable legitimate power derives from the state. There is all the
difference between violence and force.”7
Does this “force” absolve a state from a crime of violence? Not all states and
state decisions are necessarily just or right. The power that condemns to death
may be tyrannical or oppressive or simply make a mistake. How legitimate is the
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state? Did the state or the ruler of the state achieve power justly or unjustly? Does
the state’s use of force conform to law—national and international? Jacques Ellul
again: “Force used by a state is just when its use conforms to the laws; when it does
not conform to the laws, it is still force—not violence—but unjust force.” Scant
comfort for the victim but encouragement for retribution.
Ellul has five rules, which he cautions all who contemplate violence to remember:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Once begun there is continuity to violence
There is reciprocity: violence begets violence
Violence begets violence . . . and nothing else (I am not happy with this one)
There is sameness to violence—there are proportions and shades but essentially violence is violence
5. The perpetrators of violence always try to justify the violence and themselves

The Cycle of Violence, the Tandem of Responsibility
“Who started it?” Is there a parent or teacher who has not asked this question?
How often do we hear spokespersons, especially in parts of the Middle East, say,
“In response to . . . we have carried out . . .”? In any major crisis over the past decade, it
would be very difficult to define when the crisis began and by whom: Sudan, Somalia,
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Aceh, and Palestine, and I only choose some
of those where I have served. But each and every side can point to the last incident as
the one that they must revenge, and so the cycle continues. Once the violence begins
it is difficult to effect reconciliation. A leader at any level who is prepared to attend
talks with the other side risks the accusation of weakness or collaboration. But unless
both sides can at least glimpse the view from the other side, there is no hope.
The French Franciscan Father Maillard, when Director of Frères du Monde,
published in their magazine this observation: “It is always the violence of the
oppressor that unleashes the violence of the oppressed. The time comes when violence is the only possible way for the oppressed to state their case.” Again, speaking
only from personal experience, I cannot fault this.8
The black power leader Pastor Albert Cleage Jr. said after the race riots in
Detroit: “Now we are no longer afraid; now it is the white man who is afraid.” The
violence of the oppressed transfers fear to the oppressor previously secure in his
dominance. This is particularly so today in Israel where the Palestinian retaliation
includes a weapon that truly frightens the Israeli population: the suicide bomb.
Rattle the bars of a caged lion and you must expect to be scratched or bitten.
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The Perpetrator
Who is a terrorist? It depends on who applies the label. One man’s terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter. Or, to quote Noam Chomsky: “actions undertaken against oppressive regimes and occupying armies (are) considered resistance by their perpetrators and terrorism by the rulers, even when they are nonviolent.”9
Terrorists espouse a cause. The focus of the cause can be any shade of the
rainbow. They may represent the have-nots—no land, no access to education, no
money, no status, no resources; the religiously oppressed; the racially oppressed;
the politically oppressed; or the culturally oppressed. More often they are to the
left of the political spectrum but some of the most virulent are from the right wing.
They can be from minority groups, fascists, racists. They come from all walks of life
and all strata of society.

Jihad and Martyrs
A number of terrorist groups operate in and out of states where Islam is the major
faith. Their campaigns are labeled “jihad” and their dead are honored as “martyrs.”
“Jihad” is the verbal noun of the verb meaning “to strive,” “to struggle,” “to
exert.” While a number of other nouns can be linked to jihad to give it different
connotations, it is now best known in its meaning “armed struggle” and, more
specifically, “armed struggle against unbelievers.” In effect, it has the same meaning as “crusade”! Jihad is often mentioned in the Koran as is qitaal, which means
“fighting.” The most relevant references are: K22:39, “Leave is given to those who
fight because they were wronged”; K3:157–158, which encourages participation in
the fighting; and K169–172, which promised rewards in heaven to those martyrs
(shuhaada) who die in battle. K2:190–194 has a chilling relevance in the Middle East
today: “And fight in the way of God with those who fight you, but aggress not: God
loves not the aggressors. And slay them wherever you come upon them, and expel
them from where they expelled you.”10
As scholars pore over holy books and interpret them in different ways, the
Koran is no exception. There are at least two distinct schools, the Modernists and
the Fundamentalists, and two different ways of approaching the interpretations;
one is to take each verse in traditional order and to examine its content in depth,
the other is to gather together all the verses on one topic and to examine their relationship. The latter produces the more moderate interpretation.
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Rebels
Gupta is keen to point out the difference between a terrorist and a rebel. He labels
Bal Gangadhar Tilak, “who has no fetish for nonviolence,” as “a mass leader and
not an alchemist of revolution,” and similarly labels Mahatma Gandhi “a rebel with
his entire pacifist menace.” I am happy so far but have reservations with his next
statement that: “[a rebel’s] commitment is to the cause of his people and not to
himself or his group, which is the commitment of a terrorist.” This may be true in
the Indian examples he gives; I am not certain it is when applied more generally. I
suspect that many, if not most, terrorists believe that they represent the true voice
of the people. They may be deluded but their zeal is genuine.
Edward Herman and David Peterson, in Z Magazine, introduce the concept of
“retail” versus “wholesale” terror. “Bin Laden and his network . . . is a ‘retail’ terrorist network, like the IRA or Cuban refugee terrorist network: it has no helicopter
gun ships, no offensive missiles, no ‘daisy cutters,’ no nuclear weapons. Really large
scale killing and torture—‘wholesale’ terrorism—is implemented by states, not by
non-state terrorists.”11

State Terrorism
State terrorism is a taboo term. Politicians never utter it. Newspapers rarely
describe it. Academic “experts” suppress it. It is by far the most menacing form
of terrorism.
—John Pilger
We must recognize that by convention—it must be emphasized only by convention—great power use, and the threat of the use, of force is normally described
as coercive diplomacy, and not as a form of terrorism.
—Michael Stohl
There are states that support terrorism domestically, states that support terrorism externally overtly, states that support terrorism externally covertly, and states
that do all three.
William Blum is the recorder par excellence of the activities of the United States
as a purveyor of state terrorism. In his highly readable books he chronicles the
participation of the U.S. interventions around the globe. In Killing Hope, there is a
chapter for each intervention. And there are fifty-five chapters!12 The second book
is entitled Rogue State. It has three sections: “Ours and Theirs: Washington’s Love/
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Hate Relationship with Terrorists and Human Rights Violators”; “United States
and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction”; and “A Rogue State versus the
World.”13
Mavis Cheek, who chose the book as one of the books of the year in the
UK Sunday newspaper The Observer, wrote, “William Blum, once of the U.S.
Department, gives a chilling reminder that while there may be no justification for
September 11, there may be reasons.”
William Blum is not the only U.S. citizen to criticize U.S. policy. “The guiding principle, it appears, is that the U.S. is a lawless terrorist state and this is right
and just, whatever the world may think, whatever international institutions may
declare” (Noam Chomsky).
John Pilger, who is much more catholic in his range of targets, writes in a
post-Bali bombing report: “Today, largely unreported, the Indonesian military,
with the tact approval of the United States, Britain, and Australia, is terrorizing the
populations of Aceh and West Papua. Most of the ‘human rights violations’ in these
provinces—the euphemism for state terrorism—have been part and parcel of ‘protecting’ the American Exxon oil holdings in Aceh as well as the vast Freeport copper
and gold mines and BP holdings in West Papua.”14 He refers to research by Edward
Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan: “Covering the period since 1965, which points to
the killing of several thousand people by nonstate terrorists such as al Qaeda, compared with 2.5 million civilians killed by state-sponsored terrorism. These include
the violence of South African apartheid regime, the Suharto regime in Indonesia,
the “Contras” in Nicaragua, and other American-backed terrorist states.”
The U.S. State Department, which, if Mr. Blum is right, should know a thing or
two about the subject, itself maintains an annual list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
It includes Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
Is a state that pursues terrorism a terrorist state? Primoratz: “I suggest we
reserve this label for states that do not merely resort to terrorism on certain occasions, but employ it in a lasting and systematic way and, indeed, are defined in part
by the sustained use of terrorism against their own population. These are totalitarian states.”15
It is, however, important to note that a few nontotalitarian states have used
terrorism against their own population.
Is there ever a need for external interference? Irving Kristol believes so:
“Insignificant nations, like insignificant people, can quickly experience delusions
of significance. . . . In truth, the days of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ are never over. . . .
Gunboats are as necessary for international order as police cars are for domestic
order.”16
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A Case Study: Palestine
I choose Palestine for the simple reason that I was United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) Emergency Coordinator in Jenin Camp
on loan from the Center for International Health and Cooperation. I left there six
weeks before writing this chapter. I begin with a caveat: it is difficult to serve in an
occupied Palestinian community and be true to the tenets of our humanitarian
faith—neutrality, impartiality, and independence.
“What is the difference between state terrorism and individual terrorist acts?”
asks Lev Grinberg of the Humphrey Institute for Social Research at Ben Gurion
University in an oft-quoted article from the May–June 2002 Tikkun magazine. “If
we understand the difference,” he continues, “we’ll also understand the evilness of
U.S. policies in the Middle East.” He then answers the question he posed. “Israel’s
state terrorism is defined by the U.S. officials as ‘self-defense,’ while individual suicide bombers are called ‘terrorists.’”17
Grinberg is not soft on Palestinian terrorists: “Suicide bombs killing innocent
citizens must be unequivocally condemned; they are immoral acts, and their perpetrators should be sent to jail . . . However, they cannot be compared to state
terrorism carried out by the Israeli government. The former are acts of despair of a
people that sees no future, vastly ignored by an unfair and distorted international
public opinion. The latter are cold and ‘rational’ decisions of a state and a military
apparatus of occupation, well equipped, financed, and backed by the only superpower in the world.”
“Palestinian violence receives worldwide condemnation” (Chomsky),18 with
the silent rider booming in our ears that Israeli violence rarely does.
It is bitterly ironic that the modern state of Israel, conceived by a biblical promise, born out of a terrorist/freedom fighter struggle, growing up with a population
of victims of generations of oppression and constantly led by leaders whose roots
lie in the Holocaust, is not able to understand the aspirations and desires of their
neighbors with whom they share the land. “Do unto others what you would have
them do unto you” is replaced with, “Do unto others what was done unto you.”
It is sad that in the international arena “Palestinian” is associated closely with
“terrorist,” in some circles to the point of being synonymous. This image was
beginning to change in the early days of the Second Intifada with frequent television coverage of the new “Davids” slinging stones at the new “Goliath” in his
armored vehicle. Unfortunately, a faction of militant Palestinians—how easy it is
to label all actions as Palestinian—returned to the suicide bomb as its most successful weapon. More unfortunate was the choice of target. If the suicide bombers
had blown themselves up at checkpoints, in Israeli barracks, and in Israeli Defense
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Force headquarters, and all their victims were military, I am sure they would have
maintained the tide of sympathy and may even have earned admiration for their
desperate courage. Better still would have been protest suicides outside embassies
or other high-profile buildings where the suicide was the sole victim. Sadly, they
chose civilian targets and killed and maimed innocent women and children. They
have frightened the Israelis beyond expectation, but have brought upon themselves
a ruthless military retaliation and return of the dreadful epithet “terrorist.”
I was in Jenin in late April 2002 after the Israeli incursion. The talk was of a
massacre. A UN mission headed by Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner on
Human Rights, was refused entry into Israel. The United Nations assembled in
Geneva a team of the most respected of international senior persons: Mr. Martti
Ahtisaari, former Prime Minister of Finland; Madame Sadako Ogata from Japan,
former UN High Commissioner for Refugees; and M. Cornelio Sommaruga, former
President of the International Committee of the Red Cross from Switzerland, to go
to Jenin to investigate what had happened. This fact-finding mission was agreed
to between the UN Secretary General and the Israeli Foreign Minister and had the
full support of the UN Security Council. The mission was refused entry into Israel!
As well as an insult, this was a grave strategic error. Human Rights Watch (HRW),
with a speed and accuracy that should be a model for all agencies, produced in early
May a comprehensive investigation report that stated that there was no massacre
but many severe human rights violations. I will dwell no more on this incursion but
recommend the reader to view the HRW report, which is available on the Internet
and whose findings I fully support.19
I further recommend the more comprehensive and measured report Israel and
the Occupied Territories, Shielded from Scrutiny: IDF Violations in Jenin and Nablus,
issued by Amnesty International on November 4, 2002. This covers the period of
April–June 2002.
I left Jenin in early June and returned in mid-August to a Jenin under curfew. What did this mean? I soon discovered. The Israeli Defense Forces occupied
the West Bank. It was not possible to get in and out without passing IDF checkpoints, which was time-consuming for internationals and almost impossible for the
majority of Palestinians. The curfew was an added inconvenience. It was imposed
either with warning or without. If with warning, the start time was given but rarely
the end time.
If it was without warning, tanks and armored cars swept into the town, at
least one with a loudspeaker. The population was told, “It is forbidden to move
around. Go home and close your doors.” From then on anyone who moved
risked being shot.
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The population of Jenin camp is 13,900. Together the town and camp number
41,000.
Forty-one thousand citizens were expected to clear the streets and get home
rapidly. Not too easy; very difficult when you take into consideration that more
than a third of the work force of Jenin live in outlying villages. Clear the streets,
clear a checkpoint with no warning. Clear the schools, clear the hospital clinics. It
would be easy with a considerate occupying force. It would be safe with an occupying force with tight rules of engagement: having clear rules of when they can
shoot, at whom they can shoot, and with what warning. With aggressive and often
nervous troops who were told that their own safety was a paramount importance,
bursts of machine gun fire were common. Fatalities and injuries were frequent
events. The terrorizing of the population, constant. It is hard to imagine the fear
a tank generates as it growls along narrow streets sinisterly swiveling its main barrel from object to object. And if the barrel stops on you, there is a heart-stopping
moment while you silently pray the tank commander has recognized that you present no threat. More than a dozen innocent civilians were shot dead during my
time in Jenin. They included women and children. Some youths were shot dead
throwing stones at tanks. In every exchange of weapon fire between Palestinian and
Israeli, the Palestinian was the underdog, the odd-on favorite to lose. The Israeli
response was so unequal, so disproportionate. There was no weapon in any hands
in Jenin that was capable of penetrating tank armor. If there had been, they surely
would have used it. The IDF could have fired pain ball or smoke or tear gas or rubber bullets and dispersed the Palestinians at no risk to themselves.
After weeks of on and off violence, more on than off, the IDF lifted the curfew
and replaced it with a lesser imposition: closure. This was a reward for a lull in the
attacks on Israelis.
Closure meant that the town and camp were completely blockaded. There were
heavy armored checkpoints at every entrance and exit. Sounds easy. Stay within
the camp and town and no problem. But what about the third of the work force
who live outside the closed area? This included doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers,
tradesmen, humanitarian agency staff, the mayor of the town, the governor. And
what about the staff of the schools and the clinics and the university who live within
the closed area but whose workplace is in outlying villages? What about farm produce, grocery stocks, medicines, baby milk powder that comes into the town from
outside?
Did everything stop? No. So what happened? Everyone from the mayor to the
vegetable dealer used taxis to come into or out of the town using fields, tracks,
culverts, whatever cover was available. Did the IDF turn a blind eye? It knew that
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this must happen, had to happen. No, taxi drivers and passengers were killed and
wounded. Why?
Unfortunately, there were further suicide bombs, so closure was revoked
and military operation mounted. This was curfew and closure with a vengeance.
Nothing moved. Houses with good views were commandeered, snipers were
placed at vantage points, and armored vehicles were positioned at numerous
static checkpoints or roamed the town at will. Anyone on the streets was shot
at. It did not take many days before there was little food in the town, no baby
milk, and, more importantly, no water. Because of two or three suicide bombers whose mission was not known by any more than a handful of controllers,
40,000 citizens suffered severe deprivation. After a while, some pipelines for
essential personnel were opened. Passing through these checkpoints was timeconsuming and humiliating. Hundreds were arrested; some interrogated and
released, others disappeared into Israeli detention centers. Few were charged.
Fewer released. Houses of known terrorists were demolished, their bewildered
families left homeless.
When the town was on its knees and morale at its lowest, the operation ended,
and, thanking the Lord for small mercies, we gratefully accepted the comparative
liberty of closure.
I handed the office over to my successor, another international. Seven days
later, he was shot dead by Israeli gunfire in the UN compound during an unannounced military operation. The IDF delayed the arrival of an ambulance, not that
it would have been of any help.
It is hard to know where to begin categorizing the breaches of human rights. It
will be fairest if I end this chapter with an extract from the list of recommendations
of the Amnesty International report. Although written to cover April to June 2002
in Jenin, every observation is valid today.
It is not difficult to conclude that the population of Jenin is terrorized by
the IDF.
It is also indisputable that suicide bombers came from Jenin. It is indisputable
that there are terrorist cells operating within Jenin. It is indisputable that there have
been bomb-making factories in Jenin. It is indisputable that there are armed men
shooting at Israeli troops in Jenin. Perhaps they number fifty or sixty. Because of
them, 39,950 are collectively punished. IDF soldiers killed more Palestinians than
suicide bombers killed Israelis. No one placed curfews or closure in their towns.
They are, however, now fencing themselves in, creating prisons for themselves
mentally and physically.
Their tactics are increasing the numbers of hardliners in the camps and towns.
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They fail to see that they escalate the cycle of violence. Suicide bombs are a
reaction to violence, not an initiator of violence. Both sides have told me that there
is no alternative to their tactics.
Sadly, the answer lied with the United States. As I write, an Israeli team consisting
of the Defense Ministry director general, the Prime Minister’s bureau chief, and the
Finance Ministry director are in Washington to present a request for $4 billion for
special defense aid and $8 billion in loan guarantees. Few doubt that they will get it.
“It is absurd that we are still witnessing, in the twenty-first century, a case of
occupation where the dominant side is seen as the victim” (Lev Grinberg).20

Summary of Amnesty International Recommendations
Amnesty International calls on the government of Israel to:
Ensure the IDF operations are conducted in full respect of international human
rights and humanitarian law
Initiate a full, thorough, transparent, and impartial investigation into all allegations of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law,
including those documented in this report, and to make the results public
Cooperate with United Nations investigations
Bring to justice those alleged to have committed serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law in proceedings that meet international standards for fair trial
Ensure prompt and adequate reparation for victims of serious human rights or
humanitarian law violations
Respect and protect the human rights of all persons living in the Occupied Territories without discrimination
Include the practices of Israeli authorities in the Occupied Territories in all
reporting to UN human rights treaty bodies
Take immediate action to prevent the IDF from compelling Palestinians to take
part in military operations or to act as “human shields” and to take measures against any soldier or military commander who undertakes or sanctions such practices
Fulfill its international legal obligations by ensuring that medical staff and
ambulances are allowed to carry out duties without undue delays, and with
safe passage
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Ensure safe access for humanitarian and medical supplies
Immediately stop the use of lethal force to enforce curfews
End collective punishments, including house destruction, closures and curfews, and cutting off water and electricity
End torture or other ill treatment of those in custody
End administrative detention and release all administrative detainees unless
they are to be brought to trial for a recognizably criminal offence in a trial
which is in accordance with UN fair trial standards
Accept an international monitoring presence in Israel’s Occupied Territories
with a strong human rights component
Amnesty International calls on the Palestine Authority to:
Take all action to prevent anyone under its jurisdiction from attacking or otherwise endangering the safety of civilians
Amnesty International calls on the Palestinian armed groups to:
Respect fundamental principles of international law that prohibit the killing
of civilians
End any use of children in armed operations21

Addendum
Since I wrote the preceding, there has been a lot more reality and no less terrorism.
Osama bin Laden is dead and buried at sea; Al Qaida has not gone away but has
opened branches elsewhere. There seems to be no shortage of volunteers for suicide
missions. The planting of improvised explosive devices has taken a heavy toll of
lives notably in Afghanistan. Kidnapping, especially of aid workers has dramatically
increased, gangsters colluding with terrorists raise the ransom demands and complicate negotiations. The continuing lawlessness in Somalia has caused one refugee
camp in Kenya to swell by one thousand new arrivals per day. Dadaab is now the
largest refugee camp in the world, with upward of 500,000 displaced, making it the
third largest city in Kenya. In the same region piracy abounds.
I concentrated in the chapter on field examples where I had played a role. I
touched on state terrorism and chose a Middle East example. Sadly I intend to do
the same in this addendum.
I worked in Lebanon during the 2006 war. This was a confrontation between
a State and a nonstate actor, a war between Israel and Hezbollah. It is hard to
choose a start point in the lead up to the war but very easy to pinpoint when it
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began. On the evening of the 11th of July 2006 Lebanese went to bed after a normal
day of work or school or leisure with no warning of what the following day would
bring. On July 12, 2006, a stunned Beirut awoke to the sounds and sights of totally
unexpected Israeli military action, damaging Beirut airport, destroying roads and
bridges, blockading the ports, and invading south Lebanon. 730,000 Lebanese were
displaced within Lebanon and a further 230,000 fled to neighboring countries. It
was an unequal confrontation, which immediately posed the following questions:
What are the implications of a conflict between a State and a nonstate actor in
a neighboring country?
What is the impact on the principle of State sovereignty?
Does a State have a responsibility to deal with its internal ‘troublemakers?’
What is an acceptable trigger for the right to self-defense?
How do we measure proportionality?
What is the impact of a conflict on international humanitarian law? And what
are the consequences if it is breached?
The humanitarian response began as ever with the assessment and fulfillment
of needs to the degree possible. It took a little while before it was realized that the
protection of the population was the real need, which could have been achieved
with the halting of the Israeli invasion. It took thirty-four days before the international community effected a cease-fire, despite humanitarian and human rights
agencies pleading for pressure to be placed on the invading force to stop the fighting, halt the shelling, lift the blockade and permit the safe passage of aid.
The toll of the 34-day war was:
1,183 Lebanese killed and 4,054 injured
At the height of the conflict, 1 million people were displaced
151 Israelis killed (119 soldiers) and 418 injured
5 UN peacekeepers and 1 Red Cross worker killed, 16 UN peacekeepers wounded
Tons of heavy oil polluted 87 miles of the Lebanese coast
6,800 private homes or apartments, 630 roads, 70 bridges and 30 installations
(airports, ports, water treatment plants and power stations) damaged or
destroyed
778 sites in south Lebanon contaminated by cluster bombs
A reconstruction bill exceeding $7 billion
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All of this left us humanitarian responders asking a simple question: “Is a
humanitarian response purely the manifestation of the politically possible or just
the politically convenient?”
Back to today and to the future. My thoughts concern the harvest from the
Arab Spring and the uncertain seasons following it which bring into sharp focus
the quandary of a clear definition of who is a terrorist and who is a freedom
fighter. History is full of good guys becoming bad guys and bad guys becoming
good guys. My grandfather once said to me “Tell me who your friends are and I
will tell you who you are” It is becoming increasingly difficult to recognize our
friends, “our guys.”
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A Human Rights Agenda for Global Security
Irene Khan

Where . . . do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to
home—so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the
world. Such are the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal
justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless
these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere.
—Eleanor Roosevelt

Human rights are often used by governments as a cloak to put on or cast off
according to political expediency, and the UN is often powerless to render states
accountable for their adherence to international law and human rights performance. In the words of Michael Ignatieff: “Human rights treaties, agencies, and
instruments multiply and yet the volume and scale of human rights abuses keep
pace. In part, this is a problem of success—abuses are now more visible—but it is
also a sign of failure. No era has ever been so conscious of the gap between what it
practices and what it preaches.”
That gap was accentuated in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks
as governments geared up to fight “the war against terrorism.” It deepened with
the military attacks on Iraq. The drive for global security appeared to be trumping
human rights with impunity.
This chapter identifies the key challenges posed to human rights by the global
security agenda. Recognizing that a narrowly focused security agenda has failed to
make the world either safe or free, it argues for a paradigm shift in the concept of
security. At the center are not the concerns of states but the human rights of people
in the quest for a safer, more just world.

Security for Whom?
In September 2002, when I was Secretary General of Amnesty International, I led
a delegation to Burundi just days after a massacre in which some 174 civilians had
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been killed by the army in a remote village. There were only four survivors. My
colleagues and I went to the local hospital to meet them. One of them was a girl of
six named Claudine. She could not remember her family name, but she recalled
in vivid detail the way in which her grandfather, father, stepmother, and two sisters were killed and her baby brother was bayoneted to death by soldiers. She had
somehow managed to crawl between the legs of the soldiers and escape in the commotion without being noticed. A neighbor found her wounded, naked, and unconscious in the forest and had brought her to the hospital, but neither the neighbor
nor the hospital had the means to buy her any clothes. That is why Claudine, the
youngest of the four survivors of a bloody massacre, was still wrapped in a blanket
ten days later when we saw her.
The next morning in my meeting with President Buyoya, I asked him what
action he would take to protect civilians in the conflict. He replied, “Madam, you
do not understand—we are fighting a war to protect our national security.”
There was an unfortunate familiar ring to his response. How often have those
words—“national security”—been used by governments to justify the killing of
civilians, the torture of dissidents, the persecution of minorities, or the attack on
political opponents?
Backlash Against Human Rights
The erosion of human rights by governments in the name of security is not new.
What is new is the zeal with which governments have launched a frontal attack on
the very framework of human rights in recent times.
In the days, weeks, and months that followed the attacks of September 11,
almost every country in the world—from Australia to Zimbabwe—expanded its
powers, lawfully or unlawfully, to investigate, arrest, detain, and to restrict people’s
rights of assembly, free speech, and fair trials.
Between 2000 and 2011 the United Kingdom adopted a range of counterterrorism laws that expanded the definition of terrorism, increased the period of precharge detention, introduced and modified the control order regime and increased
the use of closed tribunal proceedings and stop and search powers and curtailed
the right to protest.
The United Kingdom had adopted a tough antiterrorist law in 2000 that had
already led to the banning of twenty organizations, including al Qaeda. Yet, within
weeks of September 11, the British Parliament rushed through another piece of legislation permitting the government to detain, on the basis of secret evidence and
without charge or trial, foreigners suspected of involvement in terrorism but who
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could not be deported. The United Kingdom was the only country in Europe to
seek derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights to allow introduction of such a measure. Seventeen men were imprisoned under the Act in high
security institutions. Following a ruling by the Law Lords, the highest Court in
the UK, the men detained under the Act were released in 2005, but immediately
put under “Control Orders,” tough measures akin to administrative detention in
their own homes, imposed by the Home Secretary. Control Orders were abolished
in 2011 with the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (TPIM)
and replaced with a TPIM notice by the Home Secretary, which has greater judicial oversight and a two-year limit but is basically a control order in almost all
but name. Until a 2005 ruling to the contrary by the House of Lords, the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission, which hears the detention hearings, took the
position that evidence extracted from a third party through torture could be relied
on by the Commission to rule on the detentions.
Many repressive regimes have used the so-called war against terrorism as a
license to clamp down on political dissidents or minority groups. Others have
escaped international scrutiny and censure of their appalling human rights records
by professing to join “the global coalition against terrorism.”
The enthusiasm of governments to fight “terrorism” has not been dampened
by the absence of a common international definition of the term. On the contrary, governments have chosen to define it as broadly or as narrowly as their
national, strategic, or political interests call for, making it a shifting concept that
is tied to political and ideological interests and, therefore, open to abuse and
misinterpretation.
At the international level, for many governments, terrorism signifies an act of
violence for what they do not consider to be a good cause. At the domestic level,
antiterrorist laws often cover acts that are already criminalized, and so the focus is
not on the act or its impact but on the motive. The propensity for abuse is aggravated by the fact that antiterrorist laws are notoriously vague.
In September 2001 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1373 which
imposed binding obligations on all UN member states to take counter-terrorism measures in a broad range of areas, including border control, information
exchange, asylum and refugee policies, and extradition, but failed to remind States
of their obligation to do so without undermining human rights obligations. It
took another two years for a Security Council resolution relating to terrorism to
make any mention of human rights. Even the UN has deferred to security over
human rights.
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Leading the Pack
It is interesting to note the use of the term “war on terror” by the George W. Bush
administration. By speaking of “war,” it sought to deny the applicability of human
rights. By speaking of “terror,” it tried to avoid the application of international
humanitarian law. By combining the two into a war without geographic or temporal limits, it tried to create a zone of action that is a legal black hole. By taking it one
step further to the doctrine of preemptive attack, it made the world a potentially
more dangerous place.
Under the Bush administration, the United States arbitrarily detained hundreds of its Arab and Muslim residents. It designated two of its own citizens as
enemy combatants, depriving them of legal counsel and habeas corpus. It did both
without even resorting to the draconian provisions of the Patriot Act, which was
rushed through Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks in 2001.
Doublespeak brings disrepute to human rights but is a common phenomenon
among governments. While professing to promote justice, the Bush administration
actively tried to undermine international justice and the International Criminal
Court through bilateral agreements granting impunity to its own nationals. The
message that there is one set of laws for the powerful and another for the rest of the
world not only promotes impunity for abuse but also undermines the universality
of human rights.
While professing to make the world more secure, the Bush administration
undermined the collective security that international law and international institutions offer. It detained hundreds of prisoners (including minors) at Guantanamo
Bay, in defiance of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions (a policy the Obama
administration continued despite promises to the contrary). Detainees were threatened by the Bush administration with military trials that would violate U.S. as well
as international standards of justice, leading one commentator to describe the
violations as “the Pentagon’s Kafkaesque justice system.” In Britain, Lord Justice
Steyn, a judicial member of the House of Lords, described the U.S. military commissions as kangaroo courts, a concept derived, as he put it, “from the jumps of the
kangaroo . . . the idea of pre-ordained arbitrary rush to judgment by an irregular
tribunal which makes a mockery of justice.” The U.S. government has ignored allegations of torture and ill treatment by its officials at Bagram in Afghanistan. It has
refused to investigate mass murder by its allies in Afghanistan or ill treatment of
civilians by its soldiers in Iraq. Some of its actions in Iraq were reminiscent of the
violations of international humanitarian law by the Israeli army in the Occupied

115

CH09_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p112-122.indd 115

2/13/13 9:23 PM

IRENE KHAN

Territories: house demolitions, humiliating restrictions on movement of civilians,
and failure to investigate civilian killings.
Some governments have seen the actions of the Bush administration as an
encouragement to jettison human rights in times of crisis. Others have used it to
vindicate their own practices. For instance, the Israeli government has quoted the
missile attack by the United States on al Qaeda suspects in Yemen as justifying its
own targeted executions of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

Collateral Damage
In a climate of fear where even the most powerful and protected feel vulnerable,
people are easily persuaded that the price for safety is the erosion of liberty. Yet
there is no empirical evidence to show that restraining freedom strengthens security on a sustainable, durable basis. On the contrary, the drive for security at the
cost of human rights, far from making the world a safer place, has made it more
dangerous by encouraging secrecy, shielding governments from scrutiny, promoting double standards, undermining international institutions and the rule of international law. To those consequences of the backlash against human rights must be
added others. The “war on terror” and the war in Iraq have created a deep sense of
injustice and alienation that has permeated and deeply divided societies and communities in a way not seen since the end of the Cold War. There is also a growing
cynicism about the universal value of human rights. Discriminatory antiterrorist
laws in some countries targeted only foreigners or foreign-born citizens or encouraged racial profiling. This kind of stigmatizing is a source of danger, encouraging a climate in which xenophobia and racism flourishes. Muslims, Arabs, and
Asians are easy targets of Islamophobia. On the other side, anti-Semitism has also
reemerged with the resurgence of Islamic and other political extremism. Political
rhetoric about “good and evil,”—“you are with us or against us,” “the forces of
evil,” “them and us”—has widened this gulf.
New seeds of social discord and insecurity are sprouting between citizens
and noncitizens. Racism and xenophobia are latent in all societies, but in some
European countries they feature blatantly as some politicians exploit people’s fears
and prejudices for short-term electoral gains. Some aspects of the media have
played into this strategy, dehumanizing and demonizing foreigners, foreign-born
citizens, refugees, and asylum seekers. They are pointed out as a source of danger
and become an easy target for hate speech and violence. Those who need their
rights protected the most have become the ones most at risk of attacks.
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The increasing polarization between communities has strengthened the hands
of those who have always feared the powerful appeal of human rights and who, in
turn, are using arguments based on cultural and religious norms to undermine
human rights in the Islamic world and in Islamic communities in the Western
world. Cultural relativism is being used as a ground to delegitimate the universality
of human rights, not only by some fundamentalist and extremist groups but also by
some governments in non-Western countries.
Whether at the hands of Christian, Islamic, or Hindu fundamentalists, a common casualty of the “war on terror” has been women’s human rights. Western
countries manipulated the global security agenda in the name of women’s human
rights but did little to protect women in Afghanistan or Iraq. The backlash against
human rights and the growth of fundamentalism have combined to tighten restrictions on women in Iraq, for instance, and have reinforced the excuses for violence
against women in the name of religion, custom, culture and tradition.
Heightened security concerns have also increased pressure on human rights
defenders. In many countries, governments have clamped down on activism as
a security threat in itself. Activists and particularly small local groups have found
that their space for action has shrunk, and that they are viewed with suspicion and
even hostility.
In some countries, it has become more difficult to garner public support for
human rights work. Human rights advocates work through the pressure of public
opinion. The basic premise of their work is that human rights violations anywhere
are the concern of people everywhere. It is difficult to mobilize public opinion in
affluent societies in favor of human rights when people fear that their own safety
might be at stake. It is difficult to promote international solidarity for human
rights among ethnic minorities, among the poor and the vulnerable, when they see
themselves as the targets, rather than the beneficiaries, of the international security
agenda.
Human rights groups have been accused of double standards: of failing to condemn armed groups and “terrorists,” while criticizing governments who respond to
them. The truth is that most armed groups are not as susceptible to the tactics that
human rights advocates apply. “Naming and shaming” is hardly likely to have any
impact on al Qaeda! Undoubtedly, human rights groups need to do more to find
the levers of pressure on armed groups—for instance, through pressure on allies
and supporters, or through exposing the “sources” that provide arms and funds to
these groups. But there is no doubt that attacks on civilians by armed groups are a
clear violation of international human rights and humanitarian law and can sometimes amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes. Those who commit such
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crimes must be brought to trial in accordance with international standards. Those
who support them, whether governmental or private actors, should be exposed as
being complicit in the crime and therefore also liable under international law.

An Agenda for Change
Restrictions on liberty have not paid dividends in greater security. The backlash
against human rights indicates that the world today is less free. But the insurgency
in Iraq, the anarchy in Afghanistan, and the spate of suicide bombs and attacks in
crowded cities from Mumbai to Moscow also show that the world today is less safe.
Building a safer world requires a paradigm shift in the approach to security.
Real security comes through respect of human rights and the rule of law. Insecurity
and violence are best tackled by effective, accountable states that uphold, not violate, human rights. A trade-off between human rights and security is both unprincipled and shortsighted.
Security and human rights are not incompatible. Governments have the right,
indeed the duty, to protect people from attacks by armed groups or individuals but
they are obliged to do so within the rule of law and the framework of international
human rights. It is possible to carry out both obligations within the human rights
system. Human rights treaties are drafted by governments that are acutely aware
of security concerns that range from internal subversion to international armed
conflict. The treaties therefore grant governments the power to protect legitimate
security interests without unduly restricting fundamental freedoms.
Governments are not entitled to respond to terror with terror. Just as criminal
violence is best addressed through better—not brutal—policing, so too insecurity
and violence are best tackled by effective, accountable states that ensure the security
of their people by upholding, not violating their rights.
There is now—slowly but surely—a better understanding of the balance
between security and liberty, at least among some parts of the judiciary. The U.S.
Supreme Court decided to examine the legality of detention of some of the people
held at Guantanamo and ruled several times against the Bush administration. A
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals panel issued a ruling barring the President from
declaring a U.S. citizen an “enemy combatant” without Congressional authorization. A German court upheld the right to a fair trial of a man suspected of terrorist activities and dismissed the charges against him. Legislatures in the United
Kingdom and the United States have been less ready to expand antiterrorist powers
of the executive. European governments have refused to extradite to the United
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States any suspected terrorists without a guarantee against the application of the
death penalty. A number of countries, including Brazil, have refused to sign bilateral impunity agreements with the United States.

Addressing Real Sources of Insecurity
Building a safer world also means looking at the real sources of insecurity from
which millions of people suffer. Promoting security is not just about fighting a war
against terrorism. It is about looking at threats more broadly and understanding
them in the context not of state but people’s security.
For many people the threat to personal security does not lie in terrorist attacks
but in the failure to eradicate extreme poverty and preventable diseases, to arrest
and treat the spread of HIV/AIDS, or to halt the flow of small arms. For many
women, life will continue to be insecure as long as they are unprotected from violence in their homes and communities. For many people, real security will remain
illusory as long as police, courts, and state institutions in their country remain inept
or corrupt.
A war was fought to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction. Yet the real
weapons of mass destruction are small arms and conventional weapons, which kill
almost four hundred thousand people a year. The uncontrollable proliferation of
light weapons makes it easier to recruit children to fight wars. The world is awash
with small arms: there is one weapon for every ten people and there are enough bullets produced each year to shoot every man, woman and child on this planet, twice.
Developing countries spend about $22 billion a year on weapons. For $10 billion,
they could achieve universal primary education.
The uncontrolled trade in arms puts the world at risk. In the name of combating the so-called war on terror, many governments, led by the United States,
have relaxed controls on exports to governments that are known to have appalling
human rights records, among them Colombia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Israel.
A global problem needs a global solution. An arms control treaty has been in
the making in the UN for many years. The permanent members of the UN Security
Council are the main producers and traders of weapons. Whether or not an effective treaty will be adopted eventually depends on their willingness to address this
problem. Their failure to do so will call into question not only their commitment
to human rights but also their responsibility as guardians of international security.
Directly as well as indirectly, women’s rights have suffered under a narrow
security agenda. For many women, gender violence is the greatest threat to security
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that they face. In many countries there are no laws to protect women. Even where
there are laws, police and the judiciary fail to apply them properly. In some countries discrimination against women is severe, creating an environment in which
women are routinely suppressed and attacked. Poor women are more exposed to
violence and less able to escape it than women of wealthier means.
All women have the right to be free from violence by state or private actors.
Governments need to introduce legislative and judicial changes to protect women’s
human rights. More support must be given to women’s groups to organize themselves against violence. More investment must be made in education for girls and
employment for women.
Extreme poverty is a major source of insecurity for millions of people. In a
world where globalization has brought unbelievable affluence and wealth to many,
absolute poverty has persisted and inequality has grown. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights proclaims that people have the right not only to liberty and
freedom of expression but also to a standard of living adequate for their health
and well-being, including food, housing, and medical care. Reorienting the security agenda in favor of human security and human rights will require enormous
commitment and investment by governments and the international community,
financial institutions and business leaders, and civil society. It will require a new
approach to aid and trade. New funds must be found to meet the social needs of
poor and marginalized communities. New money must be found to help countries
build fair and effective justice and policing systems, so that legal justice can go hand
in hand with social and economic justice.

Globalizing Human Rights
Global insecurity, far from diminishing the value of human rights, has actually
heightened the need to respect them. The failure of the international community
to effectively uphold those rights only underlines the importance of human rights
defenders and activists in bringing about change.
Local human rights groups, social movements, and activists are the real lifeblood
for change around the world, opening up societies, and fighting for international
standards of human rights and good governance. They are also an important antidote to attacks on human rights by governments, armed groups, or others. Together
with international human rights organizations they form a global civil society that
exposes abuse, challenges injustice, and strives for greater accountability.
The challenges facing human rights activists today are stark: to confront the
threat posed by callous, cruel, and criminal acts of armed groups and individuals;
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to resist the backlash against human rights created by the single-minded pursuit
of a global security doctrine that has deeply divided the world; and to redress the
failure of governments and the international community to deliver on social and
economic justice.
The power of people to bring about human rights change should not be underestimated. Human rights provide a tool to human rights defenders. They give voice
to the powerless: the prisoner of conscience, the prisoner of violence, the prisoner
of poverty. They bring hope to millions. Human rights are a banner to mobilize
people globally in the cause of justice and truth. They provide a fractured world
with a glue to bind people in favor of equality, freedom, and justice, and against
violence and abuse. They offer a powerful and compelling vision of a better and
fairer world for all men, women, and children, and provide a concrete plan of how
to get there. That is why a sustainable agenda for global security is an agenda for
human rights.
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PART III

Evolving Norms

Over the tumultuous half-century I have been involved in international humanitarian assistance, there have been, not surprisingly, shifting parameters and standards to help guide our actions. This section offers four important views of both
positive and negative adaptation to the harsh realities and challenges of complex
humanitarian crises. A focus on the limits of state sovereignty or on education for
children in conflict areas has only recently been considered by those providing
relief assistance. The need to clearly define—and preserve—humanitarian space is
presented here, and it is an essential theme that runs throughout the book. So also
in humanitarian work is the need for constant review and analysis; the relevant
observations of an experienced scholar, and known skeptic, add leaven to our understanding and appreciation of our noble discipline.
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Displacement in all its manifestations, internal and external, has become a global
crisis of grave and escalating magnitude. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of people displaced within the borders of their own countries has soared to
an estimated twenty to twenty-five million, and the number of refugees is now
estimated at over eleven million. Statistics indicate that although the number of
refugees appears to be declining, the internally displaced populations worldwide
seem to be increasing, a trend that suggests a correlation: As governments restrict
the right of asylum, potential refugees join the ranks of the internally displaced.
These are people who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights, or natural or human-made disasters.1
Nearly always, internally displaced persons suffer from conditions of insecurity
and destitution, and they are acutely in need of protection and survival services.
Whereas refugees have an established system of international protection and assistance, those who are displaced internally fall within the domestic jurisdiction and,
therefore, under the sovereignty of the state concerned, without established legal or
institutional bases for their protection and assistance.
Displacement is not the disease, but a symptom of a public health epidemic with
deep-rooted causes. Treating the symptoms or easing the pain through humanitarian assistance is only a first step toward the challenge of diagnosing the disease and
attacking it from its root causes. A comprehensive strategy in response to the crisis
of displacement must build on the three phases of the problem—causes, consequences, and solutions. Addressing the causes requires going beyond the mere fact
of conflicts, communal violence, or human rights violations to appreciate the even
deeper root causes. These are often reflected in the traumas of nation-building,
involving crises of identity, historical denial of democratic liberties and fundamental human rights, and the deprivations of poverty and severe underdevelopment.
Consequences relate to the humanitarian tragedies that result from violent con124
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flicts, gross violations of human rights, and the sudden and massive displacement
they generate. Remedies envisage both a response to the emergency needs of the situation and a search for lasting solutions. In other words, the corresponding themes
of response would be prevention, protection and assistance, and a secure process
of return or permanent settlement in another area, rehabilitation, reintegration,
and sustainable development. Action at these three phases must aim at balancing
sovereignty, responsibility, and international accountability.
Discharging the preventive responsibilities of sovereignty must begin with
addressing the root causes of displacement. As Mrs. Sadako Ogata, former UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, has correctly observed, “Whether we speak of refugees
or of internally displaced persons, it is clear that there will be no end to their plight
until the international community has found ways to deal effectively with the root
causes of forced displacement, so as to prevent or alleviate conditions before people
flee.”2 Recent years have witnessed a strategic shift in the operational principles of
the UNHCR. The new approach “is proactive and preventive, rather than reactive.
Instead of focusing purely on countries of asylum, it is equally concerned with conditions in actual and potential refugee-producing states. And as well as providing
protection and assistance to refugees, it seeks to reinforce the security and freedom
enjoyed by several other groups: internally displaced people; refugees who have
returned to their own country; war-affected communities and those who are at risk
of being uprooted.”3
Once displacement has occurred, priority then shifts to providing the affected
population with protection and assistance. These functions should normally fall
under the responsibilities of sovereignty, but in conflict situations the state often
lacks the political will to discharge those responsibilities. Involving the international community to fill the vacuum of state responsibility means negotiating access
against the obstacles of defensive state sovereignty. As Mrs. Ogata remarked in 1992,
“How to secure the protection of the internally displaced and ensure their access to
humanitarian assistance is one of the most important challenges facing the international community. Meeting this challenge will require the development of institutional and practical mechanisms.”4 There have since been important developments
in both these areas, which will be highlighted in the course of this chapter.

Magnitude of the Crisis
Displacement is generally a consequence of conflict, which, in turn, is a symptom
of deeper societal problems. Conflict occurs when two or more parties interact in
pursuit of incompatible objectives, which may involve material or immaterial val125
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ues. Various forms and degrees of conflict are pervasive features of normal life and,
for the most part, are negotiated and resolved by the parties or by third-party mediators. Governance is primarily a function of preventing, managing, and resolving
conflicts. The kinds of conflicts that generate internal displacement, however, are
generally of a more severe nature, involving deadly violence. As a result of these
conflicts, much destruction to life and property is pervasive throughout the world;
governments have disintegrated and entire regions have been destabilized, with
devastating humanitarian consequences; masses of uprooted populations in the
affected countries survive on emergency relief supplies, displaced within their own
countries or forced across international borders as refugees.
It is often argued that the internally displaced should be considered and treated
like refugees who have not crossed international borders. The analogy is compelling. And yet, the border factor is crucial in legal and institutional terms to qualify
one as a refugee who is thereby entitled to receive international protection and
assistance. Even more significantly, while the refugee is outside the national framework of conflict and political persecution, the internally displaced, who would be a
refugee if he or she had crossed international borders remains trapped within those
borders, a potential victim not only of conflict, but also of the persecution emanating from it and alienated from the government that is supposed to be a source of
protection and support for citizens.
Overwhelmingly, such persons live in a hostile environment, often deprived of
such survival needs as food, shelter, and medicine, frequently subjected to roundups, forced resettlement, arbitrary detentions or arrests, forced conscription, and
sexual assaults. Some of the highest mortality rates ever recorded during humanitarian emergencies have come from situations involving internally displaced persons. According to surveys conducted by the U.S. Center for Disease Control, the
death rates among internally displaced have been as much as sixty times higher
than those of nondisplaced within the same country.5
Compounding the crisis is the nature of the conflicts in which the population
is often caught up. Internal conflicts are frequently marked by few or no accepted
ground rules. These wars, as former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
observed in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, are “often of a religious or
ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty.”6
They are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and
armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command.
They are often guerilla wars without clear front lines. Civilians are the main
victims and often the main targets. Humanitarian emergencies are common-
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place and the combatant authorities, in so far as they can be called authorities,
lack the capacity to cope with them. The number of refugees registered with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has
increased from 13 million at the end of 1987 to 26 million at the end of 1994. The
number of internally displaced persons has increased even more dramatically.7
“Today’s belligerents,” a Foreign Policy Association study points out, “are
more and more willing to use humanitarian access, life-saving assistance, and even
civilians themselves as weapons in their political-military struggles.”8 The challenge posed by the situation of internally displaced persons and refugees is both to
allow them to flee from danger and to ensure their right to remain. As Mrs. Ogata
observed, “We must prevent refugee flows, not by building barriers or border controls but by defending the right of people to remain in peace in their own homes
and their own countries.”9 The mere fact that people are forced to leave their homes
to escape from conflict or persecution implies the violation of fundamental human
rights, among them “the right to life, liberty and security of person, the right not
to be subjected to torture or other degrading treatment, the right to privacy and
family life, the right to freedom of movement and residence, and the right not to be
subjected to arbitrary exile.”10 Curative prevention, which means securing the right
to remain at home in peace, the right to protection and assistance during displacement, and the right to return home safely and reintegrate into a secure life therefore
requires ensuring respect for the human rights of every person. This depends on
the willingness of states to accept responsibility for their own citizens and the role
of the international community “to foster responsibility as well as accountability of
states as regards the treatment of their own citizens.”11
Much has been written and said about the need for early warning and preventive measures. It is also increasingly acknowledged that most conflicts that have
resulted in gruesome humanitarian tragedies have not been the result of lack of
early warning, but rather because of lack of the political will on the part of the
international community to act in appropriate time. As the former UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,
“Experience has shown that the greatest obstacle to success in these endeavors is
not, as is widely supposed, lack of information, analytical capacity or ideas for the
United Nations initiative. Success is often blocked at the outset by the reluctance
of one or other of the parties to accept United Nations help.”12
Early warning and prevention essentially mean understanding the sources of
potential conflicts and addressing them in time to abort their explosion into violent
confrontation. Once a conflict has actually broken out, there is then the immedi-
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ate need to address its humanitarian consequences while also seeking an end to
the hostilities by addressing the issues that led to the conflict in the first place. The
success of the effort means restoring peace and creating conducive conditions for
reconstruction and development. These are essentially functions of governance that
normally fall within the purview of domestic jurisdiction and therefore national
sovereignty.
Although the response of governments to displacement generated by natural causes may sometimes be grossly inadequate, on the whole it is sympathetic
and supportive of the victims. Likewise, displacement caused by interstate conflicts generally elicits supportive responses from the government of the affected
population. In contrast, response to a displacement caused by internal conflicts,
communal violence, and systematic violations of human rights is nearly always
complicated by the cleavages involved. These cleavages often take the form of an
identity crisis, whether based on race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or class. What this
means is that the government or any other controlling authority concerned and the
affected population identify themselves in divisive terms that undermine solidarity
and support. The government or the controlling authority, rather than view the
victim population as citizens for whom there is a moral and legal duty to protect
and assist, tend to see them as enemies, or part of the enemy, with whom they are at
war. In such a situation, which reflects a national identity crisis, the victim population falls into a vacuum of the moral and legal responsibility normally associated
with sovereignty. It is to fill this vacuum that the international community is often
called upon to step in and provide the needed protection and assistance.
It must be noted, however, that although this notion of identity crisis is pervasive, the degree varies from country to country. And so does the response of governments and other controlling authorities. There are situations of ethnic conflict in
which the government still identifies the victim population as their people to whom
they indeed provide food and medical supplies, sometimes in cooperation with rebel
forces with whom the affected population is ethnically identified. Unfortunately,
this appears to be the exception; the pattern is tragically one of denial of solidarity
with the victim population on the basis of exclusive identity symbols.

The Challenge of Sovereignty
There are two aspects to the challenges posed by internal conflicts for sovereignty.
One is to establish and apply an effective system of conflict prevention, management and resolution; the other is to provide protection and assistance to those
affected by conflict. In both cases, the state may not be capable or willing to provide
128
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adequate solutions or remedies, especially because the government is nearly always
a party to the conflict. And because it is partisan, the government often acts as a
barrier to access by the international community to provide protection and assistance to the needy and to help in the search for peace. Such resistance to outside
involvement is justified by the invocation of national sovereignty.
Since its inception, sovereignty has developed through several overlapping
phases, which may not be neatly delineated historically, but which nonetheless signify an evolution. The first, represented by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, is the
initial phase when the sovereign reigned supreme domestically and in relations
with the outside world. The second, following World War II, marks the erosion of
sovereignty with the development of democratic values and institutions internally
and with international accountability on the basis of human rights and humanitarian standards. With the greater promotion of these values following the end of the
Cold War, the third phase emerged as a reactive assertion of sovereignty by governments whose domestic performance renders them vulnerable to international scrutiny. The fourth is the current pragmatic attempt at reconciling state sovereignty
with responsibility.

Genesis of Sovereignty
Sovereignty in legal and political theory was initially conceived in Europe as an
instrument of authoritative control by the monarch over feudal princes in the construction of modern territorial states. It was believed that instability and disorder,
seen as obstacles to a stable society, could only be overcome by viable governments
capable of establishing firm and effective control over territory and populations.13
The sovereign, as the lawmaker, was considered to be above the law. Indeed, law,
according to the “command theory” of the leading positivist jurist, John Austin,
is “a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being
having power over him.”14 Law is thus considered the command of the sovereign
who is habitually obeyed by his subjects. The power of the sovereign is supposedly
not limited by justice or any ideas of good and bad, right or wrong.15 “For Austin
. . . any legal limit on the highest lawmaking power was an absurdity and an impossibility.”16 Even in contemporary literature, it is still argued that “sovereignty is a
characteristic of power that relegates its holder to a place above the law. A sovereign
is immune from law and only subject to self-imposed restrictions.”17 Although the
form of government might vary from monarchy to aristocracy or democracy, it is
considered essential that governments maintain order through an effective exercise
of sovereignty.
129
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On the other hand, the basic proposition of international human rights law
is that “to qualify for the name of government, a government . . . has to meet
certain standards, all of which involve restraints on the use of power; no torture;
no brutalization; no seizure of property; no state terror; no discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, or sex; no prevention of people leaving a particular country,
and so on.”18 The limits of the “tyrannical” concept of sovereignty postulates three
major premises: (a) “‘humanity’—is the raison d’etre of any legal system”; (b) “the
international system . . . since the Peace of Westphalia, has not been fulfilling what
should be its primary function, namely, the protection and development of the
human dignity of the individual”: (c) “any proposed ‘new world order’ should be
structured so as to maximize benefits not for States but for individuals living within
the States, all the way from freedom of speech and elections, on the one hand, to
freedom from hunger and the right to education on the other hand.”19
These principles impose on the international community a correlative responsibility for their enforcement. Herein lies the paradox of the international order.
That paradox was indeed inherent in the settlement of Westphalia, from which
time “sovereignty created both the territorial state and the international system.”20

Erosion of Sovereignty
The post–World War II era represents the second phase of the erosion of sovereignty. The application of the right to self-determination, which provided the basis
for the process of decolonization, expanded the process of erosion. One of the
effective measures in contravention of the narrow concepts of absolute sovereignty
was that of international sanctions against South Africa. It was undoubtedly the
combination of internal and external pressures that eventually culminated in the
collapse of apartheid. The increasing internalization of the human rights agenda
and the wave of democratization that is sweeping the world are among the contemporary challenges to sovereignty.
The demands for democratic values, institutions, and practices have devolved
the classic notion of sovereign will and authority to the people who are increasingly
intolerant of the dictatorship of unaccountable government. More and more, it is
recognized that it is the will of the people, democratically invested in the leaders
they elect freely or otherwise accept as their representatives, that entitle authorities
to value and uphold the sovereignty of a nation. As Michael Reisman has written,
It should not take a great deal of imagination to grasp what an awful violation
of the integrity of the self it is when men with guns evict your government,
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dismiss your law, kill and destroy wantonly and control you and those you
love by intimidation and terror. When that happens, all other human rights
that depend on the lawful institutions of government become matters for the
discretion of the dictators. And when that happens, those rights cease. Military
coups are terrible violations of the political rights of all the members of the
collectivity, and they invariably bring in their wake the violation of all other
rights. Violations of the right to popular government are not secondary or less
important. They are very, very serious human rights violations.2
In the context of international intervention in Haiti, Reisman argues that “in
modern international law, what counts is the sovereignty of the people and not
a metaphysical abstraction called the state. If the de jure government, which was
elected by the people, wants military assistance, how is its sovereignty violated?
And if the purpose of the coercion is to reinstate a de jure government elected in a
free and fair election after it was ousted by a renegade military, whose sovereignty
is being violated? The military’s?”22
The area of humanitarian intervention has witnessed the greatest erosion of
sovereignty, mostly with the consent of the states, but at times through forceful
enforcement. Nevertheless, mechanisms and procedures of implementation of the
wide array of human rights and humanitarian standards remain undeveloped and
grossly inadequate.

Reassertion of Sovereignty
The more the international community has been assertive, the more vulnerably governments have reacted defensively against erosion of state sovereignty. This indeed
marks the third phase of the evolution of sovereignty. Governments that are threatened by the erosion of narrow concepts of sovereignty and are defensively trying to
reassert it use the argument of cultural relativity and characterize the universality
concept as a Western ploy for interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
Even among the supporters of a more liberal interpretation of sovereignty,
its erosion has been viewed with ambivalence. Former United Nations SecretaryGeneral Javier Perez de Cuellar, while acknowledging “what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in
the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents,” added the
questions, “Does intervention not call into question one of the cardinal principles
of international law, one diametrically opposed to it, namely, the obligation of
non-interference in the internal affairs of the States?”23 In his 1991 annual report,
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he wrote, “The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and
political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be
weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and
age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of
decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil
strife or insurrection.”24
In place of exclusionary notions of sovereignty, de Cuellar called for a “higher
degree of cooperation and a combination of common sense and compassion,”
arguing that “we need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between
respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights. . . . What is involved
is not the right of intervention but the collective obligation of States to bring relief
and redress in human rights emergencies.”25
Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility
Reconciling sovereignty with responsibility, the fourth phase of the evolution, has
become the operative principle. Former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
in An Agenda for Peace, wrote that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty
. . . has passed”; that “its theory was never matched by reality”; and that it is necessary for leaders of states “to find a balance between the needs of good internal
governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.”26
In another context, Boutros-Ghali elaborated his views on sovereignty by highlighting the need to rethink the concept in contemporary global context, “not to
weaken its essence, which is crucial to international security and cooperation, but
to recognize that it may take more than one form and perform more than one
function.” Boutros-Ghali goes on to postulate an intriguing concept of universal
sovereignty of individuals and peoples: “Underlying the rights of the individual and
the rights of the peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all
humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues affecting
the world as a whole. It is a sense that increasingly finds expression in the gradual
expansion of international law.”27
Living up to the responsibilities of sovereignty becomes in effect the best guarantee for sovereignty. As one observer commented, “Governments could best avoid
intervention by meeting their obligations not only to other states, but also to their
own citizens. If they failed, they might invite intervention.”28
This was indeed the point made by the Secretary-General of the Organization
of African Unity, Salim Ahmed Salim, in his bold proposals for an OAU mechanism
for conflict prevention and resolution. “If the OAU, first through the Secretary-
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General and then the Bureau of the Summit, is to play the lead role in any African
conflict,” he said, “it should be enabled to intervene swiftly, otherwise it cannot
be ensured that whoever (apart from African regional organizations) acts will do
so in accordance with African interests.”29
Criticizing the tendency to respond only to worst-case scenarios, Salim emphasized the need for preemptive intervention: “Preemptive involvement should be
permitted even in situations where tensions evolve to such a pitch that it becomes
apparent that a conflict is in the making.” He even suggested that the OAU should
take the lead in transcending the traditional view of sovereignty, building on the
African values of kinship, solidarity and the notion that “every African is his brother’s keeper.” Considering that “our borders are at best artificial,” Salim argued,
“we in Africa need to use our own cultural and social relationships to interpret the
principle of non-interference in such a way that we are enabled to apply it to our
advantage in conflict prevention and resolution.”30
It is most significant that the Security Council, in its continued examination
of the Secretary-General’s report, An Agenda for Peace, “[noted] with concern
the incidents of humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of population
becoming or aggravating threats to international peace and security and concluded
that under certain circumstances, there may be a close relationship between acute
needs for humanitarian assistance and threats to international peace and security,
which trigger international involvement.”31
The crisis of internal displacement fits into this model in that it combines human
rights with humanitarian concerns, and protection with assistance. Internal displacement is also a challenge to sovereignty in that providing the citizens with physical security and their basic survival needs are among the prerequisites for legitimacy
and therefore recognizable sovereignty in the framework of international relations.
These are among the principles that have guided the implementation of my mandate
as Representative of the Secretary-General for Internally Displaced Persons.
The normative principles of my dialogue with governments are built on the
premise that national sovereignty carries with it responsibility for the security and
welfare of the citizens. When a state lacks the capacity to ensure the protection and
welfare of its people, it is expected to call on the international community to supplement its efforts. The essence of the state responsibility, however, is accountability, both domestically and internationally. If states fail to live up to their obligations
toward their citizens with the result that large numbers of people fall victim, their
physical and social integrity violated or threatened and their very survival endangered, then the international community has the commensurate responsibility to
hold the states accountable and obtain access to provide the needed protection and
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assistance and help in the search for remedies to the conditions that had caused the
violent confrontation in order to restore a just and lasting peace.

International Responses
The plight of the internally displaced has begun to receive significant attention from
the international community. Because of the magnitude of the crisis, the inadequacy
of the response system, and the urgent need for international remedies, a number
of nongovernmental organizations, supported by concerned governments, urged
the Commission on Human Rights to take action. Concerted action began with the
consideration by the Commission of a report prepared by the Secretariat on the
subject of internal displacement.32 It was then that the Commission requested the
Secretary-General to appoint a representative to study the problems. The study was
to cover the root causes of internal displacement, the relevant international legal
standards, the mechanisms for their enforcement, and any additional measures
the United Nations might take to improve the situation of the internally displaced.
In preparing the study, I undertook field visits to five countries and engaged in a
dialogue with the governments. Since then, in-depth studies of the legal and institutional dimensions of international protection and assistance for the internally
displaced, and dialogue with governments have been the core activities of the mandate. As we shall see in the following sections, these have brought about a number
of tangible results.

Institutional Arrangements
On the issue of institutional arrangements, it is widely acknowledged that there is
a gap in the coverage because there is no one organization, or collection of organizations, mandated to take responsibility for the internally displaced. At the same
time, there is no political will to create a new organization with that mandate. Nor
is it likely that an existing institution will be mandated to assume full responsibility
for the internally displaced. Under the present circumstances, the residual option
is that of a collaborative arrangement among a wide variety of agencies and organizations whose mandates and activities are relevant to the problems of internal
displacement.33
Correlative to the increased involvement of various agencies and organizations
is the urgent need for coordination or a central point to assign institutional responsibility in emergency situations. In the last few years some institutional progress has
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been made in this area. There now exist coordinating mechanisms that promise
to bring coherence into the international system. The focal points in these structural arrangements are the Emergency Relief Coordinator (designed as the reference
point in the United Nations system for requests for assistance and protection for
internally displaced persons), and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, its working group. A similar coordinating structure is reflected at the field level through the
Resident Representatives of UNDP or, in cases of complex emergencies, the Resident
Coordinators or Humanitarian Coordinators who chair Disaster Management
Teams (DMTs) composed of UN operational agencies and sometimes NGOs and
coordinate humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons.
The High Commissioner for Refugees has observed that the success of international involvement will depend on three key factors: “The first is a well structured
division of work, on which coordination must proceed among organizations and
institutions with the required expertise and ability to avoid duplication of efforts
and fill gaps instead, the second is the ability of the international effort to mobilize
and develop local capacities and responsibilities. The third . . . is their firm foundation in common and consistent human rights standards.”34
Nor should the institutional challenge be seen merely in the context of the displacement that has already occurred. Human rights violations are a major factor
in causing displacement as well as an obstacle to safe and voluntary return home.
Safeguarding human rights in countries of origin is therefore critical, both for prevention and for the solution of refugee and internally displaced persons problems.
If the increasing problem of internal displacement is to be contained and reduced,
preventive strategies are critical.
United Nations human rights bodies have an important role to play in this
regard. Preventive measures currently relied upon include dialogue with governments, urgent appeals, public statements, emergency meetings, the deployment of
human rights field staff, machinery for the protection of minorities, and the extension of technical assistance. Commission reports addressing the root causes of mass
exoduses also exemplify efforts at prevention. Human rights treaty bodies, moreover, have been requested to examine measures they might take to prevent human
rights violations, and several have adopted emergency procedures and undertaken
missions to countries for preventative purposes. The establishment of the post of
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has added momentum
to the development of preventative strategies. Human rights field staff deployed
under her auspices are playing a valuable preventative role. Human rights advisory
services and education projects are valuable tools for the promotion of human
rights and prevention of violations.
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All of these measures, however, are at an early stage of development and
human rights bodies should be encouraged to increase their capacities for prevention. Mechanisms for minority protection in particular need to be strengthened, since many displaced persons are members of minority groups who have
been subjected to forcible expulsion, resettlement, and other persecution because
of their ethnic or other origin. Promising initiatives include the adoption by the
United Nations of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the establishment of a working group by the Submission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities to develop strategies for minority protection and to prevent conflict.
At the national level, promotion and protection of human rights through the
establishment of effective national institutions to monitor and promote them is
the safest guarantee against involuntary displacement. My country mission reports
as Representative of the Secretary-General have emphasized the importance of
supporting preventative techniques aimed at empowering the population at the
grassroots level. Very often, local communities have built up effective strategies for
mitigating the impact of displacement. The coping strategies that displaced populations themselves have developed should be carefully examined by NGOs and international agencies, because such mechanisms are essential elements of prevention
and protection.
Irrespective of the level at which preventive strategies are pursued, efforts must
be made to ensure that they do not interfere with the freedom of movement. There
is a need to reconcile strategies that encourage people to remain within their own
countries with those that safeguard the right to leave and seek asylum from persecution. Under no circumstances should the desire to forestall large-scale populations
displacements take precedence over assuring the security of displaced populations.
The Quest for Strategy
In virtually all dialogues with the governments and relevant actors, effort is made
to link the immediate challenges of protection and assistance with the need to find
lasting solutions, which in time draws attention to the causes generating the conflict that triggered displacement. This is, of course, a sensitive area in which reactions from governments are mixed. There are those who claim that it is outside the
mandate of the Representative and those who acknowledge the need for peace as
the real solution to the humanitarian tragedies of war. Objectively, there is no way
the circular link between war, its human tragedies, and the need for solutions that
address the root causes can be avoided.
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In view of these anomalies and uncertainties, there is still a need for developing
a strategy that would address effectively and comprehensively the crisis of internal
displacement, both generically and contextually. As argued at the outset of this
chapter, such a strategy should approach the displacement problem in its three
manifest phases: causes, consequences, and remedies. The corresponding responses
would be to develop measures for preempting and preceding displacement, to provide adequate means of protection and relief assistance during displacement, and
to seek durable solutions through voluntary and safe return, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and self-reliant development.
Ultimately, because conflict is at the core of displacement, emphasis needs to be
placed on conflict prevention, management, and resolution in that order of priority.
It should also be acknowledged that not only is displacement a consequence and,
therefore, a symptom of conflict, but conflict itself is a symptom of deeper societal
ills, generally rooted in ethnic, religious, and cultural diversities, disparities, and
gross inequities or injustices. It is in the fertile soil of understandable and justified grievances that the virus of violence incubates and eventually explodes. Unless
checked in time, this can turn into a chronic condition in the body politic and, as
recent developments have shown, can be even terminal to the survival of nations.
Among the characteristics of the soil in which the virus incubates are poverty,
scarcity of resources, maldistribution of the little there is, politics repressive of legitimate demands, gross violations of human rights and fundamental liberties, and a
sense of hopelessness and despair. Under those conditions, governments or dominant authorities become perceived as tantamount to foreign bodies, implanted into
a resistant body politic that is eventually forced to reject them.
To the extent that conflict represents a symptomatic warning of underlying
and potentially more serious problems, it can play a positive role if constructively
responded to. Indeed, the upsurge in violent conflicts following the end of the
Cold War indicates that many latent conflicts were repressed through the awesome power of the bipolar control mechanisms of the two superpowers, driven not
so much by the ideals of right and wrong as by ideological alignments and strategic considerations. Repressive, unrepresentative governments and regimes were
backed and supported by the superpowers because of their strategic or ideological
stand with little or no regard to their domestic legitimacy. With the withdrawal of
this support following the end of the Cold War, governments or regimes with the
propensity to repress, oppress, and plunder became exposed to internal and external scrutiny and a more determined opposition that they can no longer contain,
because they lack the capacity to exercise effective and decisive control over the
situation.
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This chaotic and often tragic conflict situation paradoxically offers countries
and the international community the opportunity to review the normative and
operational principles governing domestic jurisdiction and international relations.
Foremost of these should be the stipulation of the normative standards of responsibility associated with sovereignty. Rather than a means of barricading governments
and regimes against international scrutiny, sovereignty should be recast in response
to its contemporary challenges as embodying the will of the people, represented
by those they choose through free and fair elections or otherwise accept as their
legitimate representatives. Sovereignty must also be viewed as an instrument for
ensuring the protection and welfare of all those under its jurisdiction.
A concept that provides the core for formulating such a normative framework
remains the human dignity of the individual and the group within the domestic
jurisdiction. This concept is provided for in the charter of the United Nations, the
International Bill of Rights, and all the human rights and humanitarian principles
enunciated in many legally and morally binding documents, including now the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Rather than a means of barricading governments and regimes against international scrutiny, sovereignty should be
normatively postulated as an embodiment of the democratic will of the people and
a tool for ensuring the protection and welfare of all those under domestic jurisdiction. The incorporation and embodiment of these human rights and humanitarian
norms into the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is both a preventive
and curative prescription. Governments and other custodians of national sovereignty should see the standards not only as a guide, but also as a yardstick for evaluating their own performance.
Conflict prevention, management, and resolution clearly pose paradoxical
challenges for both change and stability. The gross inequities of the status quo need
to be scrutinized and moderated, if not eliminated. But preserving a legal order that
is protective of and responsive to reasonable standards of human dignity must be
seen as an overriding goal. It is with these normative principles in mind that governments and the international community are called upon to address the mounting crisis of international displacement, to prevent it by addressing its root causes,
to respond to its human rights and humanitarian tragedies when they occur, and
to strive to end it by creating appropriate conditions for safe return or alternative
resettlement and restoring normal life in the community and the nation at large.
In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the international community has
made considerable progress in responding to displacement, in particular with the
development of the normative framework, in the form of the Guiding Principles,
and enhancements of institutional arrangements at both the international and
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regional levels. However, much more remains to be done to give these legal and
institutional developments meaningful impact on the ground, and above all, to
make governments more responsive to the responsibilities of sovereignty for protecting and assisting their own citizens or else risk undermining their legitimacy
both domestically and internationally. The glass is half-full, but that implies that it
is also half-empty.
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The Child Protection Viewpoint
Alec Wargo

I offer personal, field-based perspectives on the often fraught relationship between
education1 and child protection in armed conflict. This personal perspective, garnered from years working in the protection field, will remove us from the world
of guidelines and policies and return us to the flesh-and-bone realities around the
globe, where students, their teachers, and their communities often find themselves
in the midst of armed conflict.

When Education Protects
At the start of my career in child protection with UNHCR in Central Africa, I was
only “theoretically” aware of the role of education in protecting children from harm
and abuse during conflict and post-conflict situations, and that education personnel
could serve as a linchpin in a community’s ability to protect its children.2 Perhaps
I still held a somewhat jaded American view of education as sets of buildings with
teachers who tried to fill our heads with bits of information in order to pass a series
of exams that would place us later in life into a particular skill or field. Sometimes
school challenged us, often it bored us, but it was always there, taken for granted.
It was only after I began to work in refugee camps in the early 1990s, and later
with UN Peacekeeping in the field, that I began to truly realize that education—
when children do have access to it—is at the heart of many efforts at documenting
violations perpetrated against children during wartime. It is also, on many occasions, the primary interface for a human rights worker—the locus and the focus
of child rights monitors and advocates’ efforts to protect children from violence
and abuse in times of utter chaos. This can be broken down into three categories
of interest for the protection advocate: (1) education as an alert and as a bridge to
response, (2) education and protection from recruitment, and (3) education and
rehabilitation and reintegration.

140

CH11_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p140-154.indd 140

2/13/13 9:45 PM

THE CHILD PROTECTION VIEWPOINT

Education as an Alert and a Bridge to Response
Rights advocates who monitor and advocate for protection of children have long
recognized that alerts from affected communities are the most efficient way to
identify violations against their children. In many cases it is the educationalist who
alerts us to these grave violations. In many places, education authorities and teachers are among the most highly respected community members, and education itself
has high value and prestige. Common practice has been that education personnel
are often trained in the rights children have to freedom from harm, often a simplified version of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and/or aspects of
the Refugee Convention or other applicable legal instruments. The training is done
with the expectation that it forms a base upon which action for proactive protection of children’s rights can be grounded. This is a worthy exercise and has resulted
in a number of interesting dialogues with education and community leaders in
affected locales. Many of these dialogues have centered on the ability of the child to
partake in decisions of his or her life choices, and, of course, a considerable amount
of dialogue has been on the rights of girls and women in their societies.
Let us assume for the purposes of this chapter that child rights and their protection in wartime, especially against grave rights violations, are more or less agreed
upon across time and cultures. The question then becomes how can we translate
this knowledge, this “rights-based” approach, into action that responds to those
violations? This action can be difficult, and sometimes almost impossible, in most
conflict situations. When a violation has occurred, protection staff are asked by
children’s families or community leaders to undertake specific interventions. In the
large majority of cases, these interventions fall into one of two general categories of
action: (1) corrective response and/or (2) accountability response.
For example, in 2002, while serving as a child protection adviser to the UN
peacekeeping mission to the Congo (MONUC), I was approached through the
local Catholic Bishop about a case brought to his attention by a group of teachers
in a village some three days distant. The case concerned an impoverished single
mother’s only child, a fifteen-year-old boy who had been excelling against all odds
at school. A rebel group active in the area had forcibly abducted him while on
his way to school some weeks earlier. The immediate request was to remedy the
situation: to assist in finding and advocating for the release of the boy as soon as
possible. It was felt that an accountability response was not practicable at the time,
because the rebel group in question was in complete control of the area and there
were no NGO or UN staff based in the vicinity to prevent repercussions against
the family.
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In another example, from a similarly isolated community, a rebel soldier had
raped an eight-year-old girl in front of her home. The headmaster of the community’s primary school brought the case to the attention of a local human rights
group, and subsequently the members of that group passed it on to me. In this case,
the parents sought both a response to the girl’s condition and an accountability
response. The girl, along with her mother, was referred to a rape response center
for treatment, HIV screening, and psychosocial recovery. The soldier was later tried
for the crime, found guilty, and sentenced by a military court.
Teachers and education administrators can, and do, serve as protection alerts
with human rights and child rights agencies. However, the crucial factor is whether
or not that educator is not only aware of the violations and the child rights perspective but also alert to the need for both a response to and, in some cases, a remedy for those violations. In my experience, these protection alerts can only work if
educators are linked meaningfully to advocates and actors who can assist them in
accessing services and/or an accountability response. Additionally, a large majority of violations in wartime happen far from major cities and towns, where these
actors are normally based. Most might assume that national or provincial education authorities serve as a link from the village to the central or provincial level. But,
alas, education authorities are the first to suffer rupture when state control is lost
and are often sorely underresourced in conflict-affected states.
The outlook would be bleak if we took such a restrictive view of “education.”
However, in most cases educationalists do succeed in making these links from farflung regions. When we reexamine these links from the deep field to urban centers,
it becomes clear that when we step back and take a broader view of the “education establishment,” it is much larger than most would realize. When we take into
account the nontraditional education actors in these countries, we see that communities of faith, NGOs, and civil society are all highly active actors in a network
of educational activities, both traditional and nontraditional.
The educational establishment should be viewed not only as the remnants of
a Western-influenced Ministry of Education apparatus, but also as the communities of faith, as well as local and international NGOs and UN partners that offer
one of the most resilient and widespread monitoring and alert mechanisms available to child-protection actors today. These education networks are also one of the
best organized and widespread “bridges” to response. While in many places these
networks are engaged as major partners for community-based protection, they
are unfortunately not always utilized in a systematic fashion by the international
community, including the UN system and donors. More must be done to support
and more deeply engage this wider educational establishment as a key partner in
protection response.
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Education and Protection from Recruitment
Though much has been written about how education can serve as a preventative
measure against everything from domestic abuse to gender-based violence, most of
my personal experience with prevention of grave violations against children in times
of conflict centers around the recruitment of children. It is estimated that approximately 250,000 children, boys and girls, serve as child soldiers around the world at
any given time, and their identification and release continues to be a major field of
activity for UN, NGO, and civil-society actors.3
Educational staff are instrumental in alerting communities to the fact that
underage recruitment is a violation of children’s rights and can result in untold
harm. They are also often an essential first line of defense in preventing recruitment. Schoolgoing children are much less likely to be recruited than those children
who are not undertaking some kind of formal or informal education. Why are
children who go to school much less likely to be recruited on the whole? Most
analyses suggest that children who have access to school, in the large majority of
conflict situations where there is no state-guaranteed access to primary or secondary education, are often from less vulnerable families. These are families who have
the wherewithal to resist or avoid situations where their children might be directly
exposed to armed actors. Their children generally spend the large part of their
days in a structured environment, and the link between educationalist community
and family can be quite strong. These families, when they do receive warning of
impending danger, are often able to move away or use other coping mechanisms
to reduce the risk of recruitment of their children.
More vulnerable families either have no means to move or are so destitute that
movement would expose them to the direct risk of starvation, or other dangers
equal to or greater than the threat of recruitment. Therefore, when we examine the
risk of recruitment for school-going children, we appreciate that they are often less
vulnerable socially and economically, are able to be alerted through educationalist/
community/family lines of communication of impending troubles more readily
and, when subject to danger, are often able to move to safety.
School often serves as a community’s barometer for trouble, and educationalists are often among the persons in the community consulted on how best to
avoid danger. For example, in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC), in 2002–2003, the Congolese armed group Rassemblement
Congolaise pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-G) began to move its recruitment and
training centers farther from urban areas to the isolated island of Idjwi in the middle of Lake Kivu to avoid human rights scrutiny of its child recruitment. The first
message I received as the MONUC child protection officer of those recruitments
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was sent through a human rights worker from a group of teachers on the island.
Though the teachers had sent many of their students to the relative safety of the
provincial capital of Bukavu to avoid this fate, many children from inaccessible
areas were forcibly taken to the island, and a large number of families who could
not afford to move from the area or send their children away were recruited. Most
were not enrolled in school at the time of their recruitment.
In similar circumstances we ran into hundreds of children, some as young
as ten years of age, associated with the Conseil National pour la Defense de la
Democratie/Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD) rebel group of
Burundi, which had migrated from their training camps on the Burundi border
with Tanzania to the Uvira/Fizi area of the DRC, where the group maintained a
rear base. Most had spent at most only one to two years in primary school and
recounted how the CNDD-FDD targeted them for recruitment because “they had
nothing else to do.” Most of the children came from broken or extremely poor
households with no means to send them to school. Many were forced to work to
support the family from the age of eight or nine years old. Almost none of them
could read or write.
This socioeconomic argument is important to appreciate fully the direct relationship between access to education and the consequent access to protection from
grave abuses. Indeed, the other end of this reality is that vulnerable children with
no access to schooling sometimes seek out armed groups for various reasons. It is
largely true that most child soldiers are unwilling or forced recruits. However, I
have run into a not inconsiderable number of child recruits who willingly “volunteered” to fight with armed forces or groups.4 In my experience speaking with hundreds of these child soldiers over the years, only a very few were enrolled in school
at the time of their recruitment. As mentioned earlier, many stated that they had
“nothing to do” and were often in dire economic straits or had suffered estrangement from their parents or caregivers. The deceptive offers of a monthly salary
(rarely, if ever, paid) or the chance to feed themselves through pillage or extortion
was attractive; and lacking any other alternative, many did “volunteer.”
Unfortunately, it took these children little time to realize that their decision was
not in their best interest—and months or years of suffering, exposure, and disappointment followed. Many lamented never going to school or not being able to
finish school, and the promise of schooling under child demobilization programs
led more than one child soldier to walk considerable distances to the nearest UN
office or outpost to seek release. Making education, formal and informal, more
widely available in communities at risk for underage recruitment should be more
seriously considered. Education has a worth as a sign of opportunity and status
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among children in conflict-affected communities, and that value can, and must, be
more deftly employed to prevent underage recruitment in the future.
Rehabilitation and Reintegration
In the area of children affected by armed conflict, the advancement of an educational response for children separated or demobilized from armed forces and
groups is probably the most developed to date. Most children desire either formal
or informal education or skills training upon release from armed groups, although
access remains slow and patchy. The high value most former child soldiers place
on education is an end or good in itself, but especially for the older children, it
also forms part of their desire to “bring something back home” to their families
and communities. My experience speaking with demobilized child soldiers about
their next steps has always centered on aspects of what they can now do to become
productive members of their family and society.
For the former child soldier returning to his or her community, well-structured education programs can mean a lifeline to “normalcy,” a future and, in many
cases, a hoped-for wage. The structure and community integrated aspect of these
programs, if undertaken properly, can provide a good grounding for efforts to
prevent re-recruitment or other abuses, either during the conflict or in the postconflict phase. These challenges are now even more complex when we consider that
the numbers of children demobilized during a conflict or immediate post-conflict
phase are rising relative to those demobilized only after the conflict has come to a
halt and stability has returned. This trend for release of children during conflict is
welcome but it comes with its own problems and challenges. Chief among these is
the re-recruitment of children who have been reintegrated, in some instances on
multiple occasions, back into their communities. Education, the structure and alert
functions for protection advocates and actors, remains of high value for successful
reintegration and protection of children demobilized while conflict continues.
Educationalists also play a key role in managing the fears and expectations
of communities who receive demobilized child soldiers. While many parents and
communities naturally welcome their sons and daughters back with open arms,
some armed groups use children against their own communities and this can cause
deep-seated distrust and fear. The UN and its NGO partners have gone a long way
to involve community members, including educational staff, in perceiving former
child combatants primarily as victims and to convince fearful parents and neighbors that it is a child’s right to benefit from reintegration assistance and that this
cannot be done without the active acceptance and participation of the community

145

CH11_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p140-154.indd 145

2/13/13 9:45 PM

ALEC WARGO

itself. Alas, each situation is unique, and the work of educationalists and their partners in war-torn communities is different depending on the circumstances prevailing prior to or during release. This only points out that much research and analysis
are required to further strengthen this approach.
To some extent, victims of sexual violence follow similar trajectories during
their reintegration, though often their interface with education is concealed or is
purposefully blurred to prevent the labeling of these boys and girls as sexual victims. This is not to say that educationalists do not undertake or have the potential to lend their support to these children. Indeed, in a number of circumstances
known to me, these staff members have been a crucial support to these children
and their families.

When Education Fails to Protect
Education is at the forefront in preventing, or responding to, abuses against children in wartime. However, in modern warfare there is a palpable trend in which
the educational personnel themselves, and/or the buildings in which that education
takes place, become the objects of abuse or play a role in the abuse of children.
Attacks Against Schools
Most rights monitors would identify the 1990s as the watershed epoch, when
attacks against schools gained the notice of child protection staff. We saw this in
the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda and in
southern Sudan, during the Rwandan genocide, and certainly in Liberia and Sierra
Leone. We currently witness these attacks in places as varied as Nepal, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, the DRC, Somalia, Palestine, and southern Thailand, as well as in the
Syrian conflict.
It is easy to oversimplify the commonalities of these attacks. Some were related
to wider crimes, such as the genocide in Rwanda, where children and educated
men and women, including teachers, were brutally murdered by gangs, many
times in schools and churches. The perpetrators were intent on the destruction of
a minority community and its perceived sympathizers or, later on, in revenge killings against those who were presumed complicit in the killings due to their ethnic
affiliation. It is here that we find education personnel complicit in killings based
on ethnic identity. Similar stories were recounted to me when I served as human
rights officer with the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) mission
in postwar Bosnia. Sadly, the very pillars of a community, who can give voice to
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protection and reconciliation, can also stoke the embers of ethnic hatred. This is
a constant danger in societies in conflict where ethnic identity is a key factor, and
the educational system, in both its personnel and as a packaged set of ideals and
perceptions of the world, often stand at the very heart of it.
There are other instances when education and identity politics have led to massive rights violations and where schools themselves have become a central battleground. I think of the recent conflict in Nepal and the politicization of Nepali
education, which will haunt that country for some time to come. During that insurgency, the Maoist youth wing concentrated its recruitment efforts on rural schools
throughout the country, abducting whole schools for days of Maoist “cultural”
programs. These programs funneled healthy recruits as young as fifteen years of age
to fighting units and struck fear into the hearts of teachers and education administrators—who had no choice but to look on or risk harm to themselves and others.
In the post-conflict phase in Nepal, the Maoist youth continue to engage in
violent acts, both in schools and in their communities. Currently other political
parties have followed suit and created their own youth wings, the largest of which
is the Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML). These
youth wings are nominally under the control of the parties, and continue to be a
source of interfactional violent acts and killings. Their presence and propagation
in schools across the country remain of deep concern to those assisting the peace
process in Nepal.
Likewise, in southern Thailand, identity politics in the traditionally Malay areas
has taken on a violent character. The instruction of Thai language and culture has
become a lighting rod for local resistance by armed actors. Students and teachers in
these schools, many of them of Malay identity, have been killed in shootings, bombings, and other attacks by armed groups. More worrisome is the effort on the part of
Thai authorities to protect these schools by sending military forces to guard them.
Though it may be well intentioned, one must question the wisdom of deploying
military personnel into schools, effectively making them targets and removing the
civilian nature that such centers of learning must display.
Increasingly, there are also the depressing ideological battles fought over the
very fundamentals of education. The questions of what can be taught and who can
attend school have generated some of the most gruesome attacks against schools
and students in recent history. The worst example of this is the current situation
prevailing in the insurgent-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and the neighboring
border areas of Pakistan, where the Taliban and their allies have wreaked havoc.
The crux of the battle concerns two types of ideological issues: (1) are girls fit to
attend school at all, especially in the company of boys? and (2) should children
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be taught anything beyond Taliban-approved interpretations of religious texts?
It has now become commonplace for the Taliban or associated leaders to leave
“night letters” threatening attacks on schools if they do not cease allowing girls to
attend school or alter the school curriculum to reflect their conservative interpretation for educating young people. Girls’ schools in particular have been attacked
with bombs, poison gas, and a barrage of threats, and there is little one can do in
the more isolated areas until some semblance of security prevails. Add to this the
depressing fact that a significant number of madrasas in the border areas appear
to be training children to undertake armed conflict as fighters or, worse, as suicide
bombers.
Finally, the wholesale attack on schools in the Syrian conflict is extreme. Since
the popular uprising against the regime there, schools have variously been used by
government forces as bases, machine gun emplacements, detention centers and
even places where adults and children are subjected to torture. Many children I met
while taking testimonies on abuses against children in that conflict had not been
able to attend school for over a year. Teachers as well stated that schools in areas
that the government had identified as antiregime were targeted, as were teachers.
Many stated that they had witnessed government forces burning or looting schools
for what they described as reprisal for perceived sympathy with political change.
This reminds us that international efforts to protect schools and students during
armed conflict are in their infancy and that much more focus has to be brought to
this crucial area.
Infiltration of Education by Armed Groups
When we survey the challenges presented when armed groups attack schools and
the difficulties these acts present for protection of education, they pale in comparison to the infiltration of education by armed groups. This does not refer to
the abduction or harassment of students and teachers described earlier, but the
much more pernicious infiltration of education by armed group cadres and their
sympathizers. The latest example of this is the Palipehutu–Forces Nationales pour
la Liberation (FNL) in Burundi, which, in the period prior to the final peace settlement, demonstrated its hold over sympathizers in the educational establishment,
resulting in teachers actively recruiting children for the FNL. It is believed that the
recruitment was aimed at securing these FNL sympathizers a demobilization package, which, in turn was promised to the children, although children have been purposely excluded from such schemes in the peace process. Many of these children
were exposed to militarized camps for fairly long stretches of time, up to two years,
before the FNL agreed to their disqualification. We can also not discount the fact
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that, if the FNL had not come to an agreement with the government of Burundi,
these children would have had a very real chance of taking up arms.
Similarly, in the Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda in the latter half of the
1990s and until quite recently, teachers and community leaders in those camps,
sympathetic to Rwandan-backed rebel groups operating in the Kivu provinces of
the DRC, actively recruited children to fight the Congolese government forces. As
the child-protection focal point for UNHCR at the time, I was amazed that our data
showed that an entire portion of the camps’ population (boys aged from thirteen to
early adulthood) had effectively disappeared. We knew from the data and corroborating evidence that the boys had been sent for military training or other support
roles to either the RCD-G, the Banyamulenge (an ethnic Tutsi group residing in
the mountains of South Kivu Province of the DRC) forces, or, latterly, the Congres
National Pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP). In this instance, teachers and community leaders were either complicit or were too frightened to give evidence. This
recruitment is a worry in a number of refugee camps, where similar pressures exist,
and more must be done to monitor and halt such practices.
Finally, testimonies from community members and students in Syria point to a
disturbing trend of government intelligence personnel utilizing teachers or school
administrators to gather evidence from school children on their political beliefs
and attitudes and beliefs of their parents, with sometimes dangerous consequences
for those parents. Utilizing trusted educational personnel to gather intelligence is a
new and worrisome trend in some anti-insurgency efforts around the world.
The Missing Children
Children missing due to recruitment, either “voluntary” or forced, are a much
smaller number than the very real problem of the thousands of children, the most
vulnerable, who will never have the opportunity to go to school. In most “failed”
or “failing” states, the number of out-of-school children can reach 50 percent and
more in the most isolated and poor regions, where conflict usually flourishes. These
are the children whom the education establishment certainly fails to protect.
We have shown that education can work as an effective monitor and alert for
human rights workers and as a bridge to response. But that very same system falls
absolutely flat for these “missing” children, because education never sees their
faces. It was not surprising, then, that the majority of the children whom I interviewed upon release from one armed group or another recount how they were not
able to attend school; how their impoverished parents were powerless to flee or to
bribe their children’s recruiters to allow their children to remain; and who are also
unable or unaware of the alert function that many educationalists can play. In any
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case, many of these families live days away from the nearest school or do not feel
they are able to share their problems with unfamiliar persons.
If education is to protect all children, and the CRC, the most widely adopted
piece of international legislation, states that it should, then the international community must do much more to find ways to expand the education safety net during
times of conflict. This could be achieved through the establishment of a range of
formal to informal educational outreach and community sensitization programs.
It should most certainly be prioritized in failed and failing states that are in crisis
or conflict.

When Education Itself Needs Protection
From the perspective of the Office of the Special Representative for Children and
Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAC), one overwhelming question has to be addressed that
is of a different nature from the technical discussions on how to ameliorate the
condition or respond to violations against children: How do we stop these attacks?
How do we break the cycle of violence against children and their teachers in classrooms during conflict?
Former Special Representative Radhika Coomaraswamy has noted the “changing nature of conflict.” And, unfortunately, its trajectory is not favorable to children. In the past children were considered peripheral to the conflict. Now they
are often at its very center. Though many experts on this matter may argue why
and exactly when this phenomenon of targeting of children and education first
appeared, it is undeniable that it is now a fact and that these attacks are not abating.
In fact, they are becoming more commonplace.
Again, what to do? One word: accountability. Ninety percent of the armed
actors cited in the Secretary General’s Annual Report on children and armed conflict are nonstate actors. Some of these nonstate actors have proxies that represent
their interests on the sidelines of UN events such as the Human Rights Council and
the Committee on the Rights of the Child. But the weight of the UN’s state-oriented
system is generally not sufficient to engender compliance by these parties.
Security Council Engagement
It was with this in mind that the former SRSG-CAC, Olara Otunnu, began a process in 1999 of engagement with reporting to the UN Security Council, positioning
children and armed conflict directly on its peace and security agenda. This was
the first “thematic” protection mandate to be entertained by the Council in such
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a way. Things progressed slowly at first, with Annual Reports of the Secretary
General speaking of a vague set of violations against children in times of conflict
but without a systematized information gathering network to backstop claims
of abuse.
The next breakthrough came in 2001 with Security Council Resolution (SCR)
1379 asking the Secretary General to prepare an annual list of parties to armed conflict who recruited and used children under the age of eighteen years in armed
conflict, the “list of shame.” After this point the Secretary General also began to
call, in a more focused way, for compliance and, when lacking progress, for the
possibility of the Council using its power to take measures, including sanctions,
against groups and individuals who recruit children.
Actual compliance, however, was slow. This was, first, because the UN system was slow to engage in a concerted campaign in a unified fashion. Second, the
information available to the Security Council at the time did not meet the rigorous
requirements usually associated with the application of sanctions. Third, compliance work lacked a recognized and agreed format. This was rectified over the next
two Resolutions agreed upon by the Council. SCR 1539 of 2004 established the
concept of a concrete timebound “action plan” to halt the recruitment and use of
children. These action plans called upon the UN country teams to engage with both
state and nonstate actors to agree to a set of measurable and timebound activities to
prevent recruitment, release children associated with those groups and verify compliance. Failing this, the Security Council reiterated its intention to consider the
use of measures, including sanctions, against violating parties. At the same time the
Council asked the SRSG-CAC to develop a system-wide plan to strengthen monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children in times of conflict. This
was aimed at establishing a more solid basis of information in which the Council
might deliberate before exercising its power.

Information Is Power
The Secretary General’s plan to provide “timely accurate, reliable and objective
information” to the Security Council was unveiled in his report (S/2005/72) of
2005. The plan is important because it defines the way in which reliable information should be collected, verified, and packaged for the Security Council and
also identified the six grave violations—including recruitment and attacks on
schools—enumerated earlier in this chapter. It also reiterated a call for action
plans and an intention to utilize all tools at its disposal to engender compliance
among parties engaged in grave violations against children in armed conflict. Most
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importantly, it also set in place a Working Group of the Security Council that
would deliberate throughout the year on specialized reports of children affected
by armed conflict, in situations listed in the Secretary General’s Annual Report,
and make recommendations to the parties concerned, as well as to the Council
sanctions committees.
This plan, as set forth by the Secretary General and endorsed by the Security
Council, resulted in the first systematic monitoring, reporting and verification
mechanisms on child protection. It identified headquarters responsibilities, but it
also mandated UN country teams to put in place task forces to undertake systematic monitoring and reporting at the country level. Since that time, the Office of
the SRSG-CAC has worked to mainstream monitoring and reporting throughout
the UN system and technically backstop the work of UN country task forces on
the design and implementation of action plans. It should be noted, however, that
though the Council endorsed the monitoring of six grave violations, including
attacks on schools, the action plans remained limited to the halt of recruitment
and use of children as soldiers. Both monitoring and reporting (MRM) and the
implementation of action plans advanced slowly but have now accelerated to the
point where knowledge and expertise on MRM and the design and implementation
of action plans to halt recruitment and use are widespread.
At the same time, the Council recognized the need to respond, with a recommendation to parties on the other five grave violations listed in SCR 1612. The
crucial lesson learned was that more could be expected of the Security Council
Working Group regarding concrete recommendations when more in-depth analysis of the violations were available to them. Information is power, and it can and
should be used by protection actors to great effect with this mechanism.
However, with a few notable exceptions, the information available on attacks
against schools is largely spotty or absent in the Secretary General’s reports on
country situations to the Working Group. Circumstantial evidence suggests that
protection partners have not spent as much time examining the issue and empowering their partners to report and make suggestions on how to better protect
schools and students during armed conflict. Without the information and analysis
needed, attacks against schools and students and the power of the Security Council
to compel parties to respect and protect education in conflict will remain woefully
underdeveloped. Other violations have similarly languished, but advances have
been made that might prove useful for partners wishing to strengthen the protection of education in conflict through this mechanism.
In July 2011, in its Resolution 1998, the Security Council expanded the listing
criteria to include those parties to conflict who perpetrate or threaten to perpetrate
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attacks against schools or school personnel. This is important for the additional
attention and focus it will generate for country teams dealing with attacks against
schools and students, and it will also result in mandatory action plans to cover this
violation. Much work remains to be done, both at headquarters and in the field, in
response to these new challenges for protection, and it must include reaching out
in a more concerted way to UNESCO, educationalists, and human rights partners
in the field.
As stated earlier, it is expected that, when violations are identified, country
teams can suggest Security Council interventions as well as actions the parties
should take under applicable national and international law. For genuine protection of education and students in armed conflict to become a reality on the
ground, UN specialized agencies and their partners must sustain efforts at better
monitoring and reporting on attacks against education. Additionally, joint MRM
task forces should utilize monitoring and reporting on attacks on education to
strengthen their advocacy and recommendations to the Security Council Working
Group on Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC). Information is power. Its efficient delivery to those who can hold violators accountable is an opportunity that
we can no longer afford to ignore.

Conclusion
I wish to reiterate that more can be done to protect education from attack in all
its manifestations, to improve the ability of education to protect children, and to
strengthen MRM to protect education in armed conflict.
With this in mind, I would make the following recommendations to the UN
system, protection partners, educationalists and donors:
Education is a key stabilizer and must be a part of any emergency planning in
conflict prone or conflict-affected areas. Education’s role in protecting children from abuse and harm through either direct action or alerts to protection personnel cannot be overstated.
Protection should be seen as a crucial part of education in conflict-affected
countries, and funding and training for protection should be built into any
programs for these states.
SCR 1612 and 1998-mandated monitoring and reporting can serve to better
protect education during conflict, and UNESCO, educational agencies,
and NGOs involved in education can and should join country task forces
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to better monitor attacks on education and to advocate with the Council
on appropriate actions as well as action plan engagement with concerned
armed forces and groups.
Education outreach for vulnerable communities pre- and post-conflict is an
important protection tool. Donors and agencies planning for child protection must seek to ensure broader coverage of disadvantaged communities.
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Preserving Humanitarian Space in Long-Term Conflict
Peter Hansen

With very few exceptions, it has been considered self-evident among those in the
humanitarian community that to achieve a reasonable measure of success humanitarian action in conflict zones should be predicated upon notions of neutrality and
impartiality. In recent years, particularly following the outbreak of numerous local
and regional armed conflicts in places such as Angola, Afghanistan, the Balkans,
Iraq, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Chechnya, Colombia, and East
Timor, an increasing number of observers have challenged this traditional presumption of humanitarian action, arguing that “humanitarian actors are deeply
involved in the political sphere.”1
For anyone familiar with the humanitarian imperative that has come to define
so much of what the United Nations (UN) has stood for since its founding, the
implications of this challenge are great. If humanitarian space is purposefully
compromised by assuming a political character, the risk of that space collapsing
altogether becomes all too real. Some have suggested that the attack on UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 was the result of “a dangerous blurring of the
lines between humanitarian and political action” and “the consequent erosion of
the core humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence” of
the UN humanitarian mission.2 This line of thought maintains that the gradual
erosion of humanitarian space in Iraq has been the result of the “choices made”
(i.e., policy choices) by the international community through the UN since 1991,
beginning with years of hard-hitting sanctions imposed by the Security Council,
followed by “the lack of a clear UN mandate” in the aftermath of the US invasion
and occupation of Iraq in 2003.3 The conceptual dilemma it presents is something
that would seem to require the careful consideration of all who find themselves on
the front-line of humanitarian action in conflict zones, particularly at this critical
juncture in the history of the humanitarian enterprise.
This chapter examines what is meant by the concept of humanitarian space,
and how such space is best maintained in conflict zones while taking into account
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divergent views on the subject. To this end, I explore how the largest humanitarian actor in the Middle East—the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)—has struggled to maintain its
humanitarian space in a particularly volatile conflict zone for over five decades.

Humanitarian Space: Principles, Challenges, and UNRWA’s Experience
In his 1995 Annual Report, former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
noted that “safeguarding both the concept and the reality of ‘humanitarian space’
remains one of the most significant challenges facing the humanitarian community.”4 But what exactly is meant by the term humanitarian space? It has been variously described, inter alia, as follows:
“Humanitarian space is more than a physical area; it is a concept in and through
which impartiality and non-partisanship govern the whole of humanitarian
action . . . in moral terms””; [it is] “a space that is not delimited, that is made up
of tolerance and respect for each and every individual once they are wounded
or captive, and displaced persons or refugees, no matter to which side they
belong.”5
“If we assume that war and violence are extensions of the political, then
we understand the traditional description of humanitarian space as an area
separate from the political.”6
“Humanitarian space is a dynamic term. Far from being like a walled room
of fixed dimensions, humanitarian space . . . expands or contracts depending
on circumstances. It may be circumscribed—or expanded—by the actions of
political and military authorities; it also may be enlarged—or contracted—by
humanitarian actors themselves. In short, humanitarian space is neither durable nor transferable but elastic.”7
“Humanitarian space is that space where humanitarian assistance is provided on the basis of need and is delivered with impartiality. Humanitarian
space is ‘owned’ by humanitarian agencies and actors and extends from their
inherent values of independence and impartiality. Military forces must minimize any movement into ‘humanitarian space.’ Any such movement serves to
blur the distinction between humanitarian and military actors.”8
It is apparent from the preceding characterizations that humanitarian space
is based upon two central assumptions. First, it exists simultaneously on both a
physical and moral plane. Accordingly, medical relief convoys and hospitals are
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as much a part of humanitarian space as the awareness by military and paramilitary actors that refugee camps must be respected as violence-free civilian areas.
Second, humanitarian space is predicated on the need to maintain designated areas
that are neutral and impartial within larger spaces that are inherently political. For
example, in the heat of a military conflict between two or more combatants, the
provision of medical aid to civilians and other noncombatants in designated health
clinics must be protected and respected as inviolable by all parties. Historically,
especially over the course of the twentieth century, the concept of humanitarian
space has evolved in response to the increasing level of violence experienced by
and directed towards civilians and other noncombatants in times of war. In answer
to the need to provide protection and assistance to such vulnerable populations
in conflict zones, neutral and humanitarian institutions such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN were established, and the international community promulgated an extensive body of international humanitarian law,9 central tenets of which have been the concepts of humanitarian action
and humanitarian space. In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, UNRWA has
maintained a humanitarian space over its fifty-three-year history that is unique
in the UN system. From focusing in its very early years on refugee reintegration
activities, UNRWA has developed into a multifaceted organization that provides
essential education, health, relief and social services, and microcredit to more than
four million Palestine refugees throughout its areas of operations. In addition, the
vast majority of the over 300,000 agency staff are Palestinian refugees themselves,
which itself uniquely marks the humanitarian space that UNRWA occupies.
Because of the highly volatile and prolonged nature of the conflict in which
it operates, UNRWA has been compelled to maintain its humanitarian space in
a wide variety of “conflict” situations, including periods of war (1956, 1967, 1973,
and 1982), periods of limited and prolonged occupation (1950–1966, 1967–present
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; 1982–2000 in Lebanon) and periods of insurrection or closure (1970 in Jordan; 1987–93, 2000–present in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip). In each of these periods, UNRWA has faced numerous challenges to
its humanitarian space, including: threats to the physical safety and security of its
staff and beneficiaries; the detention without charge or trial of its staff; curtailment
of the freedom of movement of its vehicles, goods, and staff; the misuse, damage, and/or demolition of its installations and premises; and the damage and/or
destruction of refugee shelters.
While UNRWA has exerted great efforts to maintain its humanitarian space
over the years, the period since September 2000—the month in which the current
intifada in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) began—has presented some
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of the most difficult challenges in its history. Limitations enforced on UNRWA’s
humanitarian space have been numerous, and have included severe access restrictions and armed attacks on its personnel and installations.
Many of these limitations on UNRWA’s humanitarian space have contravened
applicable principles of international law, including the Charter of the United
Nations, the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the 1967 bilateral exchange of letters
between UNRWA and the Government of the State of Israel (known as the ComayMichelmore Agreement).
In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, armed conflicts in other regions in
recent years have given rise to a debate as to whether humanitarian action must
be neutral and impartial in order to be effective in meeting its goals. According to
Weiss, a number of developments in the 1990s—including “the complete disregard
for international humanitarian law” in conflict zones, “the direct targeting of civilians and relief personnel,” and “the protracted nature of many so-called emergencies that in fact last for decades”—has split the humanitarian community into two
groups.10 On the one hand are the traditionalists who “believe that humanitarian
action can and should be strictly insulated from politics,” and on the other are
the “political humanitarians, who believe that political and humanitarian action
cannot and should not be disassociated.”11 This split has been exacerbated by the
international community’s increasing willingness to deal with humanitarian crises as threats to international peace and security, most particularly in high profile
cases, allowing for the simultaneous and at times combined deployment of military
and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones.12 This incremental integration of the
military with the humanitarian witnessed in recent years has brought into sharp
relief the dilemmas of humanitarian action and the maintenance of humanitarian space in the contemporary period, and “carries crucial policy and institutional
implications for the humanitarian enterprise.”13
A good example of a conflict that captured the essence of the debate and the
resulting dilemma is the war in Kosovo. For the traditionalists, the widespread reference to that war as “humanitarian” was regarded as a particularly striking, if not
offensive, oxymoron. As noted by one traditionalist,
How can a war—essentially something that causes destruction, losses and
unspeakable suffering—be ‘humanitarian’? Even if the motives are of a humanitarian nature—defending the basic rights of any human being—war itself cannot be ‘humanitarian.’ This most inappropriate libel . . . has been very detrimental to the humanitarian concept itself, and to humanitarian action as such.
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The ‘merging’ of military and humanitarian operations has been facilitated by
this gross contradiction in terms, and the ensuing confusion has grown exponentially.14
For the “political humanitarians,” such “confusion” was a welcome development. In their view, the simultaneous bombardment of Serb forces along with the
provision of relief assistance to Kosovar refugees made it possible to stop even
greater atrocities before they took place, thereby saving more lives as well as bringing about conditions for a relatively quick political settlement. In this sense, the
resort to force was the lesser of two evils, and one that better served the ultimate
objectives of humanitarian action.
To the traditionalists, because humanitarian space is neutral and impartial, its
proper maintenance depends upon its separation from the political and violent.
Because such space is viewed as finite, traditionalists hold that if it is increased there
is necessarily less space available for the political/violent and vice versa.15 Warner
has noted that this “zero-sum” relationship has particular “implications for the
occupation of a bounded area,”16 such as during a state of belligerent occupation.
For example, if a legal aid center run by a humanitarian agency is raided and shut
down by an occupying power, or the protection afforded to refugee camps is violated by military or paramilitary actors, the total area of political/violent space has
increased at the direct expense of the humanitarian space formerly maintained by
the humanitarian actor. Such has been the case on a number of occasions where
UNRWA installations in the OPT, schools and health clinics among them, have been
forcibly commandeered by Israeli military forces for use in military operations, or
when both the Israeli military and Palestinian militants violated the humanitarian
space of the refugee camps in the OPT by conducting armed activities in them.16
For political humanitarians, on the other hand, humanitarian space and the
political/violent do not operate in a zero-sum context. They argue that the expansion of humanitarian space allows for the parties to the conflict to avoid having to
reach a swift political settlement, ultimately resulting in greater civilian suffering.
As Warner notes:
The recent rise in interest in humanitarian affairs is an abnegation of responsibility by those in power. That is, instead of admitting that civil wars or outbreaks
of violence . . . are very political activities, these outbreaks are termed humanitarian crises in order to avoid hard decisions about what to do . . . In this sense,
upholding humanitarian principles is a political move that may undercut the
ethical basis of the [humanitarian] organization’s activities [emphasis added].17
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The maintenance of humanitarian space is therefore seen by political humanitarians as an act that effectively shifts “attention away from the politics at the heart”
of a conflict, thereby allowing it to continue interminably while humanitarian
agencies scramble for limited budgets to dole out “Band-Aid” operations on an
ostensibly “temporary” basis.18 UNRWA has been subjected to such criticism over
the years by both parties to the conflict.
On one hand, Israelis and other supporters of Israel have accused the UNRWA
of “keeping the refugee issue alive” by reaffirming Palestine refugee identity and
rights, thereby rendering a political settlement of the problem in their view far more
difficult to achieve. On the other hand, some Arabs and Palestinians have accused
the UNRWA (as well as other international organizations) of providing a “humanitarian cover” for the Israeli occupation, thereby relieving Israel of its humanitarian
obligations under international law and enabling what in law is meant only as a
temporary condition to remain prolonged and without a final political settlement.
Is the divide between traditionalist and political humanitarian approaches
unbridgeable? Is there a more nuanced and less polarized way to approach the
maintenance of humanitarian space in conflict zones? It would seem that “humanitarians cannot deny political realties,”19 and that political actors in a conflict must
acknowledge that they too have a vested interest in opening and helping to maintain humanitarian space that is neutral and impartial. As noted by Mary Anderson,
the key factor that must be accepted by all humanitarian actors is that, irrespective
of motives, the aid they provide has multiple political impacts and can either exacerbate or ease the conflicts amid which they work.20 For instance, “to the extent that
international aid agencies assume responsibility for civilian survival in war zones,
the aid they provide can serve to release whatever internal resources exist for the
pursuit of the conflict.”21 In this way, it can be said that humanitarian aid carries
with it certain “substitution effects.”22 As noted above, in the context of UNRWA’s
work, the Agency has been accused by the Palestinians that its vast array of humanitarian and human development aid has effectively underwritten the Israeli occupation, relieving the occupying power of the tremendous financial burden of administering the occupation and enabling it to divert precious resources toward consolidating its military control over the OPT. Similarly, international aid can have
“legitimization effects,” in the sense that the recipients of such aid may regard the
fact of their receiving it as a legitimization of their political cause or struggle. This
is particularly true if the recipients are a distinct group belonging to or overlapping with a party to the conflict. Again, in the UNRWA context, it is widely known
that the Palestine refugees consider the Agency not merely as an international aid
agency providing for their essential needs, but also as the physical/institutional
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embodiment of the international community’s commitment to their welfare. In
this way, UNRWA can be said to be perceived by its beneficiaries as “humanitarian
plus” in both its role and identity.
Humanitarian aid can also have certain “distribution effects,” essentially referring to the divisions that necessarily result among people in a conflict zone when
aid is provided to one group to the exclusion of others. As a humanitarian actor
charged with the task of assisting the Palestine refugees in areas that include considerable numbers of Palestinians who are nonrefugees (in the UNRWA definition of the term), UNRWA has come under the criticism that its humanitarian aid
has actually increased divisions among the Palestinians and done relatively little to
assist a large sector of the Palestinian population that, in many cases, is as needy as
the Palestine refugees themselves.
Although Anderson’s analysis treats politics as forming an integral part of the
role of humanitarian actors, adopting it is not inimical to the core principles of
humanitarian space as neutral and impartial. On the contrary, this approach actually demands that neutrality and impartiality continue to form the cornerstone
upon which humanitarian space is maintained. Neutrality, in this sense, cannot
be understood merely as not taking sides in hostilities or engaging in controversies
of a political or ideological nature, as defined by the ICRC, for instance.23 Rather,
neutrality should be the principle by which a humanitarian actor provides assistance in conflict situations where such assistance is objectively required, having no
regard to the dictates or political positions of the parties to the conflict. Neutrality
cannot mean equidistance between the parties to the conflict, and a humanitarian
actor must position himself based on an ethical compass of justice and fairness.
Likewise, impartiality must be understood as making no other discrimination in
the provision of humanitarian aid other than on the basis of need, giving priority
to those most needy. In this sense, identification or sympathy with race, religion,
nationality, and other such characteristics must have no bearing on the provision of
aid. In essence then, the efficient and effective humanitarian actor must continually
act, and be seen to be acting, as making a good faith effort to remain neutral and
impartial in situations that are inherently political. This is not an easy task, by any
objective account, but it seems to be one that is required if humanitarian space is
to be maintained in a world where the tragic effects of war and conflict are increasingly being borne by civilians. As noted by Weiss:
In today’s world, humanitarians must ask themselves how to weigh the political
consequences of their action or inaction; and politicians must ask themselves
how to gauge the humanitarian costs of their action or inaction. The calcula-
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tions are tortuous, and the mathematics far from exact. However, there is no
longer any need to ask whether politics and humanitarian action intersect. The
real question is how this intersection can be managed to ensure more humanized politics and more effective humanitarian action. To this end, humanitarians should be neither blindly principled nor blindly pragmatic.24
In addition to the effects of resource transfers on conflict zones listed earlier,
Anderson identifies a number of “implicit ethical messages” in humanitarian activity that also affect conflict. One of these messages is the idea of “impunity” of
humanitarian staff who control scarce resources, such as vehicles and fuel, and
sometimes “use them for [their] own pleasure without accountability to the people
for whom the resources were intended, even when their needs are great.”25 Another
such message is the idea of valuing lives differently,26 highlighted when international aid agencies furnish expatriate staff with supplemental “hazard” pay for
serving in particularly harsh duty stations, while failing or being unable to extend
similar benefits to local staff. While humanitarian action carries with it a number of
other implicit ethical messages, these few examples highlight the difficulty inherent
in maintaining humanitarian space without attracting criticism from those who
are affected by it. Like many other humanitarian actors, UNRWA has faced criticisms of an ethical nature while seeking to maintain its humanitarian space. For
example, funding constraints have prevented UNRWA from extending “hazard
pay” to its area staff on a continuous basis, though expatriate staff receive the same.
As noted earlier, humanitarian space is elastic and its contours are continually defined by the parties to the conflict and the humanitarian actors involved in
the situation. Special attention must be given to those occasions where a political actor’s perceptions impel it to limit humanitarian space to the point where
the continued maintenance of that space becomes virtually untenable. Such cases
often occur where a party to the conflict enjoys a preponderance of power in a
given conflict zone, such that any limitation of humanitarian space by that party is
justified under the doctrine of “military necessity” or “national security.” Resort to
“security” interests provides the disproportionately powerful party to the conflict
with a discretion that effectively trumps the efforts of the humanitarian actor to
maintain humanitarian space. This problem is compounded by two factors. First,
the notion of “military necessity” or “national security” is itself so nebulous as to
allow the claimant very wide latitude vis-à-vis the humanitarian actor. Second,
the claimant enjoys such overwhelming control over the physical space in which
the humanitarian actor operates, that there is usually little that the latter can do to
actually reverse developments on the ground. In the OPT, the Israeli authorities
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often state that the restrictions on UNRWA’s humanitarian space are necessary due
to considerations of military security or are justified under Israel’s inherent right
of self-defense. One of the bases upon which this claim is advanced is the ComayMichelmore Agreement, which requires the government of Israel to “facilitate the
task of UNRWA to the best of its ability, subject only to regulations or arrangements which may be necessitated by considerations of military security.” At no
time have the Israeli authorities and UNRWA been able to agree on the scope
or application of the language relating to “military security.” While UNRWA has
taken the position that the term can only be construed narrowly in the specific
emergency context of the immediate postwar period in June 1967, and is in any
event not applicable by virtue of Article 103 of the UN Charter,27 Israel has taken
the position that the term continues to apply to its operations in the OPT, more
than 5 decades after the close of the 1967 hostilities, and has traditionally construed
it very liberally. This has resulted in greater limitations on humanitarian space in
the OPT than UNRWA believes are reasonably necessary.
When one party to the conflict is so powerful as to enjoy overwhelming control over the physical space in which the humanitarian actor operates, it is useful to consider the options available to maintain humanitarian space. One of the
more obvious options is for the humanitarian actor to engage the powerful party in
negotiations/discussions on issues of concern, including reference to relevant provisions of international law, status agreements which the humanitarian actor may
have with the powerful party, and general appeals to the humanitarian imperative
and practicalities. Here, skills of persuasion and diplomacy must be employed in
convincing the powerful party that the maintenance of humanitarian space in the
conflict zone is ultimately in its own interests, not only military, political, and economic, but moral as well.
When such negotiations/discussions are exhausted, another mechanism that
is available is to attempt to persuade the powerful party to cease its limitations on
humanitarian space through public pronouncements, either in the media or otherwise. This has been put to good use in many conflict zones in defense of human
rights and protection of civilian persons and refugees, among many others. It is
a widely accepted form of conflict management and moral suasion that can, if
employed properly, be utilized to great effect. This is particularly so in the current
information age, where sources of information are unprecedented and knowledge
can be transferred around the world, quite literally, at the click of a button. What
must be stressed, however, is that publicity must not be used in a frivolous manner
nor resolved to in haste. As in negotiations, good judgment is required in making
the decision to “go public” and reticence in doing so is generally to be advised,
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if only for the sake of maintaining credibility and guarding against any backlash
that may result from alienating the powerful party to the conflict. Should publicity
fail to render a result, however, the humanitarian actor may look to regional and
ultimately international intervention to help maintain its humanitarian space. The
increasing number of times the international community has resorted to the use of
sanctions and even military force since the early 1990s is well documented. Suffice
it to say, that both the Security Council and regional bodies, such as NATO, have
been employed in various conflict zones around the world in the name of humanitarian assistance, which itself has increasingly allowed the concept of “humanitarian intervention” to be debated by policy makers, academics, and commentators
alike. Of course, humanitarian intervention is a matter that only states—and then
only a very limited number of states at that—may initiate, but there have been
precedents where humanitarian actors have played a central role in the intervention effort once underway. Examples include the UNHCR’s role in repatriating and
providing humanitarian aid to refugees in Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East
Timor, and Afghanistan.
For its part, UNRWA has not accepted limitations on its operations and has
sought to engage the parties to the conflict in a dialog, at times resorting to publicity in an effort to maintain its humanitarian space. Thus, it has continued to make
representations to the Israeli authorities at all levels, including meetings with the
Israeli Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, to have constraints on UNRWA’s
humanitarian space removed or alleviated. As a matter of policy, UNRWA has
agreed, without prejudice to its positions of principle under international law, to
consider pragmatic solutions that attempt to meet legitimate Israeli security concerns, while easing the movement of its staff members and other such restrictions
on its humanitarian space. On other, far more limited occasions, UNRWA has
issued public statements on the situation of the refugees (for instance with regard
to the demolition of refugee shelters) casting light on the practices of various parties to the conflict and calling upon them to change their behavior. Finally, on
an even more limited number of occasions, UNRWA has relied for support of
its humanitarian activities on the international community through the General
Assembly and the Security Council, albeit not through economic sanctions and
military force, but through the reaffirmation of the need to support UNRWA in
ensuring “the safety of civilians” in the OPT and calling on all parties to “respect the
universally accepted norms of international humanitarian law” as stated for example in Security Council Resolution 1405 of 19 April 2003. Overall, UNRWA’s efforts
to engage the Israelis on these issues has been unrelenting and principled in its
commitment to core humanitarian values. Nevertheless, the responses of the Israeli
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government have been grossly inadequate to address these issues. According to a
November 2003 status report issued by the Task Force on Project Implementation in
the OPT, the “multiple assurances” given by the Israeli government that “humanitarian aid will be fully facilitated . . . contrast dramatically with the facts on the
ground,” and the “operational environment” has “deteriorated to a degree which
many donors consider both unmanageable and unacceptable.”
Nevertheless, very serious limitations continue to be imposed on UNRWA’s
humanitarian space in the OPT, primarily, though not exclusively, by the occupying power. Israeli soldiers throughout the OPT have on many occasions failed to
show respect for UNRWA personnel, their vehicles, or their identification cards,
as required under international law. On-duty staff members also have been verbally abused, physically assaulted, threatened at gunpoint, and shot at. Since March
2002, eight UNRWA staff members have been shot and killed by Israeli troops,
and agency ambulances have been shot at by Israeli soldiers. In addition, there
have been many instances where UNRWA installations, particularly schools, have
been shot at by Israeli troops, resulting in a number of deaths of and numerous
injuries to both school staff and pupils. For their part, the Israeli authorities insist
that such shooting incidents occur only because Palestinian militants fire on Israeli
positions and settlements from within UNRWA school compounds. While there
have been a very limited number of such incidents at the beginning of the current
intifada, UNRWA moved to provide twenty-four-hour unarmed guards for all of
its facilities and called on the Palestinian Authority for greater police protection.
In addition to violating UNRWA’s privileges and immunities, even the search and
inspection procedures imposed by the Israeli authorities on agency staff in the OPT
can pose a threat to their safety and well-being. Such was the case in the Gaza Strip
where UNRWA staff and vehicles are required to be searched prior to being allowed
to enter the Al Mawasi area. Accessibility to health service installations in the OPT
has been hindered for both patients and staff, including those being transported in
ambulances and requiring critical care.
In the face of such seemingly overwhelming obstacles, the humanitarian actor
must make every effort to engage parties to a conflict that resort to “military necessity” and “national security” grounds on their own terms. As noted, the humanitarian actor must challenge, wherever reasonable, the logic upon which such claims are
based. An effort must be made to convince the disproportionately powerful party
that its “security” may not reasonably be under threat and that its overall national
interests may in fact be better served by helping maintain humanitarian space
intact. Such efforts require a good understanding of basic international humanitarian law doctrine such as military necessity and proportionality, and a willingness to
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engage the political actor on these terms. They also require an acknowledgment on
the part of the humanitarian actor that the neutrality and impartiality of the space
it aims to maintain sometimes depends on actively engaging with political players,
and that given the balance of power on the ground, their efforts may often produce
little or no results. Such are some of the pitfalls of maintaining humanitarian space
in conflict zones that have been marked by protracted political disputes.
UNRWA’s efforts in actively defending and maintaining its humanitarian space
in the OPT have encompassed a wide array of activities and programs. Foremost
among them has been its Refugee Affairs Officer (RAO) Program initiated during
the intifada of 1987–1993. Following the request of the Secretary-General to enhance
its “general assistance” capacity in the OPT, the RAO program was launched in 1988
to facilitate UNRWA operations in the difficult circumstances of the intifada and
to provide a degree of passive protection to the refugee and nonrefugee population
of the OPT. The program included a “legal aid scheme” run by UNRWA for the
benefit of the refugees. Following the conclusion of the Declaration of Principles
of Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP) in 1993, the RAO program was
phased out.
In 2001, UNRWA launched the Operations Support Officer (OSO) Program
to reinforce its existing operations in the OPT and to help deal with the increasingly severe access restrictions faced by the UNRWA. Like the RAO program
before it, the OSO program aims to maintain the humanitarian space in which
UNRWA operates. It has accomplished this by, inter alia, helping to facilitate
access of staff members and UNRWA vehicles, reporting on the developing
humanitarian crisis in the OPT, and in monitoring and inspecting all UNRWA
installations on a regular basis to ensure that they are not being used for any
unauthorized or improper purposes.
Another important policy of UNRWA that has helped it maintain its humanitarian space has been the standard requirement of its staff to remain at arms length
from all activity, particularly political, that may call into question the neutrality and
impartiality of its humanitarian mission. Among other things, agency staff have
been instructed to conduct themselves in accordance with established principles
and practices of the UN and of the need to refrain from engaging in any activity
that is incompatible with their status as independent and impartial UN civil servants. In particular, staff have been informed that they must be scrupulous about
the protection of UNRWA installations against any kind of abuse or unauthorized
use which may reflect negatively on the agency’s position as an independent and
neutral body of the UN, including ensuring that political meetings are not held in
UNRWA installations, that posters of a political nature are not affixed to the prem-
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ises, and that UNRWA property, including vehicles, is not in any way used for any
purpose unconnected with UNRWA operations. UNRWA staff have been informed
that any misuse of their position will—in addition to creating legitimate apprehensions in host countries, in the occupying power, and in donor states, regarding
the confidence to be reposed in the agency—result in disciplinary measures being
taken against the staff member, including the possibility of dismissal. Although
these statements of UNRWA’s commitment to neutrality and impartiality have
been accepted by its staff, some criticism has been levied by staff members and the
wider Palestinian community accusing the agency of attempting to infringe upon
the right to free speech of its staff members. This is demonstrative of the tension
that exists in the process of maintaining humanitarian space not only in the OPT,
but in any conflict zone where local staff strongly identify with one or the other
party to the conflict.
What of the future of humanitarian space? Lincoln Chen has noted that “the
ultimate shape” of humanitarian space “is being contested by public policies and
action on-the-ground,” and “will be determined, in part, by new issues, new ideas
and new players.”28 One such idea is the concept of comprehensive “human security” which he identifies as having “four basic principles”: first, that human security
is “people-centered,” as opposed to state-centered; second, human security comprehensively promotes freedom “from both violence and poverty”; third, human
security is strategically based on protection from the state and empowerment at the
grassroots level; and fourth, human security is interdependent in the sense that the
security of one can never be achieved at the expense of another.29 The idea of comprehensive human security meshes neatly with global developments on every score,
from the social-scientific to the political, from the economic to the technological.
As noted earlier, the information age has played a significant role in helping
expand and maintain humanitarian space in conflict zones. All signs indicate that
the role of media and information in this regard will only intensify as technology
and access to it develops. A good example of the use of technology and information to expand and maintain humanitarian space are the specialty websites devoted
to the topic of humanitarian intervention and activism, such as the OCHA-run
Relief-Web. This is in addition, of course, to the growing body of academic and
specialty journals on humanitarian action, refugees, and other such subjects with
a humanitarian focus. For its part, UNRWA has its own website and has regularly
made use of the media (through press releases, interviews, and periodic newspaper
articles) to help promote its mission among its stakeholders and the international
community at large, all of which has enhanced its ability to maintain its humanitarian space.
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In conclusion, it can be said that the decade since the end of the Cold War has
been an immense challenge for all humanitarian actors. The marked increase in
interstate and intrastate conflict, low-intensity conflict, and the rapid proliferation of nonstate actors in conflict situations has caused untold suffering to innocent civilians around the world. These events have posed considerable challenges
to the maintenance of humanitarian space in conflict zones. The humanitarian
community today has to tread a fine line while adhering to principles of neutrality
and impartiality in areas that are inherently political and usually violent. While
UNRWA is unique in the UN System by virtue of its organizational status, beneficiary base, and evolution of its mandate, it has faced and continues to face the same
challenges in maintaining its humanitarian space that all humanitarian actors now
have to deal with. UNRWA’s experience with multiple conflict situations, in the
OPT in particular, provides a useful example for other humanitarian actors to follow. It goes without saying that the contours of humanitarian space will continue
to be shaped by those who are actually engaged in the activity of humanitarian
intervention—states, multilateral organizations, and civil society actors. As such,
new measures to promote the idea of humanitarianism all over the world, most
particularly in conflict zones, should be developed in a manner that highlights the
great importance of the values that lie at the core of humanitarian action and space,
including neutrality and impartiality, but also encompassing core principles of justice, fairness, equality, and liberty.
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Humanitarian Action in a New Barbarian Age
David Rieff

If the hope for human progress and for a better world can be said to rest on anything, it rests on the great documents of international law that have been promulgated since the end of the Second World War. These include, first and foremost, the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But while
these documents offer a global vision of what the world might become if humanity
is lucky, they remain more hope than reality. In contrast, the corpus of international
humanitarian law, that is, the rules governing armed conflict, have actually proved
its utility again and again over the course of the past half-century. The four Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the Genocide Convention, and, more
recently, such initiatives as the Rome Treaty banning landmines, are no mere pious
sentiments. They have saved innumerable human lives. Think, for example, of the
fact that since the adoption of the international treaty that banned the use of poison
gas as a weapon of war, gas, so ubiquitous in the trenches of the Western Front during World War I, has probably only been used a handful of times since. Norms, it
seems, can sometimes influence realities.
That said, it would be a misreading of history, and, perhaps, a culpable exercise
in self-flattery as well, to make a fetish of the law and imagine that realities will
invariably or inevitably migrate toward norms. Despite the more grandiose claims
of human rights activists, as well as of distinguished philosophers such as Jürgen
Habermas, the record is more mixed: Over the course of the past half-century, there
are examples where they have and examples where they have not. The full legal
emancipation of African Americans in the US civil rights movement of the 1950s,
1960s, and 1970s is an example of a law-based reform or, to put it differently, a normative transformation that did end up transforming American social reality even
though at least a significant minority and possibly even a majority of Americans
were against such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education when they were first
handed down. And yet, in contrast, normative changes related to the status and
treatment of children encapsulated in the UN Convention on the Rights of the
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Child have had limited impact outside the developed world despite the best efforts
of many dedicated activists and political figures.
In other words, the record is mixed. Those who believe that human progress is
inevitable often describe this as a matter of “two steps forward, one step back,” as the
former head of Human Rights Watch, Aryeh Neier, did in his history of the human
rights movement. This is not to say that no progress has been made or that it is
unreasonable to expect that more will be made in the future. To the contrary, even
among those of us for whom the Classical Greek vision of history as cyclical seems
to conform better to the realities of our sad world than the Christian, Marxist, or,
indeed, liberal expectation that progress in the moral order of the world is as bound
to take place as progress in scientific understanding, would hardly want to do away
with the notion of progress altogether. As the great liberal realist, Raymond Aron,
once put it, “if one is not [an advocate of progress], what is left?” Humanity, he
added, had no hope for survival “outside of reason and science.”1
Aron’s conclusion in large measure amounted to insisting that one had to be
optimistic in spite of what one knew—“despite the twentieth century, I remain an
advocate of progress,” was the way he put it. This is not to be confused with the
more self-congratulatory fables that have captured the imagination of far too many
decent people in the contemporary world, and that revolve around the notion that a
“revolution of moral concern”—the phrase is that of the Canadian writer and erstwhile politician, Michael Ignatieff— began in the aftermath of World War II, gave
rise to the United Nations system as well as to the transformation of both the concept
of state sovereignty and the reach of international law. For those who believe in its
reality, this revolution has no downside, no tragic element to it (unlike all previous
revolutions in human history, whether economic, like the Industrial Revolution,
or political, like the American Revolution). Instead, it promises to usher in a better
world in which the worst human cruelties and historical tragedies—another World
War I, Shoah, or Gulag Archipelago—will not be permitted to unfold and whose
perpetrators will not enjoy the impunity that they have throughout most, if not all,
of human history.
Aron was not an optimist. Nor, lest it be forgotten, were the founders of the
United Nations. To the contrary, many of them had been soldiers and all of them
anguished observers of the most terrible war the world had ever known. They were
idealists, not utopians, and steely idealists at that. But if an Eleanor Roosevelt or
a Gladwyn Jebb viewed the nascent world body as a means of preventing the kind
of descent into the inferno that the Nazi experience had revealed to be a constant
human possibility rather than as a means of inducing any ideal world order, their
successors gradually became more optimistic. A document like Secretary General
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Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1991 “An Agenda for Peace” described a world that really
might be perfectible. And the final documents that accompanied the decade-long
extravaganzas of UN conferences of the 1990s, culminating in the formulation
of the so-called Millennium Development Goals, had a similarly utopian tinge
to them. Poverty would be halved by a date certain; States that abused their own
populations would be forced to desist because the Westphalian order, with its culture of impunity, was fading and we were entering the age of rights. War would be
limited in scope, with limitations on what weapons could be employed when and
where, steadily expanding protections for noncombatants, property, and cultural
and religious sites growing in scope.
This would happen, activists often argued, because of the transformation and
expansion of legal norms and the campaigning of civil society groups. The context
for the change would be the UN, which was viewed (and, indeed, for all its faults
continues to be viewed in this way by many people throughout the world) as the
sole legitimate authority for international rules that could apply to all of humankind. The fact that the UN was an institution without much real power and that
the term civil society is so nebulous as to be more a sociopolitical Rorschach blot
for campaigners and activists than a term that has any real specific gravity passed
largely unnoticed during the 1990s—that “silly season” of the inflated expectations.
(Otherwise, why is Human Rights Watch, which has no democratic accountability,
viewed as an emblematic institution of civil society while the US National Rifle
Association, with four million members, is viewed as something else?)
Instead, there was the very real expectation that the world was becoming a
more civilized place. Again, why the same decade that witnessed the Balkan catastrophe and the Rwandan genocide could interpret itself as a period of enormous
promise is a question for psychiatrists, not political analysts. But that optimism was
real. And the creation of the International Criminal Court, which was heralded as
the first institution that promised to genuinely promise an end to impunity for war
criminals, served as the capstone for these generous and well-intended expectations
of decent people around the world.
As Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan had presided over
the two worst failures of the United Nations during the first post–Cold War decade.
But as Secretary General, Annan not only acknowledged the UN’s failures—however belatedly, and, in the case of Rwanda, not until 2004 on the eve of the tenth
anniversary of the genocide, and then only quite ambivalently—but made the UN
Secretariat a bully pulpit for this “revolution of moral concern” and for individual
human rights as finally “trumping” state sovereignty. Annan’s UN was a place in
which international law, above all international humanitarian law—that is, the
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laws of war—was viewed as the essential component for building a more decent
world order. And in speech after speech and document after document, UN officials from the Secretary General himself on down emphasized the need for States
to comply with the obligations they had under the various international treaties
and conventions to which they had signed on. The problem, UN officials repeated,
was no longer one of first principles; the transformation of the normative environment had seen to that. Rather, the question was now one of making these norms
binding—in short, of enforcement.
In retrospect, this approach begged at least as many questions as it answered.
To begin with, there was the uncomfortable matter of why, if the norms were so
terrific, the reality of the world was so dire? But at least that objection could be
answered by saying that just as it had taken a great deal of time and struggle and
false starts to get the norms right, so it would take a long period before effective
modalities of enforcement were arrived at. And activists could point to studies
ranging from the report on UN peacekeeping by the former Algerian foreign minister, Lakhdar Brahimi, to the Canadian government-sponsored document on
humanitarian intervention, “The Responsibility to Protect,” as examples of serious
efforts to think about implementing the new norms and of, in effect, institutionalizing and reifying that “revolution of moral concern.”
More difficult was the issue of what possible motivation could impel States to
act out of essentially altruistic motives, which, however much they had been weakened by the realities of globalization, were still the fundamental constitutive elements of world order. That is, why would great powers intervene to prevent genocide in places of little economic or geostrategic significance to themselves except
very rarely and inconsistently? One did not have to be a Kissingerian realist, or the
reincarnation of Lord Palmerston, to conclude that States had never behaved in
this way in the past. For all of history until the post–World War II era, the conduct
of States had largely been determined by interests, rather than ideals. The question
was what, if anything, had changed? Was Ignatieff’s idealist template of the human
rights revolution of the second half of the twentieth century really that compelling? Or, as the British diplomat Robert Cooper argues in an influential book, The
Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, did the fact that a
successful global economy required a rules-based order really imply a commitment
to a human rights rule as well?
On the face of things, that appeared unlikely. Africa, where most of the crises
that might require so-called humanitarian intervention were occurring, was by the
turn of the millennium almost irrelevant to the world economy except for certain
key resources like oil that could be extracted even during civil wars and famines. At
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a generous estimate, it accounted for some 3 percent of world trade. The Balkans,
East Timor, Haiti: they were similarly marginal in geoeconomic terms. This reality,
which is as undeniable as its elaboration is unpalatable, tends to confirm Ignatieff’s
thesis, not Cooper’s. At the very least, it threw the debate back into the context of
morality. And if the 1990s had proved anything, it was that where morality was
concerned the so-called international community was highly selective in its commitments. The British might decide to do something about their ex-colony, Sierra
Leone, but even the highly interventionist Blair government was at pains to point
out that its deployment was not to be construed as the first of many. There would be
no British troops sent to Zimbabwe on human rights grounds although the tyranny
of Robert Mugabe was almost as destructive to its own people as the Revolutionary
United Front had been in Sierra Leone (the Mugabe government simply used hunger and internal displacement as its principle weapons, rather than the mutilations
that were the monstrous hallmark of the Revolutionary United Front). The Clinton
administration made the same point after the United States–led war in Kosovo in
1999.
Of course, had the great powers been willing to give the UN a standing force
and the authority to deploy it, as the UN’s own Sir Brian Urquhart had once suggested, the dilemma might not have been so acute. But the great powers found a
weak UN exactly to their liking, while, in much of the developing world, the critique of absolute state sovereignty that Kofi Annan had pursued was viewed as a
way of legitimizing neocolonialism rather than guaranteeing or helping to secure
people’s human rights. Inevitably, instead of being narrowed, the gap between the
new norms of international humanitarian law and realities on the ground began to
widen. The fact that some humanitarian interventions, notably the one in Kosovo,
were undertaken without UN approval only increased skepticism in the developing
world about possible hidden agendas in the revolution of moral concern.
Perhaps, had the September 11 attacks not taken place, some consensus might
have been arrived at. Possible, but not likely. While the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon did transform the landscape of international relations,
many of the contradictions between norms and realities that September 11 put in
such sharp relief were already part of the geostrategic landscape. It is just that, like
icebergs in the North Atlantic, they lay largely submerged and out of view.
So many factors militated against norms becoming reality. First and foremost, the UN had no real power to set the agenda anywhere except where the great
powers had no great interest in setting one themselves. Thus, before September
11, the UN view on Tajikistan carried some weight, but once the US decided to
invade Afghanistan the UN was relegated to the sidelines. Second, there was no
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appetite in the rich world for the kind of redistributive justice that would have
begun to address the underlying inequities that were at the root of so many socalled humanitarian or human rights crises. The refusal of the European Union
nations to radically overhaul their policies of massively subsidizing their own agricultural sector was one illustration of this. The comparative failure of the debt relief
movement to sway Washington in any truly significant way was another. Third,
despite what Third World intellectuals might imagine, there was no appetite in
Western Europe, Japan, or the United States, to “recolonize” the world. The logic
of Secretary General Annan’s speeches might sometimes seem to imply endless
wars of altruism, but neither Washington nor Brussels was prepared to make any
such commitment or to facilitate and subsidize a UN force that would.
The September 11 attacks only exacerbated these trends. But they exacerbated
them to a remarkable degree. Confronted by terrorism, whether or not it was
appropriate to call the necessary response to it a “war” as the Bush administration
did, it was the politics of that most profound and essential interest—existential
security—that was at the fore of policymakers’ calculations, not elective wars in
the name of humanitarianism and human rights. At the same time, much as had
been the case during the Cold War, States threatened by terrorism were not only
immediately engaged in curtailing domestic civil liberties but tended to be more
willing to overlook human rights violations, even on a massive scale, by States that
might play a strategic role in the antiterrorist campaign.
The American government’s volte-face on Uzbekistan—surely one of the most
abusive regimes on the face of the earth—because the Karimov dictatorship had
facilitated US operations during the invasion of Afghanistan was a case in point. In
fairness, human rights concerns have always been ignored—as much if not more
so in Europe as in the United States—when major commercial interests were at
stake, as the case of China has demonstrated all too vividly. It is true that, during
the so-called Arab Spring, the French government proved itself to be willing to
take the lead in the international intervention to overthrow the Gaddafi dictatorship in Libya, with which it had strong commercial ties. But the Western response
to the Arab Spring generally is something of an outlier, and are best understood as
Western governments believing change in the Arab Middle East is inevitable and,
for once, attempting to help shape events rather than react to them.
Senior UN officials are perfectly well aware of these trends. But since it has little
real power (to use Joseph Nye’s categories, it has no hard power and only a small
amount of soft power), and since its legitimacy is derived so importantly from its
commitment to the primacy of international law, the world organization was hard-
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pressed to shift gears to somehow respond to or at least accommodate these new
realities. Perhaps, had it done so, it would have destroyed its own raison d’etre. But
by not adjusting, the UN found itself wrong-footed by the new world disorder that
the rise of Islamic terrorism and the international response to that terrorism had
brought into being. In effect, it believed it could remain a noncombatant in that
struggle. But neither the terrorists, nor, for that matter, the Bush administration
were prepared to concede the UN the right to maintain such a stance.
Sergio Vieira de Mello was without question the most brilliant UN diplomat
of his generation, a throwback, in terms of charisma, dedication, intelligence, and
drive, to such figures as Folke Bernadotte and Brian Urquhart. But when he reluctantly accepted Secretary General Annan’s plea to becoming the UN’s special representative in Baghdad after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, de Mello never
seems to have imagined that the anti-US insurgents and terrorists would view the
UN as aligned with the US invasion. In a sense, he was right: Institutionally, the
UN had opposed the war. As de Mello saw it, he was trying to help the Iraqi people,
not serve the US occupation authorities. As the UN report on his death concluded,
neither de Mello nor his colleagues seem to have fully taken in the fact that to the
Iraqi guerrillas, the UN was just as much the enemy as the US was. And de Mello
was not so much wrong—what else could he have done? To have hunkered down
in a bunker, as the Americans did, would have been to betray everything the UN
and he personally stood for—as overtaken by a colder world. Faithful to his ideals,
he died for his belief in the UN, which, whether one shares it or not, ennobles his
sacrifice. But it is by no means clear that those ideals can be held on to.
The ways in which the United States has turned the international order on
its head in the aftermath of September 11 are obvious. By eschewing any serious
commitment to the multilateralism that lies at the heart of international law, the
future of any viable world system, however embryonic, in any usable time frame, is
open to question. But terrorism also throws that future into question. For terrorism, by definition, challenges the state’s monopoly on force, which must lie at the
heart of any international system worthy of the name. It also deforms, if it does not
negate entirely, the soldier-civilian distinction that lies at the heart of international
humanitarian law. To be sure, that distinction was already under threat from the
revolution in military technology of the last decade. A guerrilla force cannot fight
a modern army equipped with night vision equipment (this has deprived guerrilla
forces of their strongest traditional advantage, the night), thermal imaging, GPS,
smart weapons, drones, and satellites. Or, rather, it cannot fight such an army while
obeying the laws of war. To the contrary, it must employ perfidy, pretending until
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the moment it attacks that its fighters are noncombatants, and it must employ terror, because while it cannot hope to challenge a modern army on the battlefield, it
can hope to demoralize that modern army’s citizens back home.
The idea that guerrilla forces would simply bow to the superior technology
of modern armies from developed countries is as utopian as the expectation that
war itself has been superseded. An American judge once remarked famously that
the US Constitution was not a suicide pact. By the same token, for the guerrilla
fighter, neither are the laws of war. And from Gaza to Iraq, the force of that reality is
becoming pOf course, where this leaves an international system (a sounder concept
than international community) that is law-based is very much an open question.
And it is hard not to feel that, notwithstanding the Arab Spring, and the success
of democratization in Burma, that a new barbarian age is upon us. One of the first
victims of that age was Sergio Vieira de Mello. He will, of course, not be the last.
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PART IV

Actors

The ultimate challenge early in humanitarian crises is to maintain a necessary
equanimity in the face of terrible disorder, so that one can forge an effective response. One must channel the skills and energies of the multiple actors that are
required to change, at first, chaos into a semblance of stability, and later, hopefully,
into peace. As a physician, I have been accustomed to employing the tools of public
health in dealing with epidemics. The logic, and even the terminology, of preventive medicine, is understandable to politicians, diplomats, military, journalists, and
academics, as well as the medical profession. A number of the contributors in this
section have employed medical analogies in fashioning their texts.
One of the supreme creations of the human spirit is the idea of prevention.
Like liberty and equality, it is a seminal concept drawn from a reservoir of optimism that centuries of epidemics, famines, and wars have failed to deplete. It is an
amalgam of hope and possibility, which assumes that misery is not an undefiable
mandate of fate, a punishment only redeemable in a later life, but a condition that
can be treated like a disease, and sometimes cured or even prevented.
Such optimism is essential for those who choose disaster relief work as a profession. This section includes profound reflections by realists who have seen the
devastation of conflicts and disasters, yet know there is also beauty and hope in
our profession. I have selected two UN Secretary Generals, a university President,
a long-term UN humanitarian relief leader, two renowned diplomat/scholars, a
military-civilian authority, and a journalist to represent the many actors I have met
on a journey of healing and solidarity in disaster areas. In several chapters I have
purposely maintained the tense used by the authors at the time of writing in order
to demonstrate the urgency and dilemmas faced by senior decision makers.
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The Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy
The Role of the United Nations and Its Secretary-General

Boutros Boutros-Ghali

One system of metaphors that I have recently used extensively is the comparison between peace and health. . . . Peace research and health research
are metaphors for each other, each can learn from the other. Similarly, both
peace theory and medical science emphasize the role of consciousness and
mobilization in healing.
—Johan Galtung1

Introduction and Definitions
In matters of peace and security, as in medicine, prevention is self-evidently better
than cure. It saves lives and money and it forestalls suffering. Since the end of the
Cold War, preventive action has become a top priority for the United Nations.
From the beginning, a preventive role had been envisaged for the Organization.
Article 1 of its Charter had stated that one of the purposes of the United Nations
was “to take effective collective measures for prevention and removal of threats
to the peace” (emphasis added). But the Cold War reduced almost to zero the
Organization’s capacity to take such measures collectively.
When the Cold War began to thaw in the mid-1980s, two consequences followed. First, it became possible at last for the Member States to act collectively in
matters of peace and security. Second, the need for preventive action was made
brutally clear to them. The Cold War might have been over, but the world was still
plagued by a number of wars that it had spawned, almost all of them wars within
states. These were the so-called proxy wars in which each of the protagonists was
backed, politically and in materiel, by one of the Cold War power blocs. The United
Nations Security Council was now able to take effective action to end most of them.
But the cost was high. Major peacekeeping operations had to be established in
Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique, between Iran and Iraq, in Afghanistan, in
Cambodia, and in Central America. At the same time, the collapse of communism
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in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was creating a new set of conflicts, one of
which was to bring about the deployment in the former Yugoslavia of the UN’s
largest-ever peacekeeping operation.
It is not surprising that the Member States began to look for more economical ways of maintaining peace and security. On December 5, 1988, the General
Assembly adopted a “Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and
Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and on the Role of
the United Nations in this Field.” Through that instrument, the General Assembly
declared that States should act so as to prevent in their international relations the
emergence or aggravation of disputes or situations. It encouraged the SecretaryGeneral to approach the States directly concerned with a dispute in an effort to
prevent it from becoming a threat to the maintenance of international peace and
security; to respond swiftly by offering his good offices if he were approached by
a State directly concerned with a dispute; to make full use of fact-finding capabilities; and to use at an early stage the right accorded to him under Article 99 of the
Charter (namely to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that
in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security).
This decision represented a marked departure from the Cold War culture, in which
the legitimacy of a political initiative by the Secretary-General had usually been
challenged if not taken explicitly under Article 99.
On January 31, 1992, at the end of the first-ever meeting of the Security Council
at the level of Heads of State and Government, the Council adopted a statement
that inter alia invited me to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways of
strengthening and making more efficient the capacity of the United Nations for
preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping. As I worked on the
resulting report, which was later published as “An Agenda for Peace,”2 it quickly
became clear that preventive diplomacy is in fact a portmanteau for a range of prophylactic measures that can be taken by States, groups of States, or international
organizations to help maintain peace and security between and within States. Since
that report was published, the United Nations has gained experience not only in
preventive diplomacy, strictly defined, but also in preventive peacekeeping, preventive humanitarian action and preventive peace-building. Let me define these
four main types of preventive action.
Preventive diplomacy is the use of diplomatic techniques to prevent disputes
from arising, or from escalating in armed conflict if they do arise, and, if that fails,
to prevent the armed conflict from spreading. Article 33 of the Charter requires parties to disputes that could endanger peace and security to seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
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regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means the protagonists may
choose. To those techniques can be added confidence-building measures, a therapy
that can produce good results if the patients, i.e., the hostile parties, will accept it.
Central to the idea of preventive diplomacy is the assumption that the protagonists
are not making effective use of these techniques on their own initiative and that
the help of a third party is needed if the threatened conflict is to be prevented by
diplomatic means.
The techniques employed in preventive diplomacy are the same as those
employed in peacemaking (which, in United Nations parlance, is a diplomatic
activity, not the restoration of peace by forceful means). The only real difference
between preventive diplomacy and peacemaking is that the former is applied
before armed conflict has broken out, while the latter is applied thereafter. But in
the world today there are many endemic situations where the causes of conflict
are deeply rooted and chronic tension is punctuated from time to time by acute
outbreaks of virulent fighting. Examples of such situations are those arising from
the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, Israel’s occupation of parts
of southern Lebanon, and the conflict in southern Sudan. In such cases it may be
artificial to make a distinction between preventive diplomacy and peacemaking or
indeed between preventive and postconflict peace-building. Those who want to
help control and cure such chronic maladies need to maintain their efforts over a
long period of time, varying the therapies they prescribe as the patients’ condition
improves or deteriorates.
One is sometimes asked to give examples of successful preventive diplomacy.
It is not always easy to do so. Confidentiality is usually essential in such endeavors.
Time may have to pass before one can say with such confidence that success has
been achieved. Many different peacemakers may have been at work, and it can
sound presumptuous for just one of them to claim the credit.
A conspicuous success, which history now permits us to claim for the United
Nations, was the Good Offices Mission undertaken in great secrecy in 1969/1970
by Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche, on behalf of U Thant, to resolve an
Iranian claim to Bahrain before that country achieved full independence. U Thant
said of it: “the perfect Good Offices operation is one which is not heard of until it
is successfully concluded or even never heard of at all.”
Preventive peacekeeping involves the deployment of international military and
police personnel to perform a variety of possible functions: to deter aggression, to
help maintain security, to build confidence, to create conditions favorable to negotiations and/or to assist in the provision of humanitarian relief. As with all peacekeeping, a wide range of tasks can be considered, but it is essential that each mandate
should specify with absolute precision which tasks the force will actually perform.
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Preventive humanitarian action is action that, in addition to its humanitarian
purpose of bringing relief to those who suffer, has the political purpose of correcting situations, which, if left unattended, could increase the risk of conflict. A wide
range of measures may be required. They may include planning for the humanitarian action that will be required if a crisis breaks, e.g., the stockpiling of relief goods
in certain places. But they may also include creating conditions that will help to
persuade refugees or displaced persons to return to their homes, e.g., improvements in security and gender, greater respect for human rights, and creation of
jobs, etc. One example is the efforts of the international community to facilitate
the return to their homes of the Rwandese refugees in Zaire and thereby alleviate
the tensions that their presence has created between the Governments of Rwanda
and Zaire.
Preventive peace-building is the application to potential conflict situations of
the idea of postconflict peace-building, which I set out in “An Agenda for Peace.”
Like its postconflict cousin, preventive peace-building is especially useful in internal conflicts and can involve a wide variety of activities in the institutional, economic, and social fields. These activities usually have an intrinsic value of their
own because of the contribution they make to democratization, respect for human
rights, and economic and social development. What defines them as peace-building activities is that they additionally have the political value of reducing the risk of
outbreak of a new conflict, or the recrudescence of an old one.
An example in the context of potential interstate conflict is the offer in 1951 by
the then International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now the World
Bank) to provide its Good Offices to India and Pakistan to help both countries
resolve their dispute over the waters of the Indus River by approaching it as a technical and engineering problem rather than a legal and political one. The Bank’s
offer was accepted and after nine years of negotiation, the parties signed the Indus
Waters Treaty, which became the basis of the biggest waterpower and irrigation
project in the world at the time. In due course it made the two countries independent of each other in the operation of their water supplies, thereby removing the
risk of conflict on that set of issues.

The Secretary-General’s Role in Diagnosis and Prescribing Preventive Therapy
None of these preventive treatments need exclude use of any of the others. Indeed,
a fully integrated international response to an impending conflict could prescribe
them all. Nor does the United Nations have—nor claim—an exclusive right to
prescribe and administer these treatments. The most effective prophylaxis may be
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achieved through coordinated team work by the United Nations, various of its
specialized agencies, one or more regional organizations, individual Member States
and nongovernmental organizations.
There are five generic conditions that have to be fulfilled if the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations is to be able to apply the preventive treatments effectively. They are discussed in the following paragraphs with particular reference to
the most pressing situations, which, at the time this chapter was written, demanded
preventive action by the international community. That was the internal crisis in
Burundi. It is worth recording in this context that, in the week this chapter was
finalized, the Minister of Human Rights of Burundi, in a statement to the United
Nations Human Rights Commission, described her country as being “a patient on
the operation table” and appealed to the international community to help in finding “a permanent cure.”
Fulfillment of the conditions becomes more difficult when, as is so often the
case, the potential conflict is an internal one. More than 60 percent of the actual
or potential conflicts in which the United Nations played an active peacemaking
or peacekeeping role related to disputes within states, though several of them also
had a significant international dimension too. As is well known, Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter provides that the United Nations should not intervene in
matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction of a State or require its Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter. The General Assembly’s
declaration of December 5, 1988, to which I have already referred, provided that,
“States should act so as to prevent in their international relations the emergency of
aggravation of disputes or situations” (emphasis added).
Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a growing readiness by
the Member States to accept, or even insist, that the United Nations’ preventive,
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building services should not be denied to a
conflict simply because it is a conflict within a State and not one between States.
At the same time, Member States have continued to insist on the inviolability of
their sovereignty and strict respect for Article 2(7). Because the sovereign state is the
basic building block of the international system and will so remain, it is not possible to resolve this contradiction on a generic basis; Member States will continue to
defend their sovereign rights. But in practice the contradiction will continue to be
resolved on a pragmatic basis in certain situations where there is broad agreement
within the international community that an internal conflict is so dangerous and/
or cruel that international efforts have to be made to control and resolve it.
As a result, however, the United Nations cannot take preventive action without a specific request from, or at least the consent of, the Member State or States
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concerned. From the Secretary-General’s point of view, the ideal is that he should
receive a request from the government. But sometimes, when the threat of imminent conflict is evident, he feels compelled by his general mandate for preventive
action to take the initiative in suggesting a course of preventive therapy. Even when
such an idea is put forward tentatively and confidentially, it can be taken as a slight
to the sovereignty of the state concerned and the Secretary-General is blocked from
further action.
The Secretary-General also has to be ready to propose preventive action in
cases where a country no longer has a government capable of exercising sovereignty
in an effective way, the so-called failed state syndrome epitomized by Somalia. In
such cases, the Security Council may decide that the state of war is so threatening to
the country’s neighbors or is causing so much suffering that the Council is obliged
to establish a UN operation to bring it under control without seeking governmental consent. But the United Nations will still need the consent and cooperation of
those who actually control the situation on the ground in the various parts of the
country. As has been demonstrated in Somalia and Bosnia, the lack of such consent
and cooperation can prevent the United Nations operation from carrying out the
tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, even when the Council’s decision has
been taken under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The first of the five conditions for preventive action is that the Secretary-General
should have the necessary capacity for the collection and analysis of information.
One of the main reasons for my decision in 1992 to bring all the Secretariat’s political work into a single Department of Political Affairs was to create this early warning
capacity. That department, working with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs,
has its own early warning system to detect impending humanitarian emergencies.
With the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it has created a “Framework for
Coordination,” which is essentially a set of procedures for ensuring that the three
departments review at regular intervals all information relevant to a potentially
threatening situation and institute timely consultations with other elements in the
United Nations system that may have information to contribute and/or a role to
play in a concerted preventive action.
It is sometimes said that the United Nations is handicapped in its peace efforts
by the lack of an intelligence service of its own. I do not believe that this need be
the case. Much information is available to the Secretariat from the media and from
academics and nongovernmental organizations, which often contribute their own
interesting perspectives to the analysis. Above all, Member States have responded
generously to my request in “An Agenda for Peace,” which asked that Member
States be ready to provide me with the information needed for effective preventive
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diplomacy. Of course, the information they provide may sometimes reflect their
own national interests and their own preferences for action by the United Nations.
But if information on the same situation is sought from several States, it is not difficult to form an accurate picture.
That said, the United Nations, like the rest of the international community, was
caught unaware by the assassination of the President of Burundi in October 1993, as
it was by the shooting down of the aircraft carrying the Presidents of Burundi and
Rwanda in Kigali six months later, and by the horrors that followed both incidents.
There will always be acts of extreme political violence that cannot be predicted
with precision. But the United Nations needs both to be sensitive to the conditions
that can lead to such acts and able to contribute to contingency planning for an
adequate response by the international community when they occur.
The second condition is that the Secretary-General should have the clinical
capacity to prescribe the correct treatment for the condition diagnosed. To fulfill
this condition, he needs to be able to assess both the factors that have created the
risk of conflict and the likely impact of the various preventive treatments available.
Making those judgments in an interstate situation is easier than in an internal one.
In the first case, much can be learned from consultation with the States involved
and their neighbors, friends, and allies. In the second, the crisis is often due to
ethnic or economic and social issues of an entirely internal nature and of great
political sensitivity, in which the potential protagonists may include nonstate entities of questionable legitimacy and with shadowy chains of command. If in such
circumstances the Secretary-General probes for the information needed to identify
the right treatment, he can find himself accused of professional misconduct by
infringing the sovereignty of the country concerned.
Another potential source of difficulty for the Secretary-General at this stage of
the process is the need for triage. His analysis of the symptoms may lead him to
conclude that there is no preventive action that the United Nations can usefully
take. This could be because he judges that, contrary to the general impression,
conflict is not actually imminent and that what is being observed is posturing or
shadow-boxing rather than serious preparations for war. Or he may judge that
there is no effective treatment that would be accepted by the parties, or even that
there is no effective treatment at all. Such conclusions will not always be welcome to
the Member States. They rightly want the Secretary-General to do everything possible to prevent conflicts. But the reality is that not all—perhaps not even many—
actual or potential conflicts are susceptible to the United Nations treatment at all
times. Selectivity and careful timing are necessary, especially when Member States
are so reluctant to make resources available for the Organization’s peace efforts.
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In Burundi, the ethnic massacres of October 1993, to which reference has
already been made, led me to dispatch a Special Representative to that country
with instruction to inform himself about the situation, to help prevent it from
deteriorating further, to facilitate national reconciliation and to recommend to me
further preventive measures that the United Nations could take. His initial advice
was that the situation was so threatening that the United Nations’ efforts should be
concentrated on stabilizing the patient and that, for the moment, the modalities for
longer-term treatment were a matter of second priority.
After my Special Representative’s efforts and those of other peacemakers had
brought about a certain stabilization, notably through the signatures of almost all
the political parties of a “Convention of Government” in September 1994, attention
was turned to longer-term therapy. This required action on two fronts: promotion of a political dialogue and national reconciliation, for which a country-wide
“National Debate” was the chosen remedy; and measures to improve security. For
the latter, I had already proposed to the Security Council at various times a number
of possible remedies. These had included the establishment of a humanitarian base,
manned by the United Nations troops, at Bujumbura Airport; the maintenance in
a neighboring country of a military presence capable of intervening rapidly if the
situation in Burundi should deteriorate rapidly; and the deployment of a contingent of United Nations guards to protect humanitarian activities. However, these
ideas had not found favor either with the government of Burundi, whose armed
forced were strongly opposed to the stationing of any foreign troops in the country,
or with the members of the Security Council.
The situation in Burundi began to deteriorate further. I warned its leaders
and parliamentarians that they could not count on continuing support from the
international community unless they produced convincing evidence that they were
ready to reconcile their differences. In other words, I told them that unless the
patients took their physicians’ advice seriously, the physicians would turn elsewhere. The country’s condition did not improve, and I reaffirmed to the Security
Council my conviction that the international community should prepare for the
possibility of a humanitarian emergency so severe that foreign forces would have to
intervene. I again put forward the ideas of the United Nations guards and/or preventive deployment of foreign forces in a neighboring country. This proposal again
proved unacceptable to the government of Burundi and to the Security Council.
Then, I urged that Member States should at least undertake contingency planning
so that troops could be quickly deployed to Burundi if the worst happened and a
humanitarian intervention became imperative. The Security Council responded by
inviting me to pursue consultations with Member States to this end.
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The third condition for preventive action is that the parties to the potential
conflict (the patients) should accept the action proposed by the Secretary-General.
This is a sine qua non because he has no power to impose any remedy on them and
can act only with their consent. In any case the remedy will have no effect unless the
patients have confidence in it. Sadly, this is usually the most difficult condition to
fulfill. There are, of course, at least two patients in every potential conflict. Usually
one of them is more favorable than the other to international involvement; indeed,
the very fact that Party A wants international involvement is often cause enough for
Party B to oppose it. Sometimes also there exists earlier agreements committing the
governments involved to give priority to bilateral means. An example of this is the
Simla Agreement of July 1972, in which India and Pakistan agreed “to settle their
differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed between them.” At other times, powerful countries in
the region concerned may object to United Nations involvement and may insist
that the parties have recourse to regional mediators.
In internal conflicts, sovereignty is an added complication. A government faced
with an opposition that is threatening to take up arms is understandably reluctant
for an international organization to come on stage, professing its impartiality and
apparently treating government and opposition as equals. The Secretary-General
has to proceed with great delicacy and finesse in such circumstances if he is to succeed in persuading both patients to consult the doctor and to take the medicine he
prescribes.
Returning to the example of Burundi, the parties have very different views
about the desirability of United Nations—or any other foreign—intervention. The
main political party representing the Hutu majority has welcomed proposals for
contingency planning for a possible humanitarian intervention. But the main party
representing the Tutsi minority has reacted very negatively, as have the Burundi
Armed Forces, which are largely recruited from the minority.
The fourth condition for action is that the Secretary-General, having prescribed a preventive treatment and got the patients to accept it, must persuade
the other Member States, and especially the members of the Security Council, to
give him steady political support. Unless they are ready to use their influence in
a concerted effort by the international community as a whole, the efforts of the
Secretary-General alone are unlikely to produce the desired results. The reactions
of the Security Council to my various proposals for preventive action in Burundi
have already been described.
The Secretary-General must also—and this is the fifth and final condition for
success—persuade the Member States to provide the necessary resources to finance
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the agreed preventive action. The mandates given to him by Article 99 of the Charter,
by the Security Council statement of January 31, 1992, and by the Resolutions and
Statements adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively, in response to “An Agenda for Peace,” provide the Secretary-General with
considerable freedom of maneuver in diagnosis and prescription, as will be evident
from the foregoing description of my own initiatives related to Burundi. But he
has no power to commit funds without the authority of the General Assembly,
which will have to be convinced of the legitimacy, feasibility, and likely efficacy
of the prescribed treatment. If it includes the deployment of military personnel,
more than financial authority will be needed. The political authority of the Security
Council will also be necessary, as well as a readiness on the part of Member States
to contribute the troops and equipment required, whether as a UN peacekeeping
operation or as a multinational force authorized by the Security Council but under
national command.
To sum up, the salient fact that emerges from this analysis is that the SecretaryGeneral’s ability to take effective preventive action depends most critically on the
political will of the parties to the potential conflict. In international politics, as in
human medicine, the physician cannot impose treatment that the patient is not
prepared to accept. Important improvements have been made in the SecretaryGeneral’s capacity to diagnose and prescribe. Failure to take effective preventive
action is, in any case, only rarely due to lack of early warning; the symptoms are
usually there for all to see. What is too often lacking at present is a predisposition by
the parties to accept third-party assistance in resolving their dispute. Ways have to
be found to persuade them, without infringing on their sovereignty or other rights,
that it is in their own interests to accept the help of the United Nations and other
international players, rather than to allow their dispute to turn into armed conflict.
And the Member States of the United Nations have to be persuaded to pay the costs
of providing that help.

The Secretary-General’s Role in the Application of Preventive Therapy
Once a course of therapy has been defined and agreed upon by all concerned, decisions have to be taken on the modalities for its application. There is no fixed pattern.
Specific modalities have to be worked out for each case. The Secretary-General’s
role can take many different forms. He can do the work himself, directly or through
his Secretariat. He can refer the patients to specialists, such as specialized agencies
of the United Nations system, regional organizations, individual Member States,
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or nongovernmental organizations, and work with them to apply the therapy. He
can coordinate the work of others or simply provide them with political and moral
support.
The Secretary-General often performs his role through a senior United Nations
official or outside personality, appointed as his Special Representative or Special
Envoy, who takes up residence in the country or region concerned or visits it on a
regular basis. The mere appointment of a Special Representative or Envoy can have
a political impact. It alerts the Member States of the United Nations to a possible
new conflict and alerts the potential protagonists to the international community’s
concern. There are other conspicuous actions available to the Secretary-General
that can achieve similar results—the dispatch of goodwill or fact-finding missions,
a public offer of his good offices, briefing of the media, a report to the General
Assembly or Security Council, or a formal notification to the Council under Article
99 of the Charter.
Such public manifestations of the Secretary-General’s concern can sometimes
have a useful therapeutic effect. But more often he will prefer to provide his good
offices quietly, especially where the looming conflict is an internal one. Quite apart
from sovereignty-related sensitivities, it is easier for parties to make concessions
when it is not publically known that they are being urged to do so by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, who can guarantee little or nothing in return. As
already mentioned, preventive diplomacy is usually best done behind closed doors,
which can make difficulties for the Secretary General if the world is clamoring for
the United Nations to do something but he knows that to reveal what he is actually
doing would impair his chances of success, as well as being the diplomatic equivalent of violating the Hippocratic oath.
Where preventive peacekeeping takes the form of a United Nations operation,
the Secretary-General’s role is more clearly defined and more exclusive. It is he
who designs the operation; obtains the Security Council’s authority to establish
it; assembles the necessary troops and equipment from Member States; deploys,
commands, and manages the operation; and reports on it to the Council. But even
in this situation the Secretary-General can find himself exposed to considerable
pressure from countries directly or indirectly involved in the conflict.
It is not, however, to be assumed that preventive peacekeeping will always be
done through a United Nations operation. In the case of Burundi, I believe that
the peacekeeping therapy would be so demanding militarily that it could be provided only by Member States capable of responding with the necessary rapidity to
a crisis in a distant theater, and that the correct prescription would, therefore, be
a multinational force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
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Charter. In such a case the Secretary-General’s role is likely to be less than if the
operation were under United Nations command.
In the case of preventive humanitarian action, one aspect of the SecretaryGeneral’s role is to establish adequate arrangements for the coordination of relief
activities. Another is to take, or support, the political action required to persuade
the governments concerned to create the conditions that will permit resolution of
the humanitarian crisis. As already noted, these can include a wide range of measures in the fields of security, law and order, human rights, institution building,
reconstruction, restoration of economic activity and social programs, and may,
therefore, require the Secretary-General to play a coordinating role in this field also.
Peace-building is perhaps the preventive therapy where the Secretary-General’s
role is least well defined. In the case of preventive diplomacy and humanitarian
action he has the necessary authority to administer the therapy that he has agreed
upon with the parties. For preventive peacekeeping he has to obtain the authority
of the Security Council, but well-established procedures exist for him to do so, and
for the operation to be deployed once authority has been obtained.
But peace-building is more complicated. It can require a wide range and variety
of actions, not all of which will fall under the direct executive responsibility of the
Secretary-General. His functions in this context are essentially those of a general
practitioner. He can diagnose the patients’ condition and advise them that certain
general measures of a political, economic, or social nature will help reduce the risk
of conflict. Such therapies can include confidence-building measures, increased
respect for human rights, more just law enforcement, strengthening democratic
institutions, improving social services, addressing gross economic injustices, sharing natural resources more fairly, and so on. But for a detailed prescription and for
help in administering the therapy, the general practitioner will have to refer the
patients to various specialists inside and outside the United Nations system, including nongovernmental specialists.
This gives the Secretary-General three roles in the implementation of preventive peace-building, all of them delicate. The first is to persuade the specialists to
apply the therapy that he has prescribed and the patients have accepted. The best
way of doing this, of course, is to associate the specialists with the earlier consultations and make them a part of the diplomatic process, through which the parties are
brought to accept the desirability of preventive action and the nature it should take.
The Secretary-General’s second role is to coordinate implementation of all the
agreed upon peace-building actions. In some cases this can be done through the
standard arrangements for coordinating the United Nations system’s operational
activities for development through a United Nations Resident Coordinator. But
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usually wider coordination will be necessary, especially if the overall prescription
includes diplomatic, peacekeeping, and/or humanitarian elements. In that case,
the normal arrangement is for the Secretary-General to appoint a resident Special
Representative, who should have not only diplomatic skills but also sufficient experience in the economic and social fields to give him or her credibility with the
specialists in those fields.
The Secretary-General’s third role is to monitor the political impact of the
agreed peace-building measures, so that he can assess how well the patients, i.e.
the parties to the potential conflict, are responding to the therapy and whether the
prescription needs to be modified—or, of course, discontinued if the risk of conflict has been sufficiently alleviated. Obviously, the Secretary-General will depend,
to a considerable extent, upon the advice of his Special Representative; but this is
an area where visits by the Secretary-General himself or by his senior officials to
the country or region concerned, and direct contacts with their leaders, can be of
great value.

Epilogue
Prevention is indeed better than cure. I hope that this chapter demonstrates the
high priority that my colleagues in the Secretariat and I attach to improving the
United Nations’ capacity in the preventive field, as desired by the Member States
for well-founded political, humanitarian, and financial reasons. But the chapter
should also have shown that preventing the malady of conflict is even more difficult
than preventing the diseases that afflict the mind and the body of human beings.
There are no guaranteed vaccinations to prevent conflicts from starting and
no miracle cures to end them once they have started. The best prevention is for the
region or country concerned to follow a strict and healthy regimen of democratization, human rights, equitable development, confidence-building measures, and
respect for international law, while eschewing indulgence in such unhealthy practices as nationalism, fanaticism, demagoguery, excessive armament, and aggressive
behavior. Most of the elements of such a regimen are prescribed in the United
Nations Charter and in the corpus of international law.
The difficulties of prevention in the field of peace and security do not arise
because the warning signs of conflict are more difficult to detect than those of
human disease; on the contrary, they are usually more obvious. Nor is it that the
therapies are less effective; many effective therapies have been devised over the
years. The United Nations dispensary is well stocked and many experienced consultants and specialists are on call.
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The problem is with the patients and with the friends and enemies of the
patients. Human beings may be full of phobias and superstition about disease but
they can usually be relied upon to respond fairly rationally to the diagnoses and
prescriptions of their physicians. The same cannot, alas, be said of governments
and other parties to political conflicts. Many general practitioners would have been
tempted to retire in despair long ago if their advice had been disregarded by those to
whom they prescribed therapies. But the Secretary-General of the United Nations
cannot abandon his principal duty to avert imminent conflict any more than a
conscientious physician can abandon a difficult case. The Secretary-General’s duty
is to use all the means available to him, be they political, military, economic, social,
or humanitarian, to help the peoples and governments of the United Nations to
achieve the goal, emblazoned in the first paragraph of its Charter, of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war.
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Initial Response to Complex Emergencies
and Natural Disasters
Ed Tsui

On January 17, 2002, one of Africa’s most active volcanoes unexpectedly erupted
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). As lava rapidly advanced toward the
lakeside city below, fuel depots erupted into slow burning fires, tremors and shocks
crumbled buildings and collapsed houses, heat and lava flows destroyed water and
electrical systems, ash covered the landscape and lava-turned-to-rock covered parts
of the lake.
As a result, about 400,000 of Goma’s 500,000 habitants were forced to flee to
unstable areas of the DRC and Rwanda, where rebel elements remained active.
Nine died, and one hundred were wounded. About 40 percent of the town’s infrastructure was destroyed, leaving thousands without electricity or potable water.
If ever there were a typical natural disaster, the eruption of Mount Nyirangongo
was not it. Its location on a contentious border in an area plagued by armed conflicted placed it squarely in the middle of a long-standing, regional, complex emergency, where state and nonstate actors compete for control, misinformation is
rampant, and humanitarian access is limited.
A number of other factors added to the complexity of the response including
the many actors involved; the threat of further eruptions or factures from associated
volcanic and seismic activity, whose interplay was classified by both vulcanologists
and seismologists alike as a new phenomena; and the potential for contamination of
Lake Kivu, a primary source of both food and drinking water in an already impoverished area and, ironically, of noxious gases that threatened to ignite.
Yet the international humanitarian response was as quick as it was comprehensive, and, in spite of the complexity of the situation, largely succeed in alleviating
the immediate needs of those most affected.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was but one
of many players who made this response a success. OCHA and its partners over
the years have learned a great deal about the types of tools, mechanisms, and processes needed for an effective emergency response. New technologies, increases in
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the scope and magnitude of both complex emergencies and natural hazards, as well
as the need for common tools to address them, and a growing appreciation by the
Member States of the importance of humanitarian assistance and the protection of
civilian to the achievement of peace, security, and development are only a few of
the trends that have shaped the nature of emergency response as we know it today.
But despite the growing need for humanitarian interventions in ever more complex
operating environments, the key lessons learned by the international humanitarian
community regarding emergency response in the last two decades are straightforward. In short, over time we have come to understand that an effective response
depends on the following:
1. Solid needs assessments that allow relief agencies to jointly determine who does
what where, under the umbrella of a comprehensive humanitarian action plan
2. The proper staff and emergency response tools available at the right time in
the right place
3. Common tools for natural disasters and complex emergencies, to be adapted
for application
4. Emergency funding mechanisms that ensure money is readily available and
easily dispersed
5. Well-developed information management networks through which accurateas-possible data are immediately available to key decision makers
6. Reviews that draw the lessons learned from each response and help apply them
to the next
Each of these lessons was manifested in the Goma response, which included, among
other actions, early reinforcements of experienced humanitarian staff, including a
senior emergency manager; the provision, through daily updates, of credible and
timely information about the crisis at both the field and international levels; the onsite establishment of extraordinary information exchanges and a specialized center to
process, analyze, and share humanitarian data; the issuance of an interagency emergency appeal for funds; the rapid dispatch of vulcanologists to the field; and the procurement of emergency nonfood items for the affected population.
As such, this particular response to a sudden onset emergency highlights not
only the need for, but also the increasing efforts by, aid actors, in particular OCHA,
to ensure that the above elements are consistently at the disposal of the international system, so that each response is timely yet flexible, specialized when needed,
and above all, well coordinated.
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As an example of how aid can effectively reach it victims also provides a benchmark of comparison to other international emergency responses, where, for whatever reasons, action was neither as swift nor as decisive. Thus, it further highlights
the need for greater consistency in the application of the emergency response tools
and mechanisms at the disposal of the international humanitarian community.
Before I elaborate on these lessons and themes, it is useful to understand the
increasingly challenging and multifaceted backdrop against which aid workers
struggle to deliver assistance in the field and that has shaped the formulation of
emergency response.

Natural Disaster and Complex Emergencies
In the last two decades alone, more than three million people have died in natural disasters caused by extreme weather resulting from global warming and other
related atmospheric changes, as well as by deforestation and soil erosion caused
by unsustainable development practices. Combined with poverty and population
pressure, growing numbers of people are being forced to live in harm’s way, on
floodplains, unstable hillsides, and earthquake-prone zones.
Similarly, the end of the Cold War has resulted in profound changes not only
in the number but also in the nature of armed, internal conflicts. In the last decade
of the twentieth century, regions once thought to be beyond war, such as Europe,
became entrenched in it; simmering socioeconomic tensions in many African
countries resurfaced; and the war on terrorism gave way to far reaching humanitarian implications in Central Asia and the Middle East. In this period, conflicts have
claimed more than five million lives and driven many times that number of people
from their homes. At present, it is estimated that more than 40 million people have
been displaced by conflict worldwide.
Increasingly, as we saw in Goma, the traditional distinctions between the two
types of crises—natural disasters and complex emergencies—are not always so
clear. Interplay between the two has become common. This is particularly true in
the case of drought, which differs from most natural disasters in that it is slow in
onset and may continue for a prolonged period of time, which can lead to a conflict
over scarce resources. In ongoing emergencies, drought can also exacerbate existing tensions.
Whatever the cause, the resulting effects of these emergencies are similar. They
include extensive violence and loss of life, increasingly among innocent noncombatants and civilians, massive displacements of people, and widespread damage to
societies and economies. But despite the similarities, key differences in the imme194
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diacy, duration, scope, and political complexity of a crisis have increasingly called
for special capacities or services in the initial response.
Immediacy
In the event of a natural disaster, such as an earthquake or volcano, thousands of
lives are put at immediate risk. Many can be lost within hours or days of the incident
if search and rescue and other life-saving efforts are delayed. In these cases, a rapid
initial response is critical, and often more easily applicable, to the goal of saving lives.
Complex emergencies, on the other hand, are characterized by a total or considerable breakdown of authority. They usually involve more deliberate violence—
and therefore violations of human rights and international humanitarian law—targeted at civilians, as well as political and military constraints that hinder response
and pose more significant and sinister security risks to aid workers.
Duration
As a result of these differences in immediacy, the life-saving stage that follows a
natural disaster response may be over within a matter of days or weeks, notwithstanding the reconstruction efforts that may follow.
The chronic humanitarian needs arising from war, however, often continue for
months and even years. Additionally, as the nature of an emergency changes—for
example, from the immediate aftermath of military action, to a long-simmering
standoff between government and militant groups, to a negotiated peace—humanitarian assistance programs may evolve and become more varied, encompassing
simultaneous relief programs as well as rehabilitation and reintegration activities.
These situations necessitate longer-term initiatives designed to minimize human
suffering over time.

Scope
Natural disasters increasingly span several countries. For instance, when successive cyclones hit southeastern Africa in February 2001, rivers and dams overflowed throughout the region, resulting in widespread flooding in Mozambique,
Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, affecting more than
two million people. But although several neighboring countries can be affected
by the same natural disaster, especially in case of drought, their relationships are
not always strained, and cooperation is more common.
195

CH15_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p192-207.indd 195

2/13/13 10:09 PM

ED TSUI

In complex emergency situations, however, the international and cross-border dimensions are almost always characterized by political differences between
those concerned. One need not look further than the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes region of Africa, or the West African subregion for
examples of how conflict spreads, displacing thousands in a tangled web of crossborder movements. Responding to such crises requires a higher level of regional
coordination and interaction with a greater multiplicity of actors, who are often at
odds with each other.

Key Elements of a Successful Response
Against this backdrop, the international community has seen an increasing trend
toward more integrated, as well as more standardized, yet flexible, application of
initial response procedures, tools, and mechanisms in crises. This versatility entails
being able to deal with the full range and potential interplay of crises, from purely
complex emergency and natural disasters situations to every possible combination
in between, based on common platform of response practices, tools, and mechanisms that consist of the following:
1. Solid needs assessments that allow relief agencies to determine jointly who does what
where, under the umbrella of a comprehensive humanitarian action plan
When a crisis erupts, the international community—including government,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), donors, member states, the Red Cross
Movement, and the United Nations—is usually alerted by an array of monitoring
systems, including individual as well as shared sources of information, ranging
from the field reports to earthquake bulletins, weather notices, and press reports.
Once alerted to a crisis, the international humanitarian community must gauge
the willingness of the affected state to accept assistance. Although the primary
responsibility for taking care of the victims of crisis always rests with the affected
state, governments whose national capacities are not sufficient to meet the needs
may either directly request assistance or pose no objections to humanitarian
assistance.
Once the acceptance or nonobjection to aid is established, the humanitarian
community focuses its attention on ensuring the impartial and timely interagency
assessment of the humanitarian situation on the ground. These assessments, often
led by OCHA in its role as a nonoperational and therefore unbiased facilitator
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of humanitarian response, are vital to ensuring that a wide spectrum of policy
and decision makers are well informed from the outset of crisis, when time sensitive decisions regarding funding, deployments of staff and assets, and staff security must be made under enormous pressure. OCHA’s experience has shown the
importance of striking a balance between the depth and speed of reporting and
the accuracy of the initial assessments. In crisis situations, initial assessments often
must be updated hourly to reflect new, incoming information resulting from fastmoving events. Emphasis must therefore be placed on conveying what is known at
the moment.
They also form the basis for the coordination of assistance in a rapidly evolving
situation involving a multiplicity of actors with sometimes overlapping mandates.
Especially critical is the prioritization of needs—whether they be in the food, shelter, health, water, sanitation, or protection sectors—and the subsequent assignment of tasks and responsibilities based on the individual mandates, strengths, and
comparative advantage of each organization. Thus in response to a sudden onset
crisis, initial actions may focus on determining who does what where. OCHA’s
role is to ensure that, drawing on system-wide capacities, all needs are met without
duplication and that often-scarce resources are efficiently used.
Ongoing assessments throughout the crisis will then form the basis of longerterm interagency planning efforts designed to ensure that there is (1) a common
understanding of the problems and constraints besetting affected populations,
(2) a joint and complementary action plan for addressing them, and finally (3)
an effective use of limited resources for those activities that are of mutual concern
to all—such as communication, logistics, security, and information management.
These are often realized through the development of a Common Humanitarian
Action Plan (CHAP), which forms the basis of an inter-agency appeal process, of
which OCHA is the custodian. Through this process—known as the Inter-Agency
Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)—national, regional, and international relief
organizations jointly develop a common humanitarian programming, strategic
planning, and resource mobilization document, which is regularly reviewed and
revised. In the event of a sudden deterioration of an existing emergency for which
a CAP has already been developed, the plans to respond to the evolving crisis may
already have been incorporated in the CAP as possible planning scenarios. If not,
the CAP may be rapidly reviewed and revised to reflect the new needs. Similarly,
in cases where a natural disaster occurs in a country with a CAP, a revised CAP is
usually issued, reflecting the new needs presented by the natural disaster.
In natural disaster settings, needs are determined jointly by the resident agencies on the basis of rapid assessments, which are conveyed along with funding needs
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in situation reports that are issued within the first twenty-four hours of a crisis and
then updated daily.
2. The proper staff and emergency response tools available at the right time in the
right place
No matter how experienced the first in-country responders to an emergency are,
the sudden onset of a crisis is inevitably marked by alarm and confusion as national
authorities and their UN and NGO counterparts struggle to assess the situation,
often in conditions of extreme danger and limited access. Depending on the type
of crisis, the leading humanitarian official on the ground, usually the UN Resident
Coordinator (RC), may be forced to deal with many competing concerns, ranging
from assessing the situation to evacuating nonessential staff to dealing with the
media. Coordination at this stage is especially critical to ensuring that humanitarian assistance is delivered in a targeted, effective, and complementary manner.
OCHA facilitates this process by either rapidly establishing a field presence and
coordination structures in country or by providing extra support to actors already
in the country in the form of temporary rapid response teams, otherwise known as
“surge” capacity.
Usually, existing resident agencies—headed by the RC—will support the government’s efforts to respond to a disaster or complex emergency. If new structures
are needed, OCHA’s head, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (USG/ERC), in consultation with a range of
humanitarian actors, determines—based on analysis of the humanitarian, political,
military, and security situation—whether the crisis warrants a country or regional
response, and decides which coordination mechanisms best fit, including whether
there is a need to appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) to oversee the coordination of international aid efforts. Often the Resident Coordinator will also serve as
the Humanitarian Coordinator (R/HC). These permanent structures help ensure
not only the success of the initial response, but the development of common strategic planning and monitoring of humanitarian assistance throughout a crisis.
Either way, quick and decisive leadership from the USG/ERC in the initial
phase of an emergency is critical. In consultation with UN agency and Secretariat
department heads in New York, the USG/ERC may decide to visit the stricken
country personally in order to assess the damage first hand, and then report back
to the Secretary-General, the Security Council, donors, agencies, and NGOs on an
appropriate course of action. Or she/he may deploy one of OCHA’s senior managers or an OCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor (RDRA) already in the region
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to the emergency site, in order to support resident UN agencies, the R/HC, and the
local government in the initial assessment and response.
It has become clear from numerous evaluations of OCHA’s initial response
that such senior leadership is a perquisite to success. The presence of these additional senior staff can lend the necessary authority and legitimacy to build consensus for effective coordination; deal with other senior officials, especially in situations requiring access negotiations; and draw worldwide attention and resources
to the aid efforts. In East Timor, for instance, despite the lack of a meaningful
contingency plan to respond to the outbreak of mass destruction and violence on
September 4, 1999, the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator managed to fly into
Dili by September 6, 1999, where he remained as one of only two international
humanitarian representatives in East Timor until the reentry of the humanitarian
community on September 20. Under his leadership, coordination was immediately
established and a preliminary assessment document begun.
The ERC may also decide to deploy interdisciplinary rapid response teams or
“surge capacity” to support the government and/or the R/HC in assessing the situation and coordinating the relief response.
These working-level emergency reinforcements, by providing specialized
capacities or boosting existing ones in times of extreme demand, can help take
strain off governments, resident UN agencies and other organizations; focus attention on the need for extraordinary levels of coordination and contingency planning; and if necessary reorient resident agencies from their normal development
focus to the different demands of disaster response.
Their timely arrival can also be critical to the success of an initial response. In
the past decade, OCHA has been increasingly called upon to provide such surge
capacity on very short notice to R/HCs at the outset of a new crisis, when an existing emergency intensifies or to relieve temporarily or replace a critical staff member of an existing unit. In Goma, for instance, within thirty-six hours OCHA had
fielded a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team and staff with
specialized skills from nearby offices in Eritrea and Kenya, as well as from Geneva.
The Assistant Emergency Relief Coordination (AERC) was on the ground within
forty-eight hours. Within seventy-two hours, OCHA had a total of fourteen staff
members on the ground, backed up with support from desk offices in New York
and Geneva.
While OCHA in the past has drawn staff on ad hoc basis to respond to a sudden onset or deterioration in a complex emergency, the need for more systematic
internal procedures has been recognized. As a result, OCHA, borrowing from the
expertise of its more automated initial response to natural disasters, has also built
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up its own in-house capacity to deploy within twenty-four hours OCHA-trained
staff, who are fully conversant with OCHA’s mandate and the operational specifics of the organization, in order to establish immediate and effective coordination
mechanisms in a sudden-onset emergency. Depending on the crisis, these may
include information management and technology, operations, logistics, administration, and communications capacities.
Increasingly, one of their first tasks is to establish what has become known as
a Humanitarian Information Center (HIC). By providing a venue for humanitarian exchange, HICs promote communication and cooperation, especially in crises
involving a multitude of actors. Typically staffed by information management and
data specialists borrowed from humanitarian agencies and international NGOs,
HICs offer a range of products and services that make coordination and response
possible. These include, but are not limited to, Internet-based data repositories
containing baseline information on at-risk countries: Who? What? Where? (3Ws)
databases containing vital statistics on population, internal displacement, refugee
movement, and needs; country encyclopedias and digital libraries of UN reports
and documents; road maps to assist relief convoys and missions; and thematic maps
illustrating key sectorial data including housing damage, schools and clinics, and the
location of mines. HICs also often provide humanitarian aid workers with accessible,
central meeting rooms, common office equipment and announcement boards as
well as Internet and fax access.
3. Common tools for natural disasters and complex emergencies, which build on the
comparative advantage of the others without losing their ability to be applied in unique
situations
The international humanitarian community has increasingly recognized the need
to have at its disposal a range of flexible and integrated emergency response tools
that can be used in either complex emergency or natural disaster situations. OCHA,
based on its experiences over the years and the increasing demands of its partners,
is increasingly attempting to provide the international humanitarian community
with an integrated menu of emergency response tools, which include the following
subjects.
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)
Originally designed to provide assessment capacity and support for the coordination of incoming relief at the site of sudden-onset natural disaster, UNDAC
teams are drawn from a roster of volunteer national emergency managers, who
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are nominated and funded by more than forty participating countries, together
with staff from OCHA, UN agencies, and other international organizations. They
can be deployed within twelve to twenty-four hours anywhere in the world and
are capable of performing a variety of tasks, including assessment, coordination,
and information management, as well as providing experts in specialized fields of
disaster management, such as search and rescue, chemical spill management, and
infrastructural engineering.
Until very recently UNDAC was used primarily as a natural disaster response
mechanism. Since 1993, it has also been deployed in response to complex emergencies, and UNDAC continues to strengthen its capacity to respond to these types of
situations.
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)
At the same time, OCHA recognizes the benefit of retaining the unique nature
and purpose of some specialized response mechanisms. To that end, OCHA continues to help mobilize international urban search and rescue (SAR) teams, who
specialize in rescuing victims trapped by rubble. They are drawn from a network of
government-provided experts known as INSARAG. Additionally, in cooperation
with the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), OCHA facilitates the
deployment of rapid response teams with environmental expertise to coordinate
the UN emergency response to environmental emergencies, such as chemical or oil
spills and forest fires.
On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (OSOCC)
The rapid establishment—usually by UNDAC or the first international search and
rescue team on the ground—of a temporary OSOCC at the site of a disaster can
help provide a locus for information management and sharing as well as the coordination of various aid actors, particularly when infrastructure or communication
facilities are lacking. But although initially conceived of to assist local authorities
of the affected country in managing the disaster, in particular to coordinate international search and rescue teams, OSOCCs have proved valuable in their flexibility
and adaptability to various situations and needs.
Internet-based virtual OSOCCs can also be used in both complex emergency
and natural disasters to exchange information, identify needs, and plan ongoing
responses in real time from anywhere in the world. Virtual OSOCCs proved vital
in the initial response to earthquakes in El Salvador, India, and Peru, as well as in
Afghanistan.
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Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
In crises in which there is a peacekeeping mission already in place or in which militaries are heavily involved in the humanitarian response, OCHA staff, sometimes
based in HICs, will often liaise with CIMIC staff attached to various militaries or
peacekeeping operations in order to ensure the complementarity of peacekeeping
and humanitarian programming and to share vital security information. They also
help facilitate the most effective use of military and civil defense assets in humanitarian operations by promoting interaction between the humanitarian and military
cells of a relief operation. In most cases, individual UN agencies and the larger
NGOs establish their own links with military cells. However, in some instances,
OCHA will serve as the hub for the mobilization and deployment of these assets
and act as a direct liaison between humanitarian and military cells during a humanitarian relief operation. In this case, OCHA identifies personnel experienced in
civil-military coordination to work closely with the R/HC.
UN Joint Logistics Centers (UNJLC)
OCHA may also assist in the establishment of UNJLCs where logistical information, data about the estimated global need for food and nonfood items, and information about distribution of relief to beneficiaries is exchanged and shared with
the humanitarian community. For example, during the response to the flood in
Mozambique in early 2001, OCHA’s Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) participated in establishing a joint logistics center to coordinate the use of military
planes, boats, and communications equipment for rescue, water purification, food
distribution, and shelter activities.
Physical Assets
It goes without saying that the rapid deployment of emergency aid items is critical
to meeting the needs of the affected population. But when contingency plans are
lacking or the emergency is entirely unpredicted, it can take days for relief organizations to reposition stocks. Recognizing the need for instant access to relief supplies,
the UN, with support from key donors, has established a permanent renewable
stock of donated disaster relief items at the UN Humanitarian Response Depot in
Brindisi, Italy, which includes tents, blankets, kitchen sets, generators, water purification/distribution equipment, and tools. Together with the World Food Program
(WFP), which administers the depot, OCHA organizes the immediate transport
free of charge of these basic nonfood survival items to disaster-affected areas, subject to the donor agreement and availability.
202

CH15_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p192-207.indd 202

2/13/13 10:09 PM

INITIAL RESPONSE TO EMERGENCIES AND DISASTERS

OCHA also maintains a database of relief sources for use by the broader
humanitarian community. Designed to function as humanitarian yellow pages,
the Central Register includes a list of stockpiles for noncommercial equipment
and supplies, directories for search and rescue teams, national emergency response
offices, a register of available military and civil defense assets, and a roster of disaster management experts. This enables emergency response staff to identify and
approach quickly the potential providers of the required international assistance.
4. Emergency funding mechanisms that ensure money is readily available and easily
dispersed
It goes without saying that an effective response to sudden-onset emergencies and
disasters depends heavily on the availability of funds to support immediate action.
The willingness of donors to fund such response is often high, largely because when
compared to protracted emergencies, the immediate needs of an initial response
are more easily defined, direct life-saving results are more visible, and public pressure to act is at its greatest. But, in its efforts to capitalize on this fact, the international humanitarian community faces two main challenges.
The first is to provide donors accurately and quickly with interagency funding
and needs assessments. In natural disaster situations, this is typically accomplished
by including funding needs, determined jointly by the resident agencies on the
basis of rapid assessments, in its situation reports, which begin being issued within
the first twenty-four hours of a crisis.
In a new complex emergency situation, the mechanisms for immediately communicating needs to donors are less clear. Typically, ad hoc “flash appeals” or
“donor alerts” covering needs for one month may be issued within the first few
weeks of a new crisis. As the crisis evolves, the initial requirements presented in flash
appeals or donor alerts are subsequently incorporated into the more formal CAP.
In support of broader humanitarian objectives, OCHA also provides emergency cash grants of up to $50,000 from its own reserves to meet immediate, specific relief needs, such as the purchase and transport of blanket, tents, and tools;
manages a Trust Fund for Disaster Relief for life-saving activities; and often acts as
a channel for bilateral donor contributions in sudden-onset natural disasters.
5. Well-developed information management networks through which accurate-aspossible data are immediately available to key decision makers
Although vital to coordination throughout an emergency, the role of information
technology and management initial response is increasingly being recognized by a
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wide spectrum of policy and decision makers as being the most vital at the outset
of a crisis, when accurate, timely data are needed to make time-sensitive decisions.
Technological advances, as well as the increased expectations they generate among
ourselves and the public at large, are in part responsible for this dilemma. As television and satellite transmissions increasingly focus public attention on poverty and
suffering through real-time images of the victims of disaster and conflict across
the globe, we face greater pressure to respond not within weeks, but within days or
hours. Indeed, it is not uncommon for journalists to reach the scene of a disaster
and start broadcasting before we do. In short, humanitarian actors must ensure
that accurate information rises quickly to top decision makers.
Although the first task of the R/HC, with support from rapid deployment or
assessment teams, is to survey the situation quickly and define the needs and type of
assistance required, doing so in a both timely and accurate manner can be challenging, especially in the deep field. Information flow in an emergency is often limited
by the lack of national information management capacity, limited access, damaged
communication systems, insecurity, and poor communication among actors, all of
which can lead to isolated decision making on the basis of disparate analysis.
All too often, when a crisis erupts, valuable time is wasted gathering baseline
information about an affected area, which is often already available by the internet.
Even more troubling are the instances in which our greatest challenge is not the lack
of information but rather too much of it from too many, sometimes conflicting
sources—making it difficult to discern the most critical and relevant data from the
not so useful. Just as the uncoordinated arrival of relief supplies can clog a country’s logistics and distributions system, the onslaught of unwanted, inappropriate,
and unpackaged information can impede decision making and rapid response to
an emergency.
These challenges highlight the need for more systematic ways to process and
standardize information, as well as to begin information gathering and sharing on
vulnerable countries well in advance of crises.
At the most basic level, OCHA does this by issuing situation reports on the
overall humanitarian situation in country. These situation reports chronicle information on changes in the humanitarian situation, loss of life, material damage,
national response, agency response, relief needs by sector and region, and the
resultant funding appeals. Before on-site actors are able to develop or adjust their
Common Humanitarian Action Plan and present comprehensive funding needs,
these situation reports serve as vital conduit for communicating to donors the
scope of the needs. They are ideally informed by the individual or joint assessments,
the R/HC typically issues these reports at least daily, and often twice a day, during
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the first few days of a crisis and then weekly or biweekly as the crisis becomes less
acute. The reports are shared with the host government of the affected country, the
UN system on the ground, donor embassies, and with the NGO community.
Time-critical documents such as these used to be distributed by fax, telex, and
cable. Today they are available to these partners and the public through two OCHA
information-sharing platforms, the Integrated Regional Information Network
(IRIN, www.irinnews.org) and ReliefWeb (www.reliefweb.int). The former is a
humanitarian news service that provides unbiased reporting on humanitarian crises through updates, analysis, and alerts on a range of political, economic, and
social issues on forty-six countries in Africa and eight in Central Asia. The latter
provides, via the Web, twenty-four-hour coverage of relief, preparedness, and prevention activities for complex emergencies and natural disasters worldwide and
acts as a gateway to documents and other sources of information related to humanitarian assistance and relief.
As part of its efforts to provide a more integrated response through all phases of
a crisis, OCHA also deploys information specialists to the field as a part of its surge
capacity or rapid response teams. Similarly, information management, as opposed
to technology, is increasingly being recognized as a core function of UNDAC.
At the more sophisticated level, OCHA information managers also support
initial response by working closely with their humanitarian partners to develop
information products and tools, such as geographical and thematic maps, databases and digital reference libraries, and virtual coordination centers that improve
the coordination of humanitarian assistance. In particular, much work remains to
be done in the critical area of identifying cost-effective and simple technologies that
work in the deep field, from which information is often most scarce.
6. Reviews that draw the lessons learned from each response and help them apply them
to the next
When all is said and done, continued improvements in the initial response to crises
depends largely on the extent to which the lessons learned in one situation are both
recorded and then applied in similar contexts. To this end, lesson-learning reviews
can help identify strengths and weaknesses in international response coordination
mechanisms and ensure that lessons identified are integrated into future contingency planning and coordination structures. Given the need for actors to focus
on the work at hand, so-called real-time exercises may be less appropriate in the
context of an initial response but should be undertaken almost routinely at the end
of each emergency activity. These need not be full-fledged and lengthy exercises;
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important to their success is a relatively light design, one that uses a method that
facilitates joint learning and provides instant feedback.
OCHA is fully committed to such systematic reviews of lessons learned for all
its emergency activities and is currently experimenting with different modalities for
such reviews—one of the first being lessons review of the 2002 Goma earthquake.
Clearly the usefulness of these reviews depends very much on the interest and will
of participants—staff and key partners alike—to genuinely reflect on what work
and what did not and to identify workable recommendations for future activities.
Over time OCHA hopes to distill lessons from these country-specific exercises and
review their broad validity for similar activities and complex emergency situations.
Another way to identify lessons are external evaluations undertaken by independent consultants. In 2001, for example, OCHA asked independent evaluators to
analyze its performance in response to the 2000 Gujarat earthquake, address some
broader issues about the efficacy of the UN system’s disaster-response capacity and
to identify lessons for future activities. Similarly, OCHA also commissioned an
independent evaluation of its response to the East Timor crisis in 2000. Both exercises produced sound and transparent basis for reviewing OCHA’s performance.
However, unless such individual activity or country-specific exercises are systematically reviewed for their potential application in similar activities, fully incorporated into institutional memory and applied in policy- and decision making,
their usefulness is limited. Recognizing this challenge, OCHA recently created an
Evaluation Studies Unit within its Policy and Studies Development Branch and is
in the process of putting in place an evaluative framework and strategy, in consultation with its key partners.
The strategy recognizes the evaluation activities provide little added value, if
their recommendations and lessons are not applied in current and future programming, as well as policy and decision making. To that end, OCHA’s strategy aims
also to create and/or improve systems for sharing the results of evaluations and
reviews in a meaningful way, and to establish follow-up mechanisms.

Conclusion
Through this combination of shared experience, the international humanitarian
community has made great strides in its efforts to create a common platform of
response practices and tools. Overall, it is reacting more quickly and in a more
coordinated manner to bring relief to the victims of disasters and emergencies. But
as the war on terrorism and other sources of conflict continue, we are certain to face
ever increasing and perhaps unanticipated challenges in the delivery of humanitar206
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ian assistance. To that end, we must look beyond improvements in how we respond
to crisis. We must learn to be quicker and detect and prepare for crises before they
occur. The earlier we intervene, the more likely we are to have a meaningful impact
on the ground. Similarly, we must more consistently enter all crisis situations with
a clearly defined and viable exit strategy that guides all of our actions, even in the
initial response, toward the ultimate stability and recovery of the affected country.
Greater advocacy efforts before, during, and after an acute crisis can also help
us to better harness public and political attention, especially in the early days of
the crisis when international attention is the highest. The very fluidity of the situations in which we work has focused us to remain flexible, and that has led to many
improvements in our response. In the coming years, we must continue to demonstrate the same level of versatility and ability to learn from our past interventions
so that we may ultimately save more lives.
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The Peacekeeping Prescription
Kofi A. Annan

If I were a doctor examining the health of the world today, I would be greatly
alarmed at the state of my patient. The international community, vibrant in its
resolve to achieve a strong, stable, and healthy political environment as the post–
Cold War era began, has been drained and weakened by one bout after another of
violent conflict during the last decade. In Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Kosovo, and elsewhere, it has had to weather the massive displacement of people,
extensive loss of life, and irreparable damage, which are conflict’s concomitants.
Clearly, this is a pattern that must be broken.
Ideally, each of these bouts of conflict would either have been prevented completely or nipped in the bud. Prevention is—and would have been—by far the best
medicine. But the practice of prevention, in both medicine and politics, is uneven.
Some diseases resist early treatment. Some patients resist treatment until their conditions become critical—or even longer. Because of this, it becomes necessary to
address conflict fully blown, to treat the bout of conflict at or near its height.
Even at this stage, the efforts undertaken, while hopefully curative and sometime palliative, also have a preventive aspect to them. They can prevent the escalation of conflict or the resumption of it. As in the case in which a primary tumor is
discovered, intervention of this kind can prevent metastasis and hopefully bring the
disease into remission. Thus, when we speak here of the “peacekeeping prescription” or the “treatment” it entails, we must always be clear that, while we have one
eye on the crisis of the moment, we have the other on protecting the future and
preventing the threat now posed against it from becoming a reality. Prevention is
a great part of the goal of peacekeeping, and, in many instances, has constituted a
large (and often overlooked) part of its success.
Many of the conflicts of the last ten years have had to be treated using the
peacekeeping prescription, for various reasons. And, as with any other ailment, the
disease has manifested itself differently in each instance, and the treatment has had
to be adapted to those variations. Peacekeeping has proved itself a flexible rem-
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edy. Since the first edition of Preventive Diplomacy, we have deployed new United
Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Guatemala, the Balkans, Sierra Leone,
the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. While these
have been adapted to differing circumstances, the main themes I enumerated in
this volume in 1996 remain valid today. As Secretary-General, I remain committed
to enhancing the Organization’s capacity to understand conflict and to respond in
a meaningful and timely way.
If we are to strengthen the international community, if we are effectively to
confront the conflicts before us and those that await, if we are to prevent their
spread or resumption, we need to understand three things as clearly as possible: the
disease we are addressing, the treatment we are applying, and the changes to both
of them that are occurring. It is to those points that I wish to turn here.

Diagnosis
In the context of peacekeeping, how do we define and diagnose the disease of conflict? What are its symptoms? Technically, peacekeeping is prescribed for conflicts
that constitute a threat to international peace and security. The civil strife in the
former Yugoslavia was identified as constituting this kind of threat, as were the
genocide that ravaged Rwanda and the interclan warfare that engulfed Somalia in
the early 1990s.
A quick cross section of these conflicts alone can highlight two of the most
important characteristics of conflicts for which peacekeeping has been prescribed:
most of them are intrastate wars, and many of them have been identified as ethnic
conflicts.
Peacekeeping through the first forty years of the more than fifty-five-year
history of the United Nations was devoted primarily to the treatment of conflicts between clearly delimited armed forces on either side of a cease-fire line;
missions were deployed to separate antagonists, verify cease-fires, and promote
accord. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the bipolar
system, however, a seminal change occurred. Increasingly, the conflicts for which
peacekeeping was prescribed were internal in nature. More than two-thirds of the
operations deployed since the end of the Cold War—and more than two-thirds
of those currently in the field—have been sent to respond to internal conflicts.
These recent wars, which include the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, SierraLeone, and Kosovo, share other traits. These conflicts have displaced hundreds of
thousands or even millions of people, riven entire societies, devastated economies,
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caused irreparable physical and psychological damage, and risked involving or
have actually involved other countries.
Many of them have also been perceived as showing strong symptoms of ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict as a symptom is, at best, extremely difficult to assess.
Looking at any of the internal conflicts we have mentioned, most of us would be
hard pressed to say exactly where ethnic differences were the cause of conflict and
where they were the result of it. Ethnic differences are not in and of themselves
either symptoms or causes of conflict; in societies where they are accepted and
respected, people of vastly different backgrounds live peacefully and productively
together. Ethnic differences become charged—conflictual—when they are used for
political ends, when ethnic groups are intentionally placed in opposition to each
other. Of the conflicts we have mentioned, it has been said that they are not really
ethnic conflicts, but political conflicts in ethnic clothing. It is a point that we will
have to continue to observe and consider.
The broader range of symptoms, which it has become necessary to address,
have created what are basically new strains of conflict. Although the kinds of conflict to which peacekeeping traditionally responded are still very active—and even
still virulent in certain areas—the kind of conflicts that occupy us principally today
(and that will probably do so well into the future) constitute more of a complex
or syndrome in nature. They display many different but connected symptoms and
usually require multiple medications.

Prescription
In developing and prescribing treatments for these conflicts, the United Nations
has attempted to focus upon and reflect the complexity and individuality of the
cases before it. We have attempted to better identify and understand both the new
strains of conflict appearing and the possible responses to them. We have reconfirmed the necessity of the core elements of the treatment. We have expanded its
range of application. And we have improved our understanding of when it should
be applied, in what dosages, and when it should be withdrawn.
In response to the symptoms and strains just mentioned, mandates prescribed
in the last few years have far exceeded the traditional supervision of truces and
separation of antagonists; they have expanded to include elements as diverse as
monitoring free and fair elections, guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian aid,
overseeing land reform, observing and reporting on human rights abuses or violations, maintaining presence in towns and villages under attack to prevent loss of
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life, establishing safe and secure environments, assisting in the strengthening or
rebuilding of social and political structures, and even acting to save failed States.
We have found, however, that regardless of the symptoms of the conflict,
their variety, or the other elements of our treatment, three core components of the
peacekeeping prescription remain crucial: humanitarian, political, and security.
The common element of all the cases we have confronted is that each of them has
required treatment for the individuals and groups who have suffered the consequences of conflict, for the political structure that has been either shaken or broken,
and for the social environment that has been drained of trust, confidence, and any
semblance of stability.
We have learned painfully that even in the case of an active civil war, a purely
humanitarian response is both dangerous and impractical. The treatment we
attempted in Somalia confronted both the international and national communities with the grim reality that it is sometimes not enough to unload aid and expect
a problem to right itself. When the United Nations entered Somalia, it faced a
situation in which thousands of people were dying daily. As time went on and the
effects of the famine were countered, it became patently clear that the continuing
high death rate was being caused not so much by the absence of food and the presence of natural disaster as by a group of ambitious armed men who prevented food
from reaching the needy.
To allow ourselves the simplistic response of funneling aid into a port, only to
have it sequestered and sold on the black market by the men controlling that port,
would have been less than inadequate—it would actually have worsened the problem. Alain Destexhe, the former Secretary-General of Médecins Sans Frontières,
referred to this kind of prescription as “the humanitarian placebo,” explaining that,
when it is applied, “aid becomes the pretext for political inaction, which leads only
to catastrophe.”
We have learned that the linkage of the humanitarian, political, and security
components, handled well, can ensure a mission’s progress. And we have realized
that, handled poorly, this linkage created only a vicious cycle. Where security is
present, humanitarian aid reaches those who need it, political instability is diminished, and restoration can move forward. Where security is absent, humanitarian
aid is blocked, violence increases, political stability is weakened, and the situation
is exacerbated. All three elements are essential.
Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia have also reinforced the lesson that we must
not only prescribe the right elements, but also prescribe them in the right dosages.
Because of this, there has been movement, both within the United Nations and
outside it, toward peacekeeping with a credible deterrent capacity. The easiest way
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to see the extent of the change in dosage is to compare the United Nations mission
in Bosnia in 1992–95 with two other missions: its NATO-led successor and the UN
operation in neighboring Eastern Slavonia.
For nearly four years, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in
the former Yugoslavia spanned not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Macedonia
and parts of Croatia as well. Its mandate included guaranteeing the delivery of
humanitarian aid, observing cease-fires, aiding the evacuation of displaced persons, remaining present in towns under siege to deter attacks upon them and prevent loss of life, and keeping Sarajevo Airport open throughout what became the
longest humanitarian airlift in history. All this it did with little over thirty thousand
people (of which only roughly twenty thousand were in Bosnia and Herzegovina),
at an annual cost of roughly $1.7 billion.
The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), which was deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina alone, was considered robust in comparison to the UNPROFOR.
Within a narrower area, a far more restricted mandate, and with far more equipment, it deployed sixty thousand troops for a period of one year, after which it
was replaced by the smaller, but still robust, Stabilization Force (SFOR). This was
in addition to the United Nations International Police Task Force, the UN Civil
Affairs and Human Rights teams, UNHCR, the OSCE staff present to support the
election process, and other international actors who took on various tasks within
the mission area. Beyond these, the operation in Macedonia continued to be run
by the United Nations until 1999. IFOR, with fewer tasks, a smaller mission area,
three times the personnel, at three to five times the cost, constituted a stronger,
and no doubt more potent, prescription for peace in the Balkans. Similarly, when
the United Nations deployed a multinational peacekeeping operation in Eastern
Slovenia, it arrived with a strong, well-equipped force that provided credible deterrence against violations. Partly as a result of this, the operation was able to successfully and peacefully provide protection to the transitional administration in
what had been a highly volatile region of the former Yugoslavia. The UN brought
another advantage, as well. By deploying a well-integrated, multidimensional operation under sole UN authority, the Organization was able to implement a comprehensive strategy to address the conflict in its various manifestations, thus laying the
groundwork for a lasting peace.
The concept of a stronger presence, a critical mass, has in fact long been supported by the United Nations. When the six Safe Areas in Bosnia were being mandated, the United Nations asked for 34,000 troops to “provide deterrence through
strength.” The Security Council agreed to allow it only 7,600, and the UN’s Member
States took nearly a year to provide them. There was also concern expressed within
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the Organization regarding Somalia when UNITAF, the U.S.-backed coalition
operation, was replaced by UNOSOM II. UNITAF, a well-armed and well-trained
coalition force of 37,000, was deployed in southern Somalia alone, with a mandate
limited to the establishment of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. When UNOSOM II, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in
Somalia, replaced it, it was deployed throughout the country with a nation-building
mandate that included pursuing disarmament, repatriating refugees, establishing a
national police force, and fostering national reconciliation. But it was given a force
of only 28,000 to achieve it. In other missions at other times, the same kind of problem has occurred.
It is important that we realize at this point (and remember as future crises
arise) that, if we want an intervention to succeed—if we want to counter the symptoms that are present, halt their spread and prevent their recurrence—two things
are necessary. First, its mandate must be practicable. Second, it must be provided
resources adequate to achieve its mandate.
These recent years, when internal conflict has been so prevalent, have brought
us a number of late, expensive, large-scale operations. But they have also broadened
the other end of the spectrum with the first United Nations Preventive Deployment
Operation (UNPREDEP). The UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, though in the same theater of operations with UNPROFOR, and later
IFOR, played a very different role in the treatment of the region. As the Balkan
situation worsened, many worried that it would also spread laterally, involving
or enveloping one country after another. Those working to address the conflict in
1992 had the conflict of 1914 in the back of their minds. For that reason or others,
as the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia grew increasingly
unstable and the Balkan conflict threatened to spread through and beyond it, the
United Nations’ first preventive deployment was mandated. With the strength of
11,225, UNPREDEP monitored activities at the country’s border and worked to
contribute to the maintenance of peace and security within it. By applying the right
elements in the right strength over the right period, the international community
created what might well be a paradigm for future preventive deployment missions
and what was certainly a highly successful element of its treatment in the Balkans.
In 1999, United Nations peacekeeping missions are treating different variants
of the same disease worldwide. A number of them are classical peacekeeping missions, whose mandates consist primarily of observing cease-fires and separating
antagonists. The others are, as Cambodia was, more complex and multidimensional in nature, treating the abuse of human rights through the deployment of
observers to monitor the human rights situation; treating the presence of mines
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with the implementation of demining programs; treating the need to return both
military and guerillas productively to the civilian sector with demilitarization and
demobilization programs; treating the absence of broadly representative, legitimate government with the administration and supervision of fair and free elections; treating the absence of effective administration by building the capacity of
newly legitimated authorities and addressing a wide range of other symptoms. In
each case, as in the missions just examined, the questions of the proper diagnosis
and prescription, correct medication and dosages are essential. So, for all of them,
are two other parameters: When should the treatment begin? For how long should
it run?
The beginning point of treatment is, perhaps, the most difficult decision of all.
We have learned that peace can be neither coerced nor enforced. There must be a
genuine desire for peace among the warring parties. No system can achieve peace
when leaders use negotiation not to end conflict but merely to prolong it to advantage. And no agreement, however well intentioned, can guarantee peace if those
who sign it see greater benefit in war. The patient must embrace the treatment fully
and willingly.
Yet, can we always wait for a conflict to ebb and the will for peace to emerge
before we intervene? Recent experience has shown us that, if anything, urgent
intervention is sometimes necessary at the very height of conflict, even if only to
keep the disease and its symptoms from raging completely out of control. It is
preferable—and more prudent—to intervene at a moment of relative stability, but
situations like Rwanda, and more recently East Timor, have made us realize that
emergency measures might first be required simply to stabilize the patient enough
so that treatment can be administered. Measures of this kind are not likely to lead to
recuperation on their own, but they can help the patient to survive until the tumor
of conflict is ripe for removal. And, as we have seen in Rwanda, they are far preferable to the devastation that is their alternative. Along with preventive deployment,
it is this kind of intervention that constitutes the preventive element of peacekeeping. It is preventive not in the prophylactic sense, but rather in the sense that, given
a conflict in progress, it can help avoid the worst.
Intervention of this kind, however, is risky, costly, and not always effective.
Where the will to pursue treatment and cure cannot be mustered, where the patient
has not responded—as in Somalia and more recently in Angola—there is, beyond
a point, no real alternative to curtailing the treatment and hoping that the body
proves capable of treating itself. These are the cases that are most frustrating for
us, the cases where we realize that what we have is an imperfect instrument at
best, even if the only ones available. They highlight the fact that our approach to
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violent conflict is very similar to our approach to cancer or AIDS: an incomplete
understanding of the nature of the disease means that our response to it will have
to follow the law of successive approximations, requiring us to learn from failure
as well as success.
But even where a treatment is effective, should it be limited in time? Long-term
therapy is never popular with those who have to pay for it. It is often difficult to see
progress, and it is nearly always impossible to prove the benefit achieved by avoiding further deterioration. In this context, the call for quick cures and sunset clauses
has become nearly clamorous. This is dangerous for a number of reasons. First of
all, in situations like Cyprus, where the United Nations has had an operation for
over thirty years, political accord has proven frustratingly elusive, but armed conflict has been halted. The dynamics of the situation are such that there is little doubt
that conflict could quickly rekindle were the mission withdrawn. With roughly $44
million a year, we are able to keep the Cyprus conflict in check. Is it worth risking
having to spend far more in the wake of new devastation and bloodshed to avoid
that preventive investment?
Second, the larger missions, the international coalitions, partly because of their
large size and cost, usually deployed with very firm and tight deadlines. In each case,
however, they went into situations where the problems that plagued the patient
were deeply embedded and where more than a symptomatic treatment most probably required more time than they allowed. In this context, the great hazard of an
arbitrary deadline is that it can actually subvert the process of reconciliation and
recovery rather than move it forward. We need to understand and acknowledge
that for a treatment to be effective it must run until it has achieved what it can and
needs to do, not just until the insurance coverage runs out.
We have applied this lesson in Kosovo, where no arbitrary time limit has been
imposed on the international presence. Furthermore, in 1999, the UN mission in
Sierra Leone has been expanded due to the increasing demands of the situation.
And a mission has been sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo, following
movement in the peace process there. These cases reveal a determination not to be
swayed by pressure for quick and conclusive results. Long-running, deeply rooted
conflicts cannot be resolved overnight.
The efforts we have made have improved our sense of what we are dealing with
and how we must handle it. They have allowed us to respond to the complexities of
the crises that have faced us and to broaden the range of our response to them. They
have refined our sense of what dosages should be applied when and for how long.
And they have reminded us that peacekeeping as a therapy is valuable (sometimes
vital) in both its curative and preventive capacities.

215

CH16_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p208-221.indd 215

2/13/13 10:14 PM

KOFI A. ANNAN

Prognosis
Stepping back from all of this, however, we realize that the outcome of our efforts
will and must depend upon other things as well. An effective response to conflict,
as to cancer, must nourish the body as best it can, giving particular attention to
organs within it that are vulnerable. We must ensure that the circulatory system
allows nourishment to move throughout every limb; we must prevent and treat
blockages and dysfunctions. We must use the presence of peacekeepers like a form
of chemotherapy, to contain the spread of the tumor and, hopefully, to reduce it
to an operable size. We must do what we can to bring about a remission and move
toward a cure. Above all, we must be patient and persistent. We must not allow
hope to be lost, and we must not lose it ourselves.
Hope, the desire of the people on the ground to cure the conflict that afflicts
them, it the single most essential factor in determining its probable outcome. This
becomes eminently clear to us when we reflect upon the definition of an epidemic:
an agent that acts literally “against the people.” The participation of the people is
necessary to mount and sustain conflict. They, ultimately, bear in greatest part its
consequences. Without their support it is impossible to bring it to a halt.
A number of other factors, however, are also crucial in developing prognosis. Generally, they fall into two categories: those relating to the patient’s general
health and will to live and those relating to the level of care received. Strength and
hope alone are not enough. Perseverance and dedication to the course of treatment
prescribed are vital. Like the diabetic who takes an intentionally liberal interpretation of his dietary restrictions, the government whose commitments to peace are
honored more in the breach than in the making, and the group that uses a peace
process not so much to end conflict as to prolong it to its own advantage, undermine their own future and perhaps foretell their own doom. The will to sustain life
or peace needs to be accompanied by the commitment to do what is necessary to
sustain it.
But what of the factors that are not within direct control of the patient? When
we consider the level of care received, a number of important criteria come quickly
to mind. The most immediate is the rapidity of response. A clear diagnosis and
practical prescription are also essential. The presence of a treatment team that
is unified in its approach, consulting and working closely, is also vital. Adequate
resources, technology, training, and equipment are indispensable.
Rapid response is vital, particularly from a preventive perspective, because in
cases like Rwanda, the conflict’s worst effects are often felt at the earliest stages. A
rapid response is thus essential if we are effectively to limit the range, extent and
momentum of a conflict. Of the million lives lost in the Rwandan genocide, the vast
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majority occurred in the first three months of the conflict between the deaths of the
Presidents in an air crash on April 6, 1994, and the installation of the new government on the following July 19. We must be clear, however, that a rapid response
means more than simply examining or diagnosing the problem early. It means
establishing an adequate presence on the ground as quickly as possible. In the case
of Rwanda, Member States of the United Nations passed a resolution in the Security
Council five weeks after the crash, authorizing a mission of 5,500 to treat the conflict. Four months later, only 550—ten percent of that number—had been contributed and deployed. The mission did not reach its full strength until October, nearly
half a year after the crash and months after the bulk of the killing had occurred.
Rwanda is clear proof that, as a number of people have said, “we shouldn’t wait
until we hear a fire alarm to begin putting a fire department together.”
Closely tied to this point is the need for adequate resources, personnel, equipment, and training. In the context of public health and medicine, where the fragility
of the organism with which we are dealing is understood, the importance of proper
training and equipment should need no emphasis. What could 550 peacekeepers
do at the height of the Rwandan genocide, when they were surrounded by armed
factions that totaled over fifty thousand? What good can a contingent do when
deployed to the Balkans in winter if its government sends it without winter clothes
and other supplies, untrained and unprepared? To mount and sustain an effective
operation, appropriate resources are required.
Even where we have the will and resources to react rapidly, however, we do
not yet have enough. For treatment to be effective in and beyond its initial stages,
a clear understanding and unified approach among all involved in the treatment is
vital. This means that the mandates passed by the Security Council must be clear,
pointed and practicable; that member governments and troop contributors must
be willing to provide and sustain the support necessary to implement them; that
ongoing consultations between the obstacles and difficulties that arise as the mission pursues its tasks; that unified command must be observed and respected both
within the mission and by all who support it from the outside; and that agencies and
organizations cooperate maximally. This is no small task, but we are making substantial and encouraging progress toward it. My reform program has placed great
emphasis both on clean lines of authority as well as effective mechanisms to ensure
that all parts of the UN system that can contribute to the success of a mission can
work together in a single, integrated effort.
But if the international community is truly to become more effective, whatever steps we take within the Secretariat must be complemented by corresponding
action from Member States. The unfortunate reality up to now has been that the
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will to act differs greatly from case to case. It is important for the Security Council
to respond with consistency and for governments to follow up to those decisions by
making troops available, when necessary, to help implement them.
Clear and achievable mandates are also vital if we are to respond adequately to
the needs of a situation, present a credible and effective response, and maximize
the safety and productivity of those who have gone to serve. Initial international
intervention in the former Yugoslavia was hampered by both vague and limited
mandates. The Security Council must, thus, identify the right medications and the
right dosages. And the “right dosages,” in this context, need to be determined not
only in the light of the needs on the ground, but also in the light of support that
will be available (or be made available) from member governments. The strength
and structure of a peacekeeping operation must permit it to do two things: carry
out its mandate and defend itself. Determining the right dosage is the first step
toward achieving this; ensuring that governments promptly provide adequately
trained and equipped troops is the second. Our ability to respond more rapidly,
preventively, and effectively depends very much on this.
Further actions will need to be taken if we are to intervene more effectively in
either a preventive or curative capacity. We must have adequate information sharing. Many countries possess information facilities far beyond anything available to
the United Nations. Enhanced information sharing by those governments could
be of significant use in addressing the conflicts that face us. It would have a direct
impact upon our capacity to analyze situations and the ways in which they are likely
to develop, another factor that is crucial to a rapid and effective response.
Beyond the Secretariat, beyond its Member States, however, there lays one
other step to be taken. As we approach each crisis, we must ensure that the public
at large has the firmest possible understanding of what lays before us. Strong, sustained support on their part is absolutely vital. For this reason and others, we must
above all work to mobilize and optimize understanding. The health profession realized long ago that there were a number of benefits in pursuing this goal: it helps
those who are ill better understand what they are dealing with; it helps those who
are concerned better understand how they can best contribute; and it helps each of
us understand how we can best stave off the disease or recognize it early. The heart
disease and breast cancer campaigns are admirable models of this.
We are slowly learning the same lessons in the area of conflict, but there are a
number of obstacles impeding our progress. The first of these is that the general
public has come to misunderstand to a great degree what peacekeeping missions
were meant to do and can do. Second, too few of us are aware of the positive side
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of the peacekeeping prescription—what it can achieve and has achieved. To take
a few examples, what have most of us read of Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique,
or El Salvador? And how many realized, when the UN was under fire from public
opinion for failing to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia, that our troops
had not the mandate, much less the means, to do so? At the same time, the successful facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian aid received precious little coverage.
Last, it is true that today we hear, see and read far more of conflicts in various
parts of the globe than we did during the Cold War. Full-blown crises are news,
nascent conflicts are not. In an age when international intervention is decided by
governments, and governments are propelled by public opinion, this means that
effective and preventive rapid reaction is remarkably difficult. Neither do ongoing
concern the media unless there is a reason for renewed interest. In many countries,
the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were followed by revived media coverage of
the Kashmir dispute. Apparently of no direct concern to other parts of the world,
the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia floats in and out of the media.
When global attention reaches a conflict at its height, a number of problems
can occur. Acting at this point is the costliest and most dangerous way to intervene. It is also the least likely to succeed. Without any doubt, media coverage has
generated in recent years a degree of attention and response that the conflicts
examined here would otherwise never have known. But it also has shown that the
public needs to be aware earlier of what is happening and could happen in a conflict area. Technology has made it possible for governments (and often the media)
to know about many conflicts very early on, yet this information often takes far
too long to reach the public at large. The problem is one of focus, priorities, and,
once again, political will. If our efforts are indeed to become more preventive, if
they are to limit more tightly the incidence and escalation of violent conflict, that
focus must shift.
The steps that we have taken and the problems that we have identified show
us that, while we have made substantial progress in developing and applying the
peacekeeping prescription, our understanding of both conflict and its cure are
far from complete. As with AIDS and cancer, each step brings us closer, but the
disease itself changes even as we work, making a cure even more evasive. This,
however, must not daunt us. We realize today that peacekeeping is not a wonder
drug, that it is not applicable to every situation and not guaranteed to cure every
case. But, as we struggle to understand better the disease of conflict, the most
intractable that humanity has known, we cannot help but be encouraged by the
inroads we are making.
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Conclusion
Having looked at the developments of both the disease of violent conflict and the
peacekeeping prescription, having examined the prognosis of both the patient and
the treatment, we have given a clearer context and direction to our efforts. In closing, I would like to broaden it.
As I reflected on the idea of the peacekeeping prescription, on the concept
of peace as an integral and essential component of international public health,
I recalled a speech in a similar vein given more than sixty years ago by former
U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. In October 1937, as the first shadows of World
War II gathered, President Roosevelt delivered what has since become known as
the “Quarantine the Aggressors” speech, in which he warned that the “epidemic of
world lawlessness is spreading.” Taking the public-health perspective that we have
adopted here, he asserted that:
War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states
and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to
keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of
war and the dangers of involvement. . . . We cannot have complete protection in
a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down. If civilization is to survive . . . the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations
must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their
agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a cause. There must
be positive endeavors to preserve peace.
These words remain both sobering and encouraging. They are sobering because
they reemphasize the depth and breadth and length of the challenge before us; they
remind us that violent conflict is as old as humankind itself. They are encouraging
because they show us very clearly and tangibly the recent progress that we have
made in addressing it.
Roosevelt’s necessity of quarantining the aggressors is no longer the only
option. Even in instances where conflict is advanced, the peacekeeping prescription does not simply quarantine the victim and leave him to his fate. The new tools
and approaches that we have developed have allowed us to remedy cases where
the patient would otherwise have been lost. As in medicine, we have developed
techniques for detecting problems earlier. Through research and experience, we
have honed our understanding and our methods. New tools and technologies have
made it possible for intervention to be more targeted, separating, identifying, and
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correcting in treating specific symptoms and improving the prognosis. We have, as
Roosevelt urged us, undertaken “positive endeavors to preserve peace.”
In doing so we have achieved a great deal. In places like Namibia, Mozambique,
El Salvador, and the Aouzou Strip, cures have been achieved. In other areas we
have been able to bring the conflict into remission. In yet others we have halted its
growth. Some areas—like Somalia—have proven resistant to treatment, and the
international presence has had to be withdrawn, with the hope that the body’s own
defenses would help stabilize it. But these are the exception, not the rule. What will
develop in Iraq and Kosovo remains to be seen. In Africa we continue to respond
to ever more complicated and distressing situations.
I admitted earlier that, if I were a doctor examining the health of the world
today, I would be greatly alarmed at the state of my patient. And indeed I would.
But what I did not tell you is that I would not be pessimistic about his prognosis.
My work, and particularly those aspects of it which we have had a chance to discuss
here, has given me a keen sense of what we can achieve together—and what we
should do. I believe that we have made great progress in this treatment. I believe
that we will continue to do so. And I believe that the challenges ahead will demand
nothing less of us.
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Reviving Global Civil Society After September 11
Richard Falk

9/11 challenged the American way of life in a manner that is unprecedented, and it is
evolving with a significance of which we are only beginning to grasp. To uphold the
blessings of democracy, we must start with the understanding that as members of
a constitutional republic, we are citizens and not subjects. Subjects discharge their
political responsibilities to society by unconditionally obeying the government.
Citizens face a more complex challenge. Their need, especially in periods of crisis,
is to strike a balance between loyalty and patriotism on one side and conscience
and independent judgment on the other. A passive citizenry forfeits the virtues of
democracy as well as betrays a lack of confidence in public debate on controversial
issues. Without the benefits of vigorous debate and a genuine political opposition, alternatives to war and militarism tend to be bypassed. The more extreme
voices counseling political leaders gain influence, a climate of chauvinistic nationalism is likely to dominate public discussion. This pattern of behavior represents
both a general observation and is intended as a critical commentary on the drift of
American domestic and foreign policy since 9/11.1
This assertion of citizen responsibilities might have seemed too obvious in this
country to comment upon only a few years ago. It has suddenly become a matter of
some urgency in the aftermath of the mega-terrorist attacks in 2001. Because these
attacks caused such great symbolic and substantive harm, and because the adversary was a concealed terrorist network operating by stealth in sixty or more countries in such a manner as to be everywhere and nowhere, there was a tendency on
the part of the citizenry to close ranks behind our political leaders, relying on their
capacity to fashion an effective response that would restore our sense of security.
This call for unity by the government was a natural response to such an unprecedented challenge, but it has had several serious unfortunate side effects, including
the disruption of some very positive global developments of a humanitarian character that had been moving forward in the decade after the end of the Cold War.

222

CH17_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p222-234.indd 222

2/13/13 10:34 PM

REVIVING GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

These developments owed a great deal to the activism of citizens from democratic
societies around the world, as well as to their organizations, which often took the
shape of voluntary transnational associations.2
What makes the present context particularly disturbing is a rediscovery of the
fragility of societal reality. Despite American power and wealth, the country has
become vulnerable to hostile extremism as a reaction to a presence and policies
around the world that are generating intense resentment. Despite the achievements of modernity, existing forms of democratic governance are unable to control either the passions that animate politics or the technologies that are relied
upon to establish security. There may be a tragic predicament that is embedded
in these realizations. Security for the citizenry is likely to remain elusive despite
impressive technological innovations and the greatly intensified efforts of regulatory institutions.3 We confront a serious possibility that the pursuit of security
in our daily lives may prove to be both ineffectual and repressive at the same
time, thereby imperiling the quality of democracy without providing protection
against these new forms of extremism directed against our nation and people.
What is more, which is the relevant point of this essay, the pressures exerted by
the challenges of mega-terrorism have diverted energies and resources away from
some exceptionally promising developments in the humanitarian sector that were
occurring in the 1990s. These developments were exciting in several distinct ways,
raising hopes for significant improvement in the human condition, as well as representing encouraging steps from the perspective of global justice. Such initiatives exhibited both the growth of transnational social forces emerging out of civil
society, often acting internationally as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and an unusual spirit of collaboration between governments and NGOs that was
giving rise to a distinct type of diplomacy that could be described as “a new internationalism” motivated by ethical concerns, entirely different from the preoccupations with power and wealth that formed the subject matter of geopolitics as
practiced by leading states.
It seems reasonable to maintain that prior to September 11 there was a multifaceted upsurge of humanitarian initiatives that had already within the space of
a decade established a rather remarkable record of achievement, with prospects
for continuing progress. I have previously described this set of developments as
the first global normative revolution in human history, that is, a definite trend in
international relations emphasizing the relevance of ethical values and issues of
justice that were posing a challenge to the dominant realist paradigm that reduced
international relations to calculations of power.4
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A Global Normative Revolution in the 1990s
The centerpiece of the emergent normative revolution was the genuine rise of
human rights from the outer margins of diplomacy and international concern to a
position that seemed close to the center of foreign policy, bearing directly on issues
of whether or not to seek economic gains in relation with countries whose governments were responsible for repressing their own populations. Some prominent
observers of the global scene insisted that human rights had become the secular
religion of our era.5 Such a sweeping generalization undoubtedly reflected wishful thinking, but it was also a historic comment on some extraordinary reversals
of expectations that had occurred in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet system
of internal and regional domination was facilitated by strong grassroots resistance
that had long been demanding the implementation of human rights. The amazing
surprise transformation that took place in South Africa without bloodshed early
in the same decade was definitely hastened by the anti-apartheid movement that
was inspired by the global consensus condemning the institutionalized racism of
Pretoria as a crime against humanity. Such positive outcomes owed a great deal to
pressures exerted by people acting on their own on behalf of human right goals,
organized at the level of civil society, and mounting moral outrage that persuaded
governments to override material and strategic interests by joining in the struggles
to achieve change.
These encouraging initiatives reflected the interplay of many different influences, but in this chapter the focus will be on the distinctive contributions made by
the NGO world, and civil society generally. This contribution is particularly evident
in relation to the expanding role of human rights in world politics. The domain of
human rights as a subject for NGO activism goes back to the period immediately
after World War II.6 It is doubtful that sovereign states in the late 1940s would
have assented to an international framework imposing duties to respect human
rights if their leaders had thought such standards were meant in any but an aspirational spirit. What made the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR,
1948) a feasible political project was the expectation that the rights set forth would
remain internationally unenforceable. This expectation was formalized by calling
the document a “declaration” thereby signaling that it lacked the legal stature of
a treaty, and hence was not obligatory. It was also evident after World War II that
very few countries were governed in accordance with the UDHR, and that their
governments would never have lent their approval to an international instrument
that gave the UN or other states a legal basis to push for implementation.
Human rights NGOs in the years following 1948 realized that a great opportunity existed to use this aspirational document to promote some desired modi224
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fications of behavior by repressive states, and at least to depict persuasively severe
human rights abuses. Amnesty International took advantage of their realization
that governments increasingly care about their reputation, and that allegations of
human rights abuses are black marks when backed up by genuine information
and given wide distribution by the world media. Such allegations could not be dismissed as the propaganda of ideological adversaries as was the case in the exchange
of Cold War charges and countercharges being made by officials in Washington
and Moscow. NGOs put human rights on the world policy map long before the
1990s, and paved the way for many governments to adjust their regulatory policies.7
To begin with, the UDHA was converted in the mid-1960s into a pair of treaties
called “covenants” that were widely ratified by states around the world. It became
a matter of political legitimacy for states to commit themselves formally and existentially to the overall goal of conforming their political practices to human rights
standards. This evolution, although welcome, was less attributable to changes of
heart on the part of governments and more to a combination of sustained pressure
by human rights organizations and some parts of the media over the years and
a closely related trend toward the democratization of political life. Thus, despite
its modest beginnings, human rights NGOs and international institutions increasingly viewed the UDHR as a framework of rights to be seriously implemented,
which included the push for treaty-making procedures and for the further elaboration of specific rights that deserved wider recognition (for instance, prohibition of
racial discrimination, protection of women and children, prohibition of torture).8
This NGO role was then reinforced by historical circumstances that led to
opposition groups in authoritarian societies to rely on international human rights
standards to back up their demands for political reform. This process of opposition
was most dramatic in the settings of Eastern Europe and South Africa where the
wider struggle for fundamental change showed that human rights would no longer
be reduced to a set of pieties but were now a serious dimension of political conflict.
The same dynamic was to a degree also visible in the Asian pro-democracy movements of the 1980s, which did not achieve success in all instances, but exhibited the
degree to which people everywhere were inspired by growing feelings of entitlement to fundamental human rights.9
What happened in the 1990s that was so encouraging was that human rights
seemed to become an active ingredient of international public policy, generally
exhibiting a sincere concern of the general public about the suffering endured
by vulnerable populations, groups, and individuals victimized by governmental
wrongdoing.10 This upgrading of human rights was also institutionally expressed
within the United Nations, principally by establishing a High Commissioner for
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Human Rights, which in turn led to more prominence being accorded the work of
the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Commission.
The second development in the previous decade that formed part of the normative revolution getting underway, even though it remained controversial in
some settings, was the willingness of the organized international community, or
portions of it, to undertake humanitarian intervention designed to rescue or protect vulnerable populations or minorities from oppressive practices of their government.11 The idea behind humanitarian intervention is the claim by an external
political factor that it refuses to respect the supremacy of territorial sovereignty in
the face of extreme abuse of human rights. The occasion giving rise to humanitarian intervention in the 1990s was the accusation of ethnic cleaning of a disfavored
ethnic or religious component of the territorial population with the goal of expulsion, an abusive policy that was also often coupled with genocidal practices involving massive rape and massacres. Humanitarian intervention generated the sort of
debate that was also in the background of discussion about the implementation of
human rights generally.12 There were several issues: Should the obligation to uphold
human rights be implemented by force? Were the motives underlying humanitarian intervention truly humanitarian or were those claims masking geopolitical
goals? Must the UN Security Council always authorize humanitarian intervention?
Did the results of such interventions bring benefits to the vulnerable peoples?
To be sure, there were disappointments and ambiguities associated with purported humanitarian interventions. The Kosovo intervention seemed almost a
reward for the violence of the KLA; NATO relied on tactics that caused extensive death among Serbian civilians, while acting to minimize its own; it proceeded
without formal mandate from the United Nations; and during its aftermath, insufficient effort was made by occupying forces to protect the Serbian minority against
“reverse ethnic cleansing.” At the same time, the intervention provided the only
available means to ensure that the great majority of the Kosovars would be rescued
from a repetition of the ethnic cleansing that had earlier caused so much death and
destruction in Bosnia.
Of potentially even greater significance for the future of world order, a consensus seemed to be slowly taking shape among leading states insisting that sovereignty
was no longer an absolute grant of authority, and that the moral, political, and legal
prerogatives of rulership were conditioned upon adhering to the most basic human
rights standards. If a government henceforth severely abused its people, or a portion thereof, respect for its sovereign rights would be diminished, if not ignored,
by the international community. Human rights NGOs cannot take the major credit
for instances of humanitarian intervention, but it has often been their presence on
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the ground in the society experiencing, and their credibility validating, oppressive
circumstances that leads to media emphasis, which in turn tips the balance toward
intervention within governmental circles and at the United Nations.
It is important to recall the 1994 massacre of upwards of 800,000 in Rwanda
when the UN refused to respond to urgent calls for humanitarian protection, and in
Bosnia during the first half of the 1990s when an overly passive engagement by the
UN seemed partly responsible for a particularly brutal enactment of ethnic cleansing, culminating in the 1995 massacre of about 7,000 Muslim males at Srebrenica.13
This subject matter of humanitarian intervention remained problematic whether
the decision is to take positive action or to refrain from doing so. There is no doubt
that powerful states use the cover of humanitarian intervention to advance strategic
goals, and refuse to allow such responses in comparable situations if their interests
so dictated. It is reasonable for smaller states and for ex-colonial states, and the
non-Western world generally, to be deeply suspicious of humanitarian intervention as it invariably has involved the Euro-American complex of states imposing
its political will with mixed motives on one or another non-Western state. Such
suspicions are deepened if, as in Kosovo, the UN is bypassed to avoid a veto of a
resolution in the Security Council authorizing force, and if supporters argue that in
the future, not even the imprimatur of a regional grouping such as NATO is necessary, but that it is sufficient to enlist “coalitions of the willing.”
The third dimension of this focus on the ethical side of international relations
that assumed significance in the 1990s were various efforts to obtain redress in various forms for historic grievances.14 This surge of concern disclosed an increased
willingness to treat the crimes of the past as unresolved: the activism of Holocaust
survivors; of comfort women in the Japanese setting; of a variety of slave labor initiatives seeking compensation after the Cold War ended; of claims for reparations
associated with the institutions of slavery and colonialism; of an array of commissions devoted to “truth and reconciliation”; and of grievances advanced by indigenous people who had been dispossessed from their historic lands and endured
humiliations and deprivations.15 This sense of the obligations of present society
for past abuses of state power, most of which were treated as legal and valid at the
time of their occurrence, represented an extraordinary recognition that these historic wounds continued to cause suffering to victims and their descendants, and
would never be healed without some active curative response. Many of these grievances had persisted without serious notice for decades, if not centuries. Why had
these past injustices abruptly generated formal responses and increased activism
in the 1990s when they had been ignored for so long? There is no simple response,
no single explanation. Certainly, the end of the Cold War removed obstacles that
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had shielded some governments from accountability. Also relevant were the trends
toward upholding human rights and democratization. But perhaps most important
was the spreading awareness of civic empowerment. Holocaust survivors and their
descendants led the way, but also led others with grievances to push for acknowledgement, compensation, apology, and other types of redress.
In this climate of opinion, the credibility of claimants was greatly enhanced. To
be sure, there was also practical and principled resistance. Those accused tended
to be defensive, contending that there was no current responsibility for what had
been done previously in an atmosphere where values and legalities were different.
There was no consistent response from issue to issue, and from country to country.
There were some impressive symbolic and substantive steps taken toward reconciliation, and in the direction of reversing past injustice. Swiss banks were induced
to return deposits and settle many claims of Holocaust victims valued in the billions. Corporations using slave labor in Germany offered compensation. Apologies
were expressed by leaders such as President Bill Clinton for the institution of slavery, and by the British queen for the imposition of colonial rule. The Canadian
and Australian governments established education and compensation funds that
were dedicated to preserving what traditional remnants of indigenous civilizations
remained, and to provide symbolic recompense for past wrongs.
These evidences that the international community and civil society were coming to some sort of acknowledgement of these historic injustices was again, I think,
an important element in this unexpected normative revolution that was beginning
to take shape in the 1990s. Its essential character was to exhibit the interaction
of governments and civil society with respect to a series of issues bearing on the
responsibility of the state. The state, as well as other international actors, was being
humanized by this process by which injustices, even if in the distant past, were
being heeded, and to some extent addressed. Such a process reflected the capacity
of NGOs to help generate an ethical climate of accountability that exerted influence
on all global actors, including the United Nations.
There was a still further fourth major element of this normative revolution that
again exhibited the growing strength of civil society to reshape the role of the state
and its institutions with regard to issues of global justice. This element concerned
dramatic efforts to make leaders individually accountable for crimes of state committed against their own peoples.16 The Pinochet litigation, arising out of action
taken in Spanish courts leading to an extradition request directed at the British
government, came about as a result of tireless efforts by those individuals and their
relatives who had been victimized in Chile during the period of dictatorship not
giving up on the pursuit of justice when living in exile in Spain. The dramatic fact
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of Pinochet’s 1998 detention in Britain and the series of legal challenges associated
with the detention produced some notable achievement. The practice of torture
was confirmed by the House of Lords, the highest British judicial tribunal, as an
international crime that can be apprehended and punished anywhere in the world,
not just in the country where it occurred.17
Also significant was the renewal of the Nuremberg idea that even leaders of
sovereign states are not exempt from individual criminal accountability for their
official deeds, that the shield of sovereign immunity is not available. What happened unexpectedly in the 1990s after a lapse of more than forty-five years—first in
relation to the Balkans and Rwanda—was the revival of the radical idea applied to
defeated countries after World War II that political and military leaders of sovereign states are not above the law. Of course, the pursuit of Pinochet, which in the
end failed because he was found medically unfit to stand trial and returned to Chile,
suggested the analogous criminality of a host of other leaders still at large around
the world. Some of those accused were linked to powerful states. The most widely
discussed instances were Henry Kissinger, especially for his role in the wrongdoing of the Pinochet government, and Ariel Sharon for his alleged responsibility for
the massacres that took place in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila
back in 1982. Questions were raised as to whether the world is ready for such criminal accountability, which, given the realities, would lead to very uneven and selective enforcement of such standards of accountability.
The moves to detain and prosecute Pinochet stimulated civil society by suggesting that the rule of law might reach those responsible for the worse excesses of
governmental and military authority. The Pinochet controversy, together with the
experience of the ad hoc tribunal in The Hague dealing with crimes attributed to
individuals associated with managing the breakup of former Yugoslavia, led civil
society activists to embark upon an ambitious project to institutionalize the process
in some enduring way through the establishment of a permanent international
criminal court entrusted with the prosecution of the most serious international
crimes. What ensued was an effective collaboration between a transnational coalition of NGOs and a series of moderate governments that generated a political process that led in 1998 to the Treaty of Rome and then to the establishment of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. Such a major institutional innovation
was brought into being with surprising speed, securing more than the required
sixty ratifications in a period of a few years.
This experiment in institutionalization is still in its infancy. It is opposed vigorously at present by the United States, and ignored by several other powerful countries, including China and Russia. If it could come later to obtain universal partici-
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pation (as is the case with the UN), it would likely be viewed as the greatest institutional innovation since the United Nations itself. Its significance, symbolically
and substantively, is that it expresses a determination to extend accountability and
the rule of law to those who represent the state at the highest level. The creation of
procedures by which to impose such accountability is a step forward in the efforts
to overcome the impunity, at least on the international level, previously enjoyed
by those who control sovereign states. Also, even compared to Nuremberg, the
ICC is ambitious. The earlier criminal prosecutions of leaders were linked to a war,
and embodied “victors’ justice,” the winners judging the loser.18 Here, any leader
at any point is, theoretically at least, subject to indictment, whether of a powerful
or a weak country. The establishment of the ICC in an interdependent globalizing
world could yet become an extraordinary step forward in the struggle to create
global democracy as a complement to national democracy, yet to reach this goal
there are major obstacles that must be overcome.
The fifth component of the normative revolution involves the rise of the global
civil society, which has become a source of lawmaking and global policy formation. Literally thousands of NGOs are now associated with the representation of
transnational social forces in a variety of regional and global arenas. Their presence
was a robust and influential feature in the first half of the 1990s of such UN conferences as those on population, environment, human rights and women’s rights
that advanced a people-oriented agenda on these matters of global concern. This
agenda clashed with the priorities of leading governments and global corporations
and banks.19 Increasingly, the focus of efforts emanating from global civil society
was placed upon the supposed excesses of neoliberal globalization. The emphasis
on globalization led to demonstrations around the world that gained major attention from the media, particularly in the aftermath of “the battle of Seattle” in late
1999. The demonstrators and their discussion forums highlighted the antidemocratic operations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO), as well as the lending practices of the World Bank.
This antiglobalization movement, although diverse and inchoate, is properly
considered as part of the normative revolution that is being described. Its main
thrust was to resist some of the capital-driven impacts of globalization that seemed
to be producing increasing inequality within and among states, as well as leaving
some states that lacked investment trade opportunities out in the cold. This global
civil society movement was not opposed to globalization as such. It was insisting
on reforms that would lead to what might be described as “humane globalization.”
These criticisms were increasingly engendering a response from some of those most
closely associated with the world economy in its recent globalizing phase. George
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Soros and Joseph Stiglitz echoed many of the complaints that were being shouted
by the demonstrators about the way the global economy policy was proceeding.20
As a result, the language associated with globalization began to exhibit more concern with such issues as the reduction of world poverty, the promotion of greater
economic equality, the protection of human rights, particularly labor rights, and
matters of environmental protection.

The 9/11 Attacks: Detour or Derailment?
Against this background of positive initiatives, I want to raise the question as to
whether the 9/11 attacks have resulted in a permanent detour from this normative
revolution, or merely caused its temporary derailment. There is little doubt that
the energies and attention given to the initiatives discussed above have been abandoned, especially in the United States, and replaced by a renewed foreign policy
preoccupation with security and the dynamics of the war against global terror.
In light of this shift, how should we interpret the overall impact of 9/11? Instead
of seeking to build the structures of global governance, and strengthen further a
global rule of law as a means of exerting constraints on sovereign states, the new
emphasis is on claiming the authority to engage in whatever actions contribute to
antiterrorist goals. This kind of claim to carry on violent conflict has two particularly disturbing aspects.
The first concern is that there has resulted the first borderless war in history.
Both principal adversaries disavow respect for the territorial sovereignty of states.
The Al Qaeda network declared a violent jihad against America, its cadres seem
determined to launch attacks wherever such targets can be found, that is, anywhere
in the world. The United States, in turn, claims the right to attack anywhere that
it can locate an al Qaeda threat. This pattern of conflict is quite subversive from
the perspective of international law, which evolved to deal with conflicts among
territorial sovereigns. Of course, international law never enjoyed great success in
relation to wartime situations, but it did have some role in moderating the scope
of conflict by confining the zone of violent operations to the territorial domains of
combatants.
The United States is militarily the most powerful country in human history.
Since 9/11 its leadership portrays itself as the vehicle of good against this evil of antistate terrorism. To destroy this evil, it is determined, as is the case with its Al Qaeda
adversary, to suspend limits on the way force is used to achieve goals. Prisoners suspected of Al Qaeda connections are denied rights under the Geneva Conventions
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governing the standards of international humanitarian law. The White House
issues orders to assassinate suspects in foreign countries as a permissible tactic.
American investigative procedures have relied on relying on torture.21
There are additional reasons to be troubled. The antiterrorist banner is being
waved, but the goals of American foreign policy were extravagant before September
11, and now seem to be pretending that the struggle against terrorism validates the
project to exert control over virtually the entire planet. Such contentions can best
be understood by reference to such other American strategic undertakings as the
militarization of space, the realization that U.S. defense spending exceeds that of
the next fifteen countries combined, and there have been Pentagon leaks disclosing
an increased willingness to rely on nuclear weaponry in battlefield situations.
Under these circumstances can we, should we, search for new limits on the
discretion to use force in world politics? This is a vital question, especially for
Americans, which need to be addressed in the present world setting. I want to
answer such a question rather subjectively, by offering some tentative thoughts
about the reconstruction of limits, and how this might bear upon the wider agenda
of humanitarian action. As a starting point, the only acceptable way to rediscover
a framework of limits is to recognize that our own values and traditions as a free
society based on constitutionalism depend upon nurturing a respect for law and for
the opinions of others, including those situated beyond our borders, and a reluctance to embark upon warfare outside of the Western Hemisphere. This ethical
outlook is part of the federalist idea and the republican vision that has guided our
sense of ourselves as a country, despite notable departures from time to time, since
the national point of origin in the American Revolution. To protect this heritage
at this point, given the pressures of the mega-terrorist challenge and the ambitions
of the geopoliticians in the White House and Pentagon, will require a high level
of citizen vigilance. This vigilance must be provided by the American people, by
interior states such as Kansas and Minnesota, by activism on college campuses, and
by the religious community and organized labor. Even to contemplate such prospects may seem utopian at this point, given an aggressive nationalism that grips the
country, reinforced by the disturbing passivity of Congress, the provocations of the
Tea Party, and inappropriate cheerleading by the mainstream media.
At stake here also is the matter of fundamental national identity. Aside from
this acceptance of the self-limiting character of the state is the traditional American
claim to be a republic and not an empire. However, if you assess the plans put forth
by the Pentagon or peruse recent issues of Foreign Affairs, it is assumed that America
has become, whether intentionally or not, an empire. The issue that remains more
uncertain in these interpretations is whether the United States is likely to be a
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benevolent empire or whether it will be its fate to be an irresponsible, and probably, self-destructive empire.22 The question that has so far not been raised, at least
in these discussions within the American establishment, is whether being an empire
is itself subversive of the self-proclaimed constitutional identity of this country as
a republic. To be a republic is to be sensitive to the fragility of power, including
the acute dangers of its abuse. The main purpose of the constitutional structure,
based on checks and balances, is to protect the society against the destructive effects
and multiple dangers of unchecked power. This prospect threatens our liberties as
citizens, but internationally, the menace of unchecked power involves ignoring the
well-being and viewpoints of others who lack the means of resisting.
The second problematic aspect of the response to 9/11 was a missing part of
U.S. foreign policy and political consciousness for many years, that is, diagnosing
and responding to the legitimate grievances that exist throughout the world, which
if ignored, give rise to severe resentment. This resentment is especially directed
against those political actors that are perceived to be responsible for unacceptable
conditions and possess the capabilities to fashion just solutions to outstanding conflicts. The United States, as the predominant actor throughout the world, is seen
as having contributed to the suffering of peoples due to its relationship to some of
these legitimate grievances. From the moment of the attacks, the American leadership has failed to connect anti-American sentiments, including those that give rise
to political and religious extremism, and terrorist tactics with their real causes.
Instead, avoiding the slightest willingness to allow self-criticism, the explanation
of “why they hate us” is reduced to envy directed at our values and achievements.
These spiraling patterns of resentment pertain to the relations between the
United States and the Islamic world, and especially the Arab Middle East. Of course,
commentary is speculative. But it certainly seems much more likely that September
11 would not have happened if the Palestinian problems of self-determination had
been solved years ago in a manner that was fair to both peoples. This conflict should
have been dealt with long ago in a balanced way, not only for prudential reasons
associated with regional stability, but as part of a more intrinsic commitment to a
realization of the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, who had
been denied independence and statehood despite the dynamics of decolonization
having swept across the world in recent decades.
Reviving the Normative Revolution: Temptations and Commitments
In effect, the construction of a humane framework for global governance, which
was proceeding in a generally encouraging way in the 1990s, has been abandoned
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in this period after September 11. Can it be revived? Can global civil society renew
its pressures that proved effective in the prior decade? What sorts of issues should
take priority? Despite adverse trends, whatever integrity and courage are found,
there remains the possibility of positive action with respect to the agenda of the
normative revolution.
In conclusion, returning to the spirit of the normative revolution in the 1990s is
not currently feasible. The continuing security consciousness, coupled with a prolonged economic recession, discourages use of energies and resources for humanitarian purposes. If this direct security threat is further diminished, a deeper security
argument strongly supports the revival of the normative revolution, starting with
fashioning equitable responses to legitimate grievances around the world. Without
resuming the struggle to achieve humane global governance, the likelihood is that
violent resistance will occur in forms that will jeopardize Western security in various ways. We need the moral and political imagination to realize that the security
of the rich and powerful in a globalizing world depends over time on improving
the circumstances and raising the hopes of the poor and weak. If September 11
has taught us anything, it should be that the weapons and tactics of the weak are
capable of inflicting severe harm with significant adverse material and psychological consequences. To learn from such a traumatic experience means nurturing our
ethical impulses as well as sharpening our swords!
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The Academy and Humanitarian Action
Joseph A. O’Hare, S.J.

Humanitarian action is ordinarily understood to involve a response to the needs of
individuals and communities afflicted by different kinds of calamities, both those
that are natural, like earthquakes and typhoons, and those that are the result of
human intervention, like wars and political repression. Some calamities, of course,
represent a convergence of natural disasters and human mischief; famine, for example, can be the result both of climactic changes in a particular region and a flawed
distribution system created by a world market dominated by a profit motive.
Humanitarian action can also be understood in a broader sense, namely
the continuing attempts to achieve a more human world, one where wealth and
opportunity are more evenly distributed among nations and among classes within
nations. In this sense, humanitarian action is the enduring effort to create a world
where a respect for human dignity and inalienable rights of the individual are the
cornerstone of society.
At first glance, the world of the academy is more directly engaged in the second,
broader meaning of humanitarian action. The expansion and communication of
knowledge, which is the life of the academy, is more directly related to the continuing search for wisdom and a vision of the human than to the more episodic
responses to the needs of victims of wars and famines. At the present moment,
however, the possibilities of direct humanitarian action in support of the afflicted
in different parts of the world are limited and threatened by a new kind of world
conflict that is rooted in a clash of the fundamental values and traditions that have
always engaged the energies of scholars and teachers. The possibilities of humanitarian actions, in the conventional sense of a response to a crisis but also in the
broader sense of a continuing search for a more human world, are today linked
together in an unusual and more immediate relationship.
In this chapter, I propose to first describe the specific character of the present
world conflict that threatens the possibility of humanitarian action and the threat
this conflict poses for the integrity of the academy or, more specifically, the free-
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dom of the university. I will then argue that the dangers of the present moment
underline the urgency of recognizing that the contemporary university must be an
international institution, one that fosters authentic intercultural understanding and
maintains an environment where interreligious dialogue can take place and religious traditions can be renewed. One important dimension of this conflict involves
the inexorable process of globalization, which demands that contemporary education must be international in character, on every level in appropriate fashion.
The University and International Terrorism
The university, the most typical institution of academia, encourages differences,
believing that the free competition of ideas is a necessary condition for the expansion of knowledge that can lead to a glimpse of the truth and the best available wisdom to guide our lives and our world. Given this inherent diversity, does the contemporary university offer a distinctive perspective on the possibilities of humanitarian action in a world where traditions and values can be locked in conflicts that
can seem insoluble?
The dangers of the present moment arise from a network of international terrorists and terrorist organizations whose motivation and objectives are far more
obscure than the causes that have, in the past, led nation-states into armed conflicts. International terrorism transcends national borders and political ideology.
Its objective appears vague and shifting, its passion rooted in popular resentment
rather than patriotic cause, its vision of the future vague and inarticulate. The
amorphous character of international terrorism—the absence of any proposal for
an alternative future coupled with its willingness to attack the innocent at random—only adds to the unsettling, because undefined, character of its threat to
international society.
In such a climate of fear and uncertainty, legitimate concerns about national
security can escalate into unnecessary restrictions on civil liberties and the repression of legitimate differences on how to meet the dangers of international terrorism. In the wake of the terrorist attack of September 11, the desire to retaliate
overwhelmed the need to better understand the passions behind this murderous
assault. Debate on university campuses over the Middle East crisis quickly became
politicized, and the legitimacy of conflicting views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was challenged. In the rush of patriotic feeling, many were impatient with any
call for an examination of the international posture of the United States as the sole
remaining superpower in the world.
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Yet, any attempt to contain and eventually eliminate the dangers of international terrorism must include a better understanding of its deep, involved roots.
This search for understanding is the mission of the university. To fulfill this mission, however, the university must protect its autonomy and encourage the kind of
academic freedom that is a condition of authentic discovery. Such freedom, which
encourages the competition of ideas, is not a luxury that can be surrendered in a
time of national danger, but a necessity if we are to understand the nature of the
danger that surrounds us.
The Internationalization of Education
One source of the energy of international terrorism is resentment of the current
division of wealth and power in international community. Such resentment can
create coalitions of protest among groups with different agenda and ideologies.
The demonstrations against the present economic order that have marred international meetings around the world have brought together a wide variety of groups
and organizations; religious activists calling for the cancellation of the debts of
poorer nations and anarchists seeking to undermine civil order, united only in a
resistance to the inexorable but bewildering process of globalization, driven by the
dynamics of world markets and information technology. In this world economy
that transcends national boundaries, new wealth is created and whole societies can
be transformed, but the distribution of this wealth is uneven and individuals and
communities can be left behind and left out.
The very process of globalization seems to strip individuals and communities
of their autonomy and self-determination, and provokes the fury of those who consider its cost, both economically and culturally, dehumanizing. These critics of globalization insist it has created a wider gulf between the rich and the poor, between
nations and regions, and between classes within nations. Meanwhile, distinctive
cultural traditions are being undermined by a homogeneous popular culture that
comes with mass consumerism.
Resentment of the economic and cultural consequences of globalization is a
common passion that connects a broad array of critics with different causes and
agendas. The violent protests that have exploded at several international meetings
have bewildered many, while legitimate questions concerning globalization have
been obscured by the destructive behavior of radical groups. But the process of globalization, driven by the appeal of world markets and the revolution in information
technology, cannot be reversed, nor should it be.
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If the university is to contribute to a better understanding of both the challenges and the opportunities that globalization presents, then the university must
be transformed into an international institution, recognizing that in our contemporary world, all education must be international in nature.
This does not mean that individual institutions must compromise their distinctive identities and missions. In the twenty-first century we live in one world,
whether we like it or not, but it is a world of differences, and our challenge is not to
diminish those differences or paper them over in the interests of some superficial
unity. On the contrary, the challenge for the university as an institution is the same
challenge that confronts all nations and institutions in this new millennium: How
to make our differences a source of enrichment rather than division? How to better
appreciate our own traditions and values by recognizing and respecting the traditions and values of others? How to redeem the promise of cultural and religious
traditions of others? How to redeem the promise of cultural and religious traditions by a creative renewal of their deepest meanings? How to find in the renewal
of such traditions a more human response to the opportunities made possible by
the technological revolution? How to make it clear that modernization does not, in
the end, mean Westernization?

The Development of Intercultural Understanding
The most obvious sign of the increasingly international character of higher education is the growth in exchange programs that brings students and scholars from
other nations and cultures to our campuses here in the United States and encourages faculty and students from the United States to spend time at other institutions
in other nations and cultures. But while the exchange of faculty and students is
necessary, it is not enough. The university must encourage and support the development of authentic intercultural understanding.
The promotion of multiculturalism on American campuses can be an easy target for those critics who see it as a surrender of the defining values of Western civilization. It was with some chagrin that I learned some years ago of a campus debate
here at Fordham that posed the question: multiculturalism versus the Jesuit educational tradition. We need only think of historic Jesuit experiments at inculturation,
like those that led to the Chinese Rites controversy and the Paraguay Reductions,
to realize that the Jesuit education over the past four and a half centuries has always
been multicultural.
It is unfortunate that the debate about multiculturalism in American education has too often been mired in arguments about what texts should be included
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in college curricula in order to include underrepresented groups. It is a debate
that has often degenerated into academic politics in its least appealing posture. To
achieve the goals of an authentic intercultural sensibility, a program of immersion
in another language and culture should be part of the required curriculum in any
program of liberal studies. At present time, for example, the Beijing Center for
Language and Culture offers a program for undergraduates at Jesuit colleges and
universities in the United States that is far more demanding and far more rewarding in terms of an intercultural experience than prescribed readings, in translation,
of a faculty member’s favorite neglected author.
An understanding and appreciation of non-Western cultures should enrich
our understanding of Western civilization and not diminish it. To achieve this end,
however, the enduring goals of a liberal education have to be continually affirmed
and realized. The study of other cultures should not lead to a collapse of community into separate national and ethnic enclaves but rather should lead to a deeper
and richer appreciation of the common human values we share.
This process is assuredly not automatic. To be successful we cannot shy away
from cultural critiques and ethical judgments. Accepting a bland moral relativism
as the necessary corollary of multicultural appreciation will not guide the development of a more human world. At the same time, moral judgments that have no
appreciation of different cultural sensibilities will remain irrelevant abstractions.

The Challenge of Interreligious Dialogue
The university has always been an institution where tradition is not only recovered
and remembered but also renewed and transformed. In its classrooms, libraries,
and laboratories, the wisdom of the past should confront each day the questions
of tomorrow. In the life of the ideal university community, new questions are not
feared and suppressed but welcomed and debated. In actual life, of course, university communities do not always resist the narrow politicization of activist and
advocates that declare what is and is not acceptable thinking.
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attack and the continuing violence
in the Middle East, debate over the fundamental causes of the conflicts has often
become polarized and the legitimacy of dissident scholars challenged because of
their political views. If the university is to fulfill its historic role as a forum for
competing views, we must insist on the conditions for civil debate: mutual respect
and honest recognition of differences. Civility does not compromise moral commitment, although this is not obvious to campus activists who find demonstrations
more satisfying than debates.
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The need to balance passion and civility is particularly acute in the continuing
conversation that should be interreligious dialogue. Perhaps the secular university
is not the most congenial environment for such dialogue, since the recognition of
the importance of religious experience and the legitimacy of intellectual inquiry
into such experience can be absent from the prevailing ethos of the secular academy, the legacy of the children of the Enlightenment.
For the secularist, religion itself, with its absolutist claims, can appear to be
the source of inevitable conflict, and certainly human history has demonstrated in
many different ages that violence to the human spirit can be done in the name of
religion. The terrorist attack on September 11 was not the only instance in history of
the destructive purposes to which religious passion can lead. To protect the purity
of the faith, heretics were tortured and beheaded in the name of Christendom.
Closer to our own day, we have seen false messiahs inspire mass suicides by their
followers.
Religious passion is a powerful flame that can inspire the radiant example of St.
Therese of Lisieux and the heroic service to the poor by generations of missionaries.
But religious passion, we recognize, can be turned to darker and more destructive
purposes, as it surely was on September 11 when the terrorists committed the ultimate blasphemy of destroying the innocent in the name of the Almighty.
All religious traditions, if they are to be continually renewed, must be engaged
in a dialogue with history. In the Catholic tradition, we speak of the development
of doctrine, where the test of continuity is applied to new understandings of the
received tradition. Every religious tradition, if the tradition is to be a living tradition, must deal with the tension between fundamentalism and modernity. There
is no easy resolution of this tension; instead, it involves a continuing conversation,
and the university offers a privileged forum for such a conversation. This has been
the experience of Catholicism from the first development of the university as an
institution born from “the heart of the church” (Ex corde ecclesiae) in the medieval
universities of Europe.
This challenge of renewal confronts the powerful tradition of Islam. The dangers of Islamic fundamentalism can, in the end, only be resolved within Islam
itself. The renewal of Islam, as a living religious tradition, must take place in the
dialogue with history and modernity that must engage all religious traditions.
The world of the university remains a privileged forum for this indispensable
conversation and renewal. Those universities that are themselves animated by
a living religious tradition would seem to be a particularly congenial home for
such dialogue.
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In our observance of the first anniversary of the September 11 terrorist attack
at Fordham University, interreligious memorial services were held at each of our
campuses. The readings for these services were drawn from the New Testament,
Buddhist texts, and the Koran. Though obviously different in tone and accent,
all of these readings converged on the primacy of human dignity as the test of
any religious passion. Respect for those who differ from us in national identity
or religious belief does not imply an indifference toward the truth. A healthy religious pluralism fosters the renewal of distinctive religious traditions and respect
for the truth claims they make, even when one chooses to disagree with those
claims. But the critical test of such claims is their relevance to the dignity of
the human person. Does this religious vision recognize and enhance the human
person or diminish and violate human dignity? While different cultures may
manifest different expressions of what it means to be human, the assumptions of
liberal education is that there is a common humanity we all share. To destroy the
innocent on behalf of a religious cause is the ultimate blasphemy. Religious passion, then, becomes a vicious abstraction, demonic in origin rather than divine.
Part of the legacy of September 11 is the painful reminder that religious faith can
be betrayed by those who use it to justify violence. The search for understanding among differences, the mission of the university, is an essential guardian of
religious integrity.
The fundamentalist instinct in all religious traditions, of course, can slide into
a kind of anti-intellectualism that resists the kind of questioning of tradition that is
part of the life of the university. The university, as an institution of inquiry rather
than indoctrination, is suspect to the fundamentalist. The irony here is that without
such inquiry religious tradition can become distorted, frozen into harmless irrelevancy or distorted into the more dangerous sense of absolute righteousness that
can become absolute ruthlessness. Dare one suggest that the blasphemous attack
of September 11 was an extreme instance of a religious tradition that had refused
the essential dialogue with modernity that is the mission of the Catholic university
and remains the best hope of a creative renewal of the deepest truths of the Islamic
tradition?

Conclusion
The contemporary university should provide a context for humanitarian action in
the broad sense of creating a more human world and enable individuals to respond
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to the need of the afflicted in the more narrow sense of humanitarian action by
fostering an authentic intercultural understanding and encouraging the renewal of
religious traditions, and particularly the Islamic tradition, through interreligious
dialogue. In a world threatened by international terrorism, the university must
resist restrictions on academic freedom that would inhibit the task of understanding the sources of the deep-seated, if inarticulate, resentment at the heart of such
terrorist campaigns.
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Government Responses to Foreign Policy Challenges
Peter Tarnoff

Different Paths to Common Goals
It is remarkable how much the preambles of constitutions have in common. Even
when their authors come from different historical, religious, and cultural traditions, these documents extol the dignity of all citizens and defend the exercise of
freedom and rights while proclaiming the unity of a people in a national politic.
Founders of nations and their successors invariably appeal to universal sentiments common to all humankind. No doubt some of the constitution writers are
sincere in evoking aspirations that elicit a general will to work for the common
good. Other founders may be more cynical or manipulative, knowing full well
that even a morally correct constitution does not always reflect the realities of
governance.
In order to understand the true intentions of governments, we may want to
distinguish between those that are value-oriented and results-oriented. Valueoriented regimes commit themselves to govern according to traditional—usually
religious—texts or laws. The highest authorities in value-oriented states are clerics
and the most venerated documents of state are scriptures. High religious authorities are empowered to interpret religious texts in ways that apply to everyday life
including commerce, contracts, laws, and the definition and punishment of crime.
In these societies, severe restrictions usually are imposed on the behavior of ordinary citizens and close ties with foreign powers are regarded with suspicion for fear
of contamination or subversion.
Results-oriented governments aim to bring about tangible improvements in
the well-being of society in areas such as health care, prosperity, education, public safety, national security, and infrastructure. When a government is results-oriented, its laws can be based on a body of traditional doctrine, but its constitutional
foundation is consistently being interpreted and reinterpreted by secular, often
elected, judiciaries and parliaments.
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The U.S. government is, for the most part, results-oriented. Its constitution
affirms the separation of church and state. A strong federal system and independent judiciary constrain the power of the central government. The two national
political parties compete for public favor in terms of concrete deliverables. While
public rhetoric, especially during electoral periods, embraces traditional values and
moral principles, elections themselves usually are won or lost on the basis of policy
prescriptions or records of achievement.
Can the same be said of American foreign policy? Is it also results-oriented,
or is the propagation of an American value system becoming more central to U.S.
objectives around the world?
In the immediate post–World War II period, American foreign policy was
driven principally by the need to establish a network of coalitions under U.S. leadership that were prepared to defend—militarily, if necessary—the Western world
against encroachments from the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union. During
the forty-five years of the Cold War, there were superpower proxy wars in the
developing world but no armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The
two alliance adversaries made little effort to convert the other; both were principally concerned with controlling their own members and preserving their respective systems of governance and economic organization.
Suddenly, a quarter-century ago, the USSR collapsed and the Cold War ended.
An “end of history” was proclaimed by some and it looked to many Americans
as if liberal democratic forms of governments and free market economies had triumphed over the Communist and totalitarian alternatives and that there would
be a universal recognition that something close to a U.S. model had become the
system of choice for most societies. In the absence of overarching military and
ideological threats and a diminished need for the “sole remaining superpower”
to tend to minding its alliances, there was more talk in Washington than before
about a moral foreign policy and greater confidence that American values (often
portrayed as “universal values”) would be a central component of Washington’s
worldwide reach.

A Doctrinaire Foreign Policy
Doctrines and values are not new to American foreign policy. In the early nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine alerted Europeans that the United States
“should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of
this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”
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Shortly after World War II, the Truman Doctrine made clear that the United
States would act to oppose any Soviet attempt to extend its influence into Greece
and Turkey. Under President Jimmy Carter, human rights were placed high on the
U.S. foreign policy agenda and, although Carter was denounced by balance-ofpower realists for sacrificing American interests on the altar of idealism, his successor, Ronald Reagan, strengthened democracy-building efforts primarily to weaken
the hold of the Communist regimes. The first President Bush announced the coming of a “new world order” that was understood to rely heavily on the American
experience and influence.
President Clinton came to stand for what some of his aides described as a doctrine of “humanitarian interventionism,” where the international community—
assisted and sometimes led by the United States—intervenes, with force if necessary, to prevent or stop human slaughter.
The second Bush administration was more ambitious than its recent predecessors
in proclaiming the need for a new doctrinal structure and the obligation to spread
American political, economic, and moral values far and wide. It justified this redefinition of American interests and strategies on the basis of what is required to defend
the United States against new enemies and new threats in the post–Cold War world.
The Bush II administration was, of course, heavily influenced by the need to
retaliate following the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. The new Bush
Doctrine was published as the “National Security Strategy of the United States.”
The document makes clear that the United States intends to preserve and use its
position as the dominant military power in today’s world. Washington will decide
what threatens the American way of life and, while there are passing references to
international partners, it is clear that the United States is prepared (even eager) to
act alone. It is not hard to see in the text the strength of the administration’s unilateralist impulse that so concerned many foreign governments.
In the case of Iraq, the doctrinal and pragmatic strains of Bush administration
thinking meet and fuse. President Bush repeatedly stated that the United States
would act quickly, decisively, and alone (if necessary) to remove the threat that
Saddam Hussein represented. He had been so clear and consistent that it is hard to
imagine the President’s being satisfied by anything less than a convincing cleansing
of all weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the ouster of Saddam as well. Most
world leaders, including those in the Arab nations, would like nothing better than
to rid Iraq of such weapons, and there was little support around the world for the
murderous regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet, why then was there so much suspicion
regarding Washington’s demands when America’s objective (Iraqi disarmament)
was so widely shared?
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For three reasons: The first is that many governments believed that American
policy in Iraq was not based on a legitimate fear of Iraqi intentions or capabilities,
but that Washington was using Iraq as a convenient excuse to assert America’s
paramount political power and military superiority and its willingness to use them.
This skepticism was reinforced when it turned out that Iraq had no weapons of
mass destruction. The second: Many Muslim leaders believed that the United States
wanted to transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy. The third: The United
States sought improved access to oil.
But back again to doctrine. Now that there was a clearly stated official Bush
Doctrine, it became awkward for the administration to flexibly and creatively innovate new policies or react to new emergencies. But it did. The announcement by
North Korea that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program was a clear candidate
for preemptive military attack by the United States. However, the Bush administration reacted cautiously and cooperatively to the North Korean program while
defending itself against charges from the right that it was handling the challenge no
differently from the way a Democratic administration would have reacted.
The United States forcibly installing democracy in Baghdad, and beyond,
alarmed many in the Middle East who will not soon forget the crusader spirit
of those American officials eager to assert that the United States has the right to
remake Muslim societies. In the real world of international politics and diplomacy,
imposing Western ways by force of arms following a military victory on countries
determined to preserve their distinctive cultures and religions would have catastrophic consequences.
The Obama administration has generally adhered to the approach to foreign
policy practiced by the predecessors of George W. Bush. It has stressed collegiality “whenever possible” and case-by-case decisions regarding the extent of U.S.
involvement. And it has functioned at a time when the very nature of warfare and
so-called soft nonmilitary pressures are rapidly changing.

Good vs. Evil: An Age of Absolutes
American presidents have called foreign adversaries “evil” before. Ronald Reagan
labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire,” but he then went on to become a serious
negotiating partner with Mikhail Gorbachev. The second President Bush described
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as constituting an “axis of evil,” and he warned the
rest of the world that countries have a choice: they can be either for or against the
United States in the war on terror. But since World War II, the United States has
worked harder at persuading and cultivating its political, military, and economic
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partners than at negotiating with its enemies. Presidents from Truman to Obama
understood how much American security depended on having close friends and
allies, even when there were differences of views to bridge and difficult compromises to swallow.
It is also true that diplomatic conditions have changed: America’s new enemies are both more and less threatening: less threatening because, whatever their
destructive power, they are unable to obliterate the planet (although some might
do so if they could), but also more threatening because they do not seek to reach
accommodations with us. They have no interest in summitry or state visits. In the
Middle East, some have a political agenda: the destruction of the State of Israel and
the overthrow of the Gulf monarchies, especially that of Saudi Arabia. They see the
United States as the principal obstacle to their aims and have shown themselves
ready to use terror to weaken and hurt us. In the case of the most fanatic extremists,
no negotiation is possible, and the United States has no choice but to work with
others to destroy them.
Does their suicidal fanaticism make all of the terrorists’ demands evil? What
happens when countries in the Middle East that we need for security cooperation
and oil express some sympathy for the political agenda of the terrorists? The problem with labeling governments and groups as either good or evil and demanding
(rhetorically, at least) that they be for us or against us is that it may play well in
American politics but it outrages many important non-Americans whose cooperation is essential to us in the war on terror and who insist on making a distinction
between the aims and the methods of terrorist states and organizations.
The overuse of “evil” to describe countries and governments also places an
implicit obligation on the United States to dispose of such regimes. Although the
United States can fight and win wars in many places at once, few in America want
Washington to be the world’s enforcer. Indeed, less talk of good versus evil and us
versus them might allow the United States to recapture the moral high ground in the
war on terror. The more insidious the threat, the more important it will be for the
United States to be less absolutist in its approach. During the Cold War, the United
States could have fought alone against the USSR. But there is no way that the United
States can win the war on terror alone, even if America is statistically more powerful
than ever before when compared to the rest of the world.

Shifting Fault Lines
Living as I do in an earthquake zone in California, I am extremely sensitive to the
danger when fault lines start to shift, even to a small degree. I also know that it is
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hard to predict when and where these movements will occur and what will be the
extent of the damage they are likely to cause. It is clear, however, that even the most
democratic and well-intentioned governments behave uncharacteristically when
they feel threatened or destabilized. For example, they can:
relax their definition of what constitutes torture (e.g., waterboarding) and permit a degree of corporal punishment and nonphysical pressures (e.g., sleep
deprivation, noise and light harassment, extreme and indefinite isolation,
threats to family members, constant interrogation)
resort to the extrajuridical and covert assassinations of suspected terrorists
invoke a political form of “force majeure” as reason for selectively applying or
ignoring the Geneva Conventions
restrict immigration, especially from countries or cultures perceived to be
strange or hostile. Anti-immigrant sentiment also leads to the formation of
sometimes-powerful neofascist political movements in developed countries
pay less attention to issues of discrimination against women and children
amend domestic judicial practices so that terms of indictment and confinement are radically tightened. Punishments then become much more severe
for crimes stemming from the new threats
impose restrictions on the media that result in less information being made
available to the general public. Invoking national security considerations is
a frequent excuse for withholding information that might prompt citizens
to oppose the policies of their governments.
It is reasonable, even necessary, for societies under threat to resort to extraordinary measures to defend themselves. But it is also essential that in open societies
there be a continuing public and political debate about how much security can be
gained by limiting how much freedom. Such a debate can be acrimonious but it becomes unhealthy only if stifled. As frustrating as it is to policymakers, the struggle
between security and liberty is endless. Should conditions change, practices can
be loosened or tightened. The tectonic plates of policy are always shifting and the
number of independent variables at play in a crisis can be huge. Nevertheless, as
long as governments are committed to the proposition that it is ultimately desirable
for there to be more freedoms not less and more information not less, citizens can
expect that liberties and openness will someday be restored. But beware of those—
even in democracies—who seek to make emergency restrictions permanent, because the threat is potentially infinite. Their aim is to transform, not simply defend,
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society because they live in a world of absolutes, including the illusion of absolute
security.
Because the very nature of post–Cold War threats is indefinite and universal,
there are some who believe that it will be necessary to modify fundamentally the
character of free societies in order to defeat them. We know wars that end with a
V-E Day or V-J Day, and where we can see the battle lines changing in our daily
newspapers. But there will never be a V-Terrorism Day.
Like foreign policy itself, the campaigns against the new global threats will be
an endless process where success will be measured incrementally, never conclusively. In the long haul, however, it will be the free and open societies that are best
able to sustain the efforts and sacrifices necessary to stay the course in the interminable wars against the new challenges of the twenty-first century.

All Alone or All Together
When confronted with complex and ever-shifting fault lines, governments incline
either toward the unilateral or the multilateral. Smaller and more vulnerable
countries—especially those firmly embedded in regional political or economic
alliances—are prone to turn to their neighbors for help in times of crisis. Most
Member States of the European Union act that way. Especially in matters of economic policy, the EU nations tend to stick together and face the rest of the world in
a united fashion after setting common economic policies. However, EU solidarity
is less firm in political and security matters. Since the United Kingdom and France
are permanent members of the UN Security Council and most EU nations are also
members of NATO, there are not yet common European diplomatic or security
policies on most issues.
The unilateralist impulse is more prevalent in the case of major powers and
those opaque and dangerous regimes sometimes identified as “rogue states.” Major
powers are the most inclined to act and stand alone. They have the wherewithal to
operate with a high degree of autonomy and their domestic political climate favors
policies of “national interest” over “international comity.” China and the United
States are prime examples of powerful countries that are readier than most to stand
alone on matters of high policy and principle. In the case of what might be called
“outcast regimes,” their very isolation and opaqueness create a shield that makes
it hard for outsiders to have a clear view of their intentions and capabilities. North
Korea is such a case in point.
The world and the cause of peace would be better served if international organization and agreements were effectively respected by all nations. In principle, most
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countries claim that they favor a rule of international law and order that prevents
conflict and humanitarian chaos.
But nations differ over whether a threat to international peace and stability
exists and, if it does, how international players should react. The discussions in the
UN Security Council over how to disarm Saddam tended to overshadow international concerns about the scope and nature of the threat itself. Since the United
States and others invaded Iraq, the multilateral approach to solving international
problems has suffered a blow unless it makes the major powers more circumspect
about using their armed forces to achieve political aims.
In principle, the new global threats of the twenty-first century are mostly multilateral in nature. They include environmental degradation, international crime,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic and religious conflicts, disease,
extreme poverty, and violations of human and civil rights. These threats generally
know no borders and governments are not usually the sole entities with influence
and resources. In fact, governments are coming to understand that nongovernmental organs (business, labor, the media, academia, religious groups, and private voluntary organizations) are increasingly important components of international affairs.
Today’s multilateral diplomacy extends vertically to nonstate entities and horizontally to like-minded governments and international organizations. Effective international coalitions are no longer limited to ministers and generals. Nonstate players
from business, academia, labor, private voluntary organizations, and the media are
represented at the diplomatic negotiating table whether or not they are physically
present. International diplomacy is now played like multidimensional chess.

Sanctions and Fence-Mending
When countries clash over what they consider to be important issues of policy or
principle, there is always a risk that they will resort to military force. However, most
governments at least pay lip service to the proposition that they will use force only
as a last resort and many leaders actually do their best to resolve disputes peacefully.
Moreover, there has emerged in recent decades a long menu of ways that governments and international organizations can bring nonmilitary pressure to bear on
adversaries or outlaw states:
Economic Sanctions
Multilateral: Usually imposed by the UN Security Council. Generally regarded
as the most effective because the most widely observed. Can be lifted once
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offending country meets certain conditions but requires a confirming vote
by the UN Security Council to do so.
Unilateral: Country-to-country. May have political/moral effect, but porous
economically because most countries are not bound to restrict trade or
investment with targeted regime. If sanctioning country has sufficient
power in International Financial Institutions (IFIs), it can block IFI loans
and grants as well.
Extraterritorial: Sanctioning country applies economic penalties to third countries trading with targeted country. Hotly contested politically and legally by
countries unwilling to accept jurisdiction of sanctioning country over their
sovereign trading practices.
Coalition of the Willing: Although generally referring to military groupings,
there can be coalitions of sanction imposing governments operating without
formal UN Security Council approval. The imposition of economic sanctions can, however, be a broad and blunt weapon. Unless they are targeted
on the offending country’s leadership, sanctions can cause serious suffering
among the civilian population. If the pain from sanctions on the innocents
is prolonged and serious, states—especially in the region—will circumvent
them. The United States has imposed sanctions more than any other country
in recent years, but because most American sanctions are bilateral, they have
had only marginal economic effects.

Moral/Political Sanctions—Multilateral or Unilateral
This form of sanction is often applied in the area of human rights. The UN Human
Rights Commission meets annually to pronounce itself on alleged human rights violators around the world. Charges and countercharges are debated in Geneva before
the violations are put to a vote by the Commission. In addition, and uniquely, the
United States publishes annually a human rights report describing and condemning what it considers to be human rights violations around the world.

Shunning
A more discrete form of official displeasure occurs when a country decides to have
no or limited diplomatic representation in another capital. Shunning can be augmented by ordering its diplomats to avoid all contact and dialogue with representatives of the foreign power.
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Sanctions are nonmilitary methods of pressure and punishment, but the diplomatic arsenal also contains devices to promote reconciliation and dispute resolution. They include:

Mediation/Arbitration
Ideally, such interventions occur before international disputes turn violent.
Successful conflict prevention is better than settlement negotiations but resolving conflict that has already erupted is sometimes the only way that peace can be
restored. International organization negotiators (usually, but not always, with
the UN) abound but there are skilled national mediators as well. For decades, the
United States has played a unique role in the Middle East peace process and now,
more recently, in the Balkans and the EU is reinforcing its dispute resolution capacities. Regional organizations should play greater roles in settling disputes, although
the disputing parties must also be convinced that there are positive consequences
for them to settle. This means that the developed countries and the IFIs have to be
prepared to provide financial rewards for good political behavior.

Constructive Engagement
This is a diplomatic way to describe “good cop, bad cop” routine for dealing with a
recalcitrant state. It involves at least one outside government maintaining contact
with the regime that is under pressure to change or to cease and desist. Constructive
engagement works best when the “good cop” coordinates its initiatives with the
international community pressing for change. Often times neighbors are good in
this role although it helps to have a major power also involved so that the “target”
country believes that any eventual political and economic rewards it gains in return
for compliance will have broad international support.

How Democracies Should Make Foreign Policy
When governments are confronted with cataclysmic threats or emergencies, traditions, values, and humanitarian actions can be incinerated by the intense heat
of the moment. Especially in democracies where public pressure on governments
is greatest, political leaders often feel that they have to act first and ask (moral)
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questions afterwards. In the United States it is commonly accepted that the president’s first responsibility is to come to the defense of the country. Voices calling
for measured and appropriate responses consistent with a nation’s traditions and
values rarely hold sway in the command centers and cabinet rooms of beleaguered
governments. There are, however, ways that elements of morality and humanism
can be inserted into the decision-making process.
The first way is to have the public be as well informed as possible about exceptional measures that a government believes it must undertake. Ultimately, it is the
public and its elected representatives that should have the final say when it comes
to deciding how drastic and how durable these measures must be. But without
fairly full disclosure, the public will be kept in the dark and domestic discontent
will grow.
The second way is to improve the legislative oversight of foreign policy. For the
first two hundred years of our nation, it was generally accepted that foreign policy
was the purview of the executive branch. Only rarely were presidents and secretaries of state subjected to the degree of scrutiny that administrations received on
domestic issues. Then came the Vietnam War and television news. Trust in government was further eroded by Watergate, and serious oversight of foreign affairs by
the Congress began. As a result, American foreign policy may be less coherent and
well managed than before. But foreign policy is also more transparent than before
and it turned out to be no harder than domestic policy for the American people to
understand.
The third way is to broaden the uniquely American practice of having high officials shuttle between private careers and public service. Government careerists find
our system arbitrary and inefficient and it often is. But a government dominated by
career politicians and civil servants runs the risk of isolation and excess. Moreover,
having men and women who were successful in nongovernmental careers appointed
to high diplomatic office increases the chances that decisions will better reflect the
attitudes of society at large and that policies will be made by people who are used to
being held accountable for their actions because they come from professions where
rapid merit-based advancement and abrupt dismissals can occur.
The fourth way is for citizens to understand that values are as essential to their
security as military might and economic strength. A country true to a legacy of
humanism is easier to defend and harder to attack. Its population will rally to the
defense of the homeland. Its government will have standing in calling for international aid and support. Its enemies will know that world opinion will turn against
them. Such a country is not guaranteed to be invulnerable but it will be much safer
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if it makes every effort to adhere to practices and conventions accepted by most of
humanity as genuinely beneficial to all.
In modern democratic societies, the pressures for demanding high levels of
accountability, freedom, and openness come from the bottom up not the top down.
Governments under threat will always seek greater control and autonomy and it is
hard to strike a perfect balance between a government’s ability to manage a crisis
and a free people’s need to know, judge, and change what a government is doing.
Still, if the balance of power tilts too strongly and indefinitely in government’s
favor, the new global challenges that it is trying to manage will be hard to overcome.
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Disasters and the Media
Jeremy Toye

For the media, a disaster is not a tragedy. It is a challenge, an opportunity. A challenge for the traditional media to find out what is happening, how to get there, what
is at stake, who is to blame. For the nontraditional media, the tweeters, Facebook
friends, and bloggers, it is how to get the message out, who to include, when to
retweet someone else’s tweet. And for all of them, there is the chance to inform,
to activate, or to enrage, for a vast audience always turns to the media whenever a
disaster strikes.
Those are some of the challenges, but there are opportunities too. It is not
necessarily wrong, nor even cynical, for a decent journalist to see a disaster as an
opportunity to get a good story. Journalists wept at the site of the Twin Towers
falling. But they and their employers had a job to do, and in a disaster, no matter
whether it is “natural” or “man-made,” it gets harder but potentially more rewarding. And most media outlets will claim that they are there to serve noble ideals,
that challenging authority and revealing the facts will lead to change for the better.
For the owners of commercial media, there is not only an opportunity to show
expertise and concern for suffering but also a chance to revive flagging circulations
and audiences.1 In that large slice of the world where the state controls the media, it
is a chance to show that government can move fast and help—unless, of course, it
is the regime itself which is to blame for the disaster. For those among the millions
of social media users who want to go beyond their circle of friends and what they
had for breakfast, disasters spell a chance to get help, to rally support, or to let their
compassion or concern show through.
The media have traditionally been reactive to disaster. It has happened, so now
let us surf the feelings of revulsion and compassion and maybe someone will do
something about it. But the explosion of digital connectivity via instant satellite
links, social media, and above all the cell phone is leading some to question whether
the media should do something more about disasters before they happen: to educate, teach, and inform people in areas vulnerable to drought, famine, or flood; to
build, plant, save water, stock grain, or practice first aid. While more traditional
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media may argue that their role is to present the facts and let others decide, social
media opens the door for communities of all stripes to take charge of their destiny.
It is left to the readers, listeners, and viewers who turn to the media, particularly
in times of disaster, to distinguish reality from rumor, fact from fiction, promotion
from propaganda. In the middle of all this cacophony sits a wide variety of enterprises lumped together as “the Media” (often friends, sometimes foes) and the “aid
professionals,” whose role is not only to find out what is going on in what they may
call a disaster-related scenario, but also to do something about it.

Media and Disasters
Disasters have always been part of the media’s staple diet, but in early times the dish
was eaten cold. After the eruption of Vesuvius in A.D. 79, before anyone had time
to react, the elegant city of Pompeii was preserved in ash.2 By the time of Abraham
Lincoln’s assassination in 1865, the invention and rapid expansion of the telegraph
system meant the news spread across the United States in minutes.3 Two world wars
tested first print, then broadcast journalism (and the extent that censorship would
be tolerated), while advocates for change used media to move into the public glare.
The suffragettes battling for votes for women, who chained themselves to London
railings, calculated well that their photos would be used around the world.4
The Ethiopian famine of 1983–845 was a milestone in putting a remote human
disaster into the living rooms of what used to be called the first world. But even
in the world’s first TV war in Vietnam,6 instant communication to the public,
and therefore instant reaction, was rare because of limited technology and high
expense. And there was still time for judicious editing along the way: The most
gruesome scenes could be cut, prompting accusations of media manipulation and
official sanitization.
CNN coverage of the bombing of Baghdad bridged the technology gap to
show the Iraqi capital as it was bombed. Later, mobile telephony, web-cams, and
YouTube matched technology with portability and minimal price. The death of
protester Neda Agha-Soltan,7 broadcast from a cell phone camera in an Iranian
demonstration attacked by government forces, took the process to a point where
the traditional media, in the sense of providing a link between event and audience,
were almost redundant.
The events of the Arab Spring of 2011 showed that not only could you use the
new media to inform the uninformed and marshal support, you could also tell
your fellow demonstrators what was going on just a few meters away. And since
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there is a dark side to almost everything, security forces could monitor those same
calls and sift through YouTube videos for the faces they could identify. A sinister
side of social media was demonstrated in the UK riots in 2011,8 when rioters with
no political agenda could use encrypted messaging to give news on which shops
were ripe for looting. BlackBerrys, so long seen as the smart tool for the wheelers
and dealers of the commercial world, found a new, unwelcome market among
gangs of youths who knew open SMS messages would be monitored by police.
Huge numbers of passive security cameras recorded images of looters blithely trying on shoes.
Like a knife or an ax, media in the wrong hands can be a fearful weapon. The
videotapes of Osama bin Laden fueled al Qaeda’s campaigns and inspired its followers to further violence. As in the filming of journalist Daniel Pearl’s murder in
Karachi in 2002, instant communication was another weapon to be used to support
a campaign.9 Pearl’s death was also a reminder that dozens of journalists have been
killed in conflicts such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.10
No wonder, then, that much of the monitoring of social media and instant
communications is being done by representatives of the more traditional media.
Twitter feeds, recalling for wire-agency veterans like me the brief Snaps and
Bulletins used to alert media outlets to breaking news, could keep a single journalist in touch with a dozen places at once. Backed by two-way satellite communications and an array of gear, the BBC’s man in Beirut, Jim Muir, could keep track of
a host of Syrian cities under attack by the forces of a government that refused entry
to anyone identified as a journalist.
While journalists on the frontline donned flak jackets to ride with rebel forces
into Tripoli, others were scouring the airwaves in case Libyan leader Muammar
Gaddafi should suddenly send an SMS message that he needed, say, sticking plasters. When he was found, his summary execution on screen11 caused genuine shock,
even in a world becoming inured to the blood and gore of battle. The execution
was carried out by individuals in a remote place, but a cell phone camera made it
a public event.
Natural disasters seem to happen most where access is least: an earthquake in
the mountains of Pakistan; a tsunami from a quake deep below the Indian Ocean;
drought and famine in one of Africa’s most forbidding spots, Somalia. Yet even
when a disaster happens in a country as sophisticated and accessible as Japan, and
affects an industry as modern as nuclear power, the media are often hard pressed to
get there. That being said, the single-minded determination of a journalist seeking
out a story means that relief agencies often find that the media are alongside and
even ahead of them.
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No matter how reliable the firsthand source, or how venerated the wire services, every media outlet worth its salt wants its own staffer’s byline, voice, or face
to tell the story. And that costs money. Cut-price airfares suddenly fade away as
affected airports close, helicopter hire soars like the machines themselves, and even
the cost of a taxi will multiply if the driver thinks he might not be able to get back.
But for a while, some parts of the media seemed to have money to burn. The
second half of the twentieth century saw a major expansion in the money spent gathering news of all kinds, especially disasters, and much of it was driven by television.
The Guardian editor C.P. Scott could famously predict that “no good” would come
of television,12 but one of his rivals13 in the UK’s first commercial network could
equally famously boast that he had been issued “a license to print money.” The rival
U.S. networks of NBC, CBS, and ABC could outbid each other in their coverage,
each fronted by a household name, while CNN in unfashionable Atlanta endeavored to unseat them. The era of twenty-four-hour news channels had arrived, concentrating on breaking news, whatever its actual significance. On quiet news days,
they would play the same video or audio clip again and again. On the disaster days,
they would swing into action, using prearranged links to a welter of broadcasters
whose own styles have moved inexorably from studio sets to street scenes.
In the twenty-first century, mobile telephony has opened whole continents
to information access like never before. African villages that may still have only
one communal TV set now have smart phones. African populations have made
an enormous leap across a technology spectrum that had offered them nothing
before.14 Contrast this with a few years ago when the headmistress of a large secondary school in Swaziland told me that her pupils had no idea where their World Food
Programme (WFP) aid came from—“and neither do I.”
With a little help, that headmistress could now show her pupils where the food
comes from, tapping into smart phone links on YouTube, or running Skype chats
with the people who might help them grow better crops themselves. Such access
might encourage the donors to ask their “beneficiaries” what is required before
they supply, and also combat the stultifying fatalism that leaves so many children
just as stunted as their lack of vitamins. Media campaigns, such as The Guardian’s
regular reports from the Ugandan village of Katine,15 help that process, but real
change may come when means of communication sit firmly in the hands of the
villagers themselves. And that day is not far off, as cell phones spread like wildfire
across the world.
For many, information overload led directly to compassion fatigue. A new
drought in East Africa—or is it West Africa? (In fact, in 2011, it was both.) Urgent
pleas for donations from a familiar group of agencies were met by an unusually
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slow response from Western governments battling budget cuts and fighting to
maintain levels of aid pledged in rosier times. Members of the public gave generously, but there were legitimate questions about how many more times they would
be asked to save the starving child. Proponents of development rather than emergency handouts trotted out the cliché that if you give a man a fish, he will eat
for a day, if you teach a man to fish, you will feed him for life, to which a weary
aid official responded: “Yes, but the lake’s dried up.”16 Templated stories gave the
idea that disaster was recurrent, predictable, and followed patterns: from rubble to
tented cities to cholera outbreaks to stories written on the first anniversary that so
often begin with a child’s name: “Muhammad lost half his family . . . .”
With global financial turmoil gripping both the developed and developing
worlds since 2008, the media could not escape a cold blast of reality. Famous titles
disappeared from the newsstands as rising costs and falling audiences swamped
them.17 Equally famous names such as the BBC found financial support waning, forcing news teams from different divisions to work together to keep down
costs. Advertising revenue, in particular for television and print, dropped away.18
(Insurance costs alone could scupper the chances of sending a news team to cover
an event that may or may not turn into a major disaster.)
In some cases, the use of social media mirrored the agendas of the more familiar news outlets: delirious flattery for the latest music sensation; rage at a rape case;
fervent support or ferocious condemnation of politicians like President Obama,
who used the network brilliantly to help his election, and perhaps came to rue its
impact on his ratings. At other times, the social network made its own agenda. A
thirty-minute video that attracted more than 70 million online viewers in a week
is a case in point. A small charity had a committed filmmaker produce a video on
their work and on one of their targets—Joseph Kony.19
So it is no wonder that many branches of traditional media turn to cell phone
screens, blogs, and onsite video channels to supplement and even substitute their
own coverage. In one sense, they have been doing this for years: the international
wire agencies20 were the Twitters of their day, with largely anonymous correspondents filing reports from every capital and major city as wholesalers to the world’s
media retailers. They too have had to change their approach, providing elements
of their coverage without charge on innumerable websites while charging premium rates for their very best material—most of it related to financial and commercial markets.
But disasters have a habit of echoing right through those trading floors, as carefully analyzed scenarios are turned upside down by events on the coast of Japan or
in Haiti.
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Disasters and Stakeholders
While the traders hit their keys in response to the latest disasters, a disparate set of
groups spring into action. These are the “stakeholders,” in the parlance of the aid
world, who are thrown together whenever a disaster strikes:
the government departments whose job it is to safeguard a nation’s health,
safety, security, and general well-being;
the official international agencies, such as the United Nations (UN) humanitarian family, with global mandates to serve the vulnerable and dispossessed,
backed by national and international funding; agencies such as USAID and
Europe’s ECHO;
the myriad nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ranging from the Red
Cross/Crescent Society and Bill Gates’s Global Fund, to religious charities,
to a couple of Texas carpenters building one home at a time for tsunami
victims, all responding to the natural wave of sympathy and support that a
disaster brings;
communities, national, regional or local, that may be drawn from the victims of
a disaster or from others threatened by it, or from generous people far away.
Almost all of them, in an emergency, will find themselves seeking the oxygen of
publicity—or being sought out by a demanding media when they are already overwhelmed. How these groups use, and might better use, the media is a key factor in
whether they emerge in the aftermath of disaster honored or ignored.

Stakeholders, Disasters, and the Media
Alistair Cooke, once the doyen of foreign correspondents with his weekly broadcast
“Letter from America,” remarked that the only way to judge a journalist was by the
quality of his sources. Anyone in media hoping to present her readers, listeners, or
viewers with a portrait of what is happening in the world of aid would make little
headway without sources within the community of stakeholders. Some sources
would be known to many, such as a minister or an agency head. Other sources may
never show their faces in public—the “Deep Throat” of Watergate, the “usually
informed” or “reliable” sources where trust lies more with the believing journalist
than with the potentially opportunistic whistleblower.
How the potential sources among stakeholders interact with the media may
not directly affect the work they do or should do. But how their supporters and
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critics see them, and how their supporters react when asked for help or reject hindrance, can be influenced by how the stakeholders are presented in the media.

Governments, Disasters, and the Media
When disaster strikes—either on a national or regional scale, or closer to home,
say, within a government agency itself—is the time when a government’s relationship to the media is put to the test. It may have to face international media if the
crisis attracts global attention, but it is often at local and national levels that a good
relationship with the local press pays off best.
Until the onset of social media, some governments could bask in the comfort
of an entirely state-controlled media. They had little to fear from the Soviet-era
Pravda, President Mubarak’s fawning Egyptian Gazette, or the broadcasts of Radio
Peking under Mao Zedong. While a more open press has flourished in many countries since the fall of the Berlin Wall, radio and television, both with a wider reach,
have remained a principal tool of dictators everywhere.
The products of such systems are invariably dull, pedantic, and so far removed
from reality that even a disaster can be buried alive. Editorial staff who work under
the yoke of malicious state control lose their perspective in their constant search
for the ultrapositive. For the rest of the world, a lively, driven media may actually
get read, heard, or seen—but it means their governments have to work harder to
get a sympathetic hearing.
One of the first acts of any new government is to appoint an information minister. For journalists, alas, they rarely live up to their title.21 The government spokesman (occasionally a woman, but more often than not, a man) usually has more to
say, and, if they are truly professional, will always be ready to say it. But a journalist
who relied on speaking only to spokespersons of any hue would have a lackluster
career, because the spokespeople must invariably be “on message” and, if threatened, must guard the gates of government against assault.
Given half a chance, the spokesperson will attempt a more sophisticated role,
that of “spin-doctor.” Turning a nightmare catastrophe into a glorious triumph by
becoming a spin-doctor is much resented by journalists, but there will always be
those officials that cannot resist trying to put a positive spin on a clearly negative
story. Another more mundane role of the spokesperson is equally important: They
are a route to the top. Most journalists want to speak to the organ grinder, not
the monkey, and they work hard to get the most senior voice they can. A friendly
word with a spokesperson often works. This cozy relationship between the media
and their principal sources may not look much like the bombast coming out of a
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dictator in front of his cowering head of broadcasting, but the aim is the same—to
keep the message sweet.
In disasters beyond the control of government, events themselves will take precedence over the words of even the most powerful leader. But sooner or later the
spotlight turns on who needs to fix the roads, drain the fields, house the homeless
and open the airports. Invariably it is government that finds itself in the limelight.
For journalists, the questions are easy: Why was help too slow or too rushed; why
has so little or so much been spent; why wasn’t this fixed last time; what’s to stop
it from happening again?
Counterintuitively, the sooner those questions get posed, the easier they will be
to answer. A good government mouthpiece should be out there immediately saying
what is known so far. At that stage, few journalists will have their own information
to challenge what is being said. But if the government waits “until the situation
becomes clearer,” chances are it will have become muddier. The spokesperson may
now have some beautiful charts to show what has been done, but the enterprising
journalist has been there, seen a different picture, and has the quotes and photos to
challenge the official line.
It is at this point that officialdom starts to stonewall and denials multiply, not
only of facts but also of obvious conclusions.22 Some spokespersons are very proud
of being able to handle any question, no matter how tough. The trouble is they can
look like a boxer who builds a great defensive shield but fails to land the punch that
wins the bout. Some spokespersons defend so well that they rarely get around to
saying anything positive about the organization that pays them so well.
Some are masters, however: The U.S. ambassador to the UN under George W.
Bush, John Bolton, once declined to answer a tough question. When it was asked
again in a different form, he said, “Go ahead, it will be interesting to see how many
times you pose that question before you give up.” It was Bolton, the archetypal neocon, who also said that you could chop ten floors off the top of the United Nations
building in New York and “it wouldn’t make a bit of difference.”23
The UN, Disasters, and the Media
Lose ten floors off the UN HQ and a journalist might miss a couple of useful sources,
but it is more likely to have a greater impact on the ground. When the UN Offices
in Baghdad were bombed in 2003 it robbed the UN of sixty staff including its highly
respected Iraq chief Sergio Vieira de Mello. Furthermore, it robbed journalists covering the conflict in Baghdad of the expertise, experience, and data gathering that
makes the UN much sought after by the media.
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In times of disasters, journalists can rely on the UN for more than just quotes—
for access, for vital statistics to back up their own anecdotal evidence, for protection
if the story gets too hot. That is not to say that the UN is universally popular among
journalists who often like to see themselves as much more in touch with events on
the ground. It is quite easy to paint a picture of the UN as overpaid suits operating behind heavily protected walls, breezing around town in gleaming white Land
Cruisers and ready to cut and run at the slightest hint of trouble.
What is undeniable is that the UN’s hierarchical system of checking and
rechecking can mean that its reports and responses take days to appear. It can also
lead to heavy self-censorship to avoid upsetting the Member States who in the end
own the UN—and some of whom themselves see the UN as the enemy within.
UNICEF is widely judged by its sister agencies in the UN to be the most adept at
news management. “They don’t move without thinking about the media,” grumbled a UN veteran who knows his agency has fewer media professionals worldwide
than UNICEF has in one office. Another agency organizing a huge convoy into
Iraq seethed when UNICEF turned up with a handful of trucks emblazoned with
its name—and stole all the media thunder.
But one other reason why UNICEF is so well known—in spite of having an
acronym whose original meaning is often forgotten24—is that it has National
Committees. These organizations, independent of the agency itself and of each
other, run much of the publicity and fundraising at the local level in many developed
countries. Other agencies rely on their top executive to get their message across.
Josette Sheeran came from a media background to head the WFP, and frankly, her
glamorous appearance did no harm either.25 UNICEF chief Carol Bellamy26 may
have been a tough taskmaster, but she could turn on the gritty charm for the media
whenever required.
Increasingly, UN agencies are looking to social media to go beyond their own
circles to the public at large. Punchy blogs stripped of the UN’s love for acronyms
and words like “psychosocial” are posted within minutes of an event, as are emailed
invitations to support a named child with a small donation.27 Yet for many senior
UN staff, releasing the genie from the social network bottle means losing control,
and increased risk of stepping on the toes of their masters.
Some of those toes belong to the funding agencies, the donors whose decisions
can make the difference between life and death in a disaster. For the UN and most
other aid agencies, funding only flows in when a disaster strikes, the result of urgent
appeals that make up so much of the early media coverage. But once funds start
to arrive, the UN teams on the ground are in the eye of the storm, and part of that
storm is whipped up by another set of initials, the NGOs.
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NGOs, Disasters, and the Media
One UN agency counts more than 1,100 NGOs as its partners. Though the term
NGO might not be on everyone’s lips, the individual names are among the world’s
best-known “brands”— the Red Cross and Red Crescent, World Vision, Oxfam,
Save the Children, Greenpeace, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). And they are so
well known because above all they know how to use the media.
The suffering child with huge eyes and a swollen belly is an enduring symbol
of innumerable campaigns. Though glossy or homespun posters, charity workers
shaking tins on street corners, and subsidized advertising play their part, it is the
extent of media coverage that marks the successes from the also-rans. Public relations lore suggests that an unpaid article written by a real journalist is worth many
times more than paid advertising space. The one-minute video promotions shown
between TV bulletins may be fully sponsored, but an interview embedded in the
bulletin itself will have a greater impact.
In disasters, television leads the way—and some of its material is made by the
NGOs themselves. The high quality of even the smallest cameras, complete with
realistic shaky images, means that broadcasters can show aid workers as they move
in. NGO bloggers and tweeters have much more freedom than their UN counterparts not only to describe what they are doing, but also to pin down those they feel
should do more. MSF is renowned for calling everyone to task, lambasting all and
sundry. The impact can be twofold—to prompt the slow-footed into action, and
to raise funds from members of the public who admire their forthright manner—
which in turn won MSF a Nobel Peace Prize.
As with the UN, NGOs are not universally popular. Their heavy guns sent into
an emergency can shoulder aside their local colleagues and sour the work done
in building good relations on the ground. Their solutions, worked out around a
desk in a distant capital, might not gel with local communities who resist change.
In their home countries, NGOs are frequently questioned about how much of
the funds they collect actually go to their beneficiaries and how much is spent on
administration or travel.
And in all the turmoil of a disaster, the media are there looking over their
shoulders. Once behind a lens, a news photographer will stop at little to get the
shot—and if there is a crowd, they will jostle along with their text counterparts.
Like the UN, NGOs spend many hours training their staff to accept media as a
necessity rather than a mere nuisance or an actual hindrance.
Some of the larger agencies try to ensure media coverage by taking selected
journalists in with them. The journalists might insist on paying their way, and
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though they will be grateful for the access, the best of them will still keep their professional distance, and the wise trip organizer will keep a watchful eye in case the
whole thing goes wrong.
Courting publicity for any cause can backfire. An aid worker in West Africa
complained bitterly that a campaign to help people deliberately mutilated by rebel
forces had turned sour when insistent photographers made them “into a freakshow,” prompting revulsion rather than sympathy.28 The maker of the Kony video
mentioned earlier won notoriety himself when he was filmed running naked and
in distress near his home.29
Providing access is only one of the ways an agile NGO can improve its media
coverage. High-quality data-gathering pays off if boiled down to easily assimilated
facts. Introductions to the main players or even something as simple as offering
recorded samples of local music to a radio reporter yields dividends. Willingness
to answer questions while providing graphic details on the importance and success
of their work is the hallmark of an excellent NGO spokesperson—and they will be
sought out wherever they land.

The Public, Disasters, and the Media
Journalists love to recount their adventures in getting to the scene of a disaster
against insuperable odds. But even the most agile reporter cannot beat the victim
of a catastrophe who pulls out a mobile phone, snaps a surprisingly high-quality
shot, and sends it off around the world (even if in fact it was only meant for a
faraway member of the family). Communities of such people have begun to exercise their advantages of local presence and knowledge to campaign on their own
behalf.
Some communities use the NGO route, though it can be difficult to sort the
genuine from the grifters.30 Social media work well at the other end of the pipeline,
too. Email campaigns based on the old principle of chain letters can raise large
amounts of cash in very few days—though they too need careful scrutiny for scams
and spams.
As the instant access of social media spreads to every corner of the planet, the
possibilities of community-inspired media getting ahead of a disaster are increasing. Rather than wait for a drought to hit, a well-organized community can launch
a targeted appeal for money to buy grain, or sponsor wells, or agricultural extension work to identify more resilient crops. This puts powerful mitigating tools in
the hands of those most affected.
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Disasters and the Big Picture
Earthquakes, drought, floods, and fire have been with us since time began, and
media of all types know about handling them. But what of the big-ticket items that
worry so much of the world’s thinkers and planners: climate change, environmental damage, deepening poverty, crippling disease, and the demand for universal
education? If the media are adept at handling instant disasters, they are perhaps less
assured in how to deal with these ongoing challenges. And while the media struggle,
voices in the wings insist that they can do much more than report passively what
they see and hear.
All media, from the self-important “Thunderer” (as the Times of London once
styled itself) to the humblest blogger, thrive on change. But they are also addicted
to speed, and no matter how big the looming disaster of climate change, no matter
how destructive rising poverty to the future of the global village, actual change can
be very hard to spot and track day by day. Add a third motivator, which is controversy, and much of the media will struggle—to use an old print-era phrase—to
“hold the front page!”
For example, it is well established that human-made climate change will have a
catastrophic impact, but perhaps not for years to come. Polar ice melt will swamp
whole island nations but is just an almost imperceptible drip-drip every day. The
media might report the first findings and the most dramatic, but struggle to find the
vital new “angle” they need on a regular basis to avoid the unforgivable journalistic
sin of running the same story twice. That the vast majority of the world’s experts
agree that human-made climate change is a huge threat and must be checked makes
matters worse: Where is the opportunity for the “on the one hand, on the other
hand” adversarial style of most established media?
No small wonder, then, that to the fury of the conventionally wise, the mavericks that decry climate change as “media hysteria” themselves become the ones
who find journalists beating a path to their door.31 Mix in the fact that media love
a rogue more than a saint, and “good causes” have a hill to climb. There is also a
risk that well-meaning campaigners will “cry wolf,” overstating their case in the
interests of people who are genuinely suffering.
Concerns about life-threatening health risks fare better in the media. Bulletins
from the World Health Organization about bird or swine flu are given huge publicity, which in turn drives governments to act fast.32 Most journalists try hard to be
careful with stories on the latest miracle cure for cancer, but it can be tough to separate hyperbole from reality when a highly respected agency or a world-famous actor
is warning that an entire region is about to suffer the worst disaster it has ever faced.
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Human-made disasters, principally wars, have an easier route to the front page.
This time the old cliché that the first victim of war is truth is difficult to avoid for
the media and their sources alike. Like soldiers sending letters home from the front,
almost all media will respect a degree of censorship in wartime—unless they are
reporting for the other side, but then that tends to be called spying.
On the inside pages and in the TV and radio documentaries, there is a chance
to take a more nuanced view of the long-term impact of a slow- burning threat,
and many responsible media outlets do just that.33 Plus, media outlets can hardly
be blamed if the public prefers the celebrity scandal, the reality TV show or, enormously important for most media, the sport. So, can the media be more proactive
in saving the planet, and can they ever be seen, as some would like, as “a Force
for Good”?

Media: A Force for Good, Neutral, or a Necessary Evil?
Whenever media are in the dock—as they were after journalists at the Murdochowned News of the World in Britain were found to have hacked into the phones of a
large number of its targets—the charges are familiar. The media are intrusive, abusive, disrespectful, money-grabbing, salacious—and everyone knows that because
they all read, see, and hear the media.
When a media house does a clear public service—the Washington Post’s exposure of Watergate, the Sunday Times’s campaign on behalf of disfigured victims of
the thalidomide drug—its achievement is honored by jealous peers and grudgingly
respected by the public. But since the media can only be judged by their latest story,
the glory fades fast. Some media identify with carefully selected good causes, especially at festive times such as Christmas in Western countries.
Campaigners34 argue that the media can do much more to educate and advise
their audiences on critical issues affecting their lives. In the case of disasters, members of the public could be advised to stock certain types of food during periods
threatened by drought, to erect flood defenses, to build stronger quakeproof houses,
to boil drinking water, or to sleep under malaria-proof bed nets.
Along with every other communicator, the media cannot just say useful things.
They must also say interesting things. Unlike a boss who can oblige a subordinate
to read her demand to cut down on paperclips, the media cannot oblige anyone to
look or listen to what they write or say. Journalists constantly look for new angles
on old stories, but the burden also rests on their sources to make their material
interesting, and not just important.
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So, can media ever be neutral, a disinterested but by no means uninterested
recorder of whatever happens? The unsung heroes (to this entirely biased writer)
are the local, national, and international news agencies, the “wire services” who
feed a constant flow of as-it-happens reports to almost all the world’s established
media, who then choose what they will use.
The blunt instrument of media can certainly be evil in the wrong hands. The
radio stations in Rwanda that goaded and screamed the murdering gangs into
genocide were using the same basic medium that Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma used
to address her followers after years of government-imposed silence.35 The walls of
the Schindler’s Factory museum in Poland display chilling Nazi newssheets alongside schoolgirl letters describing the devastating effects on their wartime lives.36
To get the most good out of media, campaigners for any cause must make what
they say as persuasive and interesting as possible. Fortunately, there are some welltried tools that help do the job.

Tools for Disasters
The dedicated media campaigner can tap into a range of tools that have long been
used successfully to attract and maintain media attention, but first a word about
preparation. “I have no idea what this interview is about” is an awful admission.
A campaigner should use any encounter with the media as an opportunity to get
across what is happening, what is being done and what is needed. Translating
everything into the language of the café from that of the office is a vital step. Only
then will the maximum benefit come.
The humble press release remains a staple of almost all aid agency media campaigns. It should be brief, tightly edited and contain all the salient facts, backed up by
a powerful quote or two, and supplied with useful contact details. Thousands upon
thousands hit the media every hour, and sadly most end up “spiked,” in the bin.
A news release can be reworked as a series of tweets, a usable set of Q&As, or
an op-ed piece penned by the most senior person available. But for maximum
impact, a human being is required. And an interview, broadcast live, is still one of
the best ways of getting the messages across. While it is more comfortable to chat
with a reporter on the phone or (rare in these hectic times) over a beer or lunch, the
journalist involved remains at liberty to select whatever elements he wants. A live
interview reduces that risk dramatically, and a well-prepared and practiced interviewee will win out almost every time over even the most aggressive interrogator.
Once a journalist is “hooked,” a field trip to a disaster area is a popular means
of promoting a cause. Careful planning is essential, as is monitoring of results,
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as such trips are rarely cheap in financial terms and sometimes very expensive in
terms of reputation.
Perhaps most risky of all is a poorly planned news conference, because if one
journalist is a threat, a group of journalists is a radioactive hazard. Our advice at
MediaTrain is to explore every aspect of media relations before resorting to a press
conference, and then have it very firmly handled by a seasoned press officer who is
not afraid to be a policeman for the day.
Whatever tools are used, they all need regular polishing. Practice interview
techniques in front of a mirror, write a new report in the alternative style of an
op-ed piece, sit in on a press conference with the journalist’s best-loved tool, a
notebook. Many worry that too much practice can make messages sound overrehearsed and stilted: In this author’s experience, the vast majority of people facing
the media are far away from reaching that point in their media-facing lives.

Disasters and the Media: A Never-Ending Story
Whether a disaster is instant, such as an earthquake, or ongoing, such as climate
change, the basic human urges to know what is going on, and to listen to a frightening story, will remain.
Whether the media transmit information to the inside of your eyeball, or boil it
all down to an entirely arbitrary 140 characters, or blast it out of rows of loudspeakers no one can ignore, the awful, the terrible, the catastrophic will always be with us.
Though the media may never want to be a force for good (and sometimes want
to be deliberately evil), there are going to be well-meaning people who, with skill,
speed, and ingenuity, can make the media a critical part of their toolbox. In turn,
that may help prevent, predict or mitigate an impending disaster. Whatever happens, the media, in one form or another, will always be there to report it.

269

CH20_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p255-269.indd 269

2/13/13 11:02 PM

Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
Looking Beyond the “Latest and Greatest”

Christopher Holshek

There is a tendency, in a world of increasingly ephemeral attention spans, to pay
greater attention to the “latest and greatest” developments to generalize about
current topics. Behavioral psychologists and economists call this the “availability
heuristic.” The well-publicized tensions between nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and particularly the U.S. military at various times would suggest that civilmilitary coordination in humanitarian crises has been perpetually poor. However,
when the span of these relations is examined both horizontally across the globe
and vertically through time, a more assuring picture comes into view. By and large,
the humanitarian civil-military relationship has had more stories of success than
failure, suggesting it is not doomed from the start.
Even amidst the most contentious moments in the humanitarian civil-military
relationship, in 2005, the U.S. Institute of Peace noted that “interaction between
humanitarians and militaries had deepened over the last decade to include formalized exchanges, coordination, and institutional development of centers and
institutes. Indeed, an emergent consensus on coherence—coordination of intervention and humanitarian action—was emerging by the turn of the millennium.”1
Nonetheless, the difficulties experienced in post-9/11 international interventions
such as in Afghanistan and Iraq evinced serious ongoing challenges. An overview
of how these relations have evolved would not only provide some perspective, but
point to some ways ahead.
After the Cold War, the relationship between the military and civilian organizations providing relief services in the wake of natural or man-made disasters or
conflicts was maturing. While the 1990s were by no means a halcyon era, demand
for the services of both civilian and military providers of humanitarian services
grew exponentially. During that time, some clear trends with impact on this relationship emerged. A report by The Challenges Project noted:
One obvious change in peace operations over the last decade has been an increase
in the numbers and disciplines of contributors: international and national, gov270
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ernmental and nongovernmental, and military and non-military. The inability,
however, of this broad, diverse and complex set of layers to conceive, plan and
work together in managing a crisis and implementing a peace plan, despite the
massive commitment of financial and human resources, is a major challenge
in crisis management and modern peace operations today. On some occasions,
civil and military elements have worked together constructively and harmoniously, but on others the inability to achieve an appropriate level of cooperation
has seriously weakened the overall effectiveness of the mission. The reasons are
many and, although experience varies, the all-too-frequent instances of inability to cooperate willingly, to coordinate effectively and efficiently and to pursue
common objectives collectively and professionally are sometimes referred to as
the “Civil-Military Cooperation Issue (CIMIC) issue.”2
Beyond the mere proliferation of players, however, civilian relief organizations
grew increasingly more capable of taking on a greater role—indeed, the lead—in
humanitarian assistance operations. The United Nations has steadily improved
since the initial implementation of the 2001 Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, better known as the “Brahimi Report,” in the wake of the peacekeeping disasters of the 1990s. Better resourced, more professionally staffed, and
more operationally adept, the UN, NGOs, and (as of late) regional organizations
and even private industry have been taking on roles and tasks that the military had
been performing, more or less, by default since before the Second World War.
With its own maturation, the “humanitarian community” eventually developed a universal set of principles and guidelines for the conduct of humanitarian
assistance—what the military calls “doctrine”—beginning with the Code of Conduct
for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief in 1994 as well as the first humanitarian
civil-military guidelines: UNHCR’s UNHCR and the Military—A Field Guide, now
in its second edition. By the middle of the first decade of the new century, the
maturation of the UN’s Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance
(OCHA), which has become an authority on humanitarian civil-military coordination, resulted in additional guidelines, the most important of these being The Use
of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief, better known as the
“Oslo Guidelines.” This is the preeminent document codifying what is known as
“humanitarian space” defined by the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality—for many humanitarian organizations a catechism if not a doctrine.3
They have also developed their own coordinating structures, first in conjunction with UN lead agencies such as UNHCR, and then with the adoption of the
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UN’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) “cluster” approach in 2005. In
many cases, the relationship between these lead organizations or consortia and
many of the especially smaller NGOs are contractual or subcontractual in the sense
of market specialization in relief or predevelopment services.
This growth in civilian capability and sophistication has been good news, but
it has also led to the corresponding need for the military to better understand and
coordinate with civilian activities, as these actors demand a greater say, not so much
in the international political decision-making process, but in related operational
decisions on the ground. This has complicated matters for the military.
Even more significant, however, NGOs now appear in many more forms,
including the local or indigenous NGO, which tends to take over the brunt of
relief activity, either supplanting international civilian relief groups or as competing organizations, as the situation develops. In addition, many (especially
indigenous) NGOs, are sponsored by (or affiliated with) political and religious
organizations, thus blurring the distinction between a humanitarian NGO and
the plethora of like but different “civil society organizations.” The humanitarian space, in turn, has experienced its own version of “mission creep,” in which
development organizations, advocacy or activist groups, and some other private
assistance organizations have cloaked themselves in the humanitarian principles.
Beyond making it much more difficult not only to define what an NGO is, this
has made if vastly more complex and difficult for the military to determine by
what rule sets these organizations should indeed play. (This is why it is instructive
to “follow the money”—i.e., investigate the donor sources of an NGO in order
to determine its real aims and interests.) And what of those NGOs, more established and having a record of adhering to the principles that should afford them
their special status, that choose to collaborate with, albeit for practical reasons,
less impartial and neutral organizations, or obtain funding from government
agencies? Has their own impartiality and neutrality in this process been compromised? These questions have further exacerbated the challenge of civil-military
coordination.
As for the military, Karen Guttieri, in “Civil-Military Relations in Peacebuilding,”
notes:
Just as we must ask which civilians form the civil-military relationship, it also
matters which military forces are involved. Some militaries bring international
political baggage. Accepting troop contributors from interested regional actors
or major powers may increase the odds of military effectiveness at the expense
of political impartiality. Secondly, militaries have different orientations toward
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society. Some have been segregated from society and oriented toward defense
against uniformed adversaries on a defined battlefield. . . . Other militaries have
more recent experience with counter insurgencies and other internal control
functions.4
In spite of all these developments, the military remains a relatively dominant
player. Beyond leadership, planning and training, the military enjoys comparative advantages in organization, intelligence, operations, logistics, medical services,
engineering, etc., along with large amounts of funding. Parallel to the rising competence of civilian organizations has been the military’s growing ability for civilmilitary synchronization, often at the hands of specialists. In the United States,
it is called civil affairs (CA); in NATO, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); and,
in the UN, civil-military coordination (CM-Coord for civilian humanitarians,
UN-CIMIC for peacekeeping forces).
Depending on national policies, the civil-military relationship, and doctrinal
culture, civil-military operations could mean different things. CA, for example,
grew out of the U.S. Army’s experiences with military government dating back to
the 1830s. Now, its “full-spectrum” capabilities support U.S. global strategy, concerned lately with antiterrorism and counterinsurgency. NATO CIMIC, looking to
coordinate numerous national approaches, was formed by post Cold War adventures in the Balkans and other “out-of-area” operations, emphasizing support of
the military mission within a specific political mandate. The UN concept, which
is newest, is less about command and control and more about coordination. This
diversity of civil-military approaches has likewise complicated matters for civilian
organizations trying to work with the military.
Furthermore, the “complexity of interdependence between civilian-military is
not simply because both communities are engaged in all functional categories of
peace operations, but due to other complicating factors”5:
The plethora of civil and military organizations in number, type, and status, as
well as their activities in a given mission area;
The relative impact of progress or failure in one activity on another (among
them, security operations on humanitarian assistance actions);
Changes in the roles and capabilities among players at various times;
Obstacles, misunderstandings, and dilemmas (discussed below) impacting
civil-military cooperation and coordination, some derived from fundamental differences in corporate culture and others from circumstances;

273

CH21_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p270-286.indd 273

2/14/13 12:51 PM

CHRISTOPHER HOLSHEK

The ability and willingness of each community to appropriate resources, personnel, money and technology to civil-military coordination.
However, an additional complication came into greater play following 9/11;
namely, the simultaneity of conflict and peace operations. Again, the Challenges
Project noted:
In the 1990s . . . peacekeeping followed a sequence: if conflict prevention failed
then one moved on to various means of peacemaking; once there was an agreement to pursue a peaceful solution then traditional methods of peacekeeping
could be applied; and finally, once peace had taken hold, peace-building could
begin. . . . The reality of today’s operations, however, is that there is essentially
no such tidy sequence. Conflict prevention, diplomatic peacemaking, peace
enforcement actions, classic peacekeeping, peace-building and nation-building
(development) are often all taking place simultaneously. In addition, humanitarian assistance operations have been required in addressing the consequence
of these recent conflicts.6
More than any other complicating factor, it was the commingling of conflict
and peace operations that caused the greatest rub between NGOs and U.S. forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan. The major difference is that, prior to 9/11, relief workers had
been used to being much more in “postconflict” situations and thus relatively permissive environments for humanitarian assistance. Working under more hostile
conditions was more the exception than the rule. Following 9/11, the reverse happened. In short, peace operations, to include humanitarian assistance, have become
a considerably more dangerous business for the military and civilians alike.
In response to methodologies used by U.S. forces, many NGOs issued strong
protests, fearing these methods compromised the neutrality of NGOs and, in blurring the ostensible distinctions between combatants and noncombatants, endangered NGO personnel working with or in proximity to military forces attempting
to “win hearts and minds” through humanitarian actions and in attempts to “coordinate” civil-military humanitarian responses. Some, such as U.S. Special Forces
troops, operated in civilian clothing in order to better blend in.
Already by December 2002, NGOs began to articulate what were to become
enduring concerns about these methodologies as employed in Afghanistan. While
NGOs “welcomed the shift in Coalition focus to the establishment of a more secure
environment in which reconstruction can take place,” they also contended that
“using military structures to provide humanitarian assistance and reconstruction
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support will both prematurely deflect attention from Afghanistan’s deteriorating
security situation and also engage the military in a range of activities for which
others are better suited.” Namely, they were concerned that “(1) long-term impact
will be sacrificed for short-term political and military dividends, (2) communities
that oppose the current government may get different levels of aid than those who
support the government, (3) communities in conflict areas may receive different
levels of aid than those in areas considered stable and (4) the military will aim to use
NGOs as “force multipliers” to achieve political or security-related ends.”7
The NGOs also posited that “(1) military expenditures on assistance activity
could go much further in the hands of assistance professionals, and (2) because those
expenditures will be counted as a contribution to the assistance on Afghanistan
rather than as an internal expenditure of the military, this commitment will substitute for, rather than supplement, the commitments that the donors have already
made to help rebuild Afghanistan.” Then came the crux argument, as detailed in a
local coordinating agency report:
Local populations on the ground often cannot or will not distinguish between
soldiers and civilian aid workers engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction
activities. Military participation in assistance may significantly enhance antagonism towards humanitarian professionals and the risks that those the military
chooses to disengage from its reconstruction efforts, NGOs will be required
to take over and will be perceived as agents of the larger political and military
strategy as a result. While military-led assistance may be short term, the impact
on community perceptions of civilian humanitarians may be lasting.8

In addition to having the military focus exclusively on security missions, the
NGOs recommended that the military “should not engage in assistance work
except in those rare circumstances where emergency needs exist and civilian assistance workers are unable to meet those needs due to a lack of logistical capacity or levels of insecurity on the ground,” and if it does engage in such activities,
that they should fall under civilian leadership, be documented through a “transparent accountability mechanism,” and be held accountable to a “code of conduct agreed upon between the military and representatives of the civilian assistance community.” This led, in great part, to the Oslo Guidelines of 2006–2007.
The Pentagon’s response to this was, having already ordered soldiers back
into uniforms in the spring of 2002, to create Provisional Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs) to create more “whole-of-government” U.S. military and civilian interagency responses for stability and reconstruction in outlying areas in Afghanistan,
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including military CA personnel and civilian representatives from governmental
agencies, mainly the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but not
NGOs. More familiar coordinating mechanisms such as civil-military operations
centers (CMOCs) were also employed. Despite all this, many NGOs maintained
their objection to the military conduct of humanitarian assistance per se. In July
2004, following the murder of five of its aid workers, Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan under protest, marking the
nadir of the humanitarian civil-military relationship.
Yet, the dilemma remains that, while civil-military coordination is essential to
the success of either community, civilian interaction with the military risks compromised humanitarian space. In finding a way through the thicket of civil-military
issues in humanitarian assistance operations in general and under semi- or nonpermissive conditions in particular, it is helpful to reorient through examination
of these essential characteristics of the two communities.
Regardless of the level of progress in civil-military coordination over the years,
there are essential differences in the modus operandi of military and civilian organizations. While the military normally focuses on reaching clearly defined objectives through linear operational (planning and execution) progressions with given
timelines under a unified command and control structure, civilian organizations are
concerned with a process of fulfilling changeable political or social interests through
a fluctuating sequence of dialogue, bargaining, risk-taking, and consensus-building.9
British Army Major General Timothy Cross, in an earlier publication in this
Series, provides an excellent detailed analysis of the differences between military
and civilian organizations in humanitarian assistance fundamental to corporate
cultures:
Any operational development has a number of “lines of operation”; the military line is alongside the political, diplomatic, legal, economic, media, and
humanitarian lines. To be effective, military commanders must face up to the
challenges of shattered societies as well as direct military threats. They need
to remain focused on their primary imperative, that of establishing a secure
environment to enable the other lines to be developed, but balancing the various frictions is not easy . . . taken to an extreme the military can be too “task”
orientated, becoming over-controlling, autocratic, and critical; the individual
is held to be subservient to the greater good. State focused, with legitimacy
coming from the State, the military are, by definition, political servants and are
neither neutral, impartial or independent. Too often we can forget individual
needs and close our minds to others’ views; often our head rules our heart.10
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Cross lists the strengths of NGOs as: being principled in humanitarianism,
which is the basis for their legitimacy; knowledgeable, in having served in many
countries and skilled in their work; committed to the longer-term, which is often
the nature of such operations; networked with other organizations and locals,
much more adept at “relationship-building”; linked to the media and thus able to
command a moral imperative for humanitarian intervention; and enhancing the
role of women. Their weaknesses, however, often include low material resources,
the inability to respond quickly to changing conditions, overemphasis on single
issues and a view of other organizations, military and civilian, often as competitors.
Cross notes:
The NGOs exhibit softer, more manageable cultural traits than the military;
traits that make them, generally, less confrontational and, generally, fairly effective in multicultural environments. There is rooted in their souls, a “bloody
line” divide . . . put there in their early years and which many struggle to cross
in their search for moral and ethical virtues and a “what I stand for” doctrine.
Nonetheless, taken to extremes, they can be self-indulgent, too focused on their
particular human issue and, living within a “rights-based” culture, they can be
resentful of control, morally arrogant, and blind to the dark side of individual
human nature; often their heart rules their head.11
These differences between military and civilian organizations are also reflected
along the “security-development nexus,” suggesting they are more fundamental
when seen across the whole spectrum of peace and conflict. As Fouzieh Melanie
Alamir has noted:
By nature, security and development actors are ascribed to different roles and
mandates in peace-building processes. . . . Different roles yield different selfconceptions and organizational cultures. While the military is entitled with
the mandate and capacities to use force, development policy relies on mutual
acceptance and cooperation. Consequently, this results in opposed self-conceptions: being an instrument of power on the one hand, and a provider of
aid/supporter on the other. The point of reference of the military is the nation
state; its ultimate legitimacy (in democratic societies) is the political will of the
legitimate authorities, based on national interests. The point of reference for
development actors, however, is ambivalent and differs among donor nations.
. . . Military actors conduct operations, development actors implement programs and projects. This is not only a difference in terminology, but also in
approaches, procedures, and time horizons.12
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The considerable differences between the nature and modus operandi of military and civilian organizations cannot be eliminated: The gap can never be closed.
It can, however, be considerably narrowed through mutual acceptance and a careful balance between humanitarian space and civil-military coordination. Instead
of focusing on differences, the impetus for better civil-military coordination in
humanitarian assistance can be well understood by thinking of such differences as
comparative advantages, which can be managed to achieve a workable degree of
complementarity (rather than compatibility):
Although civilian organizations have taken the lead in crisis responding and
“nation-building,” the military maintains certain comparative advantages
which complement the operational shortcomings of much of the civilian peace
operations community. . . . Beyond its primary role of securing the peace operations environment, the military can play a vital role in . . . the success of the
civilian peace operation community. This is particularly true in the early phases
when civilian organizations are not as well-deployed and resourced in the field
as the military, yet at the very time when certain actions, taken or not taken,
can have long-lasting impact on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international presence. This, paradoxically, is in the direct interests of the military
and sending states in order to minimize the military’s role—i.e., in supporting
the “exit strategy” and reaching the “end state.”13
Particularly in the post-9/11 world, military and civilian players are more codependent than ever before, driven by two overarching strategic imperatives: the constraints of a transforming environment for peace and security; and the restraints of
diminishing resources in the face of higher costs, risks, and demand for intervention. In other words: we all have to do more, together, with less.
The roots of both confrontation and cooperation in civil-military relations in
humanitarian assistance extend well before 9/11; if anything, the more dangerous
and complex environments in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated to experienced soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers an even greater need to find more
practical means to work together and bridge their more principled differences.
Thus, while it is important for the military to understand and respect the principles under which NGOs operate, it is likewise important for NGOs to understand
that their involvement has an unavoidable political context. If anything, because of
the emerging realities explained earlier, NGOs are now more politically relevant—
or at least perceived to be—than ever. Thus, while NGOs and other civil society
organizations should never abandon humanitarian space, which sets them apart
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from other intervening entities, they must also temper their principles with a certain degree of pragmatism, in order not to defeat their own purposes. One author
reflected that:
In any case, inasmuch as [the] military community needs to better understand
and accommodate the ways of the civilian community whose success in peace
operations is essentially a prerequisite, civilian organizations and their practitioners in peace operations—the majority of whom have no military experience—must likewise be prepared to work with the military, operating from
its side of the Clausewitzian continuum, this time between politics and peace.
Nevertheless, “the natural reluctance of governmental and nongovernmental
agencies to be seen as working with the military in complex emergencies has
diminished in recent years, and NGOs in particular are finding that collaboration can benefit all parties.”14
Even before 9/11, terrorists, insurgents, criminal organizations, and many other
informal power structures against the international interventions that can be called
“spoilers,” particularly in areas where culture and religion shape the dialogue, often
have little to no interest in NGOs improving life for indigenous populations—
unless they can take credit for it or at least have it perceived that way. If the spoilers
cannot co-opt or gain advantage from the presence and activities of NGOs, they will
do everything or anything necessary to frustrate them—from intimidation tactics
to kidnapping or even killing them. Because the spoilers are often most interested
in the status quo or status quo ante, they resent the presence and activities of relief
and development organizations that help people to move toward and become more
oriented on the future, regardless of their association with the military or any other
government organizations. Moreover, NGOs and other “change agents” come with
information and perspectives (such as the role of women and public education)
that resent competing ideas to the orthodoxy of many spoiler groups, helping to
connect these hitherto disconnected societies to the world outside.
It was no accident, for example, following the bombing of the UN compound in
Baghdad in August 2003, that many relief workers were killed, kidnapped, or otherwise dissuaded from continuing to be a force for positive change in that country. In
military terms, this was a deliberate campaign to attack the “operational center of
gravity”—the presence, willingness, and ability of these change agents to transition
local dependence on the military and other “occupiers” to more sovereign political
and economic control, a key feature of the “exit strategy.” In short, by attacking
NGOs and other civilian relief and development groups—again, often regardless
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of their relationship with the military—the spoilers are attacking the military and
the political cachet it represents and at least the perception of legitimacy so central to their operations. The presence of NGOs and other change agents helps to
legitimize this process of change—the more an international intervention looks
like the whole-of-world (let alone the whole-of-society or whole-of-government)
has come to help a distraught population, the more legitimacy it has. This essential
impact of the presence of NGOs has been one of the main reasons why the military
sometimes—and incorrectly—terms NGOs as “force multipliers.” The error is not
so much in recognizing the reality of this legitimizing factor, but in particular U.S.
forces forgetting that good civil-military operations are essentially an application
of the civil-military relationship in democratic societies.15
The military, however, is not alone in its clumsiness. In a rejoinder to the MSF
arguments for quitting Afghanistan, a Wall Street Journal journalist noted:
It’s a different world out there, and unless they want to get out of the aid business altogether, they’ll have to come to terms with it. . . . The new generation
of terrorists does not spare unarmed humanitarians. They do not leave clinics, schools and other benign civilian projects untouched: They destroy them
especially because they want civilians to suffer and reconstruction to fail. Fear
and backwardness are a kingdom they can rule; healthy, secure and prosperous
populations have no use for them. This means that humanitarian aid workers
are not neutral in the eyes of the terrorists; rather, because they work to make
things better, they represent a threat. . . . Whoever supports progress, stability
and the well-being of civil society is the enemy. In this deeply regrettable new
situation, security, development and aid are parts of an inseparable whole.16
The question, therefore, should not be whether there should be civil-military
coordination in humanitarian assistance, even in the least permissive of operational
environments, but how. Fortunately, much has already been developed on the ways
and means that military and civilian organizations can cooperate—and more needs
to be written. Nonetheless, any discussion of humanitarian civil-military coordination should include an exploration of the following areas:
Security. While security is primarily the military’s job, it is not exclusively
their concern. That is because security has become “more than globalized; it has
also become more humanized, civilianized and democratized.”17 “Human security,” which is predicated on the security of the individual and the community, has
gained ascendancy over “national security,” which is state-centric. On one hand,
the delivery of a secure environment, which is primarily a military responsibility,
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may have a much wider application for the military than either community is at
first willing to admit, especially in less permissive environments. Unfortunately, the
military often falls into the trap of security becoming an end in itself, rather than as
an enabler to the broader goal of peace. On the other hand, relief organizations not
only have an increasing stake in the security situation, but also a greater impact on
stabilization, which the military now sees as essential to security.
Often, immediately following a conflict or crisis, there is a vacuum of governance in essential public services (among them security), which intervening military forces have no other choice but to fill (or the spoilers will) until competent
and legitimate civilian authorities are in place. The rule of law, repair or development of essential political, economic, and communications and transportation
infrastructure, and so on, are necessary to initiating a virtuous cycle of security and
relief and recovery in that critical period. Freedom of movement, for example, is as
important to security operations as to humanitarian assistance. At least early on,
the military will need to be involved more directly and robustly in humanitarian
assistance, providing it themselves, securing civilian relief supplies, convoy escorts,
clearing mines, and unexploded ordnance, and so on. In any case, any military
humanitarian involvement should be done with a view to creating a lodgement
for humanitarian space, then looking to “civilianize” and “localize”—that is, turn
it over to international or, ultimately, local civilian authorities for service delivery.
In this respect, the military should actually look at how it can be a “multiplier”
to civilian relief capability and efforts. In this respect, the role of the military should
be seen as “enablers,” because the success of the change agent is a prerequisite to the
success of the military. This is in keeping both with the quest for an “exit strategy”
and the longer-term intent to empower locals. Understanding this enabler-change
agent relationship in terms of the applied democratic civil-military relationship is
the crux to resolving the security-relief conundrum and maintaining the delicate
balance between military and civilian interveners.
Security, for example, has both physical and psychological dimensions, as well
as humanitarian, economic, political, social, and cultural elements. While the military may rely on more physical means to provide security, civilian organizations
such as the ICRC depend on their transparency and neutrality to be able to work
among all sides. The Red Cross or Red Crescent on their vehicles may have greater
protective value than the armor plating of a 70-ton tank. Who can contribute what
to a safe and secure environment must be clearly understood and respected by all
players in the intervention, regardless of mission and operating principles.
Information. Information transparency is the engine of civil-military coordination, in both directions. While NGOs often have knowledge of the local culture and
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community, socio-psychological conditions, and humanitarian needs, the military
is privy to information on the security situation and threats to safety, mines, infrastructure assessments, weather, topography, and so forth. Information management
and database sharing, from the Afghanistan Information Management Service or
AIMS (www.aims.org.af) to OCHA’s One Response (http://oneresponse.info) to
humanitarian clustering, used with great effect in the response to the Haitian earthquake, have made great strides in humanitarian coordination over the past few years.
Still, there is much progress to be made, particularly considering every organization’s tendency to work with its own systems and information sets, the “information-is-power” psychology that pervades many organizations seen to be in competition with others, and the military’s sensitivity to information and thus operation
security and the habit of classifying information that may not require classification.
Because of the sensitivity of certain information, such as regarding spoilers, mines,
and other critical elements NGOs may encounter, civilian organizations need to
understand that providing the military such information, especially on a voluntary
basis, may serve their interest in helping the military create a more secure environment. The military in turn must view civilian organizations only as sources
of information—not intelligence. Despite the clear value of civilian organizations
as sources of operationally exigent information, particularly in what the military
calls “human intelligence” (more important to stability, antiterrorist, and counterinsurgency operations), both communities must establish, in advance, clear rules
of engagement on the collection, dissemination, and attribution of such information—the more discreet and indirect, the better.
Coordination. Beyond virtual means of civil-military information exchange,
specific physical coordination nodes, often built by the military, are necessary to
facilitate the most efficient and effective use of humanitarian assistance resources,
to the benefit of the affected population. This not only avoids the issue of duplicity and underlap, but it also helps to minimize the military’s direct involvement in
humanitarian assistance, helps collectively prioritize projects, takes advantage of
shared information in support of decision making, and most importantly, enables
civilian organizations to more quickly take the lead in humanitarian assistance,
mainly because it provides an overhead capability many (especially smaller) civilian relief organizations lack in terms of resources and management expertise to put
together. It also often helps mitigate a common problem in humanitarian assistance areas, which can simply be called “assessment fatigue.”
From the point of view of the recipients of aid, there is nothing more frustrating than watching countless organizations, civilian and military, show up to
assess—rather than address—their needs before aid finally arrives. In this respect,
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there is no quicker way to delegitimize even the most well-intentioned relief efforts,
and not just for a few. Whatever these coordination nodes are called is secondary.
The deployment of liaisons to help deconflict civil-military issues in the planning
and preparation phases, as well as to provide the civilian relief community the
opportunity to exercise its advocacy in reminding the military of its humanitarian
obligations, for example, is targeting.18 Beyond that, it suggests the idea of civilmilitary preventative actions—before the outbreak of a crisis.
Among these actions could be capacity-building among regional organizations
and local governments. The most important thing is that the civilian organizations
take control of the coordination effort—the sooner, the better. In addition, both
organizations need to be disciplined about personnel designated to play a liaison
role. For the military, this should be civil-military specialists (CA, CIMIC, etc.);
for relief organizations, it should be designated liaison personnel, preferably with
a background in working with the military (e.g., CMCoord), to represent one or
many organizations. This not only minimizes confusion, but also protects both
communities from under- and overcommitment. As with security and information, clear lines of coordination, through commonly agreed civil-military rules of
engagement, are even more important in hostile or semipermissive environments,
and as any business person knows, always with an eye to the market.
Logistics. Next to security and information, this is the most practical—and most
benign—area of civil-military cooperation. In fact, ideally, the majority of issues
between military and civilian relief organizations are and should be logistical. Better
shared resourcing not only enables more effective civilian-led relief, but also minimizes the resources the military has to draw from its core security operation—mitigating “mission creep.” Nonetheless, the military may need to realize the quickest
and most effective way to get civilian relief activities up and running effectively is to
provide an initial surge of logistical support effort. Logistical information-sharing
tools have vastly improved the ability of military and civilian organizations to work
together. And logistical support and especially logistical information-sharing is
perhaps the most discreet way the military can enable the success of change agents
like NGOs in a low-key, less visible manner with less risk of compromising (at
least the perception) of humanitarian space. Notable examples include AIMS, One
Response, or the Humanitarian Logistics Software developed by the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. In addition, logisticians—or
logistically versed operators—from both communities should be key members of
the civil-military planning and coordination cast.
Training and Education. As mentioned before, one of the greatest comparative advantages the military maintains is in professional development, due to the
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tremendous value many militaries place not just in training and education but also
in lesson-learning. In the U.S. Army, for example, an officer can spend as much as
40 percent of his or her career going to school. Unlike most civilian relief organizations, the military can and must afford the overhead. While training and education should be seen as an “allowable expense” by both civilian executive and
donor boards, the military (and other government agencies), again in the role as an
“enabler,” as a matter or programmed budgeting, should open the doors of many
of its institutions to civilians. This is enlightened self-interest, not just in improving the capacity of these organizations to more quickly espouse roles the military
(and other government agencies) would ultimately rather have civilian relief (and
development) organizations take on.
Moreover, their presence—prior to operations—has a co-educational value,
for operators and not just executives. Such steady state relationship-building
helps improve cross-institutional understanding, deconstructs often long-held
stereotypes, and ultimately improves civil-military and interagency coordination.
It reduces the learning curve while operators focus on the problem at hand and
critical time is going by, in addition to feeling out implementation partners. It also
enables selective collaboration on training and capacity-building of regional and
local organizations and leverages localization by allowing local players to more
quickly become stakeholders in the peace process and thus mitigate the threats
of spoilers.
Civilian institutions, however, are themselves offering more and more highquality training in many areas of peace operations such as those created by
OCHA and the Peace Operations Training Institute (www.poti.org). Some are, in
fact, collaborations between civil and military providers. There are too many to
list here, but many are listed with the International Association of Peacekeeping
Training Centers, or IAPTC (http://www.iaptc.org). Both civilian and military
organizations should redouble efforts to host information seminars and problem-solving oriented workshops to allow executives and especially operators to
come together and inform each other on their views of civil-military coordination and respective principles and procedures, as well as capabilities and limitations, in order to mitigate obstacles, misunderstandings, and dilemmas—before
the intervention takes place and precious time and credibility is lost on both
sides. This is an application of the insight that what you do in the “steady state”
builds the strategic and operational capital upon which players draw during crisis
response operations or in the field in general, with corresponding levels of success
or failure. That is because peace operations, including humanitarian assistance,
are more than a knowledge-based enterprise; they are essentially about building
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relationships. For that reason, beyond training and education, it should never be
forgotten:
We can promulgate all the information and education in the world, but the faceto-face coordination of two to eight people is irreducible. This NGO/military
relationship is about people. The ones controlling the operation in theater are
the most important linchpins in the entire endeavor. Good people matter—they
must be selected carefully.19
What is remarkable about especially the development of civilian (or collaborative) references, guidelines, and tools on humanitarian civil-military coordination,
is a tacit recognition of more than the inevitability of such, but more important its
value—by both sides. With all the talk about “paradigm shifts” in the civil-military
relationship in humanitarian actions over the past few years, the basis of the civilmilitary imperative in these situations, years before the situations in Afghanistan
and Iraq made them center stage, has long been recognized:
Operating to the principle of altruistic self-interest allows each community
to more properly assume its comparative advantage. Each community has
something unique to offer. NGOs bring humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the affected area, and sustained commitment. The military brings in
infrastructure that provides communication, logistics, and security. In its most
simple form, the equation works like this: the military’s infrastructure leverages
the NGOs into collaboration, which the NGOs provide the military with their
ticket home. In other words, NGOs are willing to participate in collaboration
and eventual coordination because of the need for a comprehensive effort, not
to mention that the military will sometimes move their relief supplies and personnel for free. The military, on the other hand, needs to transition to civilian
agencies in order to withdraw quickly—something to which both sides agree.20
While the challenges to civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance
are greater than ever, due to the more complex, difficult, and dangerous operational environments facing both military and civilian organizations, the risks and
rewards, likewise, at a higher level, are increasingly intertwined between these two
communities, who have become more co-dependent than ever to achieve respective
and collective success. If the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the limits of civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance in nonor semi-permissive environments, the widespread international and multilateral
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efforts to provide assistance to the victims of the tsunamis and earthquakes are
reaffirming its potential. Much has been achieved and much has yet to be achieved.
They key will be continuing to improve understanding the relationship between
these communities of actors and the political, social, and other human equities they
represent. This is where civil-military coordination writ large should be seen as an
application of the societal civil-military relationship.
Above all, the civil-military coordination in humanitarian assistance should be
about managing expectations, within and between these organizations and with the
affected population itself. The nirvana of complete integration and unity of effort
is just that, but it is also not necessary. Often, it is about mutual understanding of
the principles and missions that define their presence and operations, looking for
common aims and interests. Even if you agree to disagree, it may, as a minimum,
be about getting together in order to stay out of each other’s way. Coordination on
the practical issues of security, information management and information sharing,
coordination mechanisms and methods, and logistical matters should be the greater
area of concentration, and will help balance out the thornier issues of philosophical or even political differences. As in business, the customer (i.e., the recipient of
humanitarian assistance) should be king, and therefore have the greatest common
priority. One thing is clear—failure in civil-military coordination means not just
the failure of one or the other, but the failure of all and the suffering of many.
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PART V

Operational

In this section, four humanitarian specialists with extensive operational experience consider some of the specialized approaches that are essential in providing a
comprehensive and efficient response to a complex emergency. There are accepted
methods for rapid health assessments that will guide the early days in a disaster,
helping to bring the most appropriate assistance in the shortest time to those in
greatest need. Team building is an indispensable requirement for both immediate
and sustained response.
The techniques to achieve effective collaboration under trying circumstances
are presented here. The development of educational programs and an appreciation
of the contributions that indigenous people make in disaster risk management are
other topics that were selected from many other valid options.
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Evidence-Based Health Assessment Process
in Complex Emergencies
Frederick M. Burkle Jr., M.D.

Disaster assessment is defined as the “survey of a real or potential disaster to estimate the actual or expected damages and to make recommendations for preparedness, mitigation and relief action.”1 In natural disasters, such as rapid onset earthquakes and cyclones, the health consequences are usually the direct results of injury
or death. Often, however, the greatest toll on humans comes from the unappreciated long-term secondary effects as seen with slow moving droughts and massive
flooding.
Zwi has defined complex emergencies as “situations in which the capacity to
sustain livelihood and life are threatened primarily by political factors and, in particular, by high levels of violence.”2 The most common complex emergencies of the
past two decades have involved famine and forced migration. Since the 1980s, few
famines have occurred that were not human-induced, and many famines catalyzed
the onset of complex emergencies.
The most severe consequences of population displacement have occurred during the acute phase, when relief efforts have not yet begun or are in the early stages.3
Refugees (populations that cross internationally recognized borders) and internally
displaced populations have experienced high mortality rates during the period
immediately following their migration. Internally displaced populations, in contrast to refugees, do not enjoy the immediate protections under international law
that are afforded to refugees by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees). They must fend for themselves without the benefit of basic healthcare services, food, water or sanitation that make up the protective infrastructure
of refugee camps. Therefore, in complex emergencies, the health consequences are
both directly and indirectly related to the conflict itself (Table 22.1).4
Historically, response activities in both natural and human-generated disasters have often been ineffective, both because of the poor quality of the information available as well as the manner in which an assessment was conducted.
Disaster assessment and assistance activities are often hampered by organizational
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Table 22.1. Direct and indirect effects of complex emergencies
Direct Effects

Indirect Effects

Injuries/Illnesses

Population displacement: internally
displaced and/or refugees

Deaths

Disruption of food

Human rights abuses

Destroyed health facilities

International Humanitarian Law
violations and abuses

Destroyed public health infrastructure

Psychological stresses
Disabilities

problems that ultimately diminish the effect of these efforts on the population
they intended to help.5 Unfortunately, lack of personnel, medical records, and
financial resources often hinder the assessment of the health situation in a complex emergency by conventional epidemiological methods practiced in traditional
development programs. Epidemiological methods established for situations of
restricted resources employ a simpler method of statistical analysis to be performed. The technique offered by these epidemiological methods became known
as a “rapid assessment.”6 The outcome of an appropriately organized and directed
assessment is an efficient and effective response. During the decade of the 1990s,
both health and nutritional assessments in complex emergencies gained a reputation for quality. With critical advances in indicator identification, epidemiological
analysis, data retrieval technologies, and in education and training of relief personnel, health and nutritional assessments have continued to improve as an art
and science.
The immediate priorities of assistance in complex emergencies are the protection of the affected populations and the reduction of mortality and morbidity.7 The
effective response to complex emergencies requires timely, accurate public health
information and data.8 The rationale for an assessment is to provide objective information for planning, prioritizing needs, implementing health programs, evaluating
the relief process, and identifying health issues needing further investigation.9
The humanitarian community (international organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, private governmental organizations, and peacekeeping militaries)
has a professional obligation to base the assistance on the best evidence available.10
This assumption is the cornerstone of the concept of evidence-based healthcare.
The need and demand for health care in complex emergencies are increasing at
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a rate determined, in part, by the rate at which public health infrastructure is
destroyed and the moral integrity of governance disappears. Initially, healthcare
needs may be greater than the rate at which resources are being made available.11
Use of an evidence-based approach makes it possible for decision makers (policy, operational, and field levels) to differentiate the needs of the population, the
resources available, and the costs of any decision. An evidence-based approach
helps to differentiate between what is supported by evidence and that made on
unsubstantiated assertion. Health assessments today are expected to be reliable and
valid; and as such, are inextricably linked to the analysis of specific performance
and outcome indicators, region- and disaster-specific epidemiological studies, and
measures of effectiveness.12
The assessment tool used can vary depending on the phase of the disaster event:
prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
There is much written concerning the assessment process in each phase of natural and human-generated disasters. This chapter concentrates on the rapid health
assessment of a complex emergency where disaster managers and decision makers require immediate and accurate data necessary to rationally allocate available
resources according to the emergency needs of the humanitarian organization.
Rapid Assessment Process
All health and nonhealth interventions in support of public health in complex
emergencies are determined by rapid assessments, focused surveys and surveillance. Poor surveillance design, at all three levels, will lead to a predictable resurgence of disease and public health disruption. If survey indicators and surveillance
methodologies are incomplete or inaccurate, the ability to monitor the sensitive
relationships between health, nutrition and environmental indicators, endemic
disease, injury prevention (e.g., landmine injuries), and gender and age specific
vulnerabilities will be lacking. Evaluation and monitoring programs based on these
three levels are the essential management tools for all health and nutrition-related
programs in complex emergencies. The important role of epidemiological surveillance in infectious disease control in a long-term refugee camp is illustrated in the
applications of simple epidemiological methods in camps on the Thai-Burmese
border. Here, agency collaboration organized a Health Information Office to facilitate the collection of demographic and vital statistics data, administration of a disease surveillance system, regular monitoring of hospital and outpatient discharge
diagnoses, and investigation of disease outbreaks.13 This was the forefront of Health
Information Systems (HIS), that are now an essential component of all refugee
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camp protocols. How rapidly and how accurate an assessment and an HIS can be
implemented is often used as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness of camp
management.
The objectives of a rapid assessment in the emergency phase of a complex
emergency are to:14
determine the magnitude of the emergency
identify existing and potential public health problems
measure present and potential impact, especially health and nutritional needs
assess resources needed, including availability and capacity of a local response
determine and plan an appropriate external response
set up the basis for a health system
The initial or rapid assessment comprises both situation assessment (a definition
of the problem and an assessment or measurement of its extent) and needs assessment (a systematic procedure for determining the nature and extent of problems
experienced by a specified population, that affect their health either directly or
indirectly). This is performed in the early, critical stage of a disaster to determine
the type of relief needed for immediate response. It must identify the impact on a
society, its infrastructure, the most vulnerable population groups, and the ability to
cope. A rapid assessment requires data and interpretation of data.
Therefore, data critical to interpretation of the needs of a population affected
by a complex emergency begins with background data on the political, social and
economic status of the country (and also the region where refugees might migrate),
the size and demographics of the population, and vital health information.
Facts and figures are “indispensable tools” for health personnel.15 A simple graph
of daily mortality rates can work miracles by catalyzing the mobilization of human
and material resources, focusing the attention of decision makers, and guiding and
refining the assistance program that is being put into place. The five areas that are
most useful are: mortality; incidence of the most important diseases; nutritional
status; “activities data” such as immunizations performed; and the “vital sectors,”
namely food, water, sanitation, shelter, and fuel. All assessment tools have been
minor variations on this original theme. An effective way of presenting information
is graphically, so that everyone can see the trends over time.16
Data collection commences before the field assessment and originates from
existing country profiles, maps, census data, previous demographic and health surveys, early warning system tools, and previous or ongoing in-country assessments.17
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endemic diseases
mortality rates
morbidity-incidence rates
nutritional status
sources of health care
impact of disruption of health services
More detailed assessments, in the form of surveys and surveillance, will follow
as the emergency develops and needs evolve. Assessment never stops.18
Initial assessments serve to provide a structural cornerstone for a more robust
survey and surveillance system. There is often an overlap of the rapid assessment
and the process implemented by the more organized survey teams. Field surveys
are intermittent focused assessments that collect population-based health, nutritional and environmental data found to be of concern or potential concern during the rapid assessment phase. To increase the power of a survey, it is combined
with statistical analysis. To increase the validity of a survey and affirm or deny the
suspicions drawn from the initial assessment, surveys are repeated after a certain
time has elapsed or after some intervention (e.g., vitamin A) has been completed.
In addition, surveys are performed to gather baseline data on endemic diseases, locally and regionally, and serve as the foundation for an ongoing surveillance system. The quality of the survey instruments used and the population studied increases as one moves from the rapid assessment to the more sophisticated
surveillance system. In the survey and surveillance phases, the evaluation process
screens and monitors all children within the camp and at the time of entry and
registration.

Data and Information Sought
Assessments must be sensitive and specific enough to identify the most vulnerable
groups and to appropriately target them with assistance. In complex emergencies,
indicators are used as assessment, monitoring, and evaluation tools to inform practical decision-making in the field. Indicators are defined as quantitative or qualitative criteria used to correlate or predict the value or measure of a program, system,
or organization.19
In the acute emergency phase, based on best practice, only the most essential
indicators should be selected.
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Rapid Assessment Indicators
Population size and demographics: this data is necessary for determining the denominator for indicator rates (e.g., infant mortality rates), to determine who and how
many people are entitled to material assistance, and to facilitate legal identity and
protection of those at risk. The age and gender structure (age and sex-specific rates)
of the population is also necessary to identify the vulnerable groups and to target
necessary assistance programs (e.g., immunizations). In a refugee camp setting this
data is obtained early on from the camp registration system, convenience and cluster sampling of the camp population, aerial photographs and global positioning
system (GPS) assisted population estimates.20 Humanitarian assistance is slowly
moving to an urban setting where the majority of the world’s poor now reside.21
In an urban setting, household surveys, records of beneficiary of aid, and city and
country records (if recent) can be used.22
Vital health information: The goal is to confirm or deny the above background
data against actual field data. The indicator data required from the field is summarized in Table 22.2.23
These rates are essential for the recording of disease, trend analysis, a comparison of populations at risk, and to develop a baseline for future surveillance. A public health emergency may be defined as a situation where the daily crude mortality
rate (CMR) is significantly higher than the baseline level in the affected population.
A threshold of one death per 10,000 people per day is commonly used to define
an emergency in a developing country.24 In Africa, the CMR has been as high as
Table 22.2. Vital health data
Crude mortality rate (CMR): this is the most specific indicator of a population’s health. It is
recorded as total deaths/10,000 population/day. In the post-emergency phase this reverts to total
deaths/1,000 population/month
Under age 5 mortality rate (U5MR): measured as total deaths  5 years/10,000/day
Cause specific mortality rates: Specifies proportion of deaths according to cause, e.g., trauma
Case fatality rates (CFR): proportion of individuals with a specific disease that die within a
specified time, e.g., CFR for children with malnutrition that die from measles
Age and sex-specific mortality rates: incidence rates collected during survey phase
SPHERE PROJECT MINIMUM STANDARDS in HEALTH SERVICES add:
Sex and age-specific breakdown (at least  5 years and  5 years)
Average family and household size
Age and sex-specific incidence rates of major problems and diseases
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60–80 times the baseline rates.25 Unaccompanied orphans, not easily recognized
in densely populated refugee groups, lack care and protection usually afforded by
adult supervision. As such, it is not unusual for them to experience CMRs over 200
times the baseline. CMR benchmarks are illustrated by Table 22.3.26
A concerted effort must be done during the assessment process to identify
these vulnerable populations. The most common causes of death among refugees
and internally displaced persons are diarrheal diseases, measles, acute respiratory
infections, and malaria.27 Most people become refugees only after their health and
security has been severely compromised, and during their flight the health status
deteriorates even more. Except in retrospective assessments, those that died prior
to reaching the camps are usually never recorded. In addition, mortality rates, particularly among those under age five (U5MR) and infants, increase when the rate
of newly arriving refugees is higher.28
Protein energy malnutrition (PEM) has three components: malnutrition,
micronutrient deficiency diseases (especially vitamin A, C and B1), and secondary
infections. PEM is often used instead of kwashiorkor or marasmus to define the
state of illness. Indeed, many cases are mixed (marasmus-kwashiorkor) in their
presentation and difficult to clinically distinguish. Nutritional assessments are performed by population convenience samples, screening new arrivals at the refugee
camps, and through cluster sample surveys (Table 22.4). The malnutrition rate of
children under age 5 years is next to crude mortality rates as the most specific indicator of a population’s health.29 It also determines the urgency for food ration delivery and requirements for supplementary feedings and therapeutic feeding centers.
Some interventions are now so routine that they no longer require an assessment
before implementation in the acute phase of complex emergencies. Most demonstrable is the use of vitamin A and measles vaccines in refugee populations in developing countries.
Studies from the early 1990s in complex emergencies have shown that vitamin A
will reduce mortality and morbidity in malnourished children, especially those with

Table 22.3. Crude mortality rate benchmarks
Normal rate in developing countries

 0.5/10,000/day

Serious condition

 1.0/10,000/day

Emergency condition

 2.0/10,000/day

Severe famine or disaster

 5.0/10,000/day

Effective relief effort

 1.0/10,000/day

294

CH22_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p287-302.indd 294

2/15/13 11:34 PM

HEALTH ASSESSMENT PROCESS IN COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

Table 22.4. Nutritional assessment
Goal: Prevalence of acute protein energy malnutrition (PEM)
Prevalence of micronutrient deficiencies (especially vitamin A, C, B1)
Data retrieval: Rapid Screening: Mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC)
Survey and Surveillance phase data: Weight-for-height, Z-scores
Clinical evidence of micronutrient deficiencies
Levels of acute malnutrition: Minor, moderate, serious (presence of
edema/Kwashiorkor)
Prevalence of malnutrition:  10% of  age  population  SERIOUS STATUS
 20% of  age  population (with edema/Kwashiorkor)  CRITICAL STATUS

measles (active, susceptible and exposed) and other respiratory illnesses. Indeed,
vitamin A supplementation reduces all-cause mortality in children.30 By the time
measles becomes identified in a population in a dense camp environment, the mortality and morbidity rate may already be out of control. Based on this evidence it has
become protocol to provide all children between 1 and 6 years of age, at the time of
registration into the camp, both measles vaccine and vitamin A.
This being the case, the initial assessment will focus on identifying the population in need of services and on ensuring continuing monitoring through program
outcome surveys and surveillance. Relief programs emphasize a primary health
care (PHC) approach, focusing on oral rehydration, feeding centers, immunization, promoting involvement by the refugee community in the provision of health
services, and stressing effective coordination of programs and information sharing
among the nongovernmental organizations that deal directly with the recipients
of care.31
As the nutritional assessment moves from the rapid assessment phase through
to the surveillance phase, the evaluation methodologies used become more sophisticated. For example, in the rapid assessment phase the MUAC studies performed
through convenience or cluster sampling provides the decision makers information to determine whether a serious malnutrition problem exists, but not necessarily the full extent (i.e., micronutrient status, age and gender specifics, etc.). By
moving to more exact weight-for-height and Z-score monitoring in the survey and
surveillance phases, the evaluation process screens and monitors all children within
the camp and at the time of entry and registration.
Environmental health assessments: disruptions in basic water, sanitation, shelter
and fuel indicators are indicative of public health infrastructure loss and most commonly contribute to rising acute respiratory illnesses (e.g., pneumonia, tuberculo-
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sis), and gastrointestinal diseases (e.g., dysentery, cholera, common pathogen diarrhea). In large refugee camps the mortality may increase as the population of the
camps exceeds the environmental resources available.32 In the last decade, environmental health assessments have become increasingly a critical means of defining the
causes of the mortality and morbidity seen in complex emergencies (Table 22.5).33

Epidemiological-Based Definition of Complex Emergencies
The core evidence (knowledge) base for war and public health management comes
from these assessments, surveys and surveillance studies that, with other more
advanced epidemiological research, provide a working definition and description
of the phases of complex emergencies. Burkholder and Toole first described complex emergencies in developing countries as having acute, late, and post-emergency
phases, each of which is characterized by predictable patterns of health indicators
and expected public health responses.34 If these patterns are addressed with appropriate management responses, a decline in mortality and morbidity, and a shortening of the duration of each epidemiological phase will occur.
In this developing country model, the acute phase is characterized by high
mortality rates for infants and those under the age of 5 years from severe malnutrition and outbreaks of communicable disease. Epidemiological indicator studies
in the acute phase in developed countries (e.g., Yugoslavia, Chechnya) appear to
be characterized more by violent trauma from advanced weaponry and untreated
chronic disease (e.g., diabetes, high blood pressure and stroke), increased incidence
of communicable diseases and malnutrition in the elderly, and in neonatal health
problems.35

Table 22.5. Environmental health assessment indicators
Water

Sanitation services

Shelter

Quantity: 15-20 liters/
person/day
Quality of supply

Types of facilities: e.g.,
latrines, defecation
fields, etc.

Sources of water and
accessibility

Recommended pit
latrines/family:
minimum: 1 pit
latrine/20 people
serious:  1 pit latrine
/50 people

Types of structures:
e.g., tents, plastic
sheeting, etc.
% households without
water resistant shelter
% households without
any form of shelter
Recommended area:
3.5m2/person

Fuel
Types of fuel, access,
and security
Recommended: 5 KG of
wood/family/day
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Measures of Effectiveness
With an increased understanding of the knowledge base and consequences of these
internal conflicts resulting in complex emergencies, the humanitarian community
has moved to attempt to define whether the interventions to provide relief and
assistance have actually been beneficial or not. A theme of many recent humanitarian evaluations has been that the effectiveness of the relief process has been lacking.36 In part, this has been attributed to a lack of clearly stated program objectives
and monitoring information used in both the overall program and the sector and
project components.
To answer this problem, the humanitarian community is mandated to use clear
and explicit statements of objectives starting with the initial assessment phase. This
mandate has encouraged that assessments be redefined over three levels of management and response: strategic (or policy), operational and field levels all using goals
based on indicators most relevant to the individual level. For example, “strategic
frameworks” should be established to set system (country and region) wide objectives by the international community. Second, “country (operational response)
strategies” should be clearly articulated by the donor organizations, and “logical
framework analyses” (LogFrame) are valuable as a way of articulating the goal,
purpose, outputs and indicators for humanitarian projects in the field. Some donor
organizations have made LogFrame use mandatory.37
Outcome or performance measures of effectiveness (MOEs), developed primarily from analysis research, use quantitative or qualitative criteria (indicators)
to correlate or predict the value or measure of a system or organization, and to
make decisions or judgments on performance. MOEs criteria should strive to follow these desiderata (Table 22.6).38
MOEs have been used in complex emergencies to correlate a variety of diverse
but interrelated humanitarian, security, economic, and infrastructure indicators,
and to determine whether effectiveness or success of assistance goals exists within
the overall relief program. MOEs can be used with medical and public health indicators to determine trend analyses in various sectors, compare geographic sectors
and programs, and identify areas where additional program scrutiny or security
is needed.
Medical and public health MOEs rely on data that are already collected in the
initial assessments and surveys. For example, a crude mortality rate is a MOE that
is an indicator of improving or deteriorating health status and is used to show
impact of the overall mission. As a security MOE, the measured number (fraction)
of the security assumed by the security guards at the distribution centers by the
host nation indicates the ability of the host nation to conduct the security mission
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1) so as not to levy
too high a burden on
limited resources

1) the mission is
1) quantitative values
clearly understood by (i.e., indicators)
all participants

2) qualitative descriptors (i.e., criteria)

2) focus on assessing
the effectiveness
of the mission
and not on the
accomplishment of
the supporting tasks
3) cover all aspects
of the mission
and expand as the
mission expands

1) to help the decision
makers understand
the status of the
situation in different
geographic areas

2) to present
information to higher
authorities

3) to support
authorities in making
better decisions

Cost-effective
MOEs should be
reasonable

Consistently
measureable

MOEs should be
Those measuring
related to the mission MOEs should be able
to assign a value

Mission-related

MOEs should be
appropriate to the
objective of the stated
mission

Appropriate

Table 22.6. Desired qualities of MOE criteria

3) be measured in
sufficient detail
that changes will be
apparent

2) not be greatly
influenced by other
(external) factors

1) must change as
progress toward
meeting the mission
objectives change

Must be sensitive
to the goals and
objectives of the
mission

Sensitive

3) must be timely
enough for
participants to act

1) must be sensitive
in time to what the
participants are
trying to measure

MOEs should be
responsive to changes

Timely
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themselves, and functions as a transition indicator (measures capability of host
nation to assume responsibility).39 In a complex emergency, there are always MOEs
(at a minimum) that address security, infrastructure, medical/public health and
agricultural and economic factors.40 Additional MOEs may address more directly
the human rights issues (improvements) as a measure of success in aid relief.

Characteristics of Complex Emergencies That Result in Assessment Bias
Decision makers require data rapidly in order to clarify rumors and make reasonable judgments on response management. Early on, there is much pressure to act.
Complex emergencies result in a rapidly changing situation in the field, in and out
migration of the population at risk, and a higher vulnerability to disease and injury.
The rapid assessment is time dependent, suffers from limited data resources, data
quality, and occurs within an unstable or disrupted infrastructure that is insecure
and intolerant of scrutiny. There may be pressure to interpret data to reflect a certain political or media agenda (e.g., intervention versus nonintervention).41
Several examples are illustrative of the need for well designed and measured
assessments. In the early stages of the Somalia debacle, many countries were eager
to obtain data that would justify a larger intervention. Media reports described a
rural area where there were few if any children under the age of four left alive. The
report suggested that the children had died from the violent conflict that raged
throughout the country. The report immediately became a rally point for intervention and began to drive the logistical efforts for relief. Several months later an
assessment team visited the area. They confirmed that there were few children
under age four alive, but that the reasons for this were more likely due to prolonged
infertility from secondary amenorrhea of malnourished women of childbearing
age, and lack of adult males who were either killed or long absent and fighting in
another area of the country. Childhood deaths from violence of trauma were not
above the expected norm.
Similarly, the peacekeeping forces were eager to show success in the humanitarian mission, transfer duties to other organizations, and redeploy their troops.
The singular indicator they were following was the infant mortality rate that had
skyrocketed with the onset of fighting throughout the country. They used as an
objective the baseline infant mortality rate present before the conflict escalated.
When this objective was reached, mission success was unilaterally declared and
plans were put in place to begin redeployment. Concurrently, the UN Secretariat
spoke to the humanitarian community on the status of the relief effort and communicated that there was a tenuous and alarming situation with infants, in that half
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were still considered ill and half remained malnourished. In both examples the data
were interpreted to support a particular self-interest and decision.
Many early studies were “often hastily planned rapid assessments, executed under
less than ideal circumstances, and too often did not culminate in a formal report.”42
Of twenty-three assessments studied in Somalia between 1991 and 1993, all revealed
extensive methodological differences. Target populations and sampling strategies
varied widely. Of sixteen that assessed mortality, only eight assessed cause of death.
None of the studies provided confidence intervals around the point estimates of the
rates. Use of units of measurement and inclusion of denominators in rate calculations
were inconsistent. Concerns were that some studies may have influenced policy and
program management decisions, but even here, these effects “may have been limited
by failure to adequately document results and by differences in objectives, design,
parameters measured, methods of measurement, definitions, and analysis methods.”43
Because there is no clear population denominator, it has been said that complex
emergency assessments consist of numerators searching for an accurate denominator. With denominator estimation, data accuracy may be uncertain (“dirty”).44
Unfortunately, incomplete assessments or unscrupulous interpretation of assessment data has led to misuse of scarce resources and incorrect analysis of the etiology of observed mortality and morbidity.
Given the context of shifting populations and unstable political conditions,
population size is especially difficult to assess.45 Hansch stresses that current methods are inadequate for dealing with large-area emergencies, especially where populations are unregistered, uncounted, migratory and likely to be mobile in response
to aid.46 In these situations relief agencies must employ improved sampling strategies and population tracking and unique demographic retrieval techniques, such as
advanced satellite and GPS/GIS methods.47
In conflict areas where there is little or no data available, collected or analyzed,
proxy or surrogate data collections have been employed. Cross-border assessments
of North Korean migrants seeking assistance in China have provided the most accurate view of the nutritional status within the country. This data is limited to one
province and may not reflect conditions elsewhere.48 Although there will never be
complete accuracy in the rapid assessment phase, the assessment must emphasize
uniformity in analysis and appropriate restraint on descriptive judgments to act.49

Summary and Future Directions
Rapid assessment is the first step in designing and developing a surveillance system
in complex emergencies. The data interpretations of the rapid health assessment
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will launch the initial phase of assistance, and is expected to result in a decline in
mortality and morbidity. To be accurate and timely, initial assessments and the
follow-on surveys and surveillance protocols must be:
1.
2.
3.
4.

evidence-based;
incorporate valid indicators;
derive verification from epidemiological studies;
build a data foundation by which one measures relief effectiveness.

By this process, initial assessments build the foundation by which the humanitarian community gains the knowledge and understanding of causes and consequences of the particular complex emergency and how it compares and contrasts
to others.
The process of assessment of complex emergencies has advanced considerably
and standards now exist for the process and the indicators. The humanitarian community has learned a great deal but much needs to be done. Spiegel emphasizes that
to ensure an evidence-based assessment environment, more research is needed,
especially in a grading system for existing indicators (type and levels which lead
to improved health outcomes) that address the different phases of complex emergencies and the level of development of the country in which the conflict occurs.
This would provide “credibility and a strong foundation” for decision makers and
future research. He specifically sees indicators as being evaluated in four areas:50
1.
2.
3.
4.

type of indicators;
manner in which they are implemented and interpreted;
standardization within and between different NGOs and settings;
their effects on program implementation.

Experience this past decade, the 1990s, has shown that complex emergencies
are longer lasting, more complex, more dangerous, and more widespread than
previously thought. This information, to a great degree, came through a variety
of assessment and monitoring events, both political (e.g., economic, social) and
medical. The violence perpetrated against the civilian population in complex emergencies has caused unprecedented mortality and morbidity as well as the destruction of vital public health lifelines. Societies have ceased to function, govern or
protect their citizens. Arguably, complex emergencies are appropriately referred
to as catastrophic public health and human rights emergencies that often require
the total rehabilitation and reconstruction of the entire country. Assessments have
been critical in painting this epidemiological picture for decision makers.
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Unfortunately, attempts to intervene in a complex emergency by the humanitarian community are often severely restricted by a claim of sovereignty by the
country in conflict. With health indicators deteriorating, healthcare providers frequently become “peace builders” by negotiating and mediating ceasefires to immunize and feed children and other vulnerable groups. The assessment data are used
in these negotiations as a public health argument and as an educational tool for the
warring factions to realize the extent of the destruction caused by the continued
warring.
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Teamwork in Emergency Humanitarian Relief Situations
Pamela Lupton-Bowers

The Importance of Teamwork in an Emergency Operation
Effective team functioning in disasters is often underestimated until it can no longer be ignored. The importance of teamwork to the success of a mission cannot be
overemphasized. In the urgency of a disaster or a sudden public health threat everyone’s energy and focus is given to the technical components. WatSan engineers
plan how best to provide life-supporting water to affected communities; logisticians organize how to reach them; health experts collect data, assess risk and set out
options of how governments and the humanitarian community ought to respond.
Only later in the after action reports are people cognizant of the often debilitating
dysfunction of the multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder, multicultural, and multilingual teams involved in the response.
Humanitarian professionals know the frustration of working in a dysfunctional team that fails to:
Consult broadly when collecting necessary information or problem solving.
Share information with all affected stakeholders.
Include stakeholders adequately in initial analysis.
Invite all essential partners in to the decision making process.
Respect local partners and affected communities in their interactions and early
assessments.
Recognize and handle obvious power struggles and potential conflict within
the multidisciplinary team and among involved partner organizations.
Handle inappropriate behavior as soon as it starts.
Invest in setting up processes for ongoing information sharing and decision
making.
Set standards about the working culture of the team and the quality of interactions and products, both internally and externally.
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The vast majority of humanitarian workers are deployed with little or no preparation for the tensions and complexities of working in a multicultural team, in an
emergency situation, and often in unsafe and unpleasant living conditions. Too
often lip service is observed in the agendas of leadership development programs
where priority is awarded to technical topics. The result is painfully inadequate for
changing behaviors and developing skills. Yet those same behaviors and skills are
consistently identified in evaluation reports as those that could have made the difference between the success and failure of an operation.
Fortunately, some people “get it.” The global polio eradication initiative coordinated by WHO emphasizes quality teamwork and team leadership critical to
overcoming the final hurdles in those countries most challenged by eradication.
Recognized internally and reinforced by independent review, team leadership
training has been organized for operations in Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Chad,
and Congo. The purpose of the training is to improve accountability through more
personal responsibility to achieve objectives, to encourage working more collaboratively to tackle entrenched problems, to identify more creative solutions, and to
provide leaders with the basic skills of managing performance, and of understanding that building and leading the team is real work.
During a training program in Southeast Asia to prepare a group of medical experts for deployment in teams in risk assessment of acute public health
outbreaks, the leader’s debriefing conclusion was this: “It really struck me how
important teamwork is to the success of the mission when I witnessed what
should have been the strongest group technically come out with the wrong assessment decision.” The team was not working well together. One person arrived
late to the workshop and missed the team building session. Typical of character, he dismissed it as unimportant relevant to the rest of the technical sessions.
He soon imposed himself as the de facto leader—he was Anglophone, Western,
male, and quite tall, especially compared to his Asian counterparts. The rest
of the group initially acceded to his leadership; however, cracks were forming.
There was dissent—some obvious, most passive. Some team members did not
support the decision but did not assertively express their difference sufficiently.
Fortunately we had invested in a tutor support process similar to the one modeled
by the International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA)—more on this
later—and we were able to address some of these issues so as to divert more serious emotional scars.
Unfortunately, these behaviors are not limited to training programs; the same
thing happens in real field teams. The result is exhausting, demoralizing and unacceptable, especially when one considers the potential impact on people’s health.
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The Benefit of Good Teamwork
When teams work well together things are in synch, ideas flow; people are clear
about what has to be done; they communicate openly with one another; they are
comfortable with decisions, and they work in complementary harmony. An atmosphere of fairness and inclusivity reigns, and team members respect and support
one another. There is a sense of personal as well as team fulfillment, and, most
importantly, teams are effective. The combination of knowledge and ability can
result in superior outcomes.
The complexities of a humanitarian response today demand more than ever a
multidisciplinary approach.
Effective behaviors of high performing teams (HPTs) include:
Improved communication: They gather and share information as an essential
part of their work.
Achieved results: HPTs focus on deliverables and outputs, recognizing that success depends on the knowledge and skills found in more than one person or
one discipline.
More creative and more efficient problem solving: HPTs that combine multiple
perspectives have the skills and tools to create more innovative solutions.
Higher quality decisions: Good leadership and appropriate process combine to
assure shared decision making.
Increased quality in product and services: HPTs understand what people expect
of them, control the quality of outputs, and have the interpersonal skills to
manage relationships.
Lean processes: HPTs are not hampered by unnecessary internal bureaucracy;
they identify obstacles and redesign processes to remove them, speeding up
responses.
Motivated members with a thirst for learning: HPTs allow people with different
kinds of knowledge, opinions and approaches to work together. They learn
together and grow together. Participation in such cross-functional teams
strengthens and develops individuals and can contribute to the sustainability and strengthening of organizations and partnerships.
Despite the clear added value of powerful teamwork to humanitarian work,
organizations rarely invest in building HPTs. Some refer to the limited contracts as
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excuses for their decisions, while others assume that the group dynamics involved
will occur naturally without conscious effort to establish or maintain them.
“We don’t have time to deal with that. We are there to do a job, everyone knows
what they have to do and they just get on with it.” So said a health coordinator in
Brazzaville in 1999, following an upsurge of violence in Congo. It could just have
easily have been said yesterday. In their defense, emergency response team members
are typically motivated by a clear commitment and drive to respond to the often
overwhelming humanitarian imperative.
In the first hours and days of an emergency response, time is of the essence; the
operational priority is saving lives, ensuring protection and sustenance, reducing
the vulnerability of the victims, or of risk in the case of public health outbreaks. It
is an understandable focus but it is short-lived. Emergency management may be
condoned for immediate reaction, but far too often in humanitarian assistance
operations “emergency management” becomes the accepted modus operandi. It
also ignores the fact that the relief team is not a hermetically sealed unit able to
operate in isolation. The members must operate with other actors including multiple, sometimes competing, agencies, and the local communities.
Investing time and resources in ensuring strong team performance in emergency missions has real advantages to the work.
1. The overall success of the operation: A well-prepared team with strong common values and beliefs, robust structure processes, and fair management style
will influence action on the ground.
2. Improved relationships and image with beneficiaries and local communities:
Humanitarian workers can operate more effectively and more safely in communities where they have established trust and transparency. More and more
emergencies involve a new profile of the beneficiary. Articulate communities
of people accustomed to power themselves, respond to relief personnel who
provide prompt and effective services in a fair, respectful, and compassionate
manner. They reject the traditional and essentially patronizing dynamic of the
agency-beneficiary relationship that legitimizes an authoritative approach.
3. Improved potential for creating opportunities for capacity building: One of
the great challenges of the relief operation is to exploit opportunities to share
knowledge and capacity wherever possible and no matter how minimal. Fieldworkers who can listen, who are able to cooperate and collaborate as well as
coordinate, will be those who are most effective in transferring know-how and
building the capacities of the local communities and individuals.
4. Well being of their own staff and the strengthening of their organizations: Good
team and interpersonal relations contribute to raising people’s coping abilities
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with stress. Stress is a common factor in the humanitarian world. Regardless
of the presence or absence of conflict, the human tragedy associated with all
disasters, the absence of family, friends and the traditional support network,
added to unfamiliar climate and conditions all contribute to increased anxiety
and stress for any humanitarian worker. However, when humanitarian workers
benefit from good leadership support, collaborative efforts on the part of colleagues, respect and recognition for his/her contribution then the stress of the
mission can be considerably reduced.
More and more relief workers are reporting that while they are competent
in their functional expertise, they are unprepared for, and overwhelmed by, the
ambiguous and confusing situations on the ground, which they complain get in the
way of doing the job. An example would be the reaction of a senior manager who
had been thrust into a “crisis” situation. He explained that he had not had time to
properly meet with his team in the five months since he had been appointed. This
was an HQ-based team working in the same building! One of the critical issues he
wanted to deal with in a hastily arranged retreat was internal strife and conflict, as
well as criticism levied at the team from their operational partners. In the words of
Tao, “that which we haven’t time for, we have not prioritized.”
The IDHA Investment in Teamwork
The authors of Fordham University’s flagship course, the International Diploma
in Humanitarian Assistance (IDHA), understood the value of effective teamwork
to the success of emergency missions. For this very reason the course is designed to
emulate, to the degree that an academic program can, the operational conditions
emergency teams find themselves having to cope with: being thrust into a group of
incredibly diverse individuals with whom they have to live and work, and on whom
the success of the mission depends. In IDHA programs students are selected into
the most diverse “syndicates” possible and must study and perform as a team, only
succeeding if the team succeeds.
However, unlike many organizations, the IDHA recognizes that the syndicates
have an increased likelihood of succeeding if they are prepared for the challenge
and supported in their development as a team. The first days are dedicated to helping the group bond and establishing a consensus of a culture. In addition, each
syndicate group is allocated a tutor who will assist the team throughout the course.
The tutor’s role is to observe the team’s working culture and dynamics, providing
insights and support as they struggle with increasingly difficult assignments and
personal study demands.
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The tutor support is a big investment to the program, but one that has proven
itself over and over in the forty-odd month-long courses, which have more than
2,000 graduates from 133 nations. IDHA rationalizes its investment on the following realities:
The demand for a higher caliber humanitarian worker. Large-scale complex
situations requiring international response are dependent more and more
on relief workers who are highly educated, skilled, and experienced. Gone is
the belief that a technical relief worker need simply to follow clearly defined
standard operating procedures to be able to function successfully in a predefined disaster situation. The whole playing field has less clear parameters,
which demands more flexibility to deal with the ambiguity in which they
work.
More complex environment. Modern disasters are less routine, and more
expanding and emerging. There is a greater variety of vulnerable populations, extending over all cross-sections of society. Stakeholders can include
warlords, local and international media, military, and armed guards as
well as local communities, churches, and agencies. This complex scenario
demands a more sophisticated response.
Longevity and permanence of complex emergencies. Both are increasingly distinctive features of relief operations, and agencies are seeking new models of
operation that can cope with the crisis within emergency and that include
principles of “operationality in turbulence.” A number of situations provide
vivid examples, among them long-term disasters such as Palestine, Sudan,
and Somalia. Often what starts as an emergency response evolves into longterm relief as reconstruction is hampered by the magnitude of the disaster,
and frequently followed by periods of renewed crisis as a result of the community disturbances and violence.
Sustainability and continuity of their own staff and organization. The humanitarian relief field suffers a high turnover of staff. On one hand, this is not
surprising, since many relief workers approach the work as temporary or
occasional. However, it poses threats to organizations if they lack professional career relief workers able to strategically manage their projects and to
be able to build on institutional memory and learning. Poor team leadership
and interpersonal relations contribute to this drain of talent. The stress created by the dysfunctional working environment can have a serious impact
on the health of their staff. This has been documented in research in the
general work environment.
308

CH23_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p303-319.indd 308

2/13/13 11:16 PM

TEAMWORK IN EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SITUATIONS

Human Resources (HR) studies report that it is exacerbated many fold in the
conditions the humanitarian relief workers find themselves in. There is also the
warrior’s code of “it’s part of the job, we can handle it.” This contributes to a pattern of denial, which, combined with a lack of access to professional debriefing,
leads to accumulative stress syndrome, causing serious and long-term effects on the
humanitarian worker. The consequences of inappropriate management and poor
interpersonal relations with supervisors and colleagues are a major contributing
factor to this stress. In debriefing sessions psychologists report that a significant
number of humanitarian workers leaving the profession cite unsatisfactory relations with managers or colleagues as a major reason. Said one first-time Danish
relief worker returning from a posting in Macedonia in 2000:
I went straight out to Macedonia. I didn’t have time for a briefing, I didn’t see
my manager for several weeks. I went out as a driver and ended up coordinating
a team. I had no experience for that. I had no support. I don’t think I did a good
job. I am completely burned out. I don’t think I’ll be going back.

Building the Team
The IDHA program models its approach on the emergency relief situation. Groups
of strangers are placed together within the first hours of arriving. They are organized
into syndicate groups and expected to operate immediately as productive “teams.”
The majority of them do; a few of them do not. What is it that binds them? What
helps to build the team? What prevents them and causes their failure? These are
questions that are explored within the first day of the IDHA program, because when
team formation is hampered the entire outcome of the team can be jeopardized.
A major contributing factor to the function—or dysfunction—of a team is the
underlying values and beliefs that motivate the individual to engage in humanitarian
work. This influences decision making and relationships with colleagues and especially with host communities and victims. The driving factors that lead people to seek
humanitarian relief work vary considerably. Some people are driven by fundamental
humanitarian values and a need to “do good,” others by religious beliefs, but many
are driven by less altruistic values, the excitement, the risk, the exotic locations, or
simply the desire to get away from day-to-day life back home.
We can neither assume nor rely on an agreed moral basis for modern humanitarianism. For many the concept of “deserving poor” no longer holds true, and
many aid workers suffer from that deception in an increasingly politicized world.
Impartiality, long considered an essential of humanitarianism, was questioned dur309
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ing the Rwanda operations, in Bosnia, and during the Arab Spring and associated
civil uprisings. Within the paradox of motives and context is a real need to establish
a common sense of identity and purpose.
Through a series of personal reflections and group discussions I facilitate a
team through a process that allows them to do just that. It is achieved by inviting
members to share their own experiences of good (and bad) teamwork, to build
a model that everyone buys into. The bottom line is when a team has a common
purpose, it can establish a common identity and work more effectively toward a
commonly agreed goal.
The Three-Component Model for Effective Teamwork
A simple model for establishing effective teamwork would include the what (that is,
the team objectives), the who (internal and external relations—the human dimensions, in short), and the how (organizational procedures) of a situation. All three of
these components have to be aligned to assure success.
A misperception is that a group of people thrust together to respond to the
urgency of a humanitarian disaster will naturally pull together and work together
immediately and consistently. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Interpersonal
dynamics create daunting challenges that some teams just cannot overcome.
Mastering team effectiveness means mastering complex relationships and
learning agendas. Team members are usually confident about their own subject
matter excellence, but the emergency demands much more of them in terms of the
cultural, political, and organizational challenges that are an inextricable part of the
complex fabric of the disaster environment. There are several paradoxes to building
strong teams. Here are some of them:
Team members have to learn to work together; however, they cannot really be
taught. To be truly successful, the team must design its own model.
People generally identify strong leadership as a successful factor to great teamwork and then bristle against it when it does not allow them inclusivity and
contribution.
Managers have a right and obligation to lead, but when they assert this right by
virtue of position they are at their weakest.
What: Common Goals and Objectives
The “what” gives the team its purpose and legitimacy. It describes what the team
has to do, and more importantly what they must achieve.
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The common goal has to be agreed and accepted by all. It should be in line
with the organizational mission and agreed with other stakeholders and partners.
This is not always as easy as it sounds. In today’s complex environment more and
more partners are involved in any response and they expect to be included in decision making that affects them. Partners are no longer accepting that lead agencies, despite their mandates, make decisions on behalf of all concerned. This reality
demands more frequent and more skilled coordination and collaboration.
Experts and specialists bridle against what they see as interference and slowing up of responses. Clearly this perception is delusional. While lead agencies may
have made decisions unilaterally in the past, they were not easily acknowledged
by partners; precious time was lost, and impact reduced by the passive or active
resistance to those decisions. It makes much more sense to include partners in
the early information gathering and sharing, and in the initial decision making so
that all concerned operate from the same sheet of music. This type of collaboration demands a more sophisticated management relationship and communication
competence than many team leaders currently display.
Individual objectives develop out of the agreed, common goal. Personal objectives should be allocated fairly and according to specific technical abilities, skills,
and competencies of each of the members. They will usually be based on a person’s
terms of reference, but these alone are rarely sufficiently detailed enough to capture
the specific objectives expected of personnel or provide an adequate basis to be
able to hold them accountable for their results. They should also take into consideration, where possible, individual style and preferences. They should equally consider the conclusions of recent research in motivation, which reveals much about
how and why people work.
Many emergency response team leaders claim they do not have time for
all of this while responding to an urgency. I would challenge that thinking and
say, “You don’t have the time not to.” Emergency response teams often travel
together, wait in airports together. I have briefed teams in capital cities as we wait
for transport to the final destination. I have also provided briefs to team leaders
to conduct in the vehicles en route. The time you invest at the outset clarifying
overtly expectations in terms of contributions and quality standards will save precious time later on.
Who: People
The mantra here is “Know your people.” There is nothing to replace your knowledge of your team. The leader and the team need to know and respect individual
differences, cultures, and preferred work styles. You do not have to be a psycholo311
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gist, but you do have to understand that people have different thinking and problem solving styles.
Team members are typically selected because of their specific skill set, and in
many cases their contribution to the team’s task is clear-cut, but a leader must be
aware of, and put to use, team members’ general potential and preferential work.
There are many general activities that need to be accomplished in a team, above
and beyond the individual technical contributions. It is important for the team to
know who are the accomplished negotiators, report writers, counselors, organizers,
budget handlers, and so on.
A medical team demonstrating a purely logical approach to identifying an
unknown virus causing public health dangers may ignore the complex relationship-building and communication required to ensure accurate and trustworthy
information from an affected community. A reconstruction team trying to get
access to a village of victims after years of mistrust with the local religious leaders
may fail to consider new and innovative approaches because they are so entrenched
in the way things have always been. A leader used to working from his “gut” and
ready to take risks may ignore facts and data that might suggest a more analyzed
and considered response. And most emergency response teams ignore the value of
establishing systems and investing in sustainable procedures, which often contributes to the lack of a seamless transition to on-the-ground NGOs or communities,
and to an effective exit strategy.
To be thoroughly effective, the team must think through all these issues despite
their primary mandate. To ignore them is to risk ignoring an essential part of the
picture. When the team members understand one another’s preferred thinking,
deciding, learning and communication styles the working culture is improved and
the team can be more efficient and effective. Mutual understanding and respect
empowers each member to achieve within their respective roles, and as representatives of the team.
Motivation
Another critical component effecting the functioning of the team is motivation.
One could assume that all members of the team are primed to be fully motivated in
any emergency response situation. Yes and no. Yes, in that they may set off in that
frame of mind; however, circumstances can very soon change the drive. Emergency
health professionals, logisticians, lab technicians as well as security personnel have
all described the demoralizing and demotivating impact of inappropriate and
uncaring behavior from colleagues and team leaders.
In a wide study undertaken by the Saratoga Institute on 20,000 exit interviews
exploring why people leave their jobs, 85 percent of managers believed that people
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left for better jobs and higher salaries, while 80 percent of people reported leaving
because of dysfunctional teams or poor bosses. In debriefing during the African
Great Lakes disaster, 90 percent of Red Cross delegates reported their reason for
leaving or not extending contracts as related to internal issues with the team or the
person’s manager. Examples or behaviors contributing to poor morale and defection include:
Inadequate welcome or induction into the team
Unclear or no objectives set
Uninspiring work
Seemingly disconnected work with no obvious added value to the team task
Work that does not reflect the skill set or ability
No direct contact with the leader—being ignored
Not being consulted about decisions in the team
Receiving no feedback on performance—formal or informal
Being reprimanded in front of others
Disrespectful language or attitude (both verbal and nonverbal)
These driving principles lead to several clear key points about the motivation
of individuals:
People like targets. Without something to aim for, work is just a job. The targets should be agreed with the team member themselves to encourage autonomy
and ownership. Whereas long-term goals are essential for the team, individual targets should be relatively short-term (particularly in emergency response), or else
they are too far off to be real.
People like to feel good. When people feel good about themselves they work
better. People feel good when they succeed, that is: meet their targets, and are
praised by people they respect. It is easier to raise people’s standards by raising their
targets and praising achievement than by criticizing them for their faults.
People like to work to their strengths. People tend to be more effective and
successful when they are involved in work that matches their preferences. When
people’s work emphasizes more of their weaknesses than their dominant preferences (or auxiliary preferences) then they are more likely to become disillusioned
People are different. Different people want different things out of their life and
work. Check out the psychological contract (what they intrinsically believe is their
relationship with the organization) if you can; it may not be what you think it is.
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As a team leader, this leaves you with a set of paradoxes:
Do not tell people what to aim for; it is better if
they work out their goals for themselves.
Do not shout at people who make mistakes; it
will paradoxically make them try less hard.

Do emphasize that they must work out some
precise goals against which they can measure
success or progress.

Do not assume that everyone is like you; they
may be driven by other reasons.

Do insist that they learn from their mistakes
and they set new goals for next time; forgive the
sinner but condemn the sin.

Do not give only negative feedback; it will
diminish either a person’s self-concept or his or
her view of you.

Do encourage people to be explicit about their
psychological contract, what they expect to give
and get from their work.

Do not make promises for good work; it creates
only dependent pigeons, and you will get locked
into never-ending promises

Do take opportunities to praise good work;
give feedforward1 about what you’d like to see
more of.
Do make sure that people know when their
work is good; create obvious signs of success/
progress that people can read for themselves.

Last but not least in this section, I challenge you to ask, “Who is the team?”
When I work with a team in the field, I ask them who they work with on a dayto-day basis. When I first joined the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies Secretariat I challenged the target audience of the heads of
delegation workshops, since they did not include headquarters (HQ) managers. In
every organization there has been tension between HQ and the field.

How: Process
Processes describe “how” the team will operate, and how each member will contribute and participate. Processes need to include agreed procedures for:
Participation—How the team members will communicate with one another,
with the team leader, with other teams and with external partners; how they
will share information, status updates and changing intelligence; how they
will provide feedback to line managers, to external agencies as well as to one
another. There may be a mix of informal and formal mechanisms. Both are
essential; both need to be respected.
Decision making—There are different methods of decision making, some are
more appropriate than others. A key factor in the effective working of mature
teams of professionals is that they have input into decisions. This is referred
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to as participative decision making. It does not mean that everyone gets to
make the decision, but that everyone’s opinion is heard before the decision
is made. Although many technical thinkers frequently found in medicine,
science, finance, and logistics are comfortable when decisions can be based
on factual evidence, the ambiguity of a major disaster does not often lend
itself to numerical or logical sequencing. A lot of decisions have to be made
under pressure of time and limited information. A lot of decisions are made
on experience and gut reaction. A good team leader will be comfortable with
a variety of decision-making methods: sometimes relying on “the expert” in
the team, sometimes on a majority agreement, sometimes able to rely on the
evidence or data, but sometimes just going with his or her gut. At times any
decision is the right decision.
Contribution and performance—The team should agree on levels of quality
that they all aspire to meet. It is also helpful to make explicit, and to agree
on the values and competencies that describe the way the team will operate.
How will it deal with strong and weak personalities? How to ensure the team
has whole brain thinking and that all quadrants have been explored. How
will it handle conflict if it emerges?
Progress—How will achievement be monitored and evaluated? How will your
progress be measured? Again, be cautious of recognizing all achievements.
Quite often in emergency response some of the more critical work is unseen.
A lot of the backup work is unrecognized. I remember standing on the tarmac of the airport at Dar es Salaam unable to board a flight for Kasulu,
where I was to do some leadership training for local relief workers in the
refugee camp because there was no cash to buy the fuel for the plane. A
finance person in Geneva had not completed a necessary procedure for the
request to the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the
European Commission (ECHO), formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office. When people are so disenfranchised and
disengaged from a mission that they are unaware of the consequences of
their work, the person in the field will suffer.
Celebrate—Last but certainly not least, the team must pay attention to informal relationships: how it celebrates success, how it commiserates, how it
maintains the energy and enthusiasm, how it deals with stress.
There are more questions than answers. There are no absolute answers as to
how a team should operate. Of course, certain omissions will negatively effect team
performance: lack of targets, lack of systems and appropriate filing and reporting,
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and so forth. But many of the answers will depend on the task to be achieved, the
length of time of the mission, the composition of the team, the predominant culture of the team, the location it finds itself, even the availability and tolerance for
alcohol.
Feedback
We have made reference to providing feedback, or preferably “feedforward.” One
might assume that once standard operating behaviors have been established, team
members will moderate their behavior to match the agreed culture. The capability
of a person to change, the behavioral flexibility, involves both the motivation and
the ability to adapt. Inextricably linked with success in teamwork is the assumption
that individuals are agreeable to change and that change involves learning new skill
sand adopting them. The extent to which members are able to give and take timely,
honest and constructive feedback will depend on having clear operating behaviors,
and an atmosphere that encourages discussion and sharing of expectations.
Feedback: The IDHA Model
The following factors contributed to the success:
1. Ongoing: It was a regular and natural part of the working day.
2. Specific: Team members were encouraged and helped to give detailed examples
about what happened and the impact it had. It was not enough to say “Good
job.” People were encouraged to explain why they felt it was a good job, so that
it was clear what the person was to continue doing.
3. Immediate: So that the person relates the comments directly to the behavior or
incident that occurred that day.
4. Present- and future-based: We wanted to dissociate with being reprimanded.
Members were taught to objectively describe behavior and then to provide feed
forward of what they would like the person to do in the future.
5. Helpful and constructive: The intention of the comments was to help the person improve the behavior, so that they were able to perform better, more effectively, more efficiently or more diplomatically the next time.
6. All-way: All members of the team including the team leader were open to
feedback.
7. Work-related: Comments were directed at the behavior and not at the person.
Participants were encouraged to describe what the person did or said, rather
than make statements about what the person is.
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8. Given privately: Although all team related comments were handled in the team
meeting where facilitators had personal interjections with the most difficult
situations, individuals were taken aside and given the opportunity to reflect or
respond and to save face. People are generally less likely to accept feedback if
they feel threatened, challenged, or humiliated.
A word of caution about feedback in emergency situation: People are often in
a highly charged emotional state in the early phases of an emergency. They may
be sleep-deprived and stressed. In such situations, feedback—even feedforward—
may be misconstrued and unwelcome. Another reason for establishing standard
operating behaviors or agreeing to common language to describe behaviors is that
personal insult can be reduced when discussion is being compared to standards
already accepted.

The Team Leader
The difference between leader and manager has been the subject of discussion and
exploration for many years. It is important to keep in mind Bennison’s2 distinction
between leadership, which is more about setting a new direction or vision for a
group to follow, and management being more about controls and directing people/
resources in a group according to principles or values that have previously been
established—either by a group or by the organization it represents.
In emergency response situations the role is more about managing to agreed
goals within accepted mandates, taking a shorter-term view and complying to standards. There is no doubt that to achieve this task leadership must be demonstrated
and role modeled. Great leaders demonstrate this by:
Creating and communicating the vision
Acting as powerful role models
Aligning people towards a common goal
Bringing out the best in people
Acting as change agents
Staying calm in crisis and challenge
Today’s workforce is the best-educated and most qualified in history. Managers
can no longer expect them to leave their brains at the door when they come to work.
Sadly, managers from many authoritarian cultures and others representing cross
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cultures behave as if this is the case, in their belief that they alone are qualified to
interpret information, resolve issues and make decisions. Such beliefs and practices
create quite a challenge to promoting facilitative approaches to team leadership.
Good leadership is about giving a sense of real purpose to the team. It starts with
self-awareness—the first step to what is now referred to as Emotional Intelligence.
According to the widely recognized work of Daniel Goleman,3 Emotional Intelligence
is a combination of self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, and relationship management. It is also about being proactive and thinking ahead—this
requires innovation, creativity and future planning, and being comfortable with
ambiguity and paradox. Good leadership is not about being liked but about being
effective. It is not about the status, position, fancy 4 ⫻ 4 vehicle, or other perks. It
is about doing the right thing and doing it well.
Trust: A Critical Factor in Establishing High-Performing Teams
From project managers to emergency health responders, a critical factor identified as contributing to or destroying a team is trust. It appears as the superglue
that holds teams and organizations together. Without it there is dysfunction and
suboptimal performance.
In numerous exercises conducted around the world and in numerous organizations, the following list emerges:
What creates trust

What destroys trust

Giving credit to others
Listening to understand
Keeping promises
Being kind and courteous
Being loyal to the absent
Being available and open
Offering apologies
Keeping commitments
Being open to feedback
Being emotionally stable

Pushing to be understood
Breaking promises
Being unkind and discourteous
Being disloyal
Being prideful and arrogant
Blaming others
Lying and double standards
Rejecting feedback
Personal attacks and criticism
Taking credit for others’ work

Summary
Society in general is demanding more of humanitarian action, whether it is the
Gates Foundation demanding measurable results or cooperating partners demanding more involvement with lead agencies. Today’s situations demand a more coop-
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erative and inclusive approach, and workers involved in them need to employ effective cross-functional, cross-disciplinary, and multicultural teamwork. An inherent
assumption of this approach must be that the competencies of individual relief
workers and particularly team leaders must include skills in facilitating these processes. Among some disaster relief workers there is still a reluctance, even embarrassment, on the part of humanitarian agencies to give credit to this kind of training
and preparation. But, the consequences for not doing so are serious and may be
fatal to the program, those who need assistance, and to the humanitarian workers
themselves. There are a number of advantages to getting this right.
1. The improved functioning of teams: Just as an organization’s values and beliefs
influence the actions and ethics of its people, so too does the structure, processes, and management style. By extension, both will influence the functioning
of its teams on the ground and the overall perceived success of the organization.
2. Community relations: Not only can humanitarian workers not operate in
communities where they have not established trust and transparency, but their
lives are also sometimes at risk.
3. A new profile of beneficiaries: “Articulate communities of people used to power
themselves” describes relief personnel who provide prompt and effective services in a fair, respectful and compassionate manner. They reject the traditional
and essentially patronizing dynamic of the agency-beneficiary relationship that
often legitimizes an authoritative approach.
4. Capacity building: Good team and interpersonal relations contribute to raising
people’s coping abilities with stress. Stress is a common factor in the humanitarian world. Regardless of the presence or absence of conflict, the human
tragedy associated with all disasters, the absence of family, friends and the traditional support network, added to unfamiliar climate and conditions all contribute to increased anxiety and stress for any humanitarian worker. However,
when humanitarian workers benefit from good leadership support, collaborative efforts on the part of colleagues, respect and recognition for his/her contribution, then the stress of the mission can be considerably reduced. As one aid
worker said, “In Abidjan when the violence was at its worst, the team spirit and
relationship with our colleagues in other agencies was so good that we were
able to handle the worst situations with a sense of humor and without being
totally stressed. It would have been impossible to have survived without.”
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Sixty Years of Schooling for Palestinian Refugees

Sam Rose

In times of war, still photography retains a singular ability to transfix and disturb.
From the carefully crafted and sometimes dissembled compositions by the legendary annalists of the American Civil War to the “trophy shots” of torture and abuse
of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib, war photography can chronicle the horrors of
conflict and the vulnerability of its victims with breathtaking power and emotion.
Among the most arresting images from the military operation (Operation Cast
Lead) that Israel waged in Gaza in December 2008–January 2009, are a series that
illustrates both sides of the artistry of the photojournalist. They tell the story of the
shelling of a UN school in the northern town of Beit Lahiya by the Israeli Army on
the last day of the war.1 In the initial photograph, an Israeli ordnance round can be
seen exploding above the school, while another lands in the playground, trailing
a plume of white smoke. In the next, scores of miniature fireballs rain down on a
UN compound. Subsequent pictures convey the panic and heroics of those under
bombardment—civilians flee toward the camera while paramedics dart in the
opposite direction. They disappear into a blanket of dense white smoke, which has
now engulfed much of the schoolyard and buildings, where almost two thousand
Palestinians had been sheltering. Soon, the medics are also in flight, as firefighters
struggle to douse the flames.
Suddenly, the mood and pace (and most likely the photographer) changes, and
we are taken through several more stylized compositions portraying the aftermath
of the attack. Women and children return to the blackened classrooms where they
had been sheltering before the bombardment; aid workers and local residents sift
through the remains.
We now know that the ordnance used by the Israeli Army that day was filled
with felt wedges steeped in white phosphorus, a fiercely incendiary and highly
toxic chemical. Although permitted under international law under certain circumstances, it is prohibited wherever there is “a concentration of civilians,”2 a description that Human Rights Watch has concluded applied on that day in Gaza. We also
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know that two children, aged five and seven, who were inside the school were killed,
and thirteen persons were injured.
The Beit Lahiya Elementary School sustained extensive damages. It is operated by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides basic services to around one million Palestine refugees in Gaza, approximately two-thirds
of the total population, and another 3.5 million in the West Bank, Jordan, Syria,
and Lebanon. Thirty-six of the organization’s schools were damaged during IDF
Operation Cast Lead; forty-five were turned into temporary shelters, hosting more
than fifty thousand displaced civilians.
This is not the first time that UNRWA installations have been damaged or
destroyed during military operations. The organization’s entire compound in Nahr
el Bared camp in Lebanon, which housed five schools and several other UN and
NGO facilities, was leveled by the Lebanese Army in the siege of summer 2007.
Ninety of UNRWA’s one hundred schools in Gaza were damaged or looted during
the 1967 Arab-Israel war. The almost serial nature of such incidents and the repeated
breaches of the immunity and inviolability of UN assets that they imply should in no
way reduce our shock and duty to protest in the strongest possible terms.
IDF Operation Cast Lead ended on January 17, 2009. A week later, on January
24, following makeshift repairs, UNRWA reopened the Beit Lahiya school. Teaching
resumed at all UNRWA’s schools in Gaza that day, for close to 200,000 refugee
pupils. This was arguably the most significant step taken by UNRWA in the immediate aftermath of the war. As well as creating space for children and parents to
come to terms with their trauma, it helped to provide structure and stability for
those young people whose lives had been shattered by war, reinforcing a return to
“normality,” insofar as such a word has meaning in Gaza. It also held significant
symbolic value, emphasizing UNRWA’s intent to reorient itself rapidly toward
longer-term development goals and its commitment to supporting the Palestine
refugees of Gaza during the recovery process.

The Early History of UNRWA’s Education Programs
Behind the incident described above lies the story of one of the largest education systems in the Middle East and one of the most important in contemporary
Palestinian society.
While long-term crises and sudden shocks in the past decade have forced
UNRWA to direct an increasing share of its resources to emergency relief, over
the course of its sixty-year history the organization’s primary role has been to provide social services—mainly education and health—to an ever-growing population
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of refugees. Each day of the academic year, 500,000 children aged between five
and fourteen pass through the doors of almost 700 UNRWA schools in Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, at an annual cost of US$328 million.3 Since operations began, UNRWA has educated three generations of refugees,
or around four million children.
It is in the sphere of education that UNRWA has made by far its most significant contribution to Palestinian human development. However, this was not the
original intention of the UN when it began to seek funds for Palestine refugees following the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. In what was thought would be a temporary
emergency operation, no provision was made for education by the UN’s Disaster
Relief Project for the victims of the war, which began work in July 1948, or in the
first budget of its successor, UN Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR).4 The few
schools there were in the refugee camps that had sprung up across the region had
been set up by voluntary organizations, including the Quakers in Gaza and the Red
Cross Society in the West Bank, and were supported by UNESCO.5 They survived
on sales of used materials, special appeals and grants from other UN organizations.6
When UNRWA assumed responsibility for the education of Palestine refugees
in the middle of 1950, it took over sixty-one schools from the UNRPR, with 730
teachers and 33,600 pupils, representing just over a quarter of all school aged refugee
children at that time.7 A director was assigned from UNESCO to lead the agency’s
education programs, in an arrangement that continues to this day. However, the
share of education in the organization’s first budgets was negligible: between 1950
and 1955, it accounted for only 5 percent of total expenditures.8 While understandable given the context—more than 700,000 refugees had recently been uprooted
from their homes and livelihoods—it also reflected the prevailing approach of the
major powers to the Palestine refugee “problem.”
Unable to repatriate the refugees as per the terms of UN General Assembly
Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, the international community instead
sought their regional resettlement and “reintegration.” This was to be achieved
through public works projects that would (1) help displaced communities to
become self-sufficient; (2) strengthen the economies of the host countries; and (3)
allow UNRWA to delete large numbers from its ration rolls in fairly short order.9
Projects developed to meet these goals ranged from local construction works, for
example, of shelters, roads and camps, to regional initiatives of a scope and ambition that have not been seen since in more than sixty years of peace-building efforts
for Palestinians and Israelis.10
UNRWA had already begun increasing its expenditures on education, partly to
support the goal of economic rehabilitation, but also given the longer-term char-
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acter the refugee crisis was gradually assuming. Another consideration may have
been a rebuke from UNESCO’s Executive Board to the effect that the UN would be
in breach of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights if it failed to make further
investments in educating Palestine refugee children.11
Although food parcels still accounted for the majority of UNRWA’s budgets,
there were major leaps in allocations to education during the first half of the 1950s.
By the middle of the decade, its accounted for almost one-fifth of total expenditures. Almost 100,000 pupils were being taught in 264 UNRWA schools by 2,700
teachers, with subsidies provided to house another 55,000 refugee children at government or private schools.
Most teaching had moved out of tents and into specially constructed premises
or rented buildings. UNRWA schools were the first permanent structures in many
camps and became a symbol of an increasingly education-centered approach to
refugee assistance. UNRWA was also operating two vocational training centers in
Qalandia and Gaza and had links with regional organizations and host governments to secure placements and employment contracts for its graduates at the end
of their courses. Course materials were developed with regional market needs—
and UNRWA-funded large-scale development projects—in mind, supported by
specialist UN agencies. University scholarship and teacher-training programs were
also offered, albeit on a very small scale, while tens of thousands of adult refugees
benefited from adult literacy courses.
As the 1950s progressed, skepticism about the feasibility of the much-trumped
reintegration and resettlement schemes continued to grow. The failure to resolve
the Arab-Israeli conflict as per the terms of Resolution 194, the intransigence of
Israel and host authorities, and the paucity of donor funding for development plans
were all contributing factors. Perhaps most importantly, the refugees refused to be
part of what they considered to be a conspiracy to liquidate them and deny them
their internationally recognized rights.
The Suez crisis of 1956 signaled the abrupt end of the era of regional refugeedevelopment schemes. After this time and the final acceptance that there could be
no resolution of the Palestine refugee problem absent political accommodation,
UNRWA began to reorient itself away from relief toward education. The seeds of
this strategic transformation had been planted in the five-year education plan of
1955–1959 and were given full voice in the watershed annual report of 1960.12 In that
report, UNRWA’s fourth director, John Davis, announced a three-year plan for
“well planned and promptly executed programmes for improving general education and expanding specialized types of training” that would harvest the “latent
productive talents” of refugee youth that had so far been laid to waste.13

323

CH24_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p320-334.indd 323

2/13/13 11:15 PM

SAM ROSE

Proposals included the formalization of a three-year, lower preparatory cycle;
increasing the number of vocational trainees from 500 to between 2,000 and
2,500 through the construction of six new training centers and the establishment
of a joint vocational and teacher-training school for girls and a separate men’s
teacher training center; doubling the number of university scholarships awarded by
UNRWA each year, from 90 to 180 per year; and institutionalizing UNRWA’s loans
and grants programs, designed to help refugees become self-sufficient.14
These initiatives, which placed UNRWA at the vanguard of regional education
policy, laid the foundations for a series of remarkable successes. They established
UNRWA as a significant educational force, far ahead of the curve in the Middle
East and North Africa region, and endowing refugees with an “educational advantage” over their non-refugee peers, which persisted for many decades.15 To this day,
literacy rates of Palestinian refugees are higher than for the Middle East and North
Africa region as a whole, particularly among females.16 UNRWA’s initiatives were
often groundbreaking, especially in girls’ education and vocational training, where
graduates were highly sought after and an UNRWA qualification effectively guaranteed employment. The organization had a reputation for innovation, dynamism,
and vision in its approach and commitment to education, a commitment that was
shared by the refugees.
Beginning in 1961, the share of the budget spent on education began to increase
significantly, and by 1970 it had become UNRWA’s largest program. Five years
later, education accounted for more than half of all program expenditures.17
The Successes of UNRWA’s Education Program
The successes of the program can be attributed to a number of factors. Some were
circumstantial, others a result of direct choices and support by UNRWA, refugees
and host authorities. Considered as a whole, they provide compelling evidence of
the opportunities for development and progress that can emerge from crisis and
tragedy.
The First Decade
Even before the Palestinian exodus or nakba of 1948, education levels among Arabs in
mandate Palestine were relatively good by regional standards, despite Palestinians’
primarily agrarian backgrounds. This was partly the result of investments by the
British in the last years of the mandate period. It also reflected a growing desire for
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learning among village communities at that time, with many contributing labor to
build their own schools and the government providing the teachers.18 Nevertheless,
overall attainment levels were quite low, and enrollment was far from universal.
Most schools were based in towns, limiting access for rural population and girls in
particular, who fell victim to cultural barriers regarding unaccompanied travel.19
Estimates of illiteracy among Palestinians at that time range from between 60 and
70 percent, with around half of all children—and four in five girls—not receiving
any kind of education.20
The nakba removed many of the barriers to physical and cultural access, particularly for rural Palestinians, who formed the overwhelming majority of the residents of the refugee camps. The network of schools established by voluntary organizations offered a platform that UNRWA could capitalize on and support with
resources and technical expertise. Within months, many thousands of Palestinians
now had educational establishments within walking distance. Enrollments by girls
increased with each year, as cultural norms which had conspired against progress
in normal circumstances were rapidly overcome at a time of crisis.
If UNRWA’s attitude to education in the 1950s could be seen as somewhat
ambivalent, the same charge could not be leveled at the refugees. As early as 1951
refugee communities were urging UNRWA to devote more of its resources to education,21 and while often skeptical of its overall intentions and those of its powerbrokers, they viewed education as an apolitical form of rehabilitation, which did
not compromise their right of return. UNRWA’s commitment to education from
1960 onward was also framed explicitly in these terms.22
For the first generation of Palestine refugees, education was both a short-term
and long-term coping strategy. As a result of the nakba, a predominantly peasant
society had lost access to its land and needed to secure alternative and reliable
means of livelihood. Education and training were viewed as well suited to their
needs and capacities; the human capital that they generated could not be destroyed
or taken away.23 However sepia-tinged this analysis may appear, there is no doubt
that study offered a route out of poverty, and as such, investment in education—
particularly higher education—was embraced as a “family project”24 by many
households. Some researchers have further suggested that refugees’ desire to better
themselves partly reflected a sense of inferiority next to Israelis. Bridging the gap
thus became part of the national struggle, one in which education partially replaced
the homeland as a focus for Palestinian efforts.25 There were also more mundane
considerations: Children who had previously worked in the fields no longer had the
opportunity to do so and needed alternative ways to occupy their time.
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The 1960s and Beyond: The Impact of the Davis Reforms
Davis’s plan yielded almost immediate results. It fostered the growth of what could
be described as a virtuous circle for education similar to those seen in many Western
European states following the Second World War, and which acted as a vital engine
for economic growth in the postwar period.
The institutionalization of a third year of preparatory education, formalizing
the lower secondary cycle in UNRWA schools and with it nine years of compulsory education, was critical. This enabled refugee students to graduate to upper
secondary and also tertiary education, which was often provided free of charge by
the host authorities and Eastern Bloc countries.26 By the end of the 1960s, the ratio
of Palestinian university students to total Palestinian population was considerably
higher than for the Arab region as a whole and comparable to many developed
countries. The fact that most of these students came from families who would have
been fortunate to have access to even basic education a generation earlier makes
this achievement even more impressive. As was the case with primary education,
girls in particular benefited, and host country data show major leaps in refugee
females’ participation in higher education from this point.
The expansion of UNRWA’s education and training programs enabled refugees to tap into the professional opportunities offered by the opening up of regional
markets, particularly in the Gulf. Oil-rich governments were making massive
investments at that time, including in schools and hospitals, and UNRWA was
quick to pinpoint these states as potential employers for graduates. Market surveys
and systematic analysis of labor market needs across the Middle East, played an
important role, continually informing the content of training courses at the new
vocational colleges.27 UNRWA’s own employment placement centers, originally set
up to facilitate refugee resettlement, provided further support. Investment in education quickly became self-reinforcing, as remissions from graduates of UNRWA
schools and colleges working in the Gulf funded the education of future generations of Palestinians from the camps. Importantly, such remissions also helped to
support the Palestinian national movement.
Likewise, the development of public institutions and infrastructure in Arab
host countries and UNRWA’s own expanding education and health programs
ensured a ready stream of work for qualified job seekers, particularly for women,
for whom teaching and medical jobs were well suited and culturally accepted, and
for graduates of UNRWA technical colleges, who built much of the furniture used
in agency schools.
Although partly driven by the failure of attempts to ensure refugee repatriation, UNRWA’s reorientation towards education services in the 1960s had a trans326
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formative effect. It allowed the organization to transcend the temporary nature of
its mandate and focus on longer-term human development goals. For the refugees,
whose role in shaping UNRWA’s priorities should not be underestimated, this
move effected a qualitative change in their human capital and living levels.

The Challenges
Achievements in education have come despite chronic underfunding and repeated
national and regional emergencies over the past sixty years. The cumulative effect
of these has been a dramatic narrowing of refugees’ educational advantage and
opportunities in recent decades, at a time when new labor force entrants face evergrowing competition for employment in an increasingly global job market.
Funding Shortfalls
UNRWA’s dependency on voluntary financial contributions was identified as a
major structural shortcoming as early as 1951, in the UNRWA Director’s Interim
Report of that year, which covered the first five months of operations:
The Agency’s financial situation has never been a happy one . . . At no time in
its brief career has the Agency been able to see its financial position assured for
more than a few weeks ahead. A large and complex program cannot be adequately planned and administered efficiently when it depends on the receipt
of voluntary contributions in unknown amounts, to be delivered at unknown
times.
Financial shortfalls had an immediate impact on UNRWA’s education programs, consistently limiting capacity to invest in the human and capital resources
needed to accommodate a rapidly growing student population. From the early
1950s UNRWA was forced to operate schools on a “double-shift” basis, with
one group of students studying in the morning and a second in the afternoon.
Although the planned elimination of such a system became a mantra of Annual
Reports, with each passing year the proportion of double-shifted schools grew, and
some schools in Lebanon were eventually forced to operate a third shift. By 2004,
more than three-quarters of UNRWA’s schools operated two shifts each day.28
As a result, school days have had to be shortened to accommodate the second
shift, resulting in fewer hours available for learning, use of specialized facilities and
extracurricular activities.
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Construction plans to reduce class sizes and teacher-pupil ratios and replace
rented premises, many of which dated back to the early 1950s and were increasingly ill suited to the demands of modern learning, were prepared and updated
but were routinely under-resourced. At times, the funding crisis became so grave
that programs were threatened. In the late 1970s, the provision of university
scholarships was frozen, while spiraling inflation over the course of that decade
led the Commissioner-General to propose the closure of all preparatory schools
in 1979. A year later, UNRWA was considering shutting down all its schools for
financial reasons.29
A Deteriorating External Environment
UNRWA’s inability to upgrade and develop its educational resources, facilities,
and systems undoubtedly contributed to the eventual narrowing of the educational
advantage of Palestine refugees over their Arab peers. Other external factors, which
had helped to create such an enabling environment for education throughout the
1960s and 1970s, also began to recede. By the early 1980s, the demand for professional expatriate labor in the Gulf, which had fed the drive for education and whose
remittances had supported the education of future generations, was down. The
Gulf States were becoming increasingly reliant on their own nationals to fill teaching and other public sector roles, a professional cadre and system whose development owed no small debt to Palestinian migrant workers. At the same time, massive
investment in education systems by other Arab States, designed to absorb their rapidly growing, increasingly urban-dwelling, young populations, paid dividends for
host-country nationals and led to greater competition for jobs. The same pattern
was repeated in the West Bank and Gaza after the establishment of the Palestinian
Authority in 1994: donors made significant investments in systems and structures
that had been heavily neglected by Israel in the years since 1967. Even so, the Gulf
States remained an important source of employment for professional Palestinians
until the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, when an estimated 300,000 Palestinians
were expelled from Kuwait. Particularly for those in the occupied Palestinian territory and Lebanon, there were few domestic alternatives to these professional
employment opportunities.
For Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory, the Israeli labor market
offered a major alternative source of employment. Following the 1967 war, Israel
had immediately sought to integrate the Palestinian economy into its own. It incorporated the surplus of low-skilled Palestinian labor—mainly male—into Israeli
construction, service, and industrial sectors in jobs that were unattractive to its own
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workers. Access to relatively well paid job opportunities in Israel from 1967 onward
also influenced the attitude of young Palestinian males in Gaza and West Bank to
higher education, further reducing the educational dividend for Palestinians.30
Perpetual Emergencies
Perhaps most devastating, though, have been the repeated crises across UNRWA’s
fields, which have forced the closure of schools and led to the suspension of classes
and the diversion of funding and attention to more immediate, life-saving concerns.
In the Gaza Strip and West Bank particularly, these emergencies have become the
norm in recent years. Often political or complex in nature, crises have had both
immediate and long-term, irrevocable impacts on service delivery, creating new
dynamics and realities that UNRWA and its pupils have been forced to adapt to
and negotiate.
The Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 is a case in point. Almost 300 UNRWA teachers were outside Gaza at the time of the war and were not permitted by the new
occupying power Israel to return in time for the start of the next school year. More
significantly, Israel banned the entry of most of the Egyptian textbooks used in
UNRWA schools in Gaza. Israel had long been critical of these books, which in
its view offered a “distorted account of the events leading up to and following the
establishment of the State of Israel and tended to induce hatred of Israel in the
minds of the children using them.” In coordination with UNESCO, UNRWA was
forced to produce its own temporary textbooks and teaching notes.
Special arrangements also had to be made to allow several thousands of students to complete secondary-school leaving examinations (tawjihi), a requirement
for continuing education in the Arab world. Some students were permitted to travel
to Jordan to complete their studies, while UNRWA and UNESCO succeeded in
bringing examination papers into Gaza for the remainder. This entailed a complex
logistical effort, involving a team of forty international staff, as well as hundreds
of inspectors and teachers, and representatives of the ICRC and United Nations
Emergency Force. These arrangements remained in place for twelve years, until the
signing of a peace deal between Israel and Egypt in 1979.31

Two Decades of Crisis in Gaza and the West Bank
The eruption of the first Intifada in Gaza in 1988 effectively marked the start of two
decades of upheaval and crisis for the education system in the occupied Palestinian
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territory, which continue to this day. During the first Intifada, the education system
was directly targeted, with schools and students often at the centre of violent confrontations with the occupying power. In Gaza, UNRWA schools were closed on
average every third day; even greater amounts of time were lost in the West Bank,
where UNRWA’s three training centers were also shut for more than two years
from the spring of 1988.32
Although students and youth were less directly involved in the second Intifada,
its impact on the education process has been no less devastating. Since September
2000, Israel has significantly tightened its system of restrictions on the movement
of Palestinians and Palestinian goods into, out of, and within the West Bank and
Gaza, with dramatic consequences for all aspects of Palestinian life.33 The right to
education for many has been systematically undermined and violated, with movement of teachers and pupils constrained by checkpoints and closure and regulated
by Israeli-issued permits, which are routinely denied. Since 2004, Israel has banned
Palestinian students in Gaza from studying at institutes of higher education in the
West Bank and Israel. Palestinians in Gaza seeking to travel abroad to pursue disciplines not available in Gaza have also been prevented from leaving, including
a number who had been awarded Fulbright scholarships to study in the United
States.34 In the West Bank, the national character of many universities is being
eroded by travel and movement restrictions.
Levels of violence have spiraled, including both isolated spikes, for example,
raids into refugee camps or targeted assassinations of persons wanted by Israel,
and more protracted military operations such as the recent war on Gaza, Operation
Defensive Shield in the West Bank in 2002, and more recent inter-Palestinian
clashes in Gaza. As well as direct physical and material losses—313 children were
killed in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead, according to the Palestinian Centre for
Human Rights, and 181 schools partially or totally destroyed35—these exact high
social and psychological costs for pupils, teachers and families, with deleterious
immediate and longer-term consequences.
The past decade has also seen an escalation of attacks on the Palestinian national
curriculum, whose introduction coincided with the start of the second Intifada. In
its most legitimate form, scrutiny of the curriculum has helped to promote constructive debate on the politics of textbooks, including the appropriate framing
of history for Palestinian schoolchildren and the role of education in promoting
peace and shaping national identity. Unfortunately, the focus of debate has often
moved beyond purely scholarly considerations, with various pressure groups framing Palestinian textbooks as a source of conflict, designed to promote violence and
incite hatred of Israel. The allegations and accompanying advocacy campaigns have
been used to discredit the Palestinian Authority (PA) and also formed part of an
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effort to undermine international support for UNRWA. This is despite the fact that
independent research has concluded that allegations are based on claims that are
“tendentious and highly misleading,” and that, notwithstanding some elements
of imbalance, the overall orientation of the Palestinian curriculum is “peaceful,
despite the harsh and violent realities on the ground.”36
In some cases, education providers have been able to negotiate some of the
physical and administrative obstacles created by the second Intifada, or at least
limit their effects. This includes the reassignment of teachers to schools nearer their
homes, the introduction of remedial learning and recreational programmers, and
the provision of free stationery and meals to poor students.37
Efforts to improve the quality of education have also continued. The PA has
persisted with an ambitious program of reform, with the World Bank recently
commending the remarkable advances made since the start of the second Intifada.38
Despite campaigns by its detractors, independent research has also highlighted
the constructive and systematic steps taken by the PA to constantly reform and
improve the curriculum, including focusing on faculties of critical thinking and
creative thinking and promoting concepts of human rights, democracy, and pluralism. For its part, UNRWA has introduced a human rights, conflict resolution,
and tolerance curriculum in its schools, integrated into lesson plans, with children
as young as five learning the principles, history, and core values of international
human rights instruments.
There are also indications that Palestinian families have developed a fairly
sophisticated armory of coping strategies to adapt to the new reality, reflecting a
continuing, even heightened commitment to education over the past decade. Data
from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics show that educational attendance
among both males and females has increased at every stage of the education process in Gaza and West Bank since 2000, despite the decreasing ability of parents to
support their children’s higher education. Research has identified an association
between investment in education and the loss of unskilled wage labor opportunities
in Israel due to closures.39
At the same time, the protracted crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory
is also limiting the resources and attention that service providers can devote to
education, given other competing priorities. Over the past decade, donor funding has been increasingly directed toward humanitarian relief and—in the case of
the PA—the budget support that it needs to ensure its survival, at the expense of
more strategic, longer-term, and productive development investment. UNRWA
expenditure data in the West Bank, for example, indicates that more was spent on
relief activities—including food aid, cash assistance and temporary employment
programmers—than education between 2002 and 2010.
331

CH24_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p320-334.indd 331

2/13/13 11:15 PM

SAM ROSE

In addition, recent testing in UNRWA schools points to significant drops in
educational performance. Although efforts are underway in both Gaza and West
Bank to address this through remedial actions and recovery plans, the longer-term
consequences of today’s protracted crisis on education—those leaving UNRWA
schools at the time of writing had barely begun their first grade when the Intifada
erupted—will not be fully understood for several years. And while the PA and
UNRWA have so far been able to successfully defend themselves against attacks on
the integrity of the material used in their classrooms, these campaigns have nonetheless been extremely damaging, particularly in terms of their shaping of the negotiations agenda and diverting attention away from evidently more pressing issues.

Conclusion
The history of UNRWA’s education system, and that of Palestinian education in
general, is peppered with crises and emergencies that continue to the present day.
The attacks on UNRWA schools in Gaza described in the opening paragraphs of
this chapter echo similar destruction wrought during the 1967 war; and just as
Israel banned the entry of Egyptian textbooks to Gaza in the aftermath of that war,
so today it places restrictions on the passage of paper and educational materials,
including those concerning UNRWA’s human rights curriculum.40 From direct
obstacles such as bans on entry of supplies and enforced closure of schools to indirect hindrances created by closures and checkpoints, the education system itself has
often been thrust to the very center of the conflict. This is particularly the case in
the occupied Palestinian territory, where the role of education in the formation of
national identity, the framing of historical narratives, and the peace process itself
remains under intense scrutiny, sometimes for political ends.
Its experiences mirror those of the Palestinian population as a whole over the
past sixty years, and indeed “Palestinian education” bears many of the hallmarks of
dispossession and statelessness. As the relationship with both the Gulf and Israeli
labor markets has shown, investment in higher education has typically been geared
less toward national Palestinian economic needs than those of regional markets.
The economic fruits of education have been similarly exported, leaving Palestinian
families and communities exposed to exogenous and repeated shocks—most
recently, the loss of access to Israeli markets and debilitating obstacles to normal
economic activity has generated an employment crisis of unprecedented magnitude for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
In a similar manner, the debate and very content of the Palestinian curriculum
is reflective of the complexity of Palestinians’ unresolved struggle for statehood
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and the sometimes uncomfortable relationship between on-the-ground realities
and accepted principles of international law. This relationship often borders on
the perverse, as shown by the notion of teaching future generations of Palestinians
the value and primacy of the very rights and laws that the international community
denies them on a daily basis.
When considering these constraints, challenges, and controversies, we should
not allow our attention to be diverted from the transformative role played by
education, and UNRWA’s programs in particular, on successive generations of
Palestine refugees over the past sixty years. This has ensured social, if not economic, progress that more closely resembles Western European states in the aftermath of the Second World War than that of neighboring Arab states in the immediate postcolonial period. Despite the efforts of pressure groups and detractors to
shape public opinion to the contrary, education programmers have also made a
significant contribution to stability and state building across the region. Ongoing
national Palestinian curriculum reform efforts, as well as UNRWA’s dedicated
human rights and conflict resolution programs are testament to the vitality of this
contribution.
These achievements should not be overlooked by those involved in the latest
phase of peace-making diplomacy in the region. As the protracted socioeconomic
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory highlights, it is increasingly clear that any
successful political plan must be accompanied with a development and economic
plan of the vision and ambition of UNRWA’s early years, founded on the successful education system that exists there. This is essential for meeting the future economic needs of Palestinians—both refugees and non-refugees—and ensuring that
at times of peace as at war they are able to continue contributing to the productive
development of the region.
Reflections from 2012
In recent years, education systems across the Middle East, including in the countries where UNRWA operates, have come under increasing scrutiny. Decried by
policy makers, academics and economists alike as failing to equip pupils with the
skills needed to compete in an increasingly global and knowledge-based economy,
the poor quality of schools has been viewed as symptomatic of deeper societal and
public policy failings.
International testing (Trends in International Mathematics and Science
Survey—TIMSS) has given a good deal of credence to this criticism.41 Although
enrollment rates have improved dramatically in recent years, recent data suggest
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that the quality of schooling is often poor, with pupils in Middle Eastern countries
falling behind their peers in other global regions.
Spurred on by declining quality in its own schools, in October 2011 UNRWA
launched an ambitious set of reforms designed to improve the quality of its education services.42 Their evolution coincided with a period of extraordinary transformation in the Middle East. The tumultuous events of the Arab Spring, sparked
off by the self-immolation of Tunisian market vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in
December 2010, have seen momentous change, in countries as far apart as Tunisia
to Yemen. These upheavals have placed young people at the very heart of political
and development agendas across the region.
Although Palestine refugees have not participated in the protests—directed
primarily at ruling parties and state authority—we would be wise to consider
their needs and aspirations through the lens of the Arab Spring. Like their peers
in other Middle Eastern countries, refugee youth are often disproportionately
affected by poverty, unemployment, and exclusion, socially, politically and economically disempowered.
It is therefore particularly opportune that UNRWA is seeking to reform its
education programs and deepen its engagement with young refugees at this pivotal moment. In so doing, and particularly through support to refugee youth—a
growing share of the Palestinian population, whose needs have sometimes been
neglected in the Millennium Development Goal era—UNRWA is retreading a
development path that yielded such successes during the organisation’s formative
years. It is vital that these reforms bear fruit.
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What Can Modern Society Learn from Indigenous Resiliency?
Margareta Wahlstrom

The Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2011 found that “a lot of
knowledge about climate adaptation is not reaching those who need it the most.”
How much more of a challenge is it, then, to get information, good practices, and
capacity-building tools into the hands of indigenous communities using nonmainstream languages, so that they can adapt what has been learned to their ways
of life? This challenge is alluded to in the international blueprint for disaster risk
reduction agreed and endorsed by all United Nations Member States, the Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA), which prioritizes the use of knowledge, innovation,
and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels. The HFA
Hyogo Framework Priority No. 3 recommends “Provid[ing] easily understandable
information on disaster risk and protection options, especially to citizens in highrisk areas, to encourage and enable people to take actions to reduce risk and build
resilience. The information should incorporate relevant traditional and indigenous
cultural heritage and be tailored to different target audiences, taking into account
cultural and social factors.”
It is well recognized among policymakers and academics that indigenous peoples are more vulnerable than most to the factors driving risk such as poverty,
bad planning, poor governance, prejudice, environmental degradation, and forced
migration to cities and towns. Indigenous people also have something to teach
modern communities about resilience and practices that protect environment and
the community. However, many indigenous communities, pushed to the limits of
their traditional lifestyles, have changed and may also adopt harmful practices that
impact negatively on ecosystems for their survival.
Another important reality check is “scaling up.” In a continuous search for
viable alternatives to the consumer patterns that deplete natural resources and
increase vulnerability, traditional practices offer inspiration to explore methods,
but on a scale that is limited in space and habitat. The challenge is to find out how
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and what can be scaled up to apply to today’s urban communities that are different
socially and economically from the indigenous communities.
Indigenous communities in many ways define resilience. How else would you
describe a community that has preserved its institutions and ways of life over centuries other than as resilient? Yet, in other aspects, indigenous peoples, numbering
some 370 million in ninety countries, are among the most vulnerable to natural and
human-made hazards.
Some of the most disaster-prone countries in the world are also countries in
which the indigenous people are a significant percentage of the overall population.
The Instituto Indigenista Interamericano reckons that indigenous people constitute 66 percent of the population in Guatemala, 63 percent in Bolivia, and 40 percent in Peru and Ecuador.
The range and intensity of hazards faced by indigenous communities is increasing with climate variability and more freak and extreme weather events. The Navajo
Nation, for instance, is facing one of the longest droughts in recorded history, while
at the other end of the extreme, Pacific Islanders face the challenges of rising sea
levels and increasingly intense typhoons.
As in all communities around the world, vulnerability to hazards among indigenous peoples is inextricably linked to socioeconomic development choices. The
locations and structures that indigenous people live in may contribute to the risks.
In too many indigenous communities development choices are not the community’s choices. The forest fires that plague the peoples of Borneo—destroying crops
and damaging health—can often be traced to large-scale land conversion. In other
countries, forced relocation and dispossession has pushed people onto unfamiliar and inhospitable lands. And it is not a coincidence that indigenous lands are
often selected as sites for toxic waste dumps. Socioeconomic drivers of risk such as
extreme poverty, environmental degradation, and limited access to health care are
pervasive in many indigenous communities.
Still it would be wrong to cast indigenous people as helpless victims because
their endurance tells us that is not the case. Often theirs is the story of survival
through adversity. So, how can this resilience be explained? Equipped with knowledge accumulated through generations of observation, many indigenous communities benefit from the hard-learned lessons of their ancestors. Some have resulted in
resilient building designs that have withstood blowing winds and trembling earth.
The government of Bhutan, for example, has undertaken to examine their own
construction practices and to learn from other cultures and share their insights
internationally. In some cases, this entails blending the old with the new. In India,
advice on bringing out the best of different knowledge systems and building disas-
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ter-resilient structures is available in the Guidelines for Earthquake Resistant NonEngineered Construction report; such approaches exemplify the principal of doing
more with less.1
In many indigenous communities, the accumulated knowledge stems from intimate observation of their environment. Native Hawaiians, for example, have long
been able to identify dozens of types of winds and storms, even anticipating what we
now recognize as the onset of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation. Local knowledge
saved the lives of many villagers on the island of Simulue during the 2004 Indian
Ocean tsunami. It is no surprise that when indigenous Dayak community leaders
designed a training program for fire prevention in Borneo, they set “learning to
observe local forest and temperature conditions” as the first learning objectives.
One of the distinguishing features of resilience is found in the ways that
communities recover. Indigenous communities have strong adaptive capacities.
Extensive and enduring social networks that bind communities provide the foundations of a social safety net. The ways that indigenous communities establish networks are translated into broader national and international settings. Grassroots
and indigenous women first met in Antigua, Guatemala, for example, in 2008 and
shared their experiences in making their communities less vulnerable to disasters.
They drafted a document outlining their plans for increased cooperation among
themselves and for greater participation in the disaster risk reduction plans of their
respective governments. This is a very practical example of how indigenous knowledge can be immediately transformed into learning for the wider society.
The history of indigenous peoples includes periods of resistance and cooperation with populations that have sought to dominate them. Article 3 of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states, “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.” Indigenous peoples have long struggled for the right to say no to
shortsighted development schemes and to promote their own approaches to development. Determination of balanced approaches to growth and development is not
a right held exclusively by indigenous peoples.
The cultural diversity of the world’s indigenous peoples is an asset to us all in
our various efforts to build resilient communities and nations. Diverse ways of
life, values, and knowledge systems can reduce our collective fragility and, in fact,
enrich us. It is, however, important to base this on the understanding that the right
of indigenous populations to participate in the economic and social progress of
countries is a fundamental one—and a necessary starting point.
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PART VI

Exit Strategies

After the immediate challenges of disasters are addressed survivors need to regain
a sense of security, reuniting families and rebuilding community structures. This
process should begin as soon as a relief program is developed for vulnerable, displaced people, whether they are in refugee camps, forced to migrate, or, hopefully,
been able to return to their own homes. It must be done with generosity of spirit
and fully understanding the scars of loss. To prepare traumatized populations for
the transition back to normal lives requires an enduring respect for their own customs and traditions. One must promote a sense of justice coupled, if at all possible,
with forgiveness. All this is part of an exit strategy that should be part of the planning at the very start of every humanitarian assistance mission.
In this section are philosophic and practical suggestions to accomplish the goal
of realizing as seamless a transition from crisis to stability.
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To Bind Our Wounds
A One-Year Post-9/11 Address

Kevin M. Cahill, M.D.

Throughout the centuries, those who survive disasters have offered memorials to
the dead, and they have done so with different tools and different skills: Picasso
did it for the victims of Guernica with oil paints. Verdi mourned the poet/patriot
Manzoni with a musical masterpiece. Graveyards and public squares are full of
sculpture and architecture dedicated to those we loved and those we honor as fallen
heroes. Many of us, however, still record our losses and deepest sorrows with words.
I’ve always been fascinated by words, by the challenge of trying to capture an
essence in a well formed phrase, an image in the structure of a sentence, and then
molding the flow of words so that ideas and coherent arguments emerge. There
is something very satisfying—something almost inherently good—in identifying
words, simple sounds with meaning, to link our most personal inner feelings with
external facts and events. We create words that can withstand the pressures of reality and sustain us on our journeys of discovery into the private depths of our souls
as well on our sometimes even more perilous excursions into contact with other
human beings and nature itself.
I’m not sure that my memory of last September 11 and the weeks thereafter is
as comprehensive as I would have liked in preparing this special memorial address.
But I vividly recall the verbal reaction at the time—a moral certainty on the part of
leaders summarized in words suitable for centers of religious worship, or “soundbites” for the current church of the masses, the evening television shows. They
offered a global philosophy based on words from a simpler era—a “you’re either
with us or against us” view of the world. But wrapping oneself in a flag, or invoking
God to justify aggression and preemptive strikes, seemed to me a rhetoric disconnected from the complex world I knew, a world of diversity and rich but varying
values and traditions that simply could not be forced into a single mold.
A few months ago, when I was asked to deliver this talk, I thought how apt it
would be to go back 138 years and quote from the Gettysburg Address. As all of you
now know, that brief, beautiful memorial is being recited today by the Governor
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and the President, and, it seems, by every public official of every political party
in every State of the Union. So I read further in Lincoln’s biography and realized
that for this September 11 anniversary program at Lenox Hill Hospital, it would be
far more appropriate to cite a few lines from Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address.
These provide the framework for my talk.
At his Second Inaugural, as the Civil War was grinding to a bloody close,
President Lincoln used the words of medicine to help prepare a battered nation
for a time of healing, of reconciliation, and reconstruction. The war had been pursued with firmness, and there were many who wanted to wreak vengeance on, and
demand total submission from, the vanquished. Lincoln, however, urged his audience to “bind up the nation’s wounds” and “to care for him who shall have borne
the battle, and for his widow and his orphans.”
That is our privileged role every day in medical life—to bind wounds, to care
for the afflicted. Today, it is from this solid foundation that I suggest we must
develop the courage to move beyond the traditional restraints of our profession.
We must share our wisdom and experience for the sake of our nation, as it once
again struggles in a search for a way out of a war mentality and towards a new era
of peace.
We should also learn from Lincoln that the way forward cannot be based
merely on violence against violence. In fact, if our society is ever to regain security
and tranquility, there is no safe way forward based on vengeance and no possible
way if we fail to see—and address—the wrongs that prompted our adversaries to
their actions. In that Second Inaugural Address, at the end of a bitter and long
conflict, wearily but wisely, President Lincoln said that the only way forward was
“with malice towards none, and with charity towards all.”
For almost a century and a half after Lincoln spoke these simple, profound
words, our nation was spared the physical and psychological effects of an assault on
our shores. Will we listen today to the wisdom of Lincoln, to the strong, but forgiving, caring, and gentle President, or will we attempt to memorialize our dead by
assuring more dead in an endless cycle of violence? Health workers are among the
most respected members in our society and we have, I believe, an opportunity—as
well as an obligation—to rekindle Lincoln’s spirit in a scarred nation in danger of
being isolated in its own pain.
In this solemn memorial, we do not gather here today only as individuals or
as citizens, but as members of the Lenox Hill Hospital family, with vivid images of
those tense days a year ago permanently seared in our minds. I am certain that most
of you who work in this building can recall the almost surreal weeks that followed
last September 11.
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The streets around our hospital were filled with desperate people searching
for their missing, with the walls and doors around the emergency room covered
with photographs of the almost certainly dead. In the evening one could hear, as
the crowds thinned, the silent cry of the anguished. And then Lenox Hill Hospital
became the scene of a fatal bioterrorist assault, with pulmonary anthrax snuffing
out the life of one of our own family. Most of you can also recall the lines of frightened and confused employees waiting to receive their prophylactic antibiotic supply from the Department of Health. Although the initial cutaneous anthrax cases at
NBC did not require inpatient care in our hospital, many of you know that I diagnosed those first two cases and was in close contact with our medical and laboratory
colleagues. Our hospital, located in the very heart of New York, cared for one sixth
of the entire national number of anthrax cases.
“Ground Zero” was not merely the dramatic rubble where the World Trade
Center once stood. It was a newly vulnerable city. With anthrax, we discovered how
fear could paralyze a society as efficiently as missiles. Anthrax, never previously
seen by most physicians, was now a topic to be taught to interns and residents. Yet,
as health workers must, every day of our lives, we learned and adapted.
In fact, I believe that medicine’s age old tradition to learn from failure, to constantly adapt, to modify therapies in the daily battle with disease, offers a model
for a way out of our current national morass. Medicine offers a unique way of
looking at problems, a way that now seems almost absent in our country’s political
lexicon. The discipline of medicine reflects a capacity to see and study disaster, and
not to waver, but to discover new approaches—even if progress must come in the
autopsy room—and to think afresh, every day, on chronic, intractable, sometimes
uniformly fatal diseases.
So today, as we all remember the destruction and deaths caused by terrorists,
and some sadly reflect on their own personal losses, we must also use the occasion
to recommit ourselves to applying the noble heritage of medicine to the ills of society. I believe there are fundamental contributions that the medical community can
offer our nation today.
Medicine and public health provide a common language, understood all over
the world, and a philosophic approach that has sustained humanity’s ageless search
for healing without causing further damage, for respecting all wounded regardless
of their affiliations or viewpoints, for creating calm and order from chaos, for promoting peace where there was war. The methodology of public health may provide
a new and imaginative way to solve problems in the far less specific arenas of diplomacy and public policy. At the very least, such an approach offers a badly needed
balance to the current national emphasis of trying to address our problems solely
with overwhelming force. In his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, William Faulkner
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said the will of man is “not merely to endure but to prevail.” But we need not
prevail over someone else. Rather, we must learn to prevail with and through others. Only in that way will our society realize that growth and development can be
achieved without destruction, and that we, in a field devoted to helping and healing, may hold the answer to a future based on mutual security and safety.
Wanton killing and brutality within supposedly sovereign borders, ethnic
and religious strife, millions of starving or near starving refugees, other millions
of migrants fleeing their homes out of fear for their lives or in a desperate search
for a better life, human rights trampled down, appalling poverty in the shadows
of extraordinary wealth, inhumanity on an incredible scale in what was supposed
to be a peaceful dawn following the fall of the Berlin Wall: these are the awesome
challenges that face us just as much as the hidden terrorists determined to destroy
our way of life. The challenges are quite different from the nation-state rivalries
and alliances that preoccupied statesmen during most of the past century. They
call for earlier diagnoses and new kinds of therapy. Underlying causes have to be
attacked sooner rather than later, before they become fulminating infections that
rage beyond rational control or political containment.
Almost five hundred years ago, in a small book that remains a classic text,
Machiavelli employed analogies with health in explaining a fundamental tenet of
governance. He wrote:
When trouble is sensed well in advance, it can easily be remedied; if you wait for
it to show, any medicine will be too late because the disease will have become
incurable. As the doctors say of a wasting disease, to start with it is easy to cure
but difficult to diagnose; after a time, unless it has been diagnosed and treated
at the outset, it becomes easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. So it is in politics.
It seems to me there are several important lessons in that quote. The shrewd
and cynical Machiavelli knew that health images would help make his message clear
to a skeptical public, and he wisely noted that politics is part of life. Most physicians have shied away from politics. We need not be ashamed of, and should not
be hesitant to become involved in, political life. Our health profession has so much
to offer that is rare in public life today. At its best, medicine, as a way of life, can
provide some of those almost forgotten standards on which our fragile society must
ultimately rely in its endless struggle for stability, prosperity, and peace.
Ancient principles guide the discipline of clinical medicine—qualities we take
for granted such as confidentiality, discretion, honesty, integrity, respect for other’s
bodies and minds, whether those be beautiful or, in the eyes of the world, diseased
and deformed. It is in the daily application of clinical medicine’s unique mix of art
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and science that we win the respect and honor that is ours. And it is by using this
stature and credibility that we can influence public policy above and beyond our
own profession.
On this first anniversary of a terror filled day, it behooves us to remember the
universality of tragedy and disaster, and also, very importantly, to recall the global
outpouring of sympathy for America after September 11. That brief shared identity,
a spontaneous warm international reaction, a solidarity that money couldn’t buy,
it seems to me, holds something precious for the future. There is nothing shameful or weak in admitting our pain. It is a reality doctors and nurses deal with every
day, one that allows patient and health worker to become one in the battle against
illness. So, too, can a proud nation, wounded and hurt, grow stronger and better
if we recognize in tragedy the chance for new foundations. If we do not grow from
our pain, all will be wasted in an arrogant selfish isolation, fueled by the evil fear of
other colors and religions.
Those who suffer, and are rejected, are the predictable perpetrators of future
terrorist attacks, and no amount of counterintelligence or preemptive attacks will
stamp out these huge populations. If health workers have the skills to heal individuals, as well as the tools to stop epidemics and even eliminate diseases from the face
of the earth, then we should not—in fact we cannot—absent ourselves from this
new war on terrorism, a war with no apparent end and few definable borders. New
solutions are obviously needed, and they may lie, silently and unappreciated, in the
rich traditions of our profession.
Many years ago, in the midst of a raging civil war in South Sudan, I participated
in humanitarian actions that opened doors to negotiated settlements. Even in the
midst of armed conflict, neutral and impartial immunization efforts for children
were begun. These programs created corridors of tranquility and understanding that
led to de facto cease-fire periods and, eventually, became permanent bridges to peace.
Since that time I have worked with humanitarian and diplomatic leaders around
the world, and today there is a growing consensus that the failed approaches of
the past will inevitably fail again. Power politics and military actions may provide
transient solutions; but, to be lasting, these efforts must be coordinated with health
and human rights and educational improvements. Health workers are, therefore,
major partners if peace is to be realized, and we must assume new responsibilities
in a world where another failure may prove to be the final act of civilization. In
my book Preventive Diplomacy, the somewhat immodest subtitle is Stopping Wars
Before They Start. But, for everyone’s sake, that is what we must try.
In a small examining room in my medical office there is a painting of an
American flag done by an Irish artist. Many years ago, the artist, sitting on the porch
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of our home and looking at our national flag, suddenly said “do you not see the heart
in the stars?” I share this image because it captures so much of what I feel today.
America demonstrated its heart in remarkable ways in the period after the
September 11 attacks. We all know the stories of those who rescued the disabled
and then went back into the burning World Trade Center buildings to save their
fellow workers. We know of the heroic work of police and firefighters, and one had
only to see, as I did, the people in the command center and down at the Ground
Zero site to know that America has a very big heart indeed. We saw this spirit at
Lenox Hill Hospital after the anthrax attacks.
America demonstrated a heart that we may have always known was there but,
as is our fashion, was too rarely exposed. It is critically important today that the
world understand that America is a nation of caring and compassion. If we are
perceived as only a military power that will seek only vengeance, then violence and
retribution will inevitably continue. For many years, I have been, as my wife sometimes suggests, obsessed with the idea that health and humanitarian affairs ought
to be central in our foreign policy, not peripheral afterthoughts. We have failed, as
a great nation, to let the outside world understand the goodness of our people, to
be as proud of America’s “heart in the stars” as we are of our undoubted strength.
Persisting in our current national responses to the attacks of last September
11, responses that are predictable, and even understandable, but tragically limited,
will assure a perpetuation of threats and violence against Americans everywhere.
Is it not obvious that we must expand our options, create bold new initiatives that
address all aspects of a complex crisis that is now endangering America’s heart and
soul as well as its physical body?
We can, as Lyndon Johnson once said, walk and chew gum at the same time.
An earlier President, Harry Truman, noted that he was good at making decisions
when there were no alternatives. Choosing to continue reacting with only military might, abandoning the very foundations on which this great nation was built,
indulging in gross violations of human rights and dignity for the illusion of safety is
not—and should not—be an alternative. We have lived through an incredible year,
one that has bound us together as never before. It is important that we go forth in
confidence, and in love, using the power of the mind and the heart, and the mores
of medicine, to secure a more united and safe America and a better world.
I have been honored by your invitation to speak at this memorial ceremony
among my colleagues and friends. May God bless all of you, especially this hospital
family, and may God bless America.
—Lenox Hill Hospital, New York, 9/11/2002
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The Transition from Conflict to Peace
Richard Ryscavage, S.J.

Humanitarian assistance workers may find themselves hopelessly confused by the
range of problems facing a society struggling to move from war to peace. These
problems can be approached from many directions: the shift from emergency relief
into longer-range development assistance; the religious, cultural, and psychosocial
models for dealing with trauma, recovery, and reconciliation; conflict management
and conflict resolution methods; the place of civil society organizations; the challenges of refugee repatriation and internally displaced people; the role of international peacekeepers and outside military forces; the connection between peace,
democracy, and development.
This chapter will survey the various approaches and try to organize them into
levels and “lenses” that, depending on where the humanitarian actor is in the process, he or she may find a helpful starting point for analysis and action.

Conflict to Peace: Some Basic Questions
Most humanitarian actors make the basic assumption that peace is good and war
is bad. By all means, at certain levels a peaceful world seems preferable to a planet
torn by violence. Yet too much emphasis on peace for its own sake can block the
paths to peace. Many people, not just rich people, profit immensely from war.
Economics on a wartime footing can be much more productive than peacetime
economies. So simply from the socioeconomic perspective, a quick transition from
war to peace may not be in the best interests of a society. It is always useful to stand
back from a violent conflict and do a cost-benefit analysis. Who benefits from this
war? Who bears the most costs?1
More importantly, the process of moving from war to peace is almost never a
straight line. The process has a more cyclical nature characterized by one step forward and two steps back. Large-scale violent conflict might end, but smaller spo-
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radic outbursts of violence can continue for many years. A fragile peace agreement
can quickly break down, and an even more violent stage of conflict erupts. So in
general it is not very useful to view the transition from war to peace as a continuum.
In some senses peace begins to emerge in the midst of violence, and violence can
emerge even when peace seems rather secure. This is the reason Johan Galtung and
other peace theorists have argued for years that peace-building must begin before
the conflict ends.2
How one builds peace in the midst of violence can be addressed only by looking
at the various actors or potential actors: military, guerillas, governments, UN, local
nongovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations.
Peace-building actions must be tailored to the nature of the specific actor. For
example, the military is not trained for nation building and strengthening democracy. Similarly, a humanitarian NGO should not be expected to provide security or
disarm warring parties.
From the perspective of most UN Member States and most nongovernmental
humanitarian actors, the transition from violent conflict to social peace requires international assistance designed to strengthen local socioeconomic and cultural development. It does this by helping societies recover from war and limiting future violence.
This mission seems more straightforward than it actually is. The approach rests
on the assumption that socioeconomic and cultural development is good. Many
ecologists would challenge that assumption. “Sustainable development” can damage the local small market economy and make people more, not less, vulnerable.3
The policy also presumes some rather long-term commitments and relationships
with the international community.
Most international politicians and military people are hesitant to lock themselves into a long-range development for peace strategy. Overall, though, the current consensus seems to be that the transition from violent conflict to peace must
be addressed through a development perspective.

Relief to Development Model
In the classic vocabulary of humanitarian assistance there are three phases: relief,
rehabilitation, and development. These three phases often involve different goals,
skills, agendas, and ways of operating. Yet there is much controversy over the actual
boundaries between the three phases. Conflict resolution, education and peace
strengthening can be aspects of all phases, but the limits of each phase must be
respected if the peace activity is to have any chance of success.
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Relief
Relief usually means the earliest operations phase of assistance. Sometimes the term
is qualified by saying “emergency relief.” Although the development phase might
be characterized by considerable governmental controls and the involvement of
multilateral organizations, the relief phase is dominated by private international
and local voluntary organizations. A high-profile crisis can generate millions of
dollars in government and private donations for immediate relief. Hundreds—
even thousands—of NGOs will try to jockey for a piece of the relief money.4 This
relief aid may not often fit well with the longer-range development needs of a
country.
Beginning in the early 1990s governments and private donors began shifting
most of their humanitarian assistance away from development into relief aid.5 Not
only were the emergency needs in places like Rwanda and the Balkans enormous,
but also they were well publicized. So large amounts of private short-term donations reduced the perceived need for long-term budgetary commitments.
It was in the context of post-genocide Rwanda and the war in the Balkans that
the term “complex emergency” arose. It is a useful term because it highlights the
fact that certain humanitarian disasters are multidimensional. In essence it refers
to civil war, manmade disasters, political chaos, and power struggles that accompany and cause a humanitarian crisis. Because the need for emergency food or
water exists in the middle of violent conflict and complicated political and military
maneuvering, the road out of that emergency stage will be equally complex.6

Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is a kind of midway stage between relief and development activities.
It has a very important role to play in peace-building. Rehabilitation usually means
activities that restore basic services (water, electricity, schools, and health clinics),
rebuilding houses and roads, and restoring some agricultural production and normal economic life.7
In many situations the most important rehabilitation activity will be the process
of demilitarization, including de-mining. To strengthen a budding peace process
and to proceed with social and economic reconstruction, it is essential to neutralize weapons stocks, disarm the irregular forces, and find jobs for the demobilized
army youth. For medical, agricultural, and social reasons, de-mining becomes an
urgent need. It has been shown that mine clearance is an activity that tends to
foster national reconciliation by involving formerly hostile parties in the mutually
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beneficial task of identifying and clearing mines. De-mining is an example of how
building peace can be integrated into social reconstruction during the period of
rehabilitation.8
It is within the rehabilitation phase that human rights and legal issues of land
ownership and justice can also begin to be addressed more systematically. This is
particularly important where there is a problem of large-scale refugee repatriation
or a situation where citizens have been displaced by war and now want to go home.
If the “right of return” is not faced squarely, the fragile structures of peace will be
threatened.
Sometimes coming home means rebuilding houses; more often it involves
complicated legal, ethnic, and political issues, especially if people have been gone
for a long period. One point is very clear: a refugee camp, by its nature, is not a
place for social reconstruction and development. Refugee camps are set up for the
convenience of governments, UN agencies and humanitarian workers. Camps are
never in the long-term interest of the refugees themselves. One way or another,
refugees and displaced people need to settle permanently somewhere before lasting
peace can be established.

Development
In recent decades, thanks to globalization and with little thanks to traditional foreign aid, global poverty has been falling quite rapidly in many parts of the world.
Globalization is primarily an economic process supported by new technology that
allows a country or a region to participate in a global capital market. Despite its
clear success in raising billions of people out of poverty, globalization faces some
of the same challenges as the older approaches to development.
Full-blown development stage has traditionally involved multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United
Nations Development Program, which emphasize material assistance, building
infrastructures, and sustaining bureaucracies. This approach tends to reinforce and
strengthen the role of the state as the chief agent for development. But if the state
is corrupt and poorly managed, development can be turned to the political and
personal advantage of the leadership.
Certain forms of development that stress money, infrastructure, and state regulation may not contribute at all to the reconciliation of groups previously at war.
On the other hand, turning over development responsibilities to the international
nongovernmental organizations may result in greater accountability and transparency. But by circumventing the country government’s ministries of education,
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health and state development external development aid will only weaken the state’s
long-term ability to provide essential national services.
Traditionally most economists have defined development as showing sustained economic growth over a period of time, which includes consistent improvement in living standards for the whole society. More recently, a broader concept
of development has emerged that captures a multidimensional, more sophisticated understanding of development. Economic development is still a key factor but political, cultural, and spiritual development also become essential for
full integral human development.9 Through the wider lens, development would
include promotion of democracy, human rights, protection of the environment,
and social justice.10
Within the development stage, more direct attention is needed on psychological, cultural, and religious determinants of violence. Attention to behavior that
disrupts peace and the continual reinforcement of confidence and trust building
measures will be equally important. Even years after a war has ended, if peacebuilding does not continue, a new social cycle of violence can form, undermining
everything that has been achieved.
The relief-rehabilitation-development continuum is a way of organizing our
thinking about social problems. In reality the pure continuum does not exist.11 In
some cases these “phases” can be taking place at the same time in the same country.
One section of the country—less touched by war—might be ready for some prime
large-scale development programs while another section is still without clean water
or enough food. Within the rehabilitation phase are activities that might be considered both relief and development.
The most important point for a humanitarian actor to consider is that the
introduction of humanitarian assistance, no matter what phase, can have a direct
long-term impact on the achievement of peace. Humanitarian assistance is never
neutral. It always has political, social, economic, and cultural consequences. Peacestrengthening approaches can be consciously built into any humanitarian assistance action—even at the very earliest emergency phase. But peace-building measures must never be introduced uncritically.
Approaches to Peace
Over the past thirty years, the academic fields of peace research and conflict resolution studies have grown enormously. Diplomats, politicians, and humanitarian
actors have been using methods derived from this research to facilitate the transition from violent conflict to peace.12
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One can roughly divide the research into two approaches. One approach concentrates on the social psychological aspects of overcoming conflict. Emphasis is
placed on the attitudes and perceptions of the parties to the conflict. Changing
perceptions—usually though small group work—characterizes the methodology.
Theoretically the participants then feed the changed perceptions back into the
political and decision-making process. The other approach tends to concentrate on
the operational environment. Changing structures can change behavior. By shifting the way we give assistance, peace can be strengthened.13
If evaluated carefully, both approaches can suggest ways of building peace during a period of transition. Churches, for example, have been active in convening
small groups of people from opposing sides in order to foster reconciliation and
reduce misperceptions. Sometimes referred to as “Track II” diplomacy, nongovernmental organizations have become involved in creating problem-solving “workshops” that bring together community leaders from various parties to a conflict. The
long-term benefits and cultural relevance of these “workshops” are not yet clear. In
the wrong hands they can also be heavily manipulative.14
Using a more structural approach, some humanitarian relief workers have been
able to change the food distribution system in such a way that the more marginalized and least powerful members of a community are helped. The assumption often
is that by “empowering” certain people, a more just social order can be promoted
and, therefore, a stronger base on which to build peace. But there is also the inherent danger of “social engineering” by outsiders who do not understand the culture
and who can inadvertently create tensions and promote violence.

The Role of Civil Society and the Military
“Civil society” is a term rarely used before 1990. But with the collapse of communism, the weakening of state governments, and the phenomenal growth of nonstate
actors and nongovernmental organizations, the term has taken on a new salience in
the field of social and political development, including peace-building. Most simply, civil society refers to the social “space” that lies between relationships derived
from family obligations and relationships derived from obligations to the state.
Civil society is the mediating structures between the family and the state. Like the
term “nongovernmental organization,” civil society is so broad a concept that it can
mean anything from organized crime groups and labor unions to church congregations and women’s social clubs. Everything that is not family and not state can fit
into the category of civil society.15
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Many observers believe that the hopes for peace in a society or region rest less
with governments and more with members of civil society. The approaches to conflict resolution described in the following section are all based on the importance
of activating civil society in the search for peace.16
The military has become an increasingly important actor in large complex
humanitarian emergencies. Typically the political-diplomatic actors concentrate
on prevention and peace settlements; the NGOs and the UN humanitarian agencies focus on delivering humanitarian assistance; and the military are charged with
providing security and logistical support. Such a neat division of labor has often
been more muddled.
The nature of modern warfare has changed. The classic wars were between sovereign states. More common today are so called “asymmetrical wars,” where nationstate military forces are fighting nonstate actors such as Al Qaeda. Consequently
applying the traditional international laws of war that were endorsed by sovereign
states in order to protect civilians and to provide access to prisoners of war have
become much more difficult.
Military presence and mandates can radically differ from place to place. The
classic UN peacekeepers—as they still exist in places like Cyprus today—are there
to separate the conflicting parties, at the request of the parties. But even as early as
1960 in the Congo, the UN peacekeepers took up a more aggressive role in deterring the secession of Katanga. The peacekeepers became peacemakers. But in the
humiliations suffered by the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia in the 1990s, where
eventually NATO military had to step in, showed the confusion that exists around
the use of UN military troops for purposes of peace. Sexual abuse and other scandals have clouded the reputation of UN peacekeeping forces. Yet it is hard to see
how the use of some kind of military force can be avoided in complex violent situations. Even in the transition from war to peace, some form of military presence is
often essential for maintaining security, monitoring cease-fires, clearing mines, and
reopening bridges, roads, and airports.
For the humanitarian worker there is a continual problem of how to relate to
the military in such a transitional situation. Humanitarian agencies have a very
different organizational culture from the military. The potential for bad communications between them is high. There is a long and distinguished history of military
involvement in humanitarian issues. Coordination is perhaps the most challenging aspect of the relationship between the military and humanitarian work. The
military are used to a highly disciplined centralized operation; the NGOs often
cannot speak with one voice or require a participatory decision-making process
that is cumbersome. Efforts at peace-building can be stymied by this asymmetry
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unless conscious steps are taken to bridge the divide.17 Regular communication and
information sharing are critical.18
Although the military cannot be expected to take on major “nation-building”
tasks, it can provide some important peace supports. Ideally, transnational rehabilitation activities should be planned with the military and within a long-term
development context that includes strengthening local civil society groups that can
contribute most to the peace. 19
Spiritual Transformations and Reconciliation
Any serious social transition from war to peace must involve psychological, cultural, and spiritual transformation. In the secular realm of social psychology there
is considerable literature in the West on recovery from social trauma.20 Much less
attention has been paid to the religious, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of the
transition from war to peace. How, for example, does a deep-seated “culture of
violence” become a “civilization of love”? Is such a transformation ever possible?21
Cultures do change. Indeed, some would say that they are in the constant process of
change. But to what extent should the promotion of cultural change be integrated
into the plans and programs for transitional peace-building?
International humanitarian workers might feel uncomfortable even discussing
these questions because someone outside the specific culture can never answer the
questions. Yet sometimes it takes an outsider who has some “emotional distance”
from the conflicts who can initiate a dialogue on reconciliation and forgiveness.
Unfortunately most international humanitarian actors, even if they work for a faithbased organization, are rarely prepared to enter into this arena of peace-building.
Reconciliation is a profound multidimensional process that does not lend itself
to easy analysis because often it involves very personal transformations. Sometimes
in a postconflict situation the move toward reconciliation seems much too rushed
and premature. Reconciliation does not replace the need for justice. Earlier I mentioned the workshops sponsored by churches that try to move a community toward
the goal of reconciliation. But there is a need for more evaluative research on how
successful these attempts have been.
Peace-Building Through Democracy
The thesis that democracies do not wage war against other democracies has received
increased academic attention. It is sometimes referred to as the “democratic peace
proposition.” The causal link between democracy and peace may not be direct,
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but if the proposition is basically valid, then it would follow that the promotion
of democracy should be a constitutive element of peace-building in a transitional
society. What this practically would mean is the promotion of participatory institutions and processes both within the state governmental structure as well as in
civil society.
External intervention, however, rarely succeeds in establishing a democratic
culture. The impetus and the work must come from the society itself. Building the
institutional structures for democracy may take decades. It is not something that
can be imposed.22 But humanitarian assistance in the transitional stage can in small
incremental ways try to introduce some participatory decision making at the local
level. International NGOs, for example, by establishing full-fledged partnerships
with indigenous local NGOs can begin to support and spread participative institutions in a society.23

Conclusion
There is an endless supply of specific proposals for how best to anchor peace in
a postwar society. Many projects, from “self-esteem” classes in Bosnia to “computer connectivity” sessions for children, have been suggested or tried. Sometimes,
however, the success of a specific project or approach diverts us from the fact that
most large-scale efforts at international peace-building over the past forty years
have been miserable failures. The United States has spent trillions of dollars trying
to establish secure environments and peaceful transitions to democracy in such
places as prewar Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan.24 The government acted in partnership with hundreds of NGOs working on specific aspects of
the transition. Although certain efforts may have contributed on a micro-level to
peace-building, the overall effort did not fully succeed in any of these countries.
What conclusion must we draw from these experiences?
Some major research argues that the transition to peace and the democratization of a country is almost entirely the product of domestic internal factors. Other
analysts suggest that proactive forms of humanitarian and military intervention do
not in any way prevent the recurrence of conflict in a postwar society.25
It would appear that externally engineered, even highly vigorous, peace-building programs are not enough to transform a country into a peaceful democratic,
economically healthy society. Other conditions must be present. The people must
truly want such social change and the culture must be ripe to receive it. As we witnessed in the “Arab Spring” uprisings in the Middle East, the people themselves

354

CH27_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p346-355.indd 354

2/13/13 11:17 PM

THE TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE

must become the primary engine for change. As Harrington and Huntington put
it in their book Culture Matters, “The core values of a society are what finally shape
human progress. Those values can change and be changed, but that type of change
comes slowly, and, though heavily influenced by international developments, the
change must finally come from within the culture itself.”26
We must face the challenges of humanitarian assistance in the transition from
war to peace with a stronger sense of realism and a bigger dose of cultural humility.
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In postconflict situations, the first challenge is to identify the sequence of events
preceding conflict resolution, and how one classifies what has apparently ended is
of utmost importance. Was it really a conflict? Then, what kind of conflict was it?
An international police operation, a foreign aggression, a regional war, a civil war,
a state collapse, all of the above, none of the above? Depending on the answers to
these questions, humanitarian conditions, popular perceptions, and the kind of
postconflict settlement one should work to devise and implement are substantially
different in each case.
The Germans at the end of World War II were in a completely different mindset from, say, the Somalis after the collapse of President Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.
Both cases could equally qualify as postconflict situations; actual needs and perceptions were, however, extremely different in an industrialized country, the epicenter
of a world war, from what they were in a marginal underdeveloped one, torn apart
by small armed gangs.
One of the most common misunderstandings that confound postconflict resolution is perspective: How do humanitarian agencies assess postconflict situations
versus how do the nationals describe what they have been going through? We think
our interlocutors are coming out of a civil war while they view themselves as victims of a foreign aggression; or we think they are happy because a dictatorship has
fallen while they complain about the collapse of a reassuring order. We are compassionate with their past sufferings, but they seem happy to have won their battle
against some enemy group. We are motivated by the immediate past, but they have
a better, deeper, somehow obsessive, grasp of history. And, looking for immediate
remedies to pressing problems, we easily become fed up with history, while our
interlocutors seem to have made of it their single, possessive, teacher!
Hence one of the most immediate and unnerving challenges one faces, paradoxically, deals more with the past than with the future: How far in history must we
walk back and which lessons should we draw, and for what use, today and tomor356
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row? The easiest answer I hear is, “let bygones be bygones, we are here to help you
build another, brighter, future.” Although such a stand is politically correct and
definitely pragmatic, individuals and groups may think humanitarian workers
despise their past, because they do not want to take it into consideration. Especially
following civil wars, where to start in one’s narrative is crucial because at some point
one group was dominating the other, before having the latter take revenge. Once,
in 1975, while visiting a small Christian village in a mainly Druze area in Mount
Lebanon where the people were being asked to avoid buying arms and to eschew
any kind of military confrontation with their (more numerous and better equipped)
neighbors, I was told, “Last time we did not arm ourselves and we lost seventeen
victims.” “When was that?” I asked. A chorus of village dwellers replied, “In 1860!”
Given this information, three attitudes are thus possible for humanitarian agencies to assume. One can consciously or unconsciously listen too much to one party
and end up adopting its narrative. In fact, I have encountered dozens of peacekeepers and humanitarian activists who are sometimes consciously, and at other times
unconsciously, pure partisans of one party, repeating its narrative without restraint.
This is a recipe for disaster that strips us of our credibility and makes us a party to
the conflict. The second, opposite, attitude is to ignore the past, and concentrate on
the future by basically telling your interlocutors, “Your past is your property, you
deal with it as you wish, we are here to help you build your future.” This is certainly
a more prudent stand, but somehow naïve (in view of the groups’ attachment to
and pride in their own past) and somehow patronizing (“We are modern and you
indulge in archaism”). The third and best attitude, in my view, though the most
difficult as well, is to be as knowledgeable as possible about the past.
Making the effort to comprehend the history of the conflict sends a clear message that we really care about them, that we are able not only to listen, but able to
develop solutions to partisan narratives of the past, that we know enough of what
happened before we arrived to prevent a repetition of past tragedies. Such a perspective gives us a much better standing with the various parties. Being respectful
and wise enough to study their history lends to a determination to help them build
a new history, not because one is ignorant of key events but precisely because one
knows them too well.
This has been confirmed by many studies on postconflict situations. A knowledge of history will help identify local actors, beyond the present, troubled circumstances, and improve our understanding of their reactions to our proposals, as
well as improve our facilitation efforts. How many times have we been faced with
local leaders shouting at us, “But here it is different!” Too much reliance on past
experiences in conflict resolution can become an impediment in dialogue with
357
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local actors. They may be ready to acknowledge that we have accumulated experience from other conflictual situations, but we also have to modestly acknowledge
that no postconflict situations are really similar, that local conditions are crucial,
and that our experience drawn from past involvements all over the world is only
of relative value. Packages built on our past experiences are to be tested against
the peculiarities of the local conditions and possibly forgotten when faced with a
new challenge.
Our characterization of the latest conflict to date is therefore crucial. Those
who went to Afghanistan in 1988 and described the situation there as mainly a
post-foreign-occupation situation missed the complexities of the Afghan domestic
tensions and rivalries underlying the occupation/liberation paradigm. Those who
went to Iraq and missed the complex history of that country and their even more
complex fabric of society remained prisoners of the dictatorship/democracy paradigm. This is important to realize, but is certainly not the exclusive or even the
most important paradigm needed to build a better future for Iraq. The durability
of the settlement will depend on a number of variables drawn from each country’s
history. Has there been a tradition of authoritarian rule or, on the contrary, a competition between an authoritarian rule and a parallel tradition of mutual accommodation among the warring groups? Were alignments dominated by ideological
factors (as in the Greek or Spanish civil wars), by social and economic interests (as
in many African civil wars), by identity issues (often the case in the civil wars in the
Balkans and the Caucasus) or, more generally, by a sui generis combination of all
these ingredients?
Politically, in Iraq, a postconflict situation was officially declared the day a statue
of the past president fell down in one Baghdad square. But it soon appeared that,
from a military point of view, Iraq was entering into a state of (geographically concentrated but nationally disrupting) insurgency that was to take the lives of many
more Iraqis and foreign troops than the war itself. From a humanitarian point of
view, Iraq was neither in a new conflict nor in a postconflict situation. Rather the
conflict was in a stage of post-sanctions. One’s view depends, of course, on perspective. I believe that politically, sanctions have been much more harmful to daily life
than the successive wars that have hit the country or dictatorship itself.
Iraqis have known the taste of wars, harsh repression, and authoritarian
nepotism long before Saddam, although he had practically three decades to excel
in each of these fields, especially in his last decade in power. Still, the long years
of UN-imposed sanctions appear to have been the most destabilizing factor in
the Iraqis’ daily life, public values, professional activity, and view of the world.
Sanctions deconstructed a rather thriving economy and, more importantly, a lively,
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talented, upward-moving society. Sanctions produced a new, flawed, almost cynical and substantially arbitrary relationship between state and society.
Ask Iraqis when their country’s infrastructure began to collapse. Ask them
when their salaries lost 90 percent of their value. Ask them when lawlessness
became rampant, when tribalism began to surge. Ask them when civil administration became widely inefficient and corrupt. Ask them when social ills such as
prostitution, disinterest in education, and lack of solidarity among family members
became evident. In all cases, they would answer almost invariably, “When the sanctions were imposed on our country.” I dare to add that, twenty years from now,
collective Iraqi memory will probably keep sanctions as the worst source of modern
misery and sadness. They may differ on the identity of who to blame for that sudden misery: the fallen regimes, world powers, and even the UN. Iraqis still have yet
to see how external, government and nongovernmental actors are integrating this
factor in their approach to present-day Iraq.
Again, any generalization would be dangerous. Elsewhere sanctions might have
been more useful in bringing about positive change without having the same devastating effects on the society (South Africa, for example). Mentioning sanctions
leads to a wider issue—the proper characterization of the fallen regime. When leaders have been around for ten, twenty, or thirty years, they tend to operate within
developed successive forms of rule and control. How many times were we told that
the post-Kuwait, post-sanctions Saddam Hussein was radically different from the
pre-1990 Saddam?
One has to develop a clear idea of the evolution of the fallen regime. In Iraq,
Ba’athists would be the first to recognize that the regime that fell on April 9, 2003,
was very different from the one their party had built in 1978 and even farther from
the one they thought they would be building. The regime’s last decade in power
was indeed marked by a rapid, deep, disturbing deterioration of the state/society
contract. The regular army had been sidelined and the regime was relying instead
on a number of competing praetorian guards to protect itself. The party was weakened by tribal and semi-religious forms of mobilization that utterly contradicted
the principles upon which the Ba’ath party had been established. Saddam’s sons,
too young to play a role before 1990, became the pillars of the latest configuration of
power. Sectarianism, muted for a long time in view of the regime’s secular orientation, became devastating after the savage quelling of the 1991 Shi’a intifada. Kurdish
nationalism, for which Hussein himself was willing to give substantial concessions
in the 1970 Status (something for which he had been criticized by many in the
Ba’aths’ own ranks), became radically different after the attack on Halabdja and
the 1991 campaign of repression.
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By ignoring the crucial fact that the regime that fell in 2003 was radically different from the one prewar American and British propaganda portrayed, as well
as from what the regime had been at its inception, very serious major mistakes
have been committed by the Coalition in the postwar era. These include a reckless disbandment of the army at a time when it could have been used in imposing
law and order; a sweeping, indiscriminate, revengeful de-Ba’athification that fed
the insurgency with new recruits and aggravated sectarian feelings; and a poorly
inspired tabula rasa policy in public administration that disrupted the daily life of
a weakened population.
Then comes a second, no less crucial question: When does a conflict really end
and when does a postconflict situation effectively start? Of course, the line is blurred
and there very rarely is a conflict that suddenly stops at a single point of time to be
followed by peace. Uncertainty about the mere beginning of a postconflict situation is an organic ingredient of such a situation, and that is why we are generally
unable to name it and content ourselves by saying, “This is the period that comes
after a conflict is apparently over.” Still, the question begs to be asked in Congo as
well as in Sierra Leone, in Burundi as well as in Iraq. Is what we call postconflict a
mere lull in the fighting? Is it only the passage from one sequence to the next in a
chain of wars? Is an ongoing insurgency a mere sequel of the past or the first steps
in a future wide-scale rebellion?
I witnessed a fifteen-year conflict in my home country of Lebanon. It was the
case over and over that we would falsely think that we had reached a postconflict
situation when militias were, in fact, preparing themselves for the next phase in
their fighting, when foreign powers were preparing themselves for a new kind of
interference, when arms dealers were secretly making new juicy contracts. I tend
to believe that being truly in a postconflict situation should remain an open-ended
question and not a foregone conclusion. More often than not, a postconflict situation is viewed by local actors as one in which winning parties try to consolidate
their grip on power and resources and defeated groups prepare themselves for a
new round of conflict, while neighboring countries reassess the situation. And,
if any of the actors think that the new status quo is detrimental to their interests,
they try to favor acts of destabilization directly or through proxies, which is why a
postconflict situation for some may be seen as a preconflict one, as well.
Such a contrast in perceptions, of course, affects our willingness to invest in
infrastructure rehabilitation, the selection of local interlocutors, and the timeframe
of our mission, not to mention the very essence of that mission. Are we doing what
can be done before the country enters a new phase of a protracted conflict or are
we, on the contrary, starting to rebuild the country because fighting is over? Our
analysis will have crucial personnel, financial, and programmatic effects.
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But our analysis should always take into consideration the way nationals view
their situation. Having ignored that in the past, a number of humanitarian missions have ended up indirectly, though substantially, helping armed groups prepare themselves for the next battle. This has especially been the case in Africa. For
having mistaken a truce for a postconflict situation, a lot of people looked naïve to
the local population and/or wasted precious resources on already doomed projects.
Any humanitarian mission, in such uncertain times, needs to prepare for the worst
while trying to persuade the communities that conflict, like all human endeavors,
is not a fatality. Working with local communities, especially when people think
that foreigners are better informed, means telling them the truth while encouraging
them to seek and long for more peaceful times.
One should, however, never underestimate the fact that while reconstruction
is important in and for itself, it is also a message of confidence in the future of
peace. Postponing reconstruction does not only mean a delay in the rehabilitation
of equipment or in restoring basic public services and utilities, it also implicitly
means that foreigners (governments, international organizations, NGOs) are too
skeptical concerning the country’s immediate future or the chances for peace to
invest energy and resources.
If only to avoid giving the locals such an impression, taking an uncertain bet on
the future of peace is never too expensive: even in doubt about Israeli intentions,
rebuild Gaza airport; even in fear of new fighting, build roads to connect cities in
Congo; even when Taliban are active again, build the Kabul-Kandahar highway. A
balance is, of course, to be found between available resources and the need to reassure
locals of confidence in their immediate future. A haste to do things may squander
one’s funds, but too much reluctance will certainly fuel more pessimism and despair.
What is the situation in Iraq? Yes, it is a postconflict situation, which means
that an invasion took place and that a regime change has been imposed. There are,
however, reasons to believe that resisting the invasion was merely postponed by
the fallen regime until the occupation was completed, because it knew it did have
the means to oppose the progress of the US troops. Its leaders chose instead to
make the invader’s stay extremely costly, waiting to absorb the initial shock before
launching counterattacks. The Coalition war on Iraq was not a conflict but a regime
change by force. The regime collapsed and the Coalition tried to impose a postSaddam order. In the process they unleashed new forms of insurgency against the
new order, incited new forms of external interference by state and nonstate actors,
and possibly opened the door to new forms of domestic instability. To be in a postconflict situation is an assumption, a bet on the Coalition’s capabilities of imposing a post-Saddam order as well as a regime change that will benefit the Iraqis and
produce a stable, prosperous new Iraq.
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Hence a nagging issue: Should we in the UN help in imposing that order at
the risk of antagonizing those who oppose foreign occupation? How do we label
those who challenge the new order: resistors; insurgents; armed groups; terrorists?
The same pointed question has been asked in post–Idi Amin Uganda, post-Taliban
Afghanistan, and not to mention post-Saddam Iraq. Here again some conciliation
between one’s beliefs and the population’s feelings is always necessary. One does
not want to adopt their vocabulary but one can also not hurt them. I understand
that humanitarian action seeks to avoid such issues as much as possible, but one has
to understand that local communities can be highly interested in national politics
and that this is, after all, a basic right of theirs.
They may think nationally, but one needs to work locally and expect some
tension between the two outlooks, especially when rejection of a fallen regime does
not automatically translate into an acceptance of foreign occupation, as is largely
the case in Iraq. Those who thought that these two concepts were synonymous
are still paying for their mistake. Anyone given the responsibility of managing a
postwar situation should ask every morning, “Am I doing the right thing so that
one conflict is not replaced by another? Am I stabilizing the country or helping
fuel another war?” Poor postconflict management in Colombia (1957) led to a new
civil war a few years later. Poor management of unity in Yemen between 1990 and
1994 led to a bloody North–South military confrontation. The conclusion of the
Taïf Agreement in Lebanon induced an intra-Christian civil war in its wake. Poor
management in Iraq led to fueling the insurgency ad infinitum. Most important
is to remind oneself that past exclusion prone, predatory elites can sometimes be
replaced by equally exclusion prone, predatory groups. Mobilization clichés against
a rogue regime are of no use in dealing rationally with postconflict situations.
Reconciling differences of perspective between the victors of the conflict and
the people who live in the supposed postconflict situation leads naturally to another
concept. I have strong reservations on “creating leadership and governance.” A
more modest, and certainly more efficient, way of approaching local communities
is first and foremost to identify forms of leadership that are already there. One may
not be aware of existing leaders, may not like them, or may not share their views,
but they are always there and often where unexpected: heads of tribes, clerics, recycled warlords, traditional urban notables. What does one do with them? Recognize
them although one hates their politics? Challenge them by supporting contenders
closer to one’s heart? Try to weaken their impact among those one is helping?
A conceptual issue is central in this respect: Civil society is never exactly the
one you think of. There has been a wide, and very debatable, infatuation with the
concept that strengthening civil society institutions is, for many, the remedy to all
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ills. But is this really the case? In situations of state collapse (and many states are
more or less in this situation), the most urgent task, precisely in order to protect the
society, is to rebuild a state apparatus or at least to maintain the existing one and
gradually, patiently, reform it.
No peaceful society can survive without a minimum of state institutions and
politically recognized legitimate order. Many societies, torn apart by years of civil
war, long principally for the restoration of legitimate authority as a prerequisite for
the restoration of civil peace. What happened in Central and Eastern Europe cannot be transplanted everywhere. Where the state apparatus has been strong, well
entrenched and totalitarian in nature, building up civil society organizations in
postconflict eras is the primary task.
Elsewhere, indeed in most conflictual cases in Asia and Africa, the State’s weakness is much more of a problem than an asset. Reinforcing the State becomes a
popular demand and an objectively urgent task, as well. There is a thirst for a regularly operational, efficient, clean state that is somehow omnipresent in postconflict
situations in the developing world. External helpers, too much obsessed with civil
society, often tend to ignore this. “Bring the State back in,” is a rallying cry some
are still not ready to hear. It is time they do.
The most crucial challenge is to distinguish between the State apparatus and the
political regime, avoiding an all too common temptation to identify one with the
other in a tabula rasa approach. Conflating the two would paradoxically vindicate
the fallen regime, which often tries to legitimize itself by identifying its rule with
the proper, neutral, nonpolitical functioning of a public administration. A more
exhausting, time-consuming, but certainly better approach is to impose a clear
difference between party and government, regular army and intelligence agencies,
national police and praetorian guard, etc. Postconflict emerging elites may not help
in this endeavor, because like their nemesis, they have learned to mistake a political
regime for a legitimate State. Hence the looting of public offices once a regime falls,
from Mogadishu to Monrovia, and from Kinshasa to Baghdad.
A third party should distance itself from these easy, dangerous associations.
An effort to gradually patch up elements of the defeated elites with elements of
the emerging ones should then begin, as a first step toward national reconciliation. Government agencies, by allowing bureaucrats, experts, and civil servants to
somehow merge in order to produce a new order that is based on some continuity
of the state apparatus and on the introduction of new blood, should be a pioneering example for the society to start thinking about peaceful coexistence of various
groups in a stabilized country. One common error is to mistake the management of
postconflict situations for an all-encompassing revolution. No one has a mandate
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to help run Iraq the way Republicans ran France in 1789, or Maoists ran China in
1949, or Khomeinists ran Iran in 1979!
Next comes the issue of determining the first thing one should think of doing
in matters of governance. Holding elections is the answer most often heard. But
this is not (more precisely, not in most cases) my view. First, because people usually do not call for elections as an urgent task to perform and, second, because
elections are often very hard to organize in a proper way during the initial phases
of a postconflict situation. Poorly timed, improperly prepared, or insufficiently
credible elections are the source of tensions and new forms of exclusion. Elections
may mean a proper way of leadership selection to some, while others may consider them as a way of pursuing the conflict by other means. In cases such as
Iraq, elections are primarily perceived as a way of transforming a sociological
majority into a political one. That is fine with any democrat, but often it is hard
to convince other groups that elections are not primarily a way to consolidate and
aggravate their exclusion.
It is crucial that a number of measures be taken to instill a democratic definition of the election process and to introduce safeguards that prevent elections from
becoming synonymous with a rampant coup d’état (e.g., Algeria, 1991, where the army
reacted by brutally stopping the process) or with a collective punishment of a previously dominant group. As Arend Lijphart, Theodor Hanf, and many others have
convincingly written, multiconfessional, multiethnic, multilinguistic societies cannot
be ruled through elections by a mere application of the one-man, one-vote principle.1
Westminster is great where it is; it is not necessarily a successful ready-made product.
To elaborate, ethnocentrism can be fatal. In societies where individualism has
been the dominant political and social value for centuries, the Western type of
democracy easily fits. In other societies, where recently emerging individualism is
still in competition with well-entrenched forms of family, tribal, or other bonds of
collective solidarity and mutual help, one has to balance individual human (and
voting) rights with the group’s fear of losing their political standing, or even their
mere existence. To organize electoral systems that prevent an automatic, brutal
transformation of an ethnic majority into a legally dominant hegemonic group
through the electoral process, one needs time, subtle yet often complex legal techniques, and visionary, cooperative local leaders. These essentials are not necessarily
available the very first day, or year, the guns fall silent. Elections can be facilitated
quickly, but only if they are part of the solution and not part of the old problem or
the source of a new one.
Governance often means the drafting of a new constitution. Constitutions and
other basic laws can be written in a few hours, as we are often told by “experts,” but
here the process is almost as important as the product. That is why it is crucial to
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help create the proper conditions for a truly national, transparent process by which a
consensus can emerge gradually so that the drafting process of a constitution acts as
a unifying, rather than divisive, process. A truly legitimate process cannot be rushed.
Various political and/or ethnic factions, leading and recognized legal experts,
secular and religious leaders, and the population at large should be given a real
chance to appropriate the process. Haste to impose drafts by winning groups,
exclusion of large sectors of the society, drafting in closed rooms by unknown
local and foreign experts, and brutal transposition of models adopted elsewhere
often mar a constitutional process, affect its durability, and can incite new forms
of armed rebellion.
One important factor is to be humble enough to let nationals devise their own
political future. Do not underestimate the quality of professional expertise in legal
and other matters one finds in most war-torn countries. We should not rush to
propose our own expertise in constitution drafting, or in other topics, in countries
with an educated elite, and politicized population. They need us to amplify their
influence on events, but they know the country’s needs much better than we do.
We can offer expertise if requested, play the neutral facilitator, and/or help
devise a proper drafting process if locals feel they have reached an impasse. Those
who invaded Iraq with an already written constitution in their pocket while entering Baghdad were adding insult to injury in the home country of many notable
jurists, some of whom had been helping build legal regimes in neighboring countries. I fully understand that the days of absolute sovereignty are behind us and I
applaud the most recent evolution in our interpretation of the concept. Still, this
evolution should never reach the point where the sovereign right of a people to
choose a political regime of their liking is denied, a position even less acceptable
than the absolute exercise of sovereignty by authoritarian leaders.
The fine line between “old” regime change and “new” regime imposition by
force was not really crossed in Afghanistan. It probably was in Iraq. While regime
change as a superpower’s policy is highly debatable, the imposition of a new political regime, constitutional arrangements included, is a clear violation of a people’s
right to self-determination. Persuasion, facilitation, and mediation by foreign
actors are acceptable in constitution drafting. Beyond that, a foreign actor is merely
imposing a foreign will.
In many postconflict situations, of much more immediate relevance than the
organization of elections or the drafting of a new constitution, are three tasks,
equally essential for civil peace. The first is to ensure the establishment or the reform
of national police. In order to push for an early, peaceful start of the reconstruction
effort, security of the civilian population is of the essence in the immediate postconflict period. What about existing national police? What about the role given to
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the military in domestic security? What role should occupying and/or peacekeeping forces play in ensuring urban security? What about dealing with spontaneous
ad hoc organizations practicing a police role on the local level? It is dangerous to
employ a one-size-fits-all formula in view of the substantial differences one finds
from one country to the next. Sometimes there is no such a thing as a national
police. In other cases, the police have been so tainted with past illegal practices and/
or human rights violations that there is no other solution than to disband them. In
some cases, police can be salvaged with other leadership and, more importantly,
another code of conduct.
If there is one single rule in this respect, it would be to take the civilian population’s fear of aggression, looting, theft of property, kidnapping, seriously. It is
not enough to put the blame on the past regime, competing militias, or even the
supposedly “natural right” of some to express their newly acquired freedom by
attacking their neighbors. Of course, politically motivated saboteurs may have a
free run; professional criminals and recently liberated prisoners can wreak havoc in
uncertain times. Still, human nature being what it is, normal people, with no crime
antecedents, can and do behave inappropriately in transitional times.
In Iraq, “transitional” has a name: Farhoud, a time when anyone may do
anything. Postconflict transitions have a history and, fearful of these special days,
Islamic legal experts of the past have come to the conclusion that “a hundred years
of arbitrary rule are better than one single night without a ruler.” Poorly inspired
attacks on government buildings have to do with a deeply flawed confusion of a
fallen regime with public-sector property. By taking revenge on the state, people
ignore the fact that they are hurting their future more than punishing their fallen
rulers. Attacks on private property are even less excusable. Hence the importance
of rapid police redeployment, a task that must be tackled empirically depending on
the case, but one that should always be given the highest priority.
A second immediate task is justice—that is, regular, ordinary tribunals. Civil
peace often depends on the rapid reactivation of the judicial system in order to settle
civil disputes on property: disappearances of heads of families, inheritances, pensions, labor conflicts. Clear examples showing that tribunals are operational, that
justice is no longer constrained by vested interests, or political pressure, are important early on in the process. This rebuilds confidence in the state and does not rely
upon private justice or illegal (re)appropriation of property. This challenging task
may be much less spectacular than the prosecution of war criminals, but it is much
more vital in the rapid rewriting of a new social contract between state and society.
Grandiloquent speeches on rule of law remain useless if the population does
not develop a rapid, sincere, confidence in its country’s judicial system. Although
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repression and authoritarianism are the curses of many a country in the developing
world, the failure to provide proper civil judicial courts is much more common,
even in relatively peaceful and/or democratizing countries. And while the quality of
the political regime is of the highest concern to those who are politically motivated,
the quality of the judicial system is of utmost importance for every single citizen. It
is particularly sensitive in matters of real estate ownership.
In so many conflicts, personal property issues are intertwined with political/
ethnic considerations. Sometimes personal lust has prevailed, and with others, it is
collective punishment against a group. These are issues for which people are ready
to die, or kill. A very prudent approach should be followed (although I am not sure
all international organizations were very prudent in Iraq). Real estate is not going
to disappear, so a gradual, slow, approach is important, with a growing involvement of the national reconstituted judiciary in settling individual cases and, later,
collective cases.
Transitional justice is equally important, even on the local level. Postconflict
situations are full of acts of revenge. The reality is one cannot entirely prevent people from taking revenge on those who harmed them, but one needs, on the other
hand, to develop a spirit of reconciliation. Things are much easier when national
institutions are still operational and can take care of these issues. But if this is not
the case, acts of revenge can incite the frightening climate of collective indiscriminate punishment, or create new ethnic tensions.
Skepticism envelops transitional justice in most postconflict situations. In most
cases, it is viewed as the victor’s justice. Hence the crucial importance of international norms, so crime is not followed by revenge and the doors to reconciliation
are left open. In general, international tribunals are hotly debated, and it is not my
purpose to engage those debates here. One thing, though, is certain. These issues
are much less important for most people than the settlement of judicial civilian
cases that are much more vital to them. A reconstituted independent civilian judiciary, a less spectacular endeavor indeed, is a much more urgent task.
A third immediate task is the preservation of civil society’s acquired rights.
While one crucial challenge in Afghanistan has been to reintroduce women’s rights,
suppressed under the Taliban, the main challenge in today’s Iraq is to preserve the
substantial progress in women’s rights acquired in the past five or six decades, now
challenged by some opposition forces. Civil society is not necessarily made up of
liberated women, or modernistic, multilingual intellectuals. Civil society leadership is mainly made up of people who have influence unrelated to their position
in the power structure. One has to be sure that a civic culture is not thrown away
with a fallen regime.
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Many regimes have had the ambition to modernize their societies while imposing their own authoritarian rule—two mutually supportive tasks. Authoritarianism
was used to destroy, or at least weaken, traditional loci of influence or power, which
had the perverse effect of strengthening dictatorial rule while opening venues for
nontraditional forms of group solidarity. Infatuated with their “creative chaos
approach,” postmodernists tend to reject both modernity and authoritarianism.
The gender issue points to a wider problem. The real challenge is to maintain and
reinforce the modern sectors of the society—even if they were introduced by authoritarian leaders—while also introducing democratic reforms to the political domain.
While no two cases are absolutely similar, it is natural and useful to learn from
past experiences. But, then, which past experiences should we learn from, as often
the references are so distant that we add to the problems rather than settling them.
The obsession with 1945 Germany in understanding present-day Iraq is one case
among many. Mistaking Baghdad for Berlin is one of the most important US blunders in Iraq. This simplistic approach has led to a number of unfortunate decisions
such as the indiscriminate de-Ba’athification that weakened the state apparatus
and disrupted public services, and the disbanding of the army, which increased the
ranks of the insurgency with disgruntled officers.
I do not think that civilizations really exist as political actors, that cultural
identities remain static, or that cultural, linguistic, or religious borders are able to
prevent the dissemination of human ideas, values, or institutions. Cultural borders
are real, but they keep moving. They are always relative and have a strong tendency
to collapse before new ideas. Cultural identities are real but they are never reduced
to one religious, professional, or cultural ingredient. They are a combination of all
these. Identities are also in a permanent flux of deconstruction and reconstruction
and they tend to admit, in such a process, foreign as much as domestic inputs.
Cultural boundaries are thus flexible, always reshapable and easy to cross. To present anybody as Shi’a or Tutsi or Berber as a self-explanatory qualification is, in my
view, utterly stupid. As a corollary, to entirely ignore the fact that one is Shi’a or
Tutsi or Berber is utterly naïve.
Humanitarian action cannot rely on instant anthropologists, the way Iraq has
produced instant Iraqologists and the war in Afghanistan, instant Islamologists. It is
not because something is daily repeated in the media that it is true. Iraq is not made
up of Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds—people who have reduced the secular fabric to only
one of these categories. Iraq is made up of Iraqis. The identity of each of them is
extremely complex and, more disturbingly, flexible. It is deconstructed and reconstructed daily, taking into consideration factors such as their many-generations
socialization as national Iraqis, their professional occupation, the urban/rural cleavage, their tribal affiliations, ethnic-linguistic divide, and sectarian denomination.
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That is what makes their society rich and fascinating—that tribes are often
divided along sectarian lines, that sects are divided along ethnic or tribal lines, that
many families have shifted their tribal or sectarian or geographic allegiances more
than once in the past two centuries, yet many have learned to forget all this and
define themselves as Iraqis.
I never knew the sect of my driver in Iraq. I never asked, and he never told
me. Most importantly, from listening to him, I clearly understood that his sect ties
were irrelevant to him, as it is irrelevant to many Iraqis I have met. The shift, in
many Western opinion-makers’ minds, from where traditional loyalties are utterly
ignored in the name of nation building to a position where modernization (and
its effects) is utterly ignored to the benefit of some postmodernistic infatuation
with ethnicity is really disturbing. Does the author of The Clash of Civilizations
(Huntington, 1994) still remember the fine political scientist who wrote The Soldier
and the State (Huntington, 1957), the eloquent proponent of (even authoritarian)
modernization? Should fashion and/or political agendas prevent us from simultaneously taking the two issues in consideration?
One should never become an accomplice in the ongoing process of overestimating the attachment of people to their religion or the strength of their sectarian, tribal, and other traditional affiliations. I am indeed struck by the easiness
with which so many Westerners tend to underestimate the strength of modern,
Western-inspired nationalism in Third World societies. A form of amateurish orientalism, or rather anthropologism, dominates the field, and so many people think
they have found an answer to their questions by the mere mention of some traditional piece of identity they guess in their interlocutor. What you think, or what
you say, is now less relevant than what I think you are because I guessed you are
Tamil, Sikh, Sunni, or God knows what. Peacemakers would be well advised not
to blindly follow these intellectual fashions. We live in a world where modernity is
often deeply intertwined with resilient tradition; to ignore either one of these two
is to make peace even less likely.
Humanitarianism has hopefully reached its age of reason. It started as a noble
sentiment, entered the body of international law a century ago, exploded during
the past century’s decades into a widely shared ideal, drifted into a full-fledged
universalistic ideology. And now it is back to what could be a long-term status,
not a substitute to politics, nor an appendix of it, but a useful, indeed indispensable, complement to economic rationality and political activity. Humanitarianism
is now a mature self-confident human activity, operating in what still is basically
a world of States, now slightly nuanced by limited areas of accepted world governance and of transnational norms.
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Healing with a Single History
Richard J. Goldstone

There is no democracy in which justice and the rule of law are not axiomatically
assumed to be foundational principles. In 1895, Professor A. V. Dicey, the great
English legal philosopher, defined the principles of the Rule of Law. One of them,
he declared, was that “no man is punishable or can be made to suffer in body
or goods except for a distinct breach of law.”1 Almost a century later, Professor
Archibald Cox expressed the opinion that it is “the genius of American constitutionalism which supports the Rule of Law.”2
The South African Constitution of 1996 was the product of the experience of
other democratic constitutional states and South Africa’s own painful history of
oppression and discrimination. In the Preamble, it is stated that:
We the people of South Africa, Recognize the injustices of our past;
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country;
and Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our
diversity.
We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to—
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally
protected by law . . .
The Constitution goes on to make respect for human dignity, justice, and the rule
of law central principles. In one of the oldest as well as in one of the most recent
democratic constitutions, there is the recognition of the fundamental nature of
justice and the rule of law.

370

CH29_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p370-380.indd 370

2/13/13 11:16 PM

HEALING WITH A SINGLE HISTORY

During South Africa’s transition, there was much debate as to the appropriate
manner in dealing with the sordid past of racial oppression. Nelson Mandela and
the African National Congress would have wished for Nuremberg-style prosecutions for the political and security force leaders. If then President F. W. de Klerk had
his way, there would have been blanket amnesties for the apartheid leaders. The
compromise, and it was a political compromise, was a form of truth commission.
Soon after South Africa elected its first democratic legislature, it decided to
establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The experience of
other truth commissions played an important role in that endeavor, especially that
of Chile. However, unlike its Chilean counterpart, the South African model provided for public hearings and the “naming of names.” There was also no restriction
on the kind of serious human rights violations that were investigated.
More than 20,000 victims gave their testimony to the TRC, and so, too, did
some 7000 perpetrators. Amnesty, both criminal and civil, was granted only to
those perpetrators who made full confessions of the crimes in respect of which
they sought the amnesty. The result was an outpouring of evidence of the heinous
human rights violations that were perpetrated in the execution of the apartheid
policy.
There has been much debate, both in South Africa and in the global community, about the successes and failures of the TRC. The extent to which individual
perpetrators benefited is a complex subject about which there are many contradictory views. It is clear that some victims left the TRC angry and frustrated, while
others were able, through their testimony, to begin a healing process.
Whatever the effect of the TRC on individual victims, in my opinion, there
can be no doubt that the general South African society has been a beneficiary of
the TRC process. During the apartheid era, the majority of white South Africans
believed the denials of human rights violations that were put out by the government’s security forces. It was more comfortable for those denials to be accepted by
the people who felt they were benefiting from them. But for the work of the TRC,
that acceptance of the truth of those denials would have continued into the postapartheid era. The mass of evidence made public by the TRC has given South Africa
a single history of the apartheid era—and the denials have disappeared. My grandchildren and their black friends are being taught the same history of apartheid, and
so too will their children.
Much of the violence in our contemporary world is the result of the partial
history that groups believe. That is certainly the position in the Balkans, where too
many Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs believe that they are the victims and the others
are the perpetrators. It is those false denials that provide the toxic fuel that enable
371

CH29_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p370-380.indd 371

2/13/13 11:16 PM

RICHARD J. GOLDSTONE

evil leaders of the ilk of Slobodan Milosevic to appeal to the nationalism of extreme
groups and embark on programs that result in ethnic cleansing.
The cancer of such false denials has been removed in South Africa by the TRC.
Not only does this militate against future racism in our country, but it also facilitates the acceptance by the white minority of government programs designed to
benefit the majority of our people who were so grievously disadvantaged by hundreds of years of racist oppression. The fairness and morality that require such
programs has become manifest. While not suggesting that there is no opposition
to such programs, they attract substantially less criticism than would have been the
case without the work of the TRC.
If we are ever to live in peace and harmony and prevent the cycles of bloody
wars that dominated the twentieth century, the global community will also have
to accept that justice and the rule of law are the values that should govern the
relationship between sovereign states.
I propose, in this chapter, to undertake an overview of human rights today,
examining the attitude of the United States to international law, its behavior and
that of some other countries since September 11, 2001, and the relationship between
peace and justice. The last mentioned topic illustrates compromises between conflicting objectives—essentially the kind of compromise that needs to be undertaken in respect of national security and human rights.

The Development of Human Rights
Between the end of World War II and September 11, 2001, there was an impressive
and even awesome development of the rule of law within nations and, in some areas,
in the governance of the global community. In the domestic arena, that development has been evident in the flowering of democratic forms of government in a
number of regions of the world. It is foundational to the structure of the European
Union (EU) and has been an explicit goal of the Organization of American States
(OAU), the African Union (AU), and the Commonwealth of Nations.
Over the first half century of the life of the United Nations, a fundamental
contradiction has emerged with regard to the protection of fundamental human
rights. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter obliges all Members to refrain from using
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State. Article
2(7) prohibits the UN from intervening in matters that are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State. It was the latter provision that enabled South
Africa to object to attacks by Member States on the evil system of apartheid. Despite
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that objection, in 1946 India requested the General Assembly to investigate the
treatment of Indian nationals in South Africa. The resolution passed but with the
opposition of the United States and the United Kingdom (UK).
As colonialism came to an end and it became less acceptable for democratic
states to discriminate against their citizens on grounds of race or sex, so it became
more acceptable for governments and international organizations to concern
themselves with serious violations of human rights wherever they might occur.
The provisions of Article 2(7) of the Charter were no longer recognized as a protection even when the UN or its Members took punitive steps in an attempt to end
such violations.
The recognition of universal jurisdiction for the most heinous international
crimes further eroded the strict application of sovereignty.3 Citizens of any country
could be placed on trial before the courts of any other country for such international
crimes even in the absence of a connection between the crime and such nation.
These developments reached their zenith when, in 1993, the Security Council
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and, in
the following year, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Then there
was the 1999 bombing of Serbia by the members of NATO in order to protect the
Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing. Even though Security Council authority was absent, and the intervention thus illegal, there was no condemnation of
the action. Russia attempted to have the Council condemn the intervention but
failed miserably. Instead, a UN administration was set up to govern that province
of Serbia.
The contradiction in the UN system between respecting state sovereignty and
protecting human rights is also illustrated in Security Council Resolution 1244 of
June 10, 1999, which established the terms of the UN administration in Kosovo. It
reaffirmed “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” It also reaffirmed the call in previous resolutions for “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for
Kosovo.” It went on to decide on the deployment, under UN auspices, of an international civil presence and authorized Member States to establish an international
security presence in Kosovo.
This formula was bound to lead to contradictory policies. When members
of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo met with the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Russian Duma, we were handed a long list of complaints
against the UN administration in Kosovo. For example, there was a strong feeling
that the UN replacing Yugoslavian currency with the German mark as the currency
of Kosovo was inconsistent with the recognition of the sovereignty of the Federal
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Republic of Yugoslavia. So, too, Russia objected to the issuing by the UN of visas to
persons visiting Kosovo. When Russians visit Kosovo, they make a point of traveling there from Belgrade with appropriate travel documents issued by the Yugoslav
government.
The developments to which I have referred were unthinkable a little more than
a decade ago. It was the widely accepted view that an international criminal court
could only be treaty based. And humanitarian intervention was a theory thought
unlikely to be implemented in practice.
The consequences of these developments, whether within nations or in the
global community, have been significant. Democratic ideals have spread around
the world, and especially to states of the former Soviet Union, many of which are
ever more enthusiastic to be accepted as members of the European Union.
Even less anticipated was that an International Criminal Court would be established early in the new millennium, that by the end of 2003 some ninety-three
nations would have ratified its founding treaty, that eighteen judges would have
been elected, and that that Court’s Prosecutor would be preparing to launch his
first investigation into serious war crimes allegedly committed in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Who would have thought a little more than a decade ago that the work of
international criminal courts would have a profound effect on humanitarian law—
that the somewhat irrational distinction with regard to the protection of innocent
civilians caught up in international and non-international armed conflict would
be reduced almost to the point of extinction? Who would have thought that an
international criminal court would hold that systematic mass rape could be held
to constitute genocide? And who would have anticipated that in wars fought by
democracies, their military leaders would take the requirements of humanitarian
law seriously?
Insufficient attention has been given to this last mentioned development. In
World War II, civilians became the target of warfare. Cities on both sides were
firebombed, and the atomic bomb was dropped with the intention of devastating
whole cities in Japan. In the wars in Korea and Vietnam, deaths of civilians outnumbered those of troops by about 90 percent. It was only in the post-international
criminal tribunal world that the military leaders of Western nations became committed to attacking only military targets and taking all reasonable steps to protect nonbelligerents. The consequence in the war over Kosovo was a relatively low
number of civilian deaths—fewer than 2,000 after 78 days of massive bombing.
Before the establishment of the war crimes tribunals, humanitarian law was a
subject taught at some army colleges. Since 1993, when the Yugoslavia Tribunal was
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established, humanitarian law has become a subject of daily discussion in the media
and is taught in thousands of law schools around the world.
I wish that the story ended on this high note. It does not. At the levels of both
domestic law and international law, justice and the rule of law have been dealt
grievous blows. How much permanent damage has been done, only time will tell.
The tragedy is compounded by the fact that these blows have been dealt by the
democratic nations of the world, and none more so than by the United States.

The United States and International Law
The United States has been regarded and has regarded itself as the leader of the
democratic world. It earned that reputation because of its concern for the human
rights of all people. The annual State Department report on human rights discussed
the manner in which human rights were respected or violated in just about every
country of the world. The US played the leading role in the establishment of the UN
war crimes tribunals and in calling the diplomatic conference that led to the treaty
under which the International Criminal Court was established.
I know from my own experience that without the political and financial power
of the United States neither the Yugoslav nor the Rwandan tribunals would have
become viable institutions. In their early years, the US government bent the UN’s
financial rules in order to ensure that appropriate experts and resources reached
The Hague, Kigali, and Arusha. When governments such as Croatia’s were tardy
in cooperating with the Yugoslav Tribunal, it was US financial pressure that virtually compelled the surrender of indicted war criminals. It was the US ambassador
to Cameroon who assisted me in making the crucial official contacts that, in turn,
led to the surrender of leaders indicted for the 1994 genocide to the Rwandan
Tribunal.
All this was to change. In recent years, the attitude of the United States to the
United Nations has been problematic. It has been tardy in paying its dues to the
world body. In the 1990s this almost brought the UN to the point of insolvency.
In relation to the war against Iraq, it decided to act outside its Charter obligations.
When it later welcomed an international effort to bring democracy to Iraq, the
nations that opposed the war were none too keen to have their nationals become
involved in the ongoing conflict.
The US government’s approach to ratifying international treaties has been
patchy at best. It took forty years to ratify the Genocide Convention and is the
only nation failing to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child. More
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recently, it refused to ratify a protocol to the Torture Convention, which would
allow inspections of the prisons of nations suspected of violating the provisions of
that Convention.
US ambivalence to international law and international organizations became
ever more exceptional. It refused to accept that any of its nationals should ever be
brought before an international court, out of fear that such moves might be politically motivated and biased against the United States. It demanded that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court should be subject to the approval of
the Security Council and thus enable it, and the other four permanent members,
to control where the Court could operate. When the overwhelming majority of
nations assembled in Rome rejected that approach, the US government demanded
that jurisdiction be restricted to nationals of nations that ratified the Rome statute. That too was rejected, and the United States joined only six other countries
that voted against the adoption of the Rome Treaty while 120 nations voted in
favor of it.
The US approach to the International Criminal Court has become even more
hostile under the second Bush administration. While former President Bill Clinton
signed the Rome Treaty, President George W. Bush “withdrew” that signature and
has actively campaigned against the institution. The United States has threatened
or cajoled a number of nations to enter into bilateral agreements undertaking not
to hand its citizens to the international court. It has withdrawn military cooperation from some nations that have refused to enter into such agreements.
This recalcitrant attitude of the US government has seriously retarded the
building of international justice and the rule of law. If the most powerful nation in
the world does not regard itself bound by those laws it has ratified, on what basis
can it be expected that less powerful nations will remain law-abiding?

The Effect of September 11
I turn to consider the effect of the events of September 11, 2001, on domestic justice
and the rule of law. Again, the United States is unfortunately the democracy so visibly denying civil liberties of persons under its control, whether they are citizens
or noncitizens. I refer to the resort by the US government to secret deportation
hearings; the detention of citizens and noncitizens without trial and without access
to a lawyer or to any court; the prospect of trials on capital crimes by military commissions from which there is no appeal to any civilian court; the indefinite detention of persons presumed by the Third Geneva Convention to be prisoners of war,
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without the benefits of those Conventions and again without access to lawyers or
courts. A flicker of hope has been kindled by the US Supreme Court’s agreeing to
hear an appeal from some of those detained in Guantanamo Bay who question the
lawfulness of that detention.
Other democracies have also not fared too well. Prior to September 11, the UK
enacted wide-ranging measures to counter terrorism. It did so predominantly in
the face of IRA terrorist activities. After September 11, a new antiterrorism statute
was enacted. Its most controversial provision is that providing for the internment,
without trial, of a “suspected international terrorist” if the Home Secretary reasonably believes that such person’s presence in the UK is a risk to national security
and suspects that such person is a terrorist. If the person is not a UK citizen, he or
she can be detained for an unspecified period without charge or trial. There is no
appeal to the ordinary courts but only to a government-appointed commission. It
was this provision that led the UK government to derogate from the human rights
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.
These denials of justice and acts inconsistent with the rule of law are having
serious consequences in other countries. If powerful nations can act in such a way,
what stops weaker nations from acting in a similar fashion in their regions of the
world? Of course, there is a knock-on effect.
Recent Indian legislation invades the privacy of persons in material respects
and allows detention of terrorist suspects without trial for periods of up to ninety
days. Pending South African legislation also provided for detention without trial.
The cruelty and abuses that accompanied detention without trial during the
apartheid era led to protests and these contentious provisions have now been
removed.
In a recent report by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,4 one reads that
Egypt has passed even more draconian laws allegedly to fight terrorism. Egypt’s
President Mubarak declared that the new US policies “proved that we were right
from the beginning in using all means, including military tribunals, to combat terrorism.The United Nations Security Council itself was tardy in making an effort
to ensure that civil liberties were respected in legislation that Member States were
peremptorily required, by Resolution 1373, to enact. The attitude, as conveyed to me
by the first chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Sir Jeremy Greenstock,
was that human rights are not the concern of the Security Council.
In the same Human Rights Watch report, there is reference to an instruction
given to US ambassadors. They were to report human rights violations to the State
Department in preparation for the 2002 report (issued in March 2003). According
to the instruction, “Actions by governments taken at the request of the United
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States or with the expressed support of the United States should not be included
in the report.”
There is no doubt that the events of September 11 created a new concept of
democracy that differs from the one that Western states defended before those
events took place, and especially so with respect to the freedom of the individual.
There is no better illustration than the Bush administration’s attempting to justify
the indefinite detention of citizens and noncitizens without any court intervention.
This is based primarily on the President’s declaration that such persons are “unlawful combatants.”
The oppressive former dictator of Liberia, Charles Taylor, before he ignominiously left his country and accepted asylum in Nigeria, used the American “unlawful combatant” formula to justify the arrest and torture of innocent journalists. In
November 2001, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe claimed that foreign correspondents, including American correspondents, were terrorist sympathizers for
reporting on political attacks against white Zimbabweans. His spokesman insisted
that it was an open secret that such correspondents were assisting terrorists and
distorting the facts. He then said: “As for correspondents, we would like them to
know that we agree with the United States President Bush that anyone who in any
way finances, harbors, or defends terrorists is himself a terrorist. We too will not
make any difference between terrorists and their friends and supporters. This kind
of media terrorism will not be tolerated.”5
A third illustration from the Human Rights Watch report relates to Indonesia.
The government of that nation announced in May that it was intending to build a
Guantanamo Bay–like island detention camp to house prisoners in its long-standing struggle against armed separatists in northern Sumatra.
I am not suggesting that these evil leaders are doing what the US government is
doing. What I am saying is that when the most powerful nation in the world fails to
respect its own great values, other nations will become less restrained in the manner
in which they treat their own people.
During 2002, I co-chaired a Task Force established by the International Bar
Association to report on international terrorism and the role of lawyers in helping combat it.6 The Task Force included members from Africa, Asia, Europe and
the Americas. In our unanimous report we recognized the right, and indeed the
duty, of all governments to protect their citizens. Obviously that is one of the most
important obligations of government. The challenge that international terrorism
presents to justice and the rule of law is to balance the means taken to combat it
and the invasion of the civil liberties of citizens. There can be no warrant for the
wholesale casting aside of the freedoms for which leading democracies have fought
so hard and for so long.
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Peace and Justice
Soon after he assumed office as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Sergio Vieira de Mello remarked:
[M]easures must be taken in transparency, they must be of short duration,
and must respect the fundamental non-derogable rights embodied in our
human rights norms. They must take place within the framework of the law.
Without that, the terrorists will ultimately win and we will ultimately lose—as
we would have allowed them to destroy the very foundation of our modern
human civilization. I am convinced that it is possible to fight this menace at
no cost to our human rights. Protecting our citizens and upholding rights are
not incompatible: on the contrary, they must go firmly together lest we lose
our bearing.
We are involved in a clash of values and rights that contradict one another. In
order to combat international crime, policing authorities in democracies require
additional, nontraditional powers. They need to be equipped to foil the plans of
sophisticated criminals who do not hesitate to use modern technology and who
might have access now or in the near future to weapons of mass destruction. The
right balance between national security and the protection of human rights is an
excruciatingly difficult one to find, but nonetheless one that can be found.

The Way Forward
These problems illustrate that leaders should recognize clashes of values and make
every effort to find a balanced solution in the policies that are adopted. What concerns me is that in the aftermath of September 11, politicians in too many countries
feel that they have to be seen to be taking steps to combat terrorism regardless of the
efficacy of those measures and regardless of the invasion of fundamental rights that
they might cause. A fearful electorate becomes an acquiescent electorate.
I would suggest that governments in democratic nations should be encouraged to set up their own civil liberties monitoring departments. In other words,
governments should have senior officials responsible for monitoring and reporting on violations by their own legislatures and executives of fundamental human
rights. This is especially appropriate where those rights are protected by their own
constitutions or by international conventions to which they are bound. This kind
of public oversight would unquestionably act as an effective brake on excessive and
unjustified encroachments of human rights.
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If democracies lose respect for justice and the rule of law, it will bode ill for the
future of the human race. Not only are oppressive dictators relying on the US concept of “unlawful combatants,” but it has even become acceptable in some democracies to speak publicly of killing unpopular leaders of other nations or groups.
The powerful nations of our world have a responsibility to set an example for
others to follow. That is the obligation that comes with leadership.

Afterword
This chapter was written toward the end of 2003. It is remarkable how international
criminal justice has advanced and matured since then. The 93 States that had then
ratified the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court are now risen to 121.
All of the persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia have been apprehended and sent for trial to The Hague. This includes
Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina. A popular uprising in Egypt toppled Mubarak and
Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia, has been found guilty of serious
war crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. There are now seven situations
before the ICC, three of them referred by governments and two by the Security
Council. The US government’s policy with regard to the ICC has changed from
outright hostility to friendly cooperation. While the road ahead is not an easy one,
happily the prophets of doom regarding the future of international justice have
been proven wrong.
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PART VII

Epilogue

This Reader concludes, as the International Humanitarian Affairs Book Series
began, with a short essay combining dreams, hopes, and reality, and then with a
poem. This chapter offers some philosophic reflections drawn from personal experiences in a career that has linked my own profession in clinical tropical medicine
with periods of intensive scientific field research; public health appointments; international humanitarian assistance, especially in complex emergencies; government and United Nations service; and academic responsibilities in both medical
schools and the university. It is hoped that this final section will allow the reader to
share the many joys and inordinate satisfactions that sustain those who deal with
the great problems posed by international humanitarian crises.
The sixteenth-century poem/prayer by Sir Francis Drake captures, I believe,
in four short stanzas, major themes of this Reader. All the contributors took risks
in their professional careers to help define an emerging profession, one that aims
at translating times and places of tragedy and chaos into peaceful and stable communities. And they have done their work with, as the poet notes, “courage, hope
and love.”
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The eighth Jubilee Edition of Tropical Medicine: A Clinical Text concludes with
some personal reflections on my own professional journey. When the initial chapters of my first book were serialized in the New York State Journal of Medicine in
1961, I was a young physician who had been introduced to tropical infections on a
fellowship in Calcutta, India. I was fascinated by the history of epidemic diseases,
by the dramatic clinical presentations, and by the diagnostic and therapeutic challenges they pose.
In Calcutta, I fell in love with a way of life, seeming to find romance in settings
that others might—quite legitimately—see only as dirty, broken-down wastelands.
Surely those negatives existed in Calcutta. But amidst the fetid stenches of Indian
urban decay, I mainly recall the strong aroma of exotic spices. I close my eyes and
see saffron robes rather than soiled rags. I hear music in the cacophonous sounds
of the slums and in the long silence of a city drenched in the humid heat that comes
with the monsoon rains.
Over the next four months I attended, every morning, clinical rounds at the
All India Institute of Tropical Medicine. But being young and indefatigable, I also
spent every afternoon helping to tend the dying in a gutter with a then-unknown
Albanian nun whom the world now remembers as Mother Teresa. I was immersed
in a wonder-filled, strange culture, and I faced utterly new challenges and, just as
important, new opportunities.
One of the most important lessons of India that has remained with me for life
and helped determine what I have tried to do, and how, was the realization that
one must stay calm and focused in the midst of chaos if one wanted to help others. There was no time for self indulgent, personal concerns. The petty needs that
so often dominate our lives distract us from getting critical tasks accomplished.
One quickly learned that our own individual cares simply did not matter much
in the face of what others were suffering every day, all day, in the disaster that life
offered them.
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Fortune continued to bless my nascent career in tropical medicine. At the
beginning of the 1960s, due to the ever-expanding war in Vietnam, doctors in the
United States were drafted into military service. I was assigned to the US Navy
Medical Corps and, blessedly, was first allowed to complete a degree at the London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine before being sent to Naval Medical
Research Unit 3 in Cairo, Egypt. As the Unit’s Head of Epidemiology and Director
of Clinical Tropical Medicine, I undertook, over the next few years, field investigations in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Turkey, and across the Middle East.
Once again, I discovered beauty in areas that are most often described as desolate.
The arid deserts and harsh bush of Somalia and the even more difficult, sodden,
mosquito-laden swamps of South Sudan became my favored places for epidemiologic exploration. These journeys gave direction to my own medical and academic
career as a tropicalist.
During this period, I became increasingly aware of the extramedical, complex
demands one faced in dealing with the trauma of natural and man-made disasters
in areas where there were few resources. These developing, often newly independent
nations could barely cope in relatively stable times. In the face of famine, drought,
floods and civil wars, these societies—and their very basic health services—quickly
collapsed.
On my discharge from the Navy in the mid-1960s, I established a career pattern that included daily clinical work, teaching, and continued field research. Since
then, I have been Director of the Tropical Disease Center at Lenox Hill Hospital
in New York City and Clinical Professor of Tropical Medicine and Molecular
Parasitology at the NYU Medical School. For thirty-six years (1969–2006), I was also
the Chairman of the Department of International Health and Tropical Medicine
at The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland, and have served as the Consultant in
Tropical Medicine for the United Nations Health Service and for numerous international corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
I was able to maintain close contact with the realities of life in the tropics
through semiannual research trips to Somalia, the Sudan, and Nicaragua, and by
responding to complex humanitarian crises, particularly in conflict zones, or after
devastating national disasters such as earthquakes. This latter work slowly became
my primary interest. I gradually changed my focus from individual diagnosis and
therapy to the far broader challenges of providing emergency care to refugees and
internally displaced persons.
It is at times of great calamity and suffering—in humanitarian crises—where
the developed and developing worlds most intimately interact. These occasions,
if mismanaged, cause further divisions in an ever more polarized world between
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the “haves” and the “have-nots.” But, if managed correctly, with forethought and
planning, with sensitivity and clinical efficiency, then something profoundly good
may emerge. There may be no more important arena in which academic standards
need to be urgently applied than in the repetitive humanitarian crises that shame
our so-called civilization.
There are obvious, cruel realities in humanitarian fieldwork, and no amount
of diplomatic sophistry can dehumanize the horrors of conflict and the waste of
innocent lives. These are human beings, not dull statistics, who suffer and die in
such situations. In the sad settings of refugee camps where I have worked, mothers
and children are the disposable refuse of global insecurity; becoming a child soldier
or a sex slave are terribly realistic options for innocent youngsters.
In humanitarian crises, one also struggles with the dark and tangled roots
of hatred and the incipient revenge that blossoms in such unrelenting misery.
One quickly becomes aware that there are no simple answers in such situations.
Solutions, when they can be constructed, draw on many, many disciplines. It is
essential to extend the professional standards that prevail in tropical medicine to
the less-disciplined field of humanitarian affairs. Disaster management is an evolving science, embracing every stage: from prevention and preparedness, through
rapid assessment and cluster assignments, to the final phases of reconstruction and
development.
When I was young, and very innocent, I thought I was inordinately important
as a medical doctor in a refugee camp. But it did not take long to look around and
realize, with growing humility, that those in charge of water or food or shelter or
security or sanitation or education were essential partners. It did not take long to
realize that no one could accomplish very much working alone. I came to understand that if there were to be any progress in restoring a semblance of stability for
those who had lost almost everything, we had to overcome our own restrictive
professional barriers.
One had to develop a radically different perspective regarding those treasured
academic distinctions we had been taught were so important during medical
training. One also had to learn not to be afraid to venture afield as circumstances
demanded. Diplomas and degrees can easily become artificial boxes that prevent
flexibility. In providing humanitarian assistance, flexibility is an indispensable and
absolute necessity.
Rigid definitions of duty cripple programs in the field. There is that inevitable
time when, at least in my experience, one must move beyond the traditional confines of any discipline. There had been no courses—except possibly in philosophy, anthropology, or comparative literature—that prepared me for the almost
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bizarre demands one faces in attempting to establish and manage camps for tens,
and sometimes hundreds, of thousands of frightened, ill and endangered people,
the vast majority being extremely vulnerable women and children. Three examples
demonstrate different challenges that expanded my traditional role as a physician:
Early in my career, I found myself in Southern Sudan, responsible not only for
health concerns, but also for providing other basic human services, including security. It certainly was of little help to a young girl to tell her that
her malaria was cured if she was raped every time she went foraging for
firewood.
In 1972, an earthquake destroyed Managua, Nicaragua. I served as Chief Medical Adviser, sharing a tent with the then-President. There, I learned how
politics and corruption can pollute so-called relief missions. A significant
percentage of the international aid was openly looted by the President’s cronies, and donors did not even complain for “diplomatic” reasons. One sadly
realized the limitations of altruism in the face of evil.
Retraining and resettling large numbers of refugees was essential in Somalia
after the Sahel drought caused a mass migration across Africa. I was directing camps with almost 1 million refugees, and the only outlet was the Indian
Ocean. Trying to teach nomads to abandon an age-old dependency on camels and cattle to seek survival as fishermen was an interesting exercise for an
evolving tropicalist. The experiment worked, at least for a while.
There were also obvious diplomatic possibilities in our tropical public health
work, and these could—and needed to be—exploited. Medicine offered an almost
ideal platform for preventive diplomacy. Almost fifty years ago, in the midst of a
raging civil war in Southern Sudan, “corridors of tranquility”—so-called immunization breaks—were established. These were de facto ceasefire zones, and they eventually became temporary bridges to understanding and peace. That peace didn’t
last, but the effectiveness of those “corridors” is still recalled today by those who
struggle to find the elusive common ground in the blood-soaked sands of Sudan.
My responsibilities in this field inevitably grew, particularly in the chaotic reality that is far too often, the norm around the globe, especially in conflict prone
zones where poverty and aggression prevail. One had to devise new, imaginative,
and innovative paths forward. Managing complex humanitarian emergencies, particularly in the midst of conflicts and disasters, is not a field for amateurs. Good
intentions are a common, but tragically inadequate, substitute for well-planned,
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efficiently coordinated, and carefully implemented operations that must have a
beginning, a middle, and an end. Compassion and charity are only elements in
humanitarian assistance programs; alone, they are self-indulgent emotions that for
a short time may satisfy the donor, but will always fail to help victims in dire straits.
When I first began working in complex humanitarian crises, there were almost
no standards of training. In fact, there was not even a common vocabulary. What
was desperately needed was the creation of a new profession, one that could embrace
the many areas of expertise required to provide an overall response. This is where
academia had to enter the picture. More than twenty years ago, new, practical,
university-level programs geared to the unique needs of international aid workers were developed. At Fordham University in New York, we now have more than
2,000 graduates from 133 nations, and one can earn a postgraduate master’s degree
or pursue an undergraduate minor in the field.
It is primarily in the university where knowledge is analyzed and defined, where
good—and bad—practices are studied, where the lessons of the past are distilled
in a continuing search for wisdom and understanding. Humanitarian assistance is
an ideal area for academic interest. It presents a multidisciplinary challenge, drawing on, among others, the fields of public health and medicine, law and politics,
logistics and security, technology and anthropology; indeed, all the social, physical,
moral, economic, and philosophic arts and sciences.
In trying to establish the broadest possible base for programs in humanitarian
assistance, much depends on how one approaches problems, and troubled areas.
The multiple causes of and difficult solutions to humanitarian crises require an
arena for the free, unfettered exchange of ideas where the development of new
initiatives to overcome the failed status quo is encouraged. That is the essential
environment of a good university. The university should be—and usually is—the
last bastion where open discussions, and respect for differing ideas, prevail. It is
society’s ultimate refuge from bias and prejudice, and these are among the most
significant causative factors in humanitarian crises. The search for answers cannot be limited to the medical school, or the law school, or any other specialized
school. It involves all the many, linking disciplines that are the foundation of a
true university.
During a very full, joyous career—if that is an appropriate description for a
journey where there were few guideposts along the way—I have worked in sixtyfive countries, mostly in refugee camps and war zones. I have seen plenty of tragedy
during those travels. Many scenes are still seared into my soul: the appalling waste
of life and human dignity; pain that I was often unable to relieve; the stares of starving children, and the dying gasps of too many mothers after childbirth. Yet I have
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always realized how privileged I have been to serve, to share, and even begin to
identify with those caught in the crossfire of conflicts not of their making. A spiritual solidarity develops in just being with them. They are my brothers and sisters.
But that realization was obviously not enough. I had to construct solutions to
problems that, at least for me, were without precedent. I soon came to understand
that tradition and culture were as essential as aspirin or bandages in running a basic
medical program. One quickly realized that prejudice and economic exploitation,
pride and politics, racism and religion, weather and witchcraft, corruption and
incompetence, were all integral parts of the problems one had to address. It is necessary to appreciate the cry of the oppressed, and the burden of ignorance, fear and
poverty, if one is to practice medicine in a developing land, especially during—and
after—periods of disaster.
In the most sordid situations, I have always felt inordinately humbled to see,
often with amazement, always with admiration, the courage and resiliency of the
downtrodden, those who seem to have been totally overwhelmed, but then, like the
Phoenix, rise again from the ashes. I have always returned—although part of me
never returned—from refugee camps grateful to be allowed to participate in their
valiant efforts.
I have helped, even healed, many desperate victims in humanitarian crises, but
they in turn, helped, healed, instructed, and changed me. I have been the recipient
of their kindness: They who had so little gave their meager supplies to me, and,
on more than one occasion, offered to protect me with their lives. I learned much
about the values of clan loyalty and family love around campfires in the deserts of
Somalia and Sudan, with elders who were guided by values as noble as my JudeoChristian traditions.
I have been caught behind the lines in armed conflicts, and seen senseless
slaughter from Beirut to Managua, and all across the scarred landscape of modern
Africa. Somehow in the twisted wreckage of war, and in the squalor of refugee
camps, the incredible beauty of humanity prevailed for me, as it does for most of
those privileged to work in humanitarian assistance. It is that perspective that sustains us on what otherwise may seem like a journey through hell on earth. It takes
time to refocus the romance of youth into reflective, lasting programs in humanitarian crises, to change the passion of love into healing projects. One learned from
errors and failures, and then struggled ahead, with more hard work. As Samuel
Beckett once wrote, we must “Try again. Fail again. Fail better.”
It would certainly have been easier—and safer—to reap the rewards assured by
a predictable medical practice at home. However, that was not what fate offered.
My wife and I discovered a new world—and ourselves—in politically volatile areas
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where change and revolution were in the air, and on the streets. Some were planned
in our living room. Medicine allowed unusual access, even for a Western stranger,
in closed, often hostile, societies. We were able to share in the dreams and aspirations of men and women in the developing world who were fighting for freedom,
equality, basic human rights, and often their very survival.
In such situations, silence and isolation are simply not viable options. In this
era of instant communications, basic moral values make it impossible for any of
us to hide from massive sufferings. And mere compassion is an utterly inadequate
response. We simply are not free to stay in some blissful state of denial, or to think
that expressions of concern, or endless discussions, will suffice.
The discipline of tropical medicine has taken me in uncharted directions
with multiple crisscrossing yet mutually supportive paths: from the isolation of a
research laboratory through the examining room and the lecture hall, to epidemiologic field work in remote areas, and to the rough and tumble of refugee camps.
There is no substitute in a medical career for the legitimacy and credibility
earned in the daily care of individual patients. One must provide the technical basis
for that critical continuity of clinical service. But revisions and additions in successive editions of this textbook clearly reflect a personal commitment to developing
a new, and fully recognized, profession of international humanitarian assistance.
My concluding hope is that this effort may also offer a foundation for those who
dare to broaden the horizons of a discipline and strive in new—yet unknown—
ways to help the poor and oppressed masses in the tropics realize a safer, more just
and healthy world.
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Disturb Us, O Lord
Sir Francis Drake

As with previous books, we end this volume with a poem. This one, from 1577,
seems appropriate, citing both challenge and hope.
Disturb us, Lord, when
We are too well pleased with ourselves,
When our dreams have come true
Because we have dreamed too little,
When we arrived safely
Because we sailed too close to the shore.
Disturb us, Lord, when
With the abundance of things we possess
We have lost our thirst
For the waters of life;
Having fallen in love with life,
We have ceased to dream of eternity
And in our efforts to build a new earth,
We have allowed our vision
Of the new Heaven to dim.
Disturb us, Lord, to dare more boldly,
To venture on wider seas
Where storms will show your mastery;
Where losing sight of land,
We shall find the stars.
We ask You to push back
The horizons of our hopes;
And to push into the future
In strength, courage, hope, and love.
389
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Appendix: The IIHA Resource Library

Humanitarian action requires a diverse set of skills and knowledge. Resources
do not sit in any one body of literature, but across a multitude of disciplines and
languages. More suited toward the modern student, the IIHA has developed a
comprehensive resource library that has its foundations in electronic links. These
links allow access to the fundamental principles, standards, Conventions, Treaties,
Charters, guidelines and basic reference handbooks that a humanitarian student
might require for background information. The IIHA Resource Library also contains all of the books sourced in this Reader.
Visit the IIHA Resource Library at www.fordham.edu/iiha.
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protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
54. I. C. J. Reports (1951), p. 12. See Christa Rottensteiner, “The Denial of Humanitarian
Assistance as a Crime Under International Law,” International Review of the Red Cross 835 (1999):
555–582.
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55. See the Web site dedicated to the Charter: http://www.europarl.euint/charter/default_
en.htm. The text was published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, C 364/1 (2000).
56. For this “third generation of human rights,” see Karel Vasak, “Pour une troisieme generation des droits de l’homme,” in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross
Principles, ed. Christophe Swinarski (Geneva: ICRC, 1984), pp. 837–845; Karel Crawford and Hans
Kruuk, The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
57. See: Edith Brown Weiss, ed., Environmental Change and International Law: New Challenges and
Dimensions (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 1992); http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/
uu25ee/uu25ee0k.htm; and especially Alexandre Kiss, “An Introductory Note on a Human Right to
Environment,” http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu25ee/uu25ee0k.htm; “The Fundamental
Right to Life at the Basis of the Ratio Legis of International Human Rights Law and Environmental
Law,” http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu25ee/uu25ee0p.htm. See also “Report of the Joint
OHCHR-UNEP Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment,” January 16, 2002, E/CN.4/2002/
WP. 7 (March 22, 2002), submitted to the Fifty-eighth Session of the Commission on Human Rights;
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/Documents?OpenFrameset.
58. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. res. 41/128, annex, 41 UN GAOR Supp.
(no.53) at 186, UN Doc. A/41/53 (1986). Available at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library
Web site: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/s3drd.htm; and on the UN Web site: http://www
.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm. See also Arjun Sengupta “The Right to Development as
a Human Right,” on the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Harvard
University, Web site: http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/fxbcenter/FXBC_WP7-Sengupta.pdf.
59. See the Web site of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: http://
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/10/e/rtd_main.htm; and the Report of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/72.
E/CN.4/2002/27 (November 27, 2001) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/
Documents?OpenFrameset.
60. Statement in January 1997. http://www.unesco.org/general/eng/whatsnew/decl.eng.html.
61. See the WHO Web site “Health as a Human Right,” http://www.who.int.archives/who50/
en/human.htm; and the interdisciplinary discussion held at Harvard Law School in September 1993,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/Publications/economic1.html; and Henrik Karl Nielsen,
The World Health Organisation—Implementing the Right to Health, as well as “Health and Human
Rights. An International Journal” published by the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and
Human Rights, Harvard University, since 1994; http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/fxbcenter/journal.htm.
62. See the FAO Website: http://www.fao.org/Legal/rtf/rtfood-e.htm.
63. See The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 2nd ed.
(Geneva: ICRC, 1996).
64. See Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary (Geneva, 1979).
65. Text available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/about/charter.shtml.
66. See the following Websites: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/tfs/15027570.html (Journal of
Military Ethics); http://dir.yahoo.com/Government/Military/Ethics, http://www.usna.edu/Ethics
(Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy); http://www.iihl.org (International Institute of Humanitarian Law).
67. See Cees de Rover, “Police and Security Forces. A New Interest for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law,” International Review of the Red Cross 835 (September 1999): 637–647; and C. de
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Rover, To Serve and to Protect Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces
(Geneva: ICRC, 1998).
68. The Hippocratic Oath (available at http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/hippooath.html)
and the following document of the World Medical Association: “World Medical Association
Resolution on Human Rights” (adopted by the Forty-second World Medical Assembly, Rancho
Mirage, California, U.S.A., October 1990, and amended by the Forty-fifth World Medical Assembly,
Budapest, Hungary, October 1993, the Forty-sixth General Assembly, Stockholm, Sweden, September
1994, the Forty-seventh General Assembly, Bali, Indonesia, September 1995).
“Having regard to the fact that:
1. The World Medical Association and its member associations have always sought to
advance the cause of human rights for all people, and have frequently taken actions
endeavoring to alleviate violations of human rights;
2. Members of the medical profession are often among the first to become aware of violations of human rights;
3. Medical Associations have an essential role to play in calling attention to such violations
in their countries.
The World Medical Association again calls upon its member associations:
1. To review the situation in their own countries so as to ensure that violations are not
concealed as a result of fear of reprisals from the responsible authorities, and to request
strict observance of civil and human rights when violations are discovered;
2. To provide clear, ethical advice to doctors working in the prison system;
3. To provide effective machinery for investigating unethical practices to physicians in the
field of human rights;
4. To use their best endeavors to ensure that adequate healthcare is available to all human
beings without distinction;
5. To protest alleged human rights violations through communications that urge the
humane treatment of prisoners, and that seek the immediate release of those who are
imprisoned without just cause; and
6. To support individual physicians who call attention to human rights violations in their
own countries.” http://www.wma.net/e/policy/20-2-90_e.html.
69. See the Code accepted in 1954 by the World Congress of the International Federation of
Journalists (IFJ), and amended in 1986: http://www.ifj.org/ifj/codee.html; and the Databank for
European Codes of Journalism Ethics: http://www.uta.fi/ethicnet.
70. See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/un/gc/unweb.nsf/content/thenine.htm.
71. Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
72. ICRC, ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols (Geneva: ICRC, 1987), p. 35, ¶ 39.
73. ICRC Commentary 3, p. 18 (Article 1). See Luigi Condorelli and Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, “Quelques remarques a propos de l’obligation des Etats de ‘respecter et faire respecter’
le droit international humanitaire ‘en toutes circonstances,’” in Studies and Essays on International
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles, ed. Christophe Swinarski (Geneva: ICRC, 1984), pp. 17–35;
and Umesh Palwankar, “Measures Available to States for Fulfilling Their Obligaiton to Ensure Respect
for International Humanitarian Law,” IRRC 298 (1994): 9–25.
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74. The 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as Additional Protocol 1, for the States Party to this
Protocol. See the ICRC Commentary on the Protocols, ad Article 1 of Protocol 1, pp. 35–38.
75. Article 7 (“Meetings”): “The depositary of this Protocol [Switzerland] shall convene a meeting of the High Contracting Parties, at the request of one or more of the said Parties and upon the
approval of the majority of the said Parties, to consider general problems concerning the application
of the Conventions and of the Protocol.” Such a meeting was convened by Switzerland on December
5, 2001 in Geneva (“Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention”).
76. ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 36, ¶ 43. See also Michel Veuthey, “Pour
une politique humanitaire,” in Swinarski, Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and
Red Cross Principles, pp. 989–1009.
77. Training is an obligation according to the Four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 47 of the
First Convention states the following: “The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in
time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective
countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programs of military and, if possible,
civil instruction, so that the principles thereof become known to the entire population, in particular
to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.” The Second Convention contains a similar provision (Article 48). Article 127 of the Third Convention ads the following paragraph:
“Any military or other authorities, who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of prisoners
of war, must possess the text of the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.” Article
144 ¶ 2 of the Fourth Convention reads as follows: “Any civilian, military, police or other authorities,
who in time of war assume responsibilities in respect of protected persons, must possess the text of
the Convention and be specially instructed as to its provisions.” Additional Protocol 1: (a) Reaffirms
the duty to disseminate (Article 83—Dissemination); and (b) Adds the obligation to ensure that legal
advisers are available (Article 82—Legal Advisers in armed forces). Additional Protocol 2, applicable
in non-international armed conflicts, simply states that “This Protocol shall be disseminated as widely
as possible” (Article 19—Dissemination).
78. Article 36 (“New Weapons”) of Protocol 1 reads as follows: “In the study, development,
acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon, means, or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party
is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances,
be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High
Contracting Party.”
79. The Four 1949 Conventions contain common provisions on the “Repression of Abuses and
Infractions:”
First Convention: Article 49–51
Second Convention: Article 50–52
Third Convention: Article 129–131
Fourth Convention: Article 146–148
Article 85 of Additional Protocol 1 reaffirms those provisions, adds a few acts to be considered as grave breaches (especially attacks against civilians and civilian objects), and classifies
grave breaches of the 1949 Conventions and Protocol 1 as war crimes.
See also Maria Teresa Dutli and Cristina Pellandini, “The International Committee of the Red
Cross and the Implementation of a System to Repress Breaches of International Humanitarian Law,”
IRRC 300 (May 1994): pp. 240-254.
80. See George A. B. Peirce, “Humanitarian Protection for the Victims of War: The System
of Protecting Powers and the Role of the ICRC,” Military Law Review 90 (1989): 89–162; and D. P.
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Forsythe, “Who Guards the Guardians? Third Parties and the Law of Armed Conflict,” American
Journal of International Law 70 (1976): 41–61.
81. H. Coulibaly, “Le role des puissances protectrices au regard du droit diplomatique, du droit
de Geneve et du droit de La Haye,” in Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, F. Kalshoven
and Y. Sandoz, eds. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), pp. 69078. C. Dominice and J. Patrnogic,
“Les protocoles additionnelles aux Conventions de Geneve et le systeme des puissances protectrices,” Annales de Droit International Medical 28 (1979): 24–50. J.-P. Knellwolf, “Die Schutzmacht im
Volkerrecht unter besonderer Brucksichtigung der schweizerischen Verhaltnisse” (Dissertation Bern,
Bern: Ackermanndruck, 1985). B. Laitenberger, “Die Schutzmacht,” German Yearbook of International
Law 21 (1978): 180–206.
82. It was used in Suez in 1956, in Goa in 1961, and between India and Pakistan in 1971. For a more
recent example, see the State Department Press Briefing, Thursday, April 1, 1998: “The United States
Government is contacting authorities in Belgrade through our Protecting Power, Sweden, in regard
to the illegal abduction of three American servicemen who were serving in non-combatant status in
Macedonia. There is no basis for their continued detention by the Belgrade authorities. We insist that
they be provided any necessary medical assistance and treated humanely and in accordance with all
prevailing international agreements and standards. We will hold Belgrade authorities responsible for
their safety and treatment.” http://www.aiipowmia.com/inter/in040299e.html.
83. Protocol 1, Article 2, Letter C.
84. Third Geneva Convention, Article 126.
85. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 143.
86. Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 59 and 61.
87. Third Geneva Convention, Article 123.
88. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 140.
89. First Geneva Convention, Article 23.
90. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 14.
91. Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 30.
92. Article 9 of Conventions 1, 2, and 3; Article 10 of the Fourth Convention.
93. Common Article 3 to the 1949 Conventions.
94. The Web site of the Commission: http://www.ihffc.org.
95. See Patrick Healy and Kimberly Prost, “International Criminal Law” McGill University
Faculty of Law: http://www.law.mcgill.ca/academics/coursenotes/healy/intcrimlaw, and the following links mentioned there: Nuremberg Trials, London, Agreement of August 8, 1945 (http://www
.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm); Charter of the International Military Tribunal (http://www
.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm); Judgment of the IMT for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm).
96. See the following links, quoted by Patrick Healy and Kimberly Prost, Jurisdiction of the
Yugoslavian and Rwandan Ad Hoc Tribunals, Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), May 25, 1993
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm); Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), November 8, 1994 (http://
www.un.org/Docs/sc.htm); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”), Articles 6, 8, 9 (http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm); Statue of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), Articles 5, 7, 8 (http://www.ictr.org); ICTY, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rules 7–13 (http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a
“Dule,” Appeals Chamber Decision on the Jurisdictional Motion, October 2, 1995, ss. 9–48, 9–64
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(http://www.un.org/icty/cases-ae2.htm); Substantive Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Statute of the
ICTY, Articles 2–5, 21 (http://www.un.org/icty/basic.htm); Statute of the ICTR, Articles 2–4, 20
(http://www.ictr.org) ; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Appeals Chamber, Joint separate opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ss. 32058, 66, 73–91; Separate and dissenting opinion of
Judge Cassese, ss. 11–12, 40–51 (http://www.un.org/icty/cases-ae2.htm); ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul
Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ss. 5.5 and 7 (http://www.ictr.org); Evidence, Procedure, and the
Ad Hoc Tribunals, ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 39–43, 54–61, 89–98 (http://www
.un.org/icty/basic.htm); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule,” Judgment on evidentiary matters (http://www.un.org/icty/cases-te.htm); Judgment on Corroboration in section V(c), Judgment
on Hearsay in section V0h), ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment on the request of The Republic of
Croatia for review of the decision of Trial Chamber 2 of July 18, 1997, ss. 25–60 (http://www.un.org/
icty/blaskic/ace14.htm).
97. See Jurisdiction of the ICC: Trigger Mechanisms and the Exercise of the Court’s Jurisdiction
(http://www.un.org/ic/backinfo.htm); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles
11–15, 17–18 (http://www.un.org/icc); Substantive Law and the ICC: Crimes within the Court’s Jurisdiction
(http://www.un.org/icc/backinfo.htm); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Articles
5-9, 21, 22-23, 55, 67, 69 (http://www.un.org/icc); Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court; Results of Working Groups on the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence; Most
recent laws (http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcomm/docs.htm).
98. ICRC, International Criminal Court: A Reality at Last (Geneva: ICRC, April 11, 2002).
99. See the Website of the CPT: http://www.cpt.coe.fr.
100. Elisabeth Kardos-Kaponyi, “The Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in the European
Union,” p. 139, mentions the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR),
the High Commissioner of National Minorities and the Representative on Freedom of the Media,
Document available online: http://www.lib.bke.hu/gt/2001-1-2/kardos-kaponyi.pdf.
101. Ibid., pp. 140–170.
102. The ICRC can offer its good offices to facilitate the establishment of hospital zones (according to Article 23 of the First 1949 Convention) and safety zones (Article 14, First Convention). Other
institutions or persons could offer their good offices. See B. G. Ramcharan, Humanitarian Good
Offices in International Law: The Good Offices of the United Natiosn Secretary-General in the Field of
Human Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983).
103. See Roy W. Gutman, “Spotlight on Violations of International Humanitarian Law. The Role
of the Media,” IRRC 325 (December 1998): 619–625; Urs Boegli, “A Few Thoughts on the Relationships
Between Humanitarian Agencies and the Media,” IRRC 325 (December 1998): 627–631, and, more
generally, Yael Danieli, ed., Sharing the Front Line and the Back Hills: International Protectors and
Providers—Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid Workers and the Media in the Midst of Crisis (Amityville,
N.Y.: Baywood, 2002).
104. See the open letters sent to public officials in Washington, D. C., and in Europe after
September 11, 2001, in order to promote the application of international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights guarantees. See also the open letter sent to the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) on May 8, 2002, denouncing the use of indiscriminate weapons (gas cylinder bombs) as contrary to international humanitarian law. A copy of the letter sent to
Commander Marulanda can be found at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/colombia0508.pdf.
105. See Rainer Hofmann and Nils Geissler, eds., “Non-State Actors as New Subjects of
International Law—From the Traditional State Order Toward the Law of the Global Community,”
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Proceedings of an International Symposium of the Kiel Walther-Schucking Institute of International
Law, March 25 to 28, 1998 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999); Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce
Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements
(Washington, D.C.: Rand, 2001).
106. See the “Guidelines for Engaging Non-State Actors in a Landmine-Ban,” at http://www
.icbl.org/wg/nsa/library/draft%20guidelines.html; Claude Bruderlein, “The Role of Non-State Actors
in Building Human Security: The Case of Armed Groups in Intra-State Wars,” Policy Paper for the
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, Switzerland (prepared for the Ministerial Meeting of
the Human Security Network in Lucerne), May 2000; http://www.hdcentre.org/NewsEvents/1999/
Policy%20paper.doc.
107. Safeguarding human rights is not only the concern of governments and international
organizations. Representatives of other international and local players, like human rights defenders,
drawn from civil society, have also felt committed to this issue for a long time. See “The ‘Human
Security Network’ Commitments,” at the Second Ministerial Meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, May
11-12, 2000. http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/commit-e.asp.
108. See the following Human Rights Watch appeals: “Israel/Palestinian Authority: Protect
Civilians, Allow Independent Reporting,” HRW Press Release, April 3, 2002, at http://hrw.org/
press/2002/04/isr-pa040302.htm; “Jenin: War Crimes Investigation Needed: HRW Press Release, May
3, 2002, at http://hrw.org/press/2002/05/jenin0503.htm.
109. See Daniel L. Smith-Christopher, ed., Subverting Hatred: The Challenge of Nonviolence in
Religious Traditions (New York: Orbis Books, 1998).
110. See http://www.santegidio.org/ and Andrea Riccardi, Sant’Egidio, Rome et le monde,
Beauchesne editeur (Paris, 1996); and Philippe Leymarie, “Les batisseurs de paix de Sant’Egidio,” Le
Monde Diplomatique (September 2000): 16–17.
111. See the Executive Summary of the Global Report at http://www.icrc.org/icrceng.nsf/5cacfdf
48ca698b641256242003b3295/be5298c00339e340c1256af4004efaf3?OpenDocument.
112. “Human rights is a complex idea with differing emphases even as between various Western
societies. Only with appropriate humility and self-doubt can true dialogue be encouraged.” Stephen
J. Toope, “Cultural Diversity and Human Rights” (F. R. Scott Lecture). http://collections.ic.gc.ca/
tags/cultural.html.
113. Paul Grossrieder, “Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences,” in ICRC, Seminar
for Nongovernmental Organizations on Humanitarian Standards and Cultural Differences. Summary
Report, ICRC & The Geneva Foundation to Protect Health in War, Geneva, December 14, 1998.
114. See Umesh Palwankar, “Measures Available to States for Fulfilling Their Obligation to
Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law,” IRRC 298 (1994): 9–25. http://www.icrc.org/
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList113/35289C31F0187A41C1256B6600591427.
115. Such as the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act, which forbids security assistance to any government
that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”
[22U.S.C. Secs 2034, 2151n].
116. Mary Griffin, “Ending the Impunity of Human Rights Atrocities: A Major Challenge for
International Law in the Twenty-first Century,” IRRC 838 (2000): 369–389.
117. Resolution 827.
118. Article 2 of the Statute.
119. Article 3.
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120. Article 4.
121. Article 5.
122. See Iain Guest (Overseas Development Council) on National Public Radio (“All Things
Considered”), Friday April 16, 1999. “The Hague Tribunal was established by the UN Security Council
in May 1993, ostensibly to deter war crimes, but the [Security] Council squabbled over funding and
even delayed appointing a prosecutor for a year” (on July 8, 1994, Resolution 936, appointing Richard
J. Goldstone).
123. See Patricia Grossman, “Bring Warlords to Justice,” International Herald Tribune, March
9–10, 2002, p. 10.
124. See the following recommendations by Amnesty International:
1. Ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and enact effective implementing legislation to cooperate fully with the Court.
2. Enact and use universal jurisdiction legislation for the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, torture, extrajudicial executions and “disappearance,” in order
that their national courts can investigate and, if there is sufficient admissible evidence,
prosecute anyone who enters its territory suspected of these crimes, regardless of where
the crime was committed or the nationality of the accused or the victim.
3. Enact legislation to ensure effective cooperation with the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and any other international criminal court created in the future.
125. International humanitarian law is one of the many legal, political, ethical instruments, in
today’s global disorder, to deal with our “genocidal mentality” and to “become healers, not killers,
of our species.” Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Markusen, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and
Nuclear Threat (New York: Basic Books, 1990), p. 279.
126. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,583028,00.html; Dr. Scilla Elworthy,
“Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century,” Tuesday, October 30, 2001; and Michel Veuthey,
“Remedies to Promote the Respect of Fundamental Human Values in Non-International Armed
Conflicts,” The Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights 30 (2001): 37–77.
127. The March 2002 issue of Democracy Issues, an electronic journal published by the United
States Department of State, is dedicated to human rights education. It includes some interesting contributions, including articles by Felisa Tibbitts (“Emerging Models for Human Rights Education”)
and Nancy Flowers (“Human Rights Education in U.S. Schools”); an interview with human rights
educators from South Africa (“Human Rights Education in Divers, Developing Nations: A Case in
Point—South Africa”); and an article on training for judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and the police
(“International Human Rights Training” by Michael Hartmann). The journal also features a short
bibliography and related Websites. The full text of the journal can be found at http://usinfo.state.gov/
journalsitdhr/0302/ijde/ijde0302.htm.
128. Including by campaigns for a universal ratification of human rights and international
humanitarian law treaties. See Hans-Peter Gasser, “Steps Taken to Encourage States to Accept the 1977
Protocols,” IRRC 258 (May 1987). Another example is the campaign conducted in February 2002 to
recommend to the U.S. Senate that it ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict; http://world.pylduck.com/02/0212.html
129. See the ICRC’s “Woza Africa! Music Goes to War.” This was the slogan adopted by six
popular African musicians who, responding to the ICRC’s call, led a campaign in 1997 to help curb the
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indiscriminate violence that has long plagued their continent. The musicians strove to reach people’s
hearts and minds through a series of original songs, which they performed live and recorded.
130. See “commitment to Global Peace,” The Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious
and Spiritual Leaders, New York, August 2000; http://global-forum.org/research/globalpeace.html.
131. See the educational programs of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
(http://www.icrc.org), Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, as well as by UNESCO (http://
www.unesco.org) and human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Internet,
and academic institutions such as the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo
(Italy) with courses on laws of war for military personnel, on refugee law, and on international
humanitarian law (http://www.iihl.org).
132. It is not only needed to stop the use of child soldiers (http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/
index.htm), but also to reintegrate them into society. See Mike Wessels, “Child Soldiers,” Bulletin
of Atomic Scientists (November–December 1997) (http://pangaea.org/street_children/africa/armies
.htm); and the Website of the Office of the SRSG for Children and Armed Conflict (http://www.undp
.org/erd/recovery/ddr/organizations/osrg.htm); and UNICEF, “Children at Both Ends of the Gun,”
http://www.unicef.org/graca/kidsoldi.htm.
133. See Amnesty International Handbook, 7th ed., available online, at http://www.amnestyvolunteer.org/aihandbook, especially chap. 4 (“Campaigning”) and chap. 5 (“AI Action—Advice and
Guidelines”); as well as the excellent Human Rights Education Handbook (University of Minnesota Human
Rights Resource Center, 2000), available online at http://www.hrusa.org/hrmaterials/hreduseries/
hrhandbook1/toc.html.
134. See Morton Winston, “NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility,”
Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 1 (spring 2002). According to Morton Winston, there is a basic
divide between NGOs:
a. Engagers try to draw corporations into dialogue in order to persuade them by means of
ethical and prudential arguments to adopt voluntary codes of conduct, while confronters believe that corporations will act only when their financial interests are threatened,
and therefore take a more adversarial stance toward them.
b. Confrontational NGOs tend to employ moral stigmatization, or “naming and shaming,”
as their primary tactic, while NGOs that favor engagement offer dialogue and limited
forms of cooperation with willing MNCs.
135. See William Hartung, “The New Business of War: Small Arms and the Business of Conflict,”
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405

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 405

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 38–50

136. See Anna Segall, “Economic Sanctions: Legal and Policy Constraints,” IRRC 81, no. 836
(December 1999): pp. 763-784; and Claude Bruderlein, “UN Sanctions Can Be More Humane
and Better Targeted,” Public Affairs Report (University of California, Berkeley) 41, no. 1 (January
2000) http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/publications/par/Jan2000/Bruderlein.html; Arthur C. Helton
and Robert P. DeVecchi, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and Sanctions,” http://www
.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/issuebriefs/IBHumanRights.html; and H. C. Graf Sponeck, “Sanctions
and Humanitarian Exemptions: A Practitioner’s Commentary,” European Journal of International
Law 13, no. 1 (2002): 81–87. Full text available at http://www3.oup.co.uk/ejilaw/current/130081.sgm
.abs.html.
137. See Michel Veuthey, “The Contribution of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to International
Security,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1999): 22–26.
138. See Antonia Cassese, “The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?” EJIL 11, no. 1
(2000): 187–216; Theodor Meron, “The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience,” AJIL 94, no. 2 (2000): 78–89; Shigeki Miyazaki, “The Martens Clause and International
Humanitarian Law,” in Etudes et essais sur le droit international humanitaire et sur les principes de la
Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de Jean Pictet, ed. C. Swinarski (Geneva: ICRC, 1984), pp. 433–444.

Nicola Smith and Larry Hollingworth, Humanitarian Vignettes
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., Technology for Humanitarian Action (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2005), 40 and 138.

Valerie Amos, Humanitarian Response in the Era of Global Mobile
Information Technology
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., More with Less: Disasters in an Era of
Diminishing Resources (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 110–122.
1. A video of the creation of this volunteer map is viewable at http://vimeo.com/9182869.
2. See (SBTF team member) Patrick Meier, “The [unexpected] Impact of the Libya Crisis Map
and the Standby Volunteer Task Force.” Available at http://blog.standbytaskforce.com/sbtf-libyaimpact.
3. One of several accounts of the intervention can be found on the SBTF website: http://blog
.standbytaskforce.com/unhcr-somalia-latest-results.
4. Internews, Dadaab, Kenya: Humanitarian Communications and Information Needs Assessment
among Refugees in the Camps (Washington, D.C.: Internews, 2011). Available at http://www.internews
.org/sites/default/files/resources/Dadaab2011-09-14.pdf.
5. Statement by WFP.
6. Linus Bengtsson, Xin Lu, Richard Garfield, Anna Thorson, and Johan von Schreeb, Internal
Population Displacement in Haiti: Preliminary Analyses of Movement Patterns of Digicel Mobile Phones:
1 January to 11 March 2010 (Karolinska Institute and Columbia University). Available at http://haiti
.humanitarianresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZPH8pFFkMnU%3D&tabid=149&mid=1045.

406

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 406

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 52–70

7. See, for example, Concern Worldwide, Oxford Policy Management, and the Partnership for
Research in International Affairs and Development, New Technologies in Cash Transfer Programming
and Humanitarian Assistance (Oxford: Cash Learning Partnership, 2011), 57.

Alain Destexhe, M.D., Neutrality or Impartiality
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Preventative Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before
They Start (New York: Routledge, 2000), 101–117.
1. H. Dunant, Un souvenir de Solferino (Geneva, 1862).
2. A. Destexhe, L’humanitaire impossible ou deux siècles d’ambiguité (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993).
3. J. C. Favez, Une mission impossible? Le CICR, les deportations et les camps de concentration
Nazis (Lausanne: Editions Payot, 1988).
4. J. de Saint Jorre, The Nigerian Civil War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1972).
5. A. Destexhe, “Why Famine?” in Populations in Danger, ed. F. Jean and A. M. Huby (London:
John Libbey/Médecins Sans Frontières, 1992).
6. R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1994).
7. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
approved December 9, 1948, in effect since January 12, 1951.
8. A. Destexhe, “The Third Genocide,” Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994–95); A. Destexhe, Rwanda
and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1995).
9. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
10. William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984).
11. On several occasions, Bosnia’s leaders made it known that if they were given the choice between
humanitarian aid and arms (or the lifting of the arms embargo), they would prefer the latter option.

Timothy W. Harding, M.D., Torture
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 191–211.
1. J. Swain, A History of Torture (London: Tandem Books, 1986).
2. E. Peters, Torture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
3. D. Forrest. ed., A Glimpse of Hell (London: Amnesty International/Cassel, 1996).
4. S. Milgram, “Behavioural Study of Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 67
(1963): 277–285.
5. Y. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II (Boulder, Colo.: Westview,
1996).
6. K. Farrington, History of Punishment and Torture (London: Hamlyn, 2000). See also M.
Kerrigan, The Instruments of Torture (Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 2001).

407

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 407

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 71–88

7. For the relationship between the terms “torture” and “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,” see chapter 3 of N. Rodley, The Treatment of Prisoners Under International Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987).
8. P. Tavernier, “Article 15” in L-E. Petititi, E. Decaux, and P-H. Imbert, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: Commentaire article par article (Paris: Economica, 1995).
9. Human Rights Watch, Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Enforced
Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011 (New York: Human Rights Watch,
2012).
10. Rita Maran, Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War (New York: Praeger,
1989).
11. International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment by Coalition Forces
of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq during Arrest,
Internment and Interrogation (Geneva: ICRC, 2004).
12. Neil A. Lewis, “Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantanamo,” New York Times,
November 30, 2004.
13. The full judgment can be found at http://www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
14. Editorial, “Doctors and Torture,” British Medical Journal 319 (1999): 397–398.
15. British Medical Association, Torture Report (London: Tavistock, 1986).
16. British Medical Association, Medicine Betrayed: The Participation of Doctors in Human Rights
Abuses (London: Zed Books, 1992).
17. R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: The Psychology of Medical Killing (London: Papermac, 1986;
new edition available from Basic Books with the modified title The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and
the Psychology of Genocide, 2000).
18. E. Staub, “The Psychology and Culture of Torture and Torturers,” in Psychology and Torture,
ed. P. Suedfeld (New York: Hemisphere, 1990).

Judy A. Benjamin, Issues of Power and Gender in Complex Emergencies
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Emergency Relief Operations (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2003), 153–179.
1. UNHCR report, On Sexual Violence and Exploitation in West Africa, Note for Implementing
and Operational Partners by UNHCR and Save the Children U.K., April 26, 2002.
2. Caroline Moser, Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and Training (New York:
Routledge, 1993).
3. In this chapter the terms “refugee women” and “displaced women” are for the most part
interchangeable.
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), General Assembly, A/RES/17 A (III),
December 10, 1948.
5. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), A/RES/34/180, December 18, 1979.
6. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (Torture Convention), General Assembly, A/RES/39/46, December 10, 1984.

408

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 408

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 97–124

Larry Hollingworth, Terrorism: Theory and Reality
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 226–241.
1. Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Longman, et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988).
2. Noam Chomsky, “International Terrorism: Image and Reality,” in Western State Terrorism,
ed. Alexander George (New York: Routledge, 1991).
3. U.S. State Department, Annual Review of Global Terrorism 2002.
4. Igor Primoratz, “State Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Center for Applied Philosophy and
Public Ethics, University of Melbourne.
5. Rakesh Gupta, “Changing Conceptions of Terrorism,” JNU: http://www.idsa-India.org.
6. Primoratz, “State Terrorism and Counterterrorism.”
7. Jacques Ellul, Violence (London: Mowbrays, 1978).
8. Ibid., 56.
9. Chomsky, “International Terrorism.”
10. Extracts from Rudolph Peters, Jihad (Lanham, Md.: Marcus Weiner, 2005).
11. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “The Threat of Global State Terrorism: Retail versus
Wholesale Terror,” Z Magazine (January 2002).
12. William Blum, Killing Hope (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1999).
13. William Blum, Rogue State (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 2000).
14. “Lethal Hypocrisy—John Pilger on State Terrorism,” John Pilger Pacific Media Watch, 2002.
15. Primoratz, “State Terrorism and Counterterrorism.”
16. Irving Kristol, “Where Have All the Gunboats Gone?” Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1973.
17. Lev Grinberg, “State Terrorism in Israel?” Tikkun (May–June 2002).
18. Chomsky, “International Terrorism.”
19. “Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority Territories.
Jenin: IDF Military Operations,” Human Rights Watch 20, no. 10 (May 2002): 10.
20. Grinberg, “State Terrorism in Israel?”
21. “Israel and the Occupied Territories,” Amnesty International (November 2002).

Irene Khan, A Human Rights Agenda for Global Security
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Human Security for All (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2004), 15–27.

Francis Deng, The Limits of Sovereignty
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Preventative Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before
They Start (New York: Routledge, 2000), 119–142.

409

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 409

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 124–29

1. The working definition of the internally displaced used by the 1992 analytical report of the
UN Secretary-General considers them “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly
or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of
human rights or natural or man-made disasters; and who are within the territory of their own country” (Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, E/CN.4/1992/23(1992),
pp. 4–5). IDP figure cited in 1999 GA report at par. 1. Refugee figure (actual figure is 11, 491, 710) cited
in UNHCR’s Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR-Statistical Overview (Table 1.4, “Indicative
number of Refugees, 1989–1998”).
2. Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata to the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June
15, 1993), 3.
3. UNHCR, The State of the Word’s Refugees: In Search of Solutions (London: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 8–10.
4. Ogata, Statement to the World Conference on Human Rights, 3.
5. M. Toole, Centers for Disease Control, Department of Health and Human Services, testimony before the U.S. Senate, April 3, 1990, as quoted in Refugee Policy Group, “Internally Displaced
Women and Children in Africa” (1992).
6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
A/50/60; S/1995/1, 3.
7. Ibid., 5. Evidently, because there are no reliable statistics, estimates for both refugees and
internally displaced vary considerably.
8. L. Minear and T. Weiss, Humanitarian Politics (Washington D.C.: Foreign Policy Association,
1994).
9. Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata on the occasion of accepting the Human Rights Award from
the international Human Rights Law Group, Washington, D.C., June 8, 1994.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. B. Boutros-Ghali, Report of the Secretary-General, par. 27, pp. 7–8.
13. H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of
Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990); G. M. Lyons and M.
Matastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 6; and T. G.
Weiss and J. Chopra, “Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention,”
Ethics and International Affairs 6 (1992): 95.
14. J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. Robert Campbell, 1885, 225–226. Extracts reproduced in D. Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence (London: Stevens and Sons, 1959), 134–37; and W. M.
Reisman and A. M. Schreiber, Jurisprudence: Understanding and Shaping Law (New Haven, Conn.:
Yale University Press, 1987), 270–280. See also W. Friedmann, Legal Theory, 4th ed. (London: Stevens
and Sons, 1960), 211–13.
15. Friedmann, Legal Theory, 211.
16. L. L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart,” Harvard Law Review
71 (1958): 634; see also H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law
Review 72 (1958): 593–629.
17. Weiss and Chopra, “Sovereignty,” 103. See also F. H. Hinley, Sovereignty, 2d ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986).

410

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 410

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 130–35

18. W. M. Reisman, “Through or Despite Governments: Differentiated Responsibilities of
Human Rights Programs,” Iowa Law Review 72, no. 2 (January 1987): 391–399.
19. Richard B. Lillich, “Sovereignty and Humanity: Can They Converge?” in The Spirit of
Uppsala 406–407, ed. A. Grahl-Madsen and J. Toman (Hawthorne, N.Y.: De Gruyter, 1984). Quoted
in Lewis Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials, 3rd ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1993), 19.
20. Lyons and Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia, 6.
21. W. M. Reisman, “Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies,” Fordham
International Law Journal 18, no. 3 (1988): 794–805, 795. See also W. M. Reisman, “Coercion and SelfDetermination: Construing Charter Article 2(4),” American Journal of International Law 624 (1984):
78; and “Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law,” American Journal of
International Law 866 (1990): 84.
22. W. M. Reisman, “Haiti and the Validity of International Action,” American Society of
International Law 899, no.1 (January 1995): 82–84, 83.
23. UN press release SG/SM/4560, April 24, 1991. Cited in Lyons and Mastanduno, Beyond
Westphalia, 2. Portions of the statement also cited in David J. Scheffer, “Toward a Modern Doctrine
of Humanitarian Intervention,” 23 University of Toledo Law Review 253 (1992): 262.
24. J. Perez de Cuellar, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization (1991),
12, 13.
25. Ibid.
26. B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, June 17, 1992, UN Document A/47277-S/2411, p.5.
27. B. Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/93):
91–101, 99.
28. Scheffer, “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention,” 262–263.
29. Council of Ministers, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for an
OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, CM/1710 (L. VI) Addis Ababa: Organization
of African Unity, 1992).
30. Ibid.
31. United Nations, Note by the President of the Security Council, S/25344 (February 26, 1993).
32. United Nations, Analytical Report of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons,
E/CN.4.1992/23.
33. See R. Cohen and J. Cuenod, “Improving Institutional Arrangements for the Internally
Displaced,” Brookings Institution/ Refugee Policy Group Project on Internal Displacement, October
1995.
34. Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the
52nd Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, March 20, 1996, p.5.
See Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Internally Displaced
Persons: Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, E/CN.4/1995/50
(New York: United Nations, 1995); and Chris J. Bakwesegha, “The Role of Organization of
African Unity in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,” paper prepared for the
Organization of African Unity/United Nation High Displacement in Africa, Addis Ababa,
September 1994.
Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the
52nd Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, March 20, 1996, p. 5.

411

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 411

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 140–57

Alec Wargo, The Child Protection Viewpoint
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, ed., Even in Chaos: Education in Times of Emergency
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 26–43.
1. For the purposes of this chapter, “education” is defined as the individual persons that make
up an education system who can feasibly be engaged in protection activities, including but not limited
to administrators, teachers, parent-teacher associations, and, with safeguards, children themselves.
2. Under Security Council Resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009), grave rights violations during armed conflict include recruitment or use of children by armed forces or groups, killing and
maiming of children, sexual violence perpetrated against children, attacks on schools and hospitals,
abduction of children and denial of humanitarian access for children. Of course, these are not exhaustive, but they are often indicative of a wider range of abuse suffered by children during wartime.
3. The UN-accepted definition of a child soldier is any child, girl or boy, recruited or used by an
armed force or group in any capacity including, but not limited to, combatants, sexual slaves, porters,
cooks, spies, and the like.
4. It is the viewpoint of the United Nations that children under legal age of recruitment are,
by their very minority, unable to make a mature choice on what harm may befall them if they are
recruited and used in armed conflict.

Peter Hansen, Preserving Humanitarian Space in Long-Term Conflict
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., Human Security for All (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2004), 147–164.
1. D. Warner, “The Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide,” International Review of the
Red Cross 833 (March 31, 1999): 109–118.
2. A. Donini, “The Future of Humanitarian Action: Implications of Iraq and Other Recent
Crises—Issues Note (workshop organized by the Feinstein International Famine Center and the
Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University, Boston, October 9, 2003), 3.
3. Warner, “Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide.”
4. “Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization” (annual report,
United Nations, New York City, 1995), http://www.un.org/docs/sg/sg-rpt.
5. B. Megevand Roggo, “After the Kosovo Conflict, a Genuine Humanitarian Space: A Utopian
Concept or an Essential Requirement?” International Review of the Red Cross 837 (March 31, 2000):
31–47.
6. Warner, “Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide.”
7. C. Eguizabal et al., “Humanitarian Challenges in Central America: Learning the Lessons of
Recent Armed Conflicts” (Occasional Paper, no. 14, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International
Studies, Brown University, 1993), 17.
8. Australian Council for Overseas Aid, “Guiding Principles for Civil Military Action,” http://
www.acfoa.asn.au/emergencies/cimic_interaction.htm.
9. International humanitarian law regulates the conduct of armed conflict between states and
nonstate actors. Many of its principles exist in customary international law. In conventional form, this

412

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 412

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 157–60

body of law is best exemplified by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the fourth of which concerns the
protection of civilian persons in time of war. Examples of how the concept of humanitarian space is
incorporated into the Fourth Geneva Convention abound, and include, inter alia, the designation of
civilians as “protected persons” (Article 4); the establishment of “hospital and safety zones” (Article
14) as well as “neutral zones” (Article 15); the protection of the “wounded and sick, as well as the
infirm, and expectant mothers” (Article 15); the protection of “hospital staff” (Article 20); protection of medical convoys (Articles 21–22) and free passage of “medical supplies, food and clothing”
(Articles 23 and 55); protection of children (Articles 24 and 50); protection against “collective penalties” (Article 33); protection of real and personal property (Article 53); and protection against “willful
killing,” “torture or inhumane treatment,” “unlawful deportation or transfer,” “unfair trials,” “taking
of hostages,” and “extensive destruction and appropriation of property” (Article 147).
See United Nations, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force
October 21, 1950); United Nations, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force October 21, 1950); United Nations, Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force
October 21, 1950); United Nations, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force October 21, 1950).
10. T. G. Weiss, “Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action,” Ethics and International Affairs
13 (December 4, 1999): 1. Humanitarianism and War Project, Tufts University, http://hwproject.tufts
.edu/publications/electronic/e_ppaha.html.
11. A. Donini, “The Future of Humanitarian Action.”
12. Ibid., 11.
13. Ibid.
14. Megevand Roggo, “After the Kosovo Conflict, a Genuine Humanitarian Space.”
15. Warner, “Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide.”
16. For instance, in April 2003 Israeli troops took over UNRWA’s Tulkarem Girls School for use
over several days as a mass detention center for male residents of the Tulkarem refugee camp. Likewise,
in September 2002 an armed Israeli special unit made an incursion into UNRWA’s Qalqilya hospital,
where it threatened staff and patients at gunpoint, beat five members of the hospital staff, including
a female administrator and health official who had arrived at the scene to treat the wounded, and
then arrested three other UNRWA staff members. Likewise, on May 23, 2003, Palestinian militants
purporting to be members of the Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades broke into the Balata Camp Boys School
and held a memorial ceremony attended by thousands of people, where political speeches were given
and weapons were fired into the air.
17. Warner, “Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide.”
18. Ibid.
19. Weiss, “Principles, Politics and Humanitarian Action,” 12–13.
20. M. Anderson, “Reflecting on the Practice of Outside Assistance: Can We Know What Good
We Do?” (handbook, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin, April 2001). See also M.
Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
21. See Anderson, “Reflecting on the Practice of Outside Assistance.”
22. Ibid.

413

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 413

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 161–221

23. Michael Meyer, “Neutrality as a Fundamental Principle of the Red Cross,” International
Review of the Red Cross 315 (December 31, 1996): 627–630.
24. Ibid.
25. Anderson, “Reflecting on the Practice of Outside Assistance.”
26. Ibid.
27. Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that “in the event of a conflict between the obligations
under any other international agreement, the obligations of the present Charter shall prevail.” Articles
104 and 105 of the UN Charter provide the general concepts of privileges and immunities of the United
Nations upon which the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations is
based, to which the State of Israel is a party.
28. Lincoln Chen, M.D., “Expanding Humanitarian Space: Challenge for Global Philanthropy”
(paper, Humanitarian Interventions Today: New Issues, New Ideas, New Players conference sponsored
by the Conrad Hilton Foundation, New York City, September 24, 2003, http://www.bettersaferworld
.org/issues/lincoln_chen_article.
29. Ibid.

David Rieff, Humanitarian Action in a New Barbarian Age
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Human Security for All (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2004), 52–59.
1. Raymond Aron, Thinking Politically: A Liberal in an Age of Ideology (New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction Publishers, 1997).

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the
United Nations and Its Secretary-General
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before
They Start (New York: Routledge, 2000), 189–204.
1. Johan Galtung and Daisaku Ikeda, Choose Peace: A Dialogue between Johan Galtung and
Daisaku Ikeda (London: Pluto Press, 1995).
2. B. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, June 17, 1992, UN Document A/47277-S/24111.

Ed Tsui, Initial Response to Complex Emergencies and Natural Disasters
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Emergency Relief Operations (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2003), 32–54.

Kofi A. Annan, The Peacekeeping Prescription
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before
They Start (New York: Routledge, 2000), 175–185.

414

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 414

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 222–26

Richard Falk, Reviving Global Civil Society After September 11
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., Traditions, Values, and Humanitarian Action
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York: Palgrave Macmillan, 200), 325–335.
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1. For North America see the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) website (http://www.accessabc
.com) and the related ABC sites for other countries.
2. Pliny’s account of the disaster makes clear warning signs that Vesuvius was about to erupt
were ignored, and no help came. See Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “Pompeii: Portents of Disaster,” BBC
.co.uk, last modified March 29, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk /history/ancient/romans/
Pompeii_portents 01.shtml.
3. News of the assassination in 1865 took its time to reach the rest of the world—a steamship
voyage across the Atlantic. The laying of the first transatlantic cable and subsequent global network
made information flow almost instantaneous.
4. See http://www.parliament.uk.
5. See “Issue Brief: Ethiopian Famine 25th Anniversary,” One.org, available at http://one.org/c/
us/issuebrief /3127/.
6. See the Museum of Broadcast Communications (http://www.museum.tv), an archive of TV
footage that features news of Vietnam War.
7. The video won the George Polk award for videography in 2009. See Robert McFadden,
“Times Reporter Held by Taliban Is among Polk Award Winners,” New York Times, February 16, 2010.
8. Between August 6 and 10, 2011, several districts of London and provincial cities were hit by
riots involving looting and arson, with the police seemingly unable or unwilling to intervene.
9. Copies of the video can be found on the web, but their distribution was condemned at the time.
10. Reporters without Borders (http://www.rsf.org) said sixty -seven journalists were killed in
2011 alone. See “2011: 67 Journalists Killed,” Reporters without Borders, available at http://en.rsf.org/
press-freedom-barometer-journalists-killed.html?annee=2011.
11. See http://www.rt.com and others.
12. “Television? The word is half Greek and half Latin. No good can come of it.” Attributed to
Scott by various sources, in slightly different forms.
13. Scottish Television’s Roy Thomson, quoted by http://www.news.bbc.co.uk, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/1229805.stm.
14. In a Mozambique community where I have worked on a tiny community support scheme,
we sent a messenger on foot for several hours to deliver a phone SIM card to a village chief so he could
discuss the next stage in building classrooms. See http://www.mandawilderness.org.
15. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/katine.
16. Conversation with the author, 2011.
17. Newspaper Death Watch (newspaperdeathwatch.com) listed fourteen U.S. metropolitan
dailies that had closed by early 2012, including the Rocky Mountain News and the Albuquerque Tribune.
18. See report on online versus traditional advertising on readwriteweb.com.
19. See the Huffington Post (http://www.huffingtonpost.com) and others. The fact that more
than 70 million people watched a thirty- minute video produced by the hitherto little-known charity
Invisible Children provoked controversy, though it was unclear whether it would help or hinder the
search for the leader of a ruthless band of killers operating in Central Africa.

417

CH33_Notes_2012_016_FUP_Cahill_p393-428.indd 417

2/15/13 11:44 PM

NOTES TO PAGES 259–70
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21. When I asked the Information Minister of Ethiopia why he never seemed to have any information to impart, he replied with a smirk that it was his job to collect information, not to hand it out
to the likes of me.
22. I asked a government spokesman for an update on a bird flu outbreak: “Eighty percent of
the poultry tested was unaffected,” he said loftily. “So 20 percent had bird flu?” I said. “That is not an
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23. Bolton speaking on February 3, 1994. See “John Bolton in His Own Words: Bush’s UN
Ambassador Nominee Condemns United Nations,” Democracy Now, last modified March 31, 2005,
available at http://www.democracynow.org/2005/3/31/john bolton_in his own words.
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27. See http://www.wfp.com/molly.
28. The fashion chain Benetton courted further controversy when it showed images of such
mutilations in a series of advertisements.
29. Journalists at a MediaTrain conference in Khartoum readily agreed that naming and showing the faces of child soldiers involved in a Justice and Equality Movement rebel attack could lead to
reprisals against them and their families by both sides in the conflict.
30. One supposedly genuine NGO in East Africa repeatedly sends invitations to conferences
that do not exist, working a scam that echoes the infamous e-mails from alleged Nigerians offering
million-dollar payouts in return for bank account details.
31. See conservapedia.com/climategate.
32. The huge unused stocks of Tamiflu in some countries that were built up in response to the
bird and swine flu scares are testimony to how that reaction can itself be excessive.
33. See Steven Ross, Toward New Understandings: Journalists and Humanitarian Relief Coverages
(San Francisco: Fritz Institute, 2004). Available at http://www.fritzinstitute.org/PDFs/Case-Studies/
Media studyexcSum.pdf.
34. See the Governance and Social Development Resource Center (http://www.gsdrc.org).
35. See “Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi Makes Landmark Campaign Speech,” BBC.co.uk, last modified March 14, 2012, available at http://bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17363329.
36. See “Schindler’s Factory in Krakow,” Krakow-Info, available at http://www.krakow-info
.com/schindler.htm.

Christopher Holshek, Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination: Looking Beyond the
“Latest and Greatest”
Originally published in Kevin M. Cahill, M.D., ed., The Pulse of Humanitarian Assistance (New
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1. From an informal paper provided at the start of “Humanitarian Roles in Insecure
Environments: A Strategic Workshop,” U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., January 13–14, 2005.
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for Development Cooperation and the Military,” Sicherheit und Frieden, 2/2012, 72; http://www
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13. Christopher J. Holshek, “Interdisciplinary Peace Operations Professional Development:
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and Peace Building, ed. Alexander Edward Richard Woodcock and David F. Davis (Cornwallis Park,
Nova Scotia: Pearson Peacekeeping Center, 2003), 53.
14. Robert M. Schoenhaus, “Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations,”
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